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FOREWORD 
This book represents the highlight of a career of scholarship by its 
author and a most significant contribution to the literature, which 
will bring to those who seek it an understanding of the role law plays 
in Soviet Russia. More important, it will bring that understanding 
in a comparative context which sharpens the impact and compels a 
careful analysis of the social function legal institutions perform in 
both systems. Though Soviet jurists may deny the validity of com­
parative methodology as applied to the Soviet legal order, the analysis 
which is here presented proves not only that comparisons are possible 
but also that they can be most illuminating. 
In some respects it is a grim story which unfolds in this per­
ceptive work. The Western mind is not unfamiliar with governmental 
efforts to shape human conduct through the creation or manipulation 
of legal institutions. We are not unmindful that the monopoly of force 
reserved to government can be turned, through the imposition of 
penal sanctions, to deter human conduct which would otherwise 
emerge as a result of other social pressures. But the Western mind 
will find the chapter on Homo Sovieticus extremely disquieting as the 
author traces the means by which and the extent to which the com­
pulsive force of law is directed toward reshaping the ideas, the atti­
tudes, the minds of the Soviet citizens. To read, from the Judicature 
Act of 1933, that courts of law "shall educate the citizens of the 
USSR in the spirit of devotion to the country and the cause of social­
ism ... " cannot but evoke in the Western mind a response of shock, 
when one recalls the power of the court to enforce its dictates. To 
watch the concept of "public official" being expanded through legal 
viii Foreword 
manipulation to include practically an entire population, while simul­
taneously observing that the state is imposing a stringent liability 
upon public officials who deviate from current political or economic 
views, will not be restful. To learn that libel suits have disappeared 
from the dockets of socialist courts because the press now represents 
functionally the best way to attack problem spots in the social and 
economic life and must not be impeded by individual interests from 
pursuing social action, will not appeal to those who champion free­
dom of the press. 
But this book is not written to shock the reader. It is written 
to bring him enlightenment concerning the realities of legal order in 
Russia. Not many persons could write it. To do so requires a deep 
understanding of several legal systems, a capacity to translate the 
verbal doctrine into terms of social function, and an ability to perceive 
those points of comparison which will permit the reader to understand 
the human meaning of legal institutions. The distinguished author, Dr. 
Kazimierz Grzybowski, has all these qualifications and he has brought 
them to bear in full measure to produce this volume. 
We at the Michigan Law School were privileged to assist the late 
Vladimir Gsovski in publishing, in 1948, his vitally important work 
on the Soviet Civil Code. We are proud to have assisted also in mak­
ing possible this current exposition of the Soviet legal order which 
should stand as a monument to the values of scholarly research. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
May, 1962 
Allan F. Smith 
Dean, University of Michigan Law School 
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Chapter 1 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
PARALLELS AND ANALOGIES 
The present social and economic order of the Soviet Union, with 
its emphasis upon industrial economy and the urban mode of life, is 
only a phase of that general process of change which has produced 
modem industrial society. The principal instrument of change oc­
curred in the mastering of the new technological processes and in the 
application of modem science to the satisfaction of social needs. In 
the Soviet Union, as well as in the Western societies where the process 
of change originally started, industrial and social revolutions made it 
necessary to redefine certain basic legal concepts, with the result of a 
veritable jural revolution. In the Soviet Union, no less than in the 
West, the role of the state and the concept of public order have been 
reformulated as the control and management of the national economy 
became the central problem of public concern. Thus, in new social 
conditions the concept of public function has acquired a new meaning. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to lay ground for a sys­
tematic examination of Soviet reality in terms of the social functions 
of Soviet legal institutions. Soviet jurists, preoccupied with the political 
aspects of their legal order, reject the idea of the comparative method 
regarding the Soviet legal order. In spite of the formal similarities be­
tween socialist and capitalist legal institutions, Soviet professors al­
leged that the different political content precludes analogy between 
socialist and capitalist law, for: 
Terms of bourgeois legislation are found in separate articles of Soviet 
statutes and in the statutes in their entirety. That, however, is not the 
point. The heart of the matter is that Soviet character of . . .  the law is ex­
pressed in its political character . . in its socialist content.1 
1 Yudin, "Socialism and Law," in Soviet Legal Philosophy 294 (1951). 
2 Soviet Legal Institutions 
Admittedly, the political motivation behjnd a legal rule is an 
important element in the determination of its purpose and of its func­
tion. It is equally true, however, that governmental policies do not 
account for all aspects of the social function of the enacted rules of 
law. Legal institutions live their lives and are inspired by their own 
policies. And these are broader than the actual policies of the regime. 
In order to obviate overemphasis on the political aspects of social 
ordering in the Soviet polity, the present inquiry is less concerned 
with the general theories of the function of the Soviet legal system 
than with the social role of the institutions of Soviet law, including 
all aspects of their influence on the course of human affairs. 
In order to provide a general framework. for the comparative 
treatment of the institutions of Soviet law, the reader's attention is 
drawn to some of the main features of the modem legal systems in 
Western Europe. New social conditions tend to emphasize the role 
of public law. The final result has been the creation of a new branch 
of legal regulation, administrative law, while private law has declined 
as a regulator of basic social functions. New avenues are thus opened 
for action by the public authority in the promotion of the interests of 
the polity and of the social welfare. The shape and systematic ar­
rangement of the rule of law have been seriously affected by the in­
creased flow of legal regulations. Finally, the expansion of administra­
tive action has called for the redefinition of the tasks and scope of 
judicial control. 
In the field of legal theory, two trends of jurisprudence have 
been outlined as important for the understanding of Soviet legal 
ideas; though never fully acknowledged by Soviet jurists, they reflect 
the evolution of ideas which resulted from the social changes of the 
nineteenth century. The positivistic school, in linking legal order 
with the institution of the state, sees in the latter the most important 
element in the preservation of social order. The sociological school, 
emphasizing the role of the social milieu, on the other hand, relegates 
the state to a less important place. 
The central idea inspiring the policies of social reform in the 
Soviet Union is the theory of the progress of human society toward 
higher forms of social organization as it was formulated by Karl 
Marx. This theory was conceived as a process of social evolution 
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under the impact of the changing, ever more efficient and more col­
lective production techniques. Soviet policy has supported the action 
of social agents by the action of the state in enforcing Soviet law. 
Thus, a new legislative technique has been evolvt:d. Aiming at the 
achievement of social reform through the enforcement of the rule 
of law, it is an idea not only non-Marxian, but in addition, has been 
borrowed from the sociological ideas of the West. 
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 
After a period of initial doubt as to the place of legal regulation 
in the socialist society, Soviet leadership determined to accord it a 
role in tht: realization of the aims of the Soviet state. The law, it 
was concluded, offered a useful mechanism for coordinating the ac­
tivities of social orgabizations, for reorganizing economic life, and 
for instilling new ideas on the purpose of social action in the minds 
of the people. In the words of Vyshinskii, who was called on to per­
form the act of faith in the name of the Soviet legal profession, the 
state and the law serve to "eradicate completely and finally the rem­
nants of capitalism in the economic system, to develop the class 
conscience of the people and to create the Communist society." 2 
A Soviet jurist, writing in the post-World War II period for the 
benefit of his less experienced Polish brethren, stated that: 
Socialist legality . .. is defined by the policy of the Soviet state. . . . The 
policy of industrialization, of collectivization, required a number of 
legal measures, which ensured historical achievements of socialist con­
struction in the USSR. Stalin's five-year plans are laws strictly executed. 
. . . Here the correlation between politics, legal regulations and socialist 
legality is direct and immediate. 
Thus, the idea of planned progress toward higher forms of so­
cial and economic organization provides the ethos for the legislative 
embodiments of Soviet policy. In addition, it constitutes the founda­
tion for the Soviet claim that socialist law is a higher type of law. As 
the Soviet scholar continued: 
At the present time, countries of people's democracy having liquidated 
the capitalist order, are achieving in the development of their new law, 
2 Vyshinskii, Materialy pervoi konferentsii nauchnykh rabotnikov prava, 
May 16-19, 1938, at 183 (1938). 
4 Soviet Legal Institutions 
not the reception of Roman law patterns, but of the highest type of law: 
socialist law.s 
In spite of its simplicity, however, the idea of irresistible progress 
toward better forms of social organization, when viewed in the con­
text of the basic assumptions of Marxist world outlook, presented a 
number of practical difficulties in the promulgation of concrete legal 
rules. While there was no doubt in the minds of Soviet leaders that 
transforming the backward economy of Russia required imitation of 
Western industrial techniques, it was far less certain in which direc­
tion to seek the models for reforming the antiquated laws of the 
country. Since Marxist theory dictated that progress be conceived as 
a dialectical process, in which higher forms of production were re­
flected in new social relations, the new laws could not be borrowed 
nor imitated outright from the bourgeois experience or patterns.• 
And yet, repeal of prerevolutionary laws did not mean renuncia­
tion of the basic convictions of Russian jurists who, though siding 
with the Revolution, nevertheless sought to correlate their own revo­
lutionary convictions and work for the new order with the teachings 
of progressive jurists of the bourgeois world. A decade after the out­
break of the October Revolution, a Soviet jurist reporting on trends 
in legal science in the Soviet Union acknowledged that Soviet legal 
scholars still adhered to the main current of European jurisprudence. 11 
It is not surprising then that a great many ideas and formulations of 
modem European scholars have been incorporated into Soviet legis­
lation, although on occasion there was involved little more than 
terminological similarities reflecting, it would appear, habits of 
thought rather than fundamental convictions. 
In view of the intellectual debt owed to Western jurisprudence, 
it is no wonder that the idea of uniqueness of the Soviet experiment 
did not appear coterminous with early statutes. The conviction of the 
Bolshevik leaders that the October Revolution was only the first 
· outbreak in a chain of revolutions which would change the political 
3 Mankowski, "Zasady radzieckiej praworz11dnosci socialistycznej," 5 PiP . 
27-28 (1950). 
4 Grzybowski, "Continuity of Law in Eastern Europe," 6 Am. J. ·eomp. 
L. 48-49 (1957). 
5 Stalgevich, Puti razvitia sovetskoi pravovi mysli (1928). 
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and social face of Western civilization likewise militated against the 
assertion of uniqueness. To the same effect, Soviet jurists, together 
with sociologists, poets, artists, and scientists, looked upon the 
achievements of modem social and scientific thought, and modem 
trends in art and literature, as a legitimate heritage of revolutionary 
Russia. 
Further, the method of legal reform in revolutionary Russia 
was the very process of codification, employed in the Western Euro­
pean tradition, and indeed, by prerevolutionary Russian lawyers 
themselves. Thus, after an initial averment of the revolutionary con­
cept of law, which relied on the theory that revolutionary justice 
could function without formal legal rules, the Soviet government, in 
order to implement its policies and provide the foundations for the 
orderly operation of its institutions, returned to formalized lawmak­
ing, and legislative procedures became the main source of Soviet 
law.6 
As a result of the intellectual heritage of the West and the 
relative indifference of Soviet leaders to socialist aspects of legal 
form, the Soviet legal system, even after forty years of existence, has 
not ceased to belong to that broad category of legal tradition which 
is known as civil law. This is even more remarkable in view of the 
fact that the Soviet regime, as distinguished from Soviet scholars, 
has accorded little attention to modem developments and legislative 
trends in the free world. Hence, in spite of the current claim that the 
Soviet social system represents a unique achievement, qualitatively 
different from the institutions of the free world, Soviet legal order 
nevertheless may be analyzed in terms of response to the challenge 
of social change, a response which has retained the formal aspects 
of the modem European law. By no means may the Soviet legal 
system be called a legal order of the new civilization, for Soviet in­
stitutions remain copies of similar institutions in Western Europe.7 
While the formal similarities represent a valid basis for com­
paring legal institutions with those of nonsocialist countries, there 
are other important reasons to justify the comparative treatment. No 
economist or sociologist would hesitate to compare social and eco-
6 1 Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law 163 ff. and 193 ff. (1948). 
7 Hazard, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society 478-79 (1960). 
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nomic data of socialist countries with those of Western societies. 
On the contrary, they readily integrate the Soviet experiment into 
the general pattern of the development of modern industrial societies. 
Furthermore, the phenomena explored and the terminology employed 
are entirely compatible with a legalistic analysis of Soviet reality, and 
particularly is this true regarding the active role of the State in 
managing and shaping social institutions. Soviet legislative policies, 
the content of the legal rule, and the doctrines of Soviet legal institu­
tions are related to similar phenomena in the nonsocialist world. The 
Soviet experiment with the social reconstruction and industrializa­
tion of Russia is part and parcel of the general process of the growth 
of industrial societies, with all that those changes mean to the mode 
of life of modem man. The structural alterations in Soviet society, the 
functions of organized social groups in the public life of the socialist 
countries, the social and moral ills of modem man within the socialist 
orbit-all bear a striking resemblance to the developments and prob­
lems on our side of the world. 
At the present moment, Soviet polity represents perhaps the 
only social milieu in which the idea of inexorable progress provides 
a motive force for social action. Soviet world outlook expresses un­
failing optimism and the promise of the planned achievement of the 
millennium. Nevertheless, even in this atmosphere of official optimism, 
the idea of progress has not survived untarnished. Indeed, the very 
concept of the role of Soviet law would appear the result not so 
much of the teachings of Marxism as of the Russian national tradi­
tion in which action by the central government constituted the prin­
cipal motor of reform. s 
This tradition, combined with the influence of prerevolutionary 
legal education, was characterized by the great concentration on 
8 For a recent expression on the role of progress in Soviet thinking, see 
Doklady i vistuplenia predstavitelei sovetskoi filosofskoi nauki na XII 
mezhdunarodnom filosofskom kongresse (1958). 
"Broad propaganda by the contemporary bourgeois philosophy of 
scepticism and agnosticism represents one of the forms of struggle 
against science and dialectical materialism." 39 Bolshaia Sovetskaia 
Entsiklopedia 223. 
"The world outlook of the proletariat, the basis of which is Marxism­
Leninism, is permeated by the faith in the brilliant future and the triumph 
of communism." 32 id. 564. 
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private law problems, which figured high in the plans of the reform 
of Russian laws. The legal mind of prerevolutionary Russia operated 
within the framework of the individual collectivity relations, which 
predicated progress on the influence of the rule of law on the human 
mind in the position conceived by the French philosophers of the 
eighteenth century. In this respect, then, Soviet ideas on the function 
of the legal order in modem society predate the origins of the Marxist 
doctrines. Scientific achievements of the age of enlightenment were 
useful in germinating within the individual a new understanding of 
the surrounding world, in dispelling his prejudices and liberating him 
from the tyranny of superstition. Social progress was conceived to be 
a matter of the moral advancement of each individual, which in tum 
could be advanced by proper legislative policy. 
Beccaria, formulating his ideas on modem penal policies, in­
sisted on moderate punishments and efficient administration of jus­
tice as the best means of crime prevention, on the ground that swift 
justice has a greater chance of eradicating criminal inclinations from 
the human mind. The very idea of nonretroactive justice was rooted 
in the concept that moral improvement had a decisive part in de­
termining the purpose of criminal law. 
To similar effect, Condorcet, in his plans for reforming French 
society, saw in bad laws the only cause of bad social mores. "To re­
move bad morals, it is necessary to remove their cause. And there 
is only one, that is bad laws." 9 And in 1794 Cambaceres, the chief 
author of the French Civil Code, wrote: "laws are the seeds of 
mores." 10 His associate, Portalis, who was the author of the Discours 
preliminaire, a first modem example of legislative motives for the 
consideration of the legislative assembly and for the enlightenment 
of the public, concluded that a statute's main purpose was to "make 
people better.'' 11 
This moralizing role of legal regulation bore directly upon the 
individual collectivity relations noted above. Thus, the autonomy of 
9 Grzybowski, "The _Criminal Law of France," in Essays on French Law 
47-48 (1958); Condorcet, Reponse A d'£premesnil (1779). 
10 1 Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux preparatoires du Code Civil 108 
(1827). 
. 
11 Id. at 473. 
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the individual will constitute the main source of .laws, although the 
law itself enjoyed obligatory force only as the dictate of reason. The 
more reasonable, therefore the more moral, was the individual hu,. 
man being, and the easier it was for society to discover the rule of 
law by which to establish a balance between individual life and the 
interests of the collectivity .12 
This concept of the function of the legal rule in modem society, 
however, did not survive. A century later Pollock had a less exalted 
idea as to the function of legal rule: "Law does not aim at perfecting 
the individual character of men, but at regulating the relations of 
citizens to the commonwealth and to one another." 18 
Pollock's views summarize a veritable revolution of ideas con­
cerning the nature and mechanism of progress. In revolt against the 
French concepts of lawmaking, the German historical school, as 
well as the philosophy of Hegel, was addressed to the social milieu 
as differing both from the state and the individual. The simple formula 
of individual collectivity relations was replaced by a scheme of human 
relations including the individual, society, and the state, each of 
which was assured separate autonomous existence. Though Hegel 
focused primary attention upon the state, society as well was en­
dowed with especial function in his analysis of social reality. To the 
latter, the state was no longer the result of social contract-some­
thing consciously created by the compact between individuals for the 
fulfillment of specific purposes. It was, rather, the organ of the entire 
- community and a historic necessity. 
In time the historical school, which ascertained the source of 
law in the ideas of law and justice crystallized during the course of 
the historical development of human societies, and in the tenets of 
the transcendental truth the agent which limited the arbitrary human 
will, was supplemented by the theory of evolution. This even more 
perfect motor of progress espoused the view that society was the 
environmental milieu in which evolutionary changes took place. At-
12 Rommen, Die ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrecbts 76 ff. (1947); also 
Rommen, Natural Law, A Study _in Legal and Social History and 
Philosophy, 77, 83-85, 94-96 (1947). 
· 
13 Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence for Students of the Common 
Law 46 (2d ed. 1904). 
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tention was thus directed to society as opposed to the Hegelian pre­
occupation with the State. 
The idea of society in conjunction with the theory of evolution 
made possible the studies of Comte, Bagehot, Spencer, and Marx. 
Comte, the most systematic thinker of this new trend, established 
a new direction of inquiry into human affairs by laying the foundations 
for sociology as a separate discipline. Crucial to his theory was the 
so-called "law of three stages" through which Comte believed sciences 
and societies have passed: the theological, the metaphysical, and the 
positive. In the theological stage, imagination played the principal 
role, and man interpreted his environment in terms of gods and 
spirits. In the metaphysical stage, universal ideas were used to ex­
plain the universe, and the idea of nature was substituted for the 
idea of God. The third stage, the positive, subordinated both imagina­
tion and reason to experience. Truth was said to consist of empirical 
facts. Thus, be arrived at the concept of sociology, or "social physics," 
limiting its tasks to the discovery of the laws of social life. Society 
was, for Comte, an organism subject to evolution. In consequence, 
it could be explained scientifically by reference to the concept of 
cause and effect. 
In 1859 there appeared Darwin's Origin of Species. It was 
then left to the sociologist to demonstrate that social life obeyed the 
same general laws of evolution as did nature, and thus to predict 
scientifically the future development of society. The Origin bad 
demonstrated that the evolution of species led to better and more 
perfect forms of life. Thus, Darwin discovered the laws of the de­
velopment of the organic world; according to Engels, Marx discov­
ered the laws governing human society.14 
14 Marx & Engels, 2 Selected Works 1S3 (19SO). Cf. also Bury, The Idea 
of Progress, An Inquiry Into Its Origin and Growth 164-66, 194-95, 
20S-6, 209, 234-36, 276-77 (1942). 
"In the last quarter of the century Darwin's ideas set a fashion 
for positivist-historical thought. Embryology seemed to give an analogy 
for history. The development of an institution or of a doctrine was 
parallel to the development of an organism. A crop of books on the 
evolution of law followed, expounding legal institutional development 
in terms of Darwin .... Today, no one thinks in this fashion. Instead, 
the correct thing is to urge an administrative absolutism." Pound, 
Fashions in Juristic Thinking 9 (1938). 
10 Soviet Legal Institutions 
Of the various trends of socialist theory on the role of the law 
and the state in social development toward higher forms of existence, 
Soviet theory is without doubt the farthest removed from the original 
Marxian doctrine. Only reformist socialists in the West have ac­
cepted fully the doctrine of the growth of the socialist forms of life 
in its pure form. Only they have found it possible to coordinate the 
growth of socialism with the existence of the modem state, to assure 
social peace in order to foster the growth of socialism through the 
work of social processes alone. 
Soviet leadership has found it impracticable to implement fully 
the idea that changes in social structures and in property relations 
are the result of such social forces, as techniques of production, 
which are equated with Darwin's environmental causes. 
Thus, after more than forty years of the Soviet order, L. Sobolev, 
chairman of the Writer's Union of the RSFSR, in addressing the 
plenary session of the Union's Board in May 1960, still clung to 
Stalinist concepts of the role of the state and of coercion in social 
engineering. Sobolev visualized progress toward higher forms of social 
existence in terms of an attack on the prejudices which he believed 
to constitute an unhappy heritage of capitalism. "We find ourselves," 
Sobolev asserted, "on approaches to communism. I consciously use 
this military term, because, in the progress of the assault which our 
society is mounting, we must still overcome the minefields laid thou­
sands of years ago--the so-called survivals of capitalism in the con­
sciousness of the people." u 
SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE RULE OF I4W 
An additional perspective for the study of Soviet legal institu­
tions may be gleaned from the realization that the fundamental 
juristic ideas underpinning the legislation of the free world preceded 
the emergence of the modem industrial society with its concomittant 
submergence of individual life. Thus, the Code Civil of France was 
the code of an agricultural society. It was conservative and static in 
its concepts, and was addressed primarily to. the various types of 
property and to the family unit. It was designed to serve the interests 
.15 Pravda, May 11, 1960. 
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and life of a society which depended for its existence upon the cultiva­
tion and ownership of land. 
But even more important was the fact that in the Code culmi­
nated the idea of the two kinds of law, public and private. The Code 
reflected the scheme worked out by Jean Domat (1625-1696) who 
in his Traite des lois had delimited the separate spheres of public and 
private law with a greater precision than was ever done before him. 
To the province of private law belonged all matters of property, con­
tracts and other agreements, guardianships, statutes of limitation, 
mortgages, and successions. In a very real sense, therefore, the Code 
had its roots in the social order which preceded the Revolution. In 
their quest for the abolition of medieval society, the philosophers of 
legal reform in France relied on the idea of individual liberty, whether 
their specific concern was with the structure of property relations, 
the economic organization, or with the political order .16 
The structural changes produced by the Industrial Age in the 
Western World found expression primarily in the separation of owner­
ship and control of the means of production. Personal ownership 
of industrial property was replaced by the ownership of stocks and 
bonds, while physical control of productive processes passed to cen­
tralized groups of professional managers. With the management of 
property in bulk, business concerns frequently acquired the character 
of public institutions.17 Increasing urbanization and standardization 
of life produced the phenomenon of masses, the latter being char­
acterized by identity of interests and similarity of occupation and 
conditions of existence. In the new conditions, classes and social 
groups "must be taken account of no less than individuals." 18 This 
in tum produced a veritable revolution in the content of the legal rule 
and led to the reform of the basic concepts of the legal order. 
Generally speaking, as a response to the legal reform changing 
conditions of modem life took three forms. The most obvious and 
16 Savatier, Du droit civil au droit public (1950). 
17 Berle & Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property 7 (1933). 
Cf. also Friedmann, Legal Theory ch. 31 (1953), and Bolgar, "The 
Magic of Property and Public Welfare," 2 lnter-Amer. L. Rev. 288 
(1960). 
18 Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 31 (1931). 
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easiest to account for was the increased scope of regulation, the 
effect of which was to change the role of public authority and of 
social organizations. The second was the activity of the courts in re­
shaping and redesigning the rules of positive law.19 Thirdly, the civil 
law institutions themselves lost much of their social significance. 
In that system of social and economic activity which llliked 
business activity with personal control of the means of production, 
private law institutions were of central importance. Provisions of 
civil codes regarding inheritance, community property, and the man­
agement of property during the personal incapacity of owners con­
stituted a vital part of a vast social and economic structure of which 
family and individual entrepreneur were the most important fea­
tures. The depersonalization of economic activity and the substitu­
tion of great corporations for individual enterprise, however, relegated 
private law with its system of rights to an inferior position in terms 
of social function . 
. The place of individual entrepreneurs and family businesses 
became occupied by enormous corporations and employers' associa­
tions. These new bodies were faced at the other end of the social 
spectrum by the trade unions, together with a host of other organiza­
tions representing the related and intermediary interests of con­
sumers, small producers, cooperatives, professions, etc. The result­
ing complication is compounded by the fact that the modem state 
has abandoned its exalted position of social umpire protecting the 
broader interests of the polity. Rather, it has assumed direct re­
sponsibility for the management of key branches of the national 
economy. 
The state's intervention is justified by the necessity of assuring 
the flow of services deemed essential to modem life and its public 
functions and of adjusting the availability of capital, raw material, 
. and other resources in order to promote industrial activity or con­
sumption. 
Furthermore, judicial activity in the adaptation of civil law rules, 
as well as in the implementation of the modem laws of the welfare 
state, tends to equalize the burden· of risk inherent in such modem 
19 Cf. Geny, Methode d'interpretation et sources en droit prive positif 
(1899). 
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forms of life as mass transportation, the operation of great industrial 
factories, and the catastrophic fluctuations in economic activities.20 
Lines of division between what was previously considered as the 
exclusive realm of the private law and that which pertained to 
public law have been further blurred by the fact that the state, in 
order to discharge its responsibilities, has assumed the garb of a 
private entrepreneur. The result has been a great difficulty in de­
marcating between government owned or controlled, public or mixed 
corporations, and economic institutions which are not owned by the 
state, emphasizing further the fact that modem forms of industrial 
and economic activity ceased to be wholly encompassed by the rules 
of private law. 
These structural changes in modem societies have confronted 
the modem state with new problems. Depersonalization of control 
of the means of production and the corresponding concentration of 
economic power have created tensions which the state has had to 
control in order to preserve social peace. Further, the great mass of 
private entrepreneurs was replaced by a small number of organiza­
tions, thus permitting easier identification of social issues with the 
conflicting interests of economic and social organizations. This, in 
tum, has permitted a change in the method of social regulation. The 
state has been enabled to intervene directly in a manner which makes 
of itself a third party representing broader interests. 
Prior to the emergence of great social organizations representing 
the interests of the masses, the state had been little interested in the 
internal organization of associations. Only where external interests 
expressed in the standards of legal commerce and public confidence 
were concerned did the state intervene. Now, with the mass partici­
pation of individuals in associations, the matter of membership has 
become a matter of public concern. The obvious reason is that in­
clusion or exclusion may mean very much the same thing as partner­
ship in the national polity itself. Thus, the restriction of contractual 
freedom and the intervention of public authority in the process of 
20 Cf. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society 24-25 (1959); also Savatier, 
supra note 16; Savatier, M�tamorphoses �nomiques et sociales du droit 
civil d'aujourd'hui (1948) specifically in regard to the function of con­
tract. 
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collective bargaining have been paralleled by government interven­
tion into the internal affairs of great associations representing eco­
nomic and social interests. Regulation is justified on the ground that, 
though voluntary in principle, such associations by their very size 
exercise what amounts to a monopolistic position in their particular 
spheres of professional or social activity. 
An interesting process may be observed in connection with the 
vast expansion of the social activities of the state and the virtual 
statification of social and economic institutions which are not state 
organizations. Regulation by the public authority tends to shape the 
business and social activities of great organizations into standard 
forms, which are then presented in uniform terms to the public. 
Contracts and forms of organizing activity must conform to standards 
'dictated by the needs of public order. At the same time, legal regula­
tion tends to rely less and less on the form of an abstract legal 
command. 
Portalis, the spokesman for the committee which drafted the 
French Civil Code, asserted that the abstract form of the legal rule 
constituted its indispensable characteristic: "[T]he law provides the 
rule for all: it considers men en masse, never as individuals; it 
should not deal with individual facts, nor with litigations which 
divide the citizens . . . .  " 21 The French society of the Civil Code, 
however, was a society of individuals. The modem nation, on the 
other hand, coalesced into great organizations. In consequence, the 
state has had to readopt the role of the medieval sovereign. It must 
face broad social interests and powerful groups, joining them in 
compacts, playing one against the other, and using its influence and 
control of resources in order to promote cohesion and the orderly 
operation of social services.22 The basic difference between the mod­
em state and its medieval antecedent is that the aspect of liberty 
which was the product of the French Revolution has survived the 
social crises of modem times. Thus, personal freedom continues to 
represent a social goal in its abstract formulation and may not be 
21 Portalis, Discours pr61iminaire, Projet de Code Civil pr6sent6 par Ia 
Commission nom.m6e par le Gouvemement, le 24 Thermidor an 8. 
22 Friedmann, supra note 20, 74, 101, 109, 286, 297, 309. Cf. Pound, 
supra note 18, at 31. Savatier, supra note 20, at 9, 64-65, 71, 86-87, 
208-9 (2d series 1959). 
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translated into terms of status with reference to the social and eco­
nomic ramifications of modem societies.23 
LEGAL ORDER OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION 
The social mechanism envisaged by the Civil Code of France 
was perhaps best described by the following quotation from Jhering's 
classical work ( 1872) : 
What is sowed in private law is reaped in public law and the law of na­
tions. In the valleys of private law, in the very humble relations of life, 
must be collected, drop by drop, so to speak; the forces, the moral capital, 
which the state needs to operate on a large scale, and to attain its end. 
Private law, not public law, is the real school of the political education 
of the people, and if we would know how a people, in case of need, will 
defend their political rights and their place among the nations, let us 
examine how the separate members of the nation assert their own right 
in private life. . . . Law is idealiSm-paradoxical as this may seem­
not the idealism of the fancy, but of character: that is, of the man who 
looks upon himself as his own end, and esteems all else lightly when he 
is attacked in his personality.24 
Thus, the main stream of legal commerce was thought to ftow 
in the bed of private law transactions; and private law litigation, 
to constitute the principal means to be employed by the public au­
thority in upholding the rule of law. It was in this spirit that West 
European legal scholarship in the nineteenth century approached 
the problem of reforming codes of civil procedure. Simplification 
of court proceedings was sought through the adoption of the prin­
ciple of immediacy and publicity, by the oral examination of wit­
nesS!!S, and by the direct participation of parties and their legal coun­
sel in court proceedings. But almost simultaneous with the achieve­
ment of these goals of simplification and expediency, permitting 
speedy and cheap disposition of cases, juristic preoccupation with 
private litigation was superseded by the problems of social change.25 
23 Cf. Grzybowski, "Fundamental Rights of Persons and Social Groups," 
in 3 (pt. 6) Memoires de l'Academie Intemationale de Droit Compare 
15-24; also Rivero, Les droits de l'homme dans le droit constitutionnel 
fran� d'aujourd'hui, id. at 25-40. 
24 Jbering, The Struggle for Law 99-101 (1915). 
25 Engelman et al., A History of Continental Civil Procedure 587-615, 
628-44, 748-82 (1927). 
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Gradually, juridical attention became riveted to the forms of the 
administrative activities of the state. 26 
As social interests could no longer be safeguarded through the 
enforcement of private rights, state activity assumed new forms. From 
the role of umpire in private litigations, it now assumed the role of 
social and economic organizer and administrator of national assets. 
The creative function of public administration, with its new forms 
of governmental action, thus became an indispensable feature of the · 
modem state. 
The intervention of the state in social and economic affairs, 
however, raised a number of legal problems requiring solutions 
which challenged accepted ideas of the role of public authority vis­
a-vis the public. The final outcome has been the evolution of ad­
ministrative law. Its subject matter consists in the attempt to deter-
. mine the responsibilities of governmental authorities, as well as the 
rights of citizens and social organizations. It further provides the 
framework for a partnership between the authority and the citizen 
either as a private individual or as a member of an organization. 
The emergence in Western Europe of the modem welfare state 
was facilitated by the familiarity of the civil law world with state 
and territorial corporations acting in the capacity of private persons. 
And it was due to this tradition that there finally emerged the 
principle that in all of its activities the state was subject to the rule 
of law, and to administrative procedures and a system of controls 
in which the courts performed the important function of preventing 
the abuse of pciwer.2T 
The appearance of the modem welfare state in its varied as­
pects called for the reassessment of the criteria of legality of govern­
mental action. Now, it is obvious that, in order to achieve their 
purposes, administrative authorities must be guided by different and 
perhaps more lenient rules as to the formal legality of their action 
than those rules pertaining to courts of justice. In fact, even with re­
gard to the latter, the European tradition contained the seeds of 
that type of public action which finally became characteristic of the 
26 Robson, Justice and Administrative Law 229 (1947). 
27 Friedmann, supra note 20, 351-52. 
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life of the modem state. Civil law courts in pursuit of their functions 
as guardians of minors, of absentee interests, and of those deprived 
for various reasons of their capacity for legal transactions, and in all 
nonadversary proceedings, exercise their power with a minimum of 
attention to form. Discretion is moderated by expediency rather than 
by formal legality. While public authority acting qua public authority 
has had to adhere to the principle of legality, its criteria have been 
changed. Thus, when representing the proprietary rights of the state, 
it is endowed with a certain degree of discretionary power, somewhat 
similar to that degree of freedom of action enjoyed by a private per­
son or state agency. As French jurisprudence has almost unanimously 
recognized, freedom of action is essential if the state action is to 
achieve its purpose: 
The mission of public administration cannot be restricted to a slavish 
execution of the provisions of the public law legislation. Missions of 
public authority cannot be put in terms of the blind execution of the 
commands of the legislator, not even in terms of ideas contained in the 
legal rules. Public authority must examine independently those elements 
which are left to its decision in the perspective of its proper functions, 
in accordance with the spirit of the institution .. . When an administra­
tive authority applies. the law, it does so with certain independence, 
which is quite considerable at times.2s 
This freedom of action of the administrative authority was 
further enlarged by the recognition that it could also act as a private 
person, and could engage thereby the interests of the state in the 
terms of private law. "The methods of performing public services 
have the character of adminis�rative action, except when administra­
tion voluntarily resorts to the procedures of normal life, or is en­
joined by the legal rule to resort to · them." This rule, firmly estab­
lished since 1872 by the French Conseil d'Etat, provides another 
28 Walter, Le contr8Ie jurisdictionnel de la moralite administrative 34-36 
(1929). 
"L'administration n'est seulement l'executrice servile de Ia Ioi ou 
le rouage de transmission des commandements legislatifs; elle est encore 
un organe autonome et createur." Alibert, Le contr8Ie jurisdictionnel 
de l'administration au moyen du recours pour l'exces de pouvoir 16 
(1926). Cf. Renard, Le droit, la Iogique et le bon sens 362 (1926 J; 
Stier-Somlo, PolitiQue 29 (4th French ed. 1919). 
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basis for the integration of public action with the social and economic 
pursuits of the citizens.29 
In the final analysis, however, the character of public action 
depends not so much upon the form as upon the need for action in 
the discharge of the duties and functions of the modem state. The 
tendency has been toward expansion of those activities which cannot 
be strictly determined by legal regulation. Administrative authority, 
as some French writers suggest, follows rules of conduct which are 
not law in the strict sense, but are rather rules of conduct within the 
framework of legal order. Here standards of public action acquire 
a coloring which suggests assimilation of the criteria of public action 
into the standards of ethics controlling the actions of the individual. 
Realization of the "bien commun" must follow the rules of what is 
suggestively termed "moralite administrative," "administrative con­
venances," or "rules of good administration." 80 The analogy between 
private initiative and the intervention of public authority is further 
suggested by the fact that ultimately the tasks and responsibilities 
of the modem state are dictated not so much by the fact that the 
state alone can undertake to provide social services, as by the fact 
that these services cannot be provided by private initiative: 
Public service exists in all those cases when competent authorities con­
sider that ... private initiative is unable to perform a certain task or 
cannot perform it in a satisfactory manner, and decide to assume re­
sponsibility for the service which seems to them to be of public utility. 
This same flexibility applies also to practical measures which 
the public authority adopts in order to discharge its responsibilities. 
Such may entail direct action by the public authority itself, a gov-
29 Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif 40 (1927); Fleiner, Ober die 
Umbindung der zivilrechtlichen Institute durch das offentliche Recht 
6 ff. (1906). 
30 "Le controle jurisdictionnel de Ia moralite administrative est, avant tout, 
le moyen d'assujettir l'activite administrative-non A Ia · seule legalite 
formelle, mais au buts qui lui sont impartis, suivants Ia disposition de 
l'ordre administratif, en vue de satisfaction de l'interet public." Welter, 
supra note 28, at 36. Cf. Hauriou, supra note 29, at 197; Renard, 
Le droit, Ia justice et Ia volonte 400 (1924); Beurdeley, Le detournement 
de pouvoir dans !'interet financier ou patrimonial de !'administration 
164-65 (1928). 
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ernment-organized commercial corporation, or a government in­
spired private enterprise. 81 
The revolution in the scope of governmental action was followed 
by a revolution in the field of concepts regarding judicial control, 
as the old precept that court action was restricted to the private law 
area alone could no longer be maintained. 
The principle of judicial control of administrative authority, and 
the problem of the type of judicial control to be employed, called for 
the reappraisal of time-sanctioned doctrines as to the existence of 
two branches of legal regulation, public and private, over which the 
powers of the courts were thought to hold a different compass. Thus, 
civil law relations were subject to judicial adjudication even when 
the state appeared as a claimant of proprietary rights. Otherwise, 
public authority was not subject to judicial control. 
Roughly corresponding to the above distinction was the doc­
trine that only those actions of the state which were covered by the 
provisions of the law, i.e., legal interests, were capable of judicial 
review according to the general principles of litigation. Eventually, 
this latter doctrine was replaced by still another distinction, this time 
between government activities which constituted an exercise of power 
( actes de pouvoir, acta imperii) and those which were the acts of 
normal administration (acta gestionis) . This last division corre­
sponded to the view of an absence of court jurisdiction regarding 
those acts of the state which were not a subject of parliamentary 
legislation, or which did not involve proprietary rights of the state 
in its capacity as a private person (fisc). This, in fact, was true quite 
irrespective of their impact on the rights of the individual.82 
The succession of theories and doctrines described above ex­
hibited inexorable progress toward the principle of judicial control 
of state action. The only question remaining was that of a proper 
distribution of responsibility, according to the specific qualifications 
of the two great branches of the judiciary, i.e., courts of general 
jurisdiction and the administrative judiciary. Since 1872 in France, 
31 Waline, Trait6 616mentaire de droit administratif 6 ff. (1957); Fleiner, 
supra note 29, at 6 ff. 
32 Laferriere, Jurisdiction et contentieux (1896); Bahr, Der Rechtsstaat 
(1864). 
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the Conseil d' £tat has made it clear that administration is always 
accountable at court, and court jurisdiction depends upon the man- · 
ner of public action.88 
Today, even on the continent of Europe where the history of 
administrative law nears the century mark, the accelerated pace of 
social and economic change has impeded the efforts of administrative 
law both in the achievement of clarity and of simplicity in legal 
provisions and in the effectuation of symmetrical and systematic 
arrangement characteristic of the admirable monuments of legisla­
tive technique represented by the modem codes of Europe. The result 
is that a good deal of uncertainty continues to persist as to the dis­
tribution of the border areas of social life and as to their definite 
assignment to one of the two branches of adjudication. This situa­
tion is further complicated by the feeling that new social services 
call for the participation of the social interests involved, which in 
tum cause multiplication of special tribunals. The concept of "public 
service," which replaced other criteria of expediency of administra­
tive action in specific situations, again caused confusion. The prob­
lem was that the old distinction between action resulting from special 
authorization and a transaction of private law was no longer held 
to be deeisive in the assignment of judicial responsibility.84 This ap­
proach was further confused by the emergencies resulting from na­
tional catastrophes. After World War II, the need to organize basic 
services and to undertake social and economic reConstruction, coupled 
with the mobilization of private enterprises, created another problem 
of jurisdiction. It was held that private entrepreneurs servicing the 
public under government contract also could be classified as falling 
into the category of the agents of public services.811 
The common feature of the experiences of the two great legal 
. cultures of the world, of the civil law and of the Anglo-American 
tradition, is that the principle of judicial control dominates juristic 
thinking in regard to the responsibilities of the modem state. In the 
33 Hauriou, supra note 29, at 40. 
34 Appleton, Traite 616mentaire du contentieux administratif 114 (1927); 
Bernatzik, Rechtssprechung und materielle Rechtskraft 36-37 (1886). 
35 Durand, "Les fonctions publiques de l'entreprise privee," 8 Droit Social 
246-50 (1945). 
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Anglo-American tradition, the technique was to  expand the responsi­
bilities of the general courts, while the tendency in the civil law 
countries has been toward more specialized tribunals. The result, 
however, has not been the devaluation of judicial authority. Rather, 
great administrative tribunals rival in stature and authority the su­
preme courts of their countries.36 The emergence of the former was 
due to the complexity of administrative action and to the unsystematic 
character of the provisions of administrative law. Public authority 
could not, in a world of great corporations and mass organizations, 
assure satisfaction of broader social interests through the formal 
commands of the law. Even before the period of the great wars, a 
French jurist, in characterizing the new law which had come to 
occupy the most important place in the legal systems of modem 
societies, said: 
In its new conception the law no longer assumes to tender absolute 
commands, it strives at diversity in its praciical operation, seeks to guide, 
to counsel, endeavors to regularize the movements of social life . . . .  87 
And indeed mediation, arbitration, administrative pressure, per­
suasion, mobilization of public opinion, joint industrial enterprise, 
use of privilege and exemption from taxation, subsidy and control 
of standardized contracts, and internal intervention into the life of 
private associations-all have become legitimate means of ad­
ministrative action. A distinguished jurist, referring to the circum­
stances of postwar France, has expressed doubt that the social stresses 
and conflicts of contemporary society permit orderly law enforce­
ment at all.38 Indeed, it seems that the "acceleration of history," 
which appears to be the mark of our time,89 will not permit modem 
societies to engage in a labor comparable to that of the Civil Code 
of France, which aimed at systematic codification of all law into one 
book. Nevertheless, there are fundamental legal ideas which do con-
36 Tezner, Das Oesterreichische Administrativverfahren 430 ff. ( 1925) ;  
Geny, Science et technique en droit prive positif ( 1927 ) ;  Perraux, 
Technique et jurisprudence en droit prive ( 1923 ) .  
3 7  Leroy, La loi, essai sur Ia theorie d e  l'autorite dans Ia democratie 19  
( 1908).  Cf. Friedmann, supra note 20, at 288-90. 
38 Roubier, Theorie generate du droit 279 ( 1946). Cf. Rippert, Le declin 
du droit 154 ( 1949) .  
39  Halevy, Essai sur l'acccHeration de l'histoire ( 1948) .  
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stitute the core of the administrative law of modem societies. Prin­
cipal among these is the conviction that public authority has the 
power to act only with reference to a rule of law. Thus, the at­
tributes of discretion and freedom from judicial control persist only 
when the law directly and expressly so provides. In this manner, 
the function of legal order to provide balance between individual 
life and collective existence has asserted itself anew. In reference 
to new conditions, law enforcement has changed in form, but not 
in ultimate purpose.40 
Structural changes in legal systems and the reappearance of 
old concepts which stress the idea of relation or function have been 
sometimes interpreted as per se significant to the acceptance of new 
ideas regarding social aims and methods of social control. Some 
authors aver that concepts of function or relation are specific for 
certain social or national environments.41 Others claim that jurists' 
concern with the issue of rights is only a relic of a situation char­
acteristic of the conflict between the exercise of governmental power 
and the idea of the law.42 
A mere glance at the history of these ideas should dispel such 
40 Bernatzik, supra note 34, at 36-47; Laun, Das freie Ermesse und seine 
Grenzen 61-79 (1910); Jellinek, Gesetz, Gesetzanwendung und Zweck­
massigkeitserwagung 89 (1913). 
41 Guins, Soviet Law and Soviet Society 382 n. 44 (1954). 
42 "An opposition has for long existed in Britain between the idea of 'law' 
and the idea of 'government.' This is a heritage from the conflict in the 
seventeenth century between, on the one side, a sovereign claiming to 
rule by the divine right and to exercise an undisputed prerogative in all 
matters of government, and, on the other side, a nation claiming a 
supreme law to which the sovereign should be subject. That struggle 
between King and Commons has become transformed in our own day 
into a conflict between the Executive on the one hand, and the Judiciary 
and the legal profession on the other. The lawyers still regard them­
selves as champions of the popular cause; but there can be little doubt 
that the great departments of State administering or supervising public 
health, public education, pension schemes, unemployment and health 
insurance, housing and all the other modem social services, are not 
only essential to the well-being of the great mass of people, but also 
the most significant expressions of democracy in our time. Considerations 
of this kind, however, could scarcely be expected to weigh with the 
predominantly upper middle-class legal mind." Robson, supra note 26, 
at 316. 
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preconceptions. Their employment in juristic constructions to meet 
the needs of changing times has no ideological significance per se. 
Similarly, it seems quite futile to endeavor to explain away the issue 
of rights as no longer providing an insight into the meaning and 
the function of legal institutions. Only the context of the exercise of 
rights has been changed, and both the sociologist and the jurist must 
seek their content within broader human institutions.48 
DOCTRINES OF THE INSTITUTIONS 
Soviet legal theories are predicated upon the idea of progress 
and are identified with the Soviet policy of transforming, according 
to a predetermined plan, the economic and social order into that 
of an industrial civilization. In order to achieve higher material and 
moral values, Soviet leadership has concentrated all social and of­
ficial action, including the method of legal regulation, on the task 
of surpassing the economies of the more advanced industrial nations 
of the West. Soviet legal order is thus designed to accomplish con­
crete functions in the program of the transformation of social reality 
in Russia. 
Hence, a comparative study of the Soviet legal system must 
seek to answer two questions. First, have Soviet jurists been able to 
develop new techniques in response to the singular tasks faced by the 
Soviet society and legal order? Second, have the role of the Soviet 
legal order and concrete social conditions affected the inner mean­
ing and function of Soviet legal institutions, and if so, in what manner? 
Soviet jurists claim broadly that Soviet law and Soviet legality repre­
sent new values, permitting realization of higher standards of per­
sonal freedom. 
Our inquiry here calls for a sketch, albeit in most general 
terms, of the impact of the process of social change on the legal in­
stitutions of modem societies. Admittedly, in open societies neither 
the state nor the legal order has entertained ambitions comparable 
to those advanced by the Soviet polity. However, the planned partici­
pation of the state and its legal order in the program of social re-
43 Pound, supra note 18, at 31. Pound, "Individualization of Justice," 7 
Fordham L. Rev. 153 (1938); Bolgar, "The Concept of Public Welfare," 
8 Am. J. Comp. L. 44-71 (1959); Bolgar, supra note 17, at 283-316. 
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construction can hardly be considered, from the viewpoint of Western 
civilization, as a full and complete response to the social needs of any 
environment. While the law must promote social discipline, its func­
tions cannot be limited to that task alone. It must also preserve human 
autonomy in forms related to the social techniques of the time. 
Doctrines of legal institutions must be distinguished from broad 
legal theories. Thus, doctrines, as opposed to theories, constitute the 
premise on which a legal institution operates in a concrete historical 
situation. They also explain the inner changes generated by social 
conditions, which find refiection in the institutions themselves. In 
the light of doctrines, institutions appear as social techniques in­
tended to achieve political aims and in the process to realize eternal 
values of the law. 
To take a concrete example, legislation represents a method of 
social ordering. In modem times, it operates on the theory that it 
is a major instrument of democracy in that it constitutes the chief 
function of the representative institutions. However, changes in the 
legislative techniques and in the formal aspects of the laws refiect 
the impact of the times. One of the experiences of our times is the 
fact that lawmaking is no longer a monopoly of a single governmental 
institution. 
Proceeding further, it would perhaps be well to point out the 
close kinship between the basic juristic categories which constitute 
the common background of the Soviet legal order with the legal orders 
of the free world. 
The era of codified statutes in Western Europe, which sought to 
comprehend within a single book all the various fields of law of a 
given state, was fathered by the conviction that there exists a system 
of natural laws, discoverable by reason and legal scholarship. In the 
course of the nineteenth century, however, the idea of immutable and 
perfect natural law was replaced by the scholarship of trained law­
yers.•• The Austrian Civil Code of 1 8 1 1  still referred the judge to 
principles of natural law when the law could not provide a rule for 
the solution of a case. Section 9 of the Russian Civil Procedure of 
1864 ruled that in such a case the court was to base its decision on 
44 Aumann, The Changing American Legal System: Some Selected Phases 
30 (1940); Schultz, History of Roman Legal Science 23 (1946). 
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the "common sense of laws." And Article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code, 
which was the product of legal scholarship of the twentieth century 
when the theories of natural law had lost their validity, enjoined the 
judge, unable to solve a case by application of a written statute or 
its interpretation, to resort to the customary law as a subsidiary source 
of legal rule. In the absence of the latter he was to apply a rule 
such as he would enact if he were a lawmaker, being guided by 
established doctrine and tradition. 
Under the Austrian Code, the judge was called upon to enforce 
a legal system of which the Code was only a written part. Russian 
and Swiss provisions for filling lacunae in the laws of the country 
were the result of century-old experience in codification. The convic­
tion that a legal order was a part of a natural system of law had 
dimmed by that time, but not so the belief that law was an autonomous 
discipline. Thus, it was still felt that answers to every legal problem 
could be found, either in the common sense of law or in doctrine and 
tradition. 
An interesting aspect of the evolution of ideas regarding methods 
of providing an answer to legal problems where no direct answer is 
prescribed in the rules of the positive law is that in the main the 
tradition survived the impact of revolutionary changes. Article 12 
of the Italian Civil Code of 1942, which was the product of the 
Fascist regime, has departed little from the original pattern. It or­
dained that if "a controversy cannot be solved by the application 
of the provision which applies directly to the case, regard will be 
taken of the provisions which apply to similar cases or regulate 
analogous matters; if the case is still doubtful, it shall be decided 
according to the general principles of the general legal order of the 
state." 
The general purport of Article 12 of the Civil Code of 1942 
leaves little doubt that it is a product of the traditional approach. 
But it also leaves little doubt that the actual content of the legal rule 
which the court would establish by following its instructions would 
be colored in the final analysis by the political nature of the actual 
regime, and that the real doctrine of the institution is discoverable 
only by analysis of its function within the social context of the mo­
ment. Although no legislator in the past anticipated it, the same ap-
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plies with equal force to the Austrian, Russian, or Swiss examples. 
The teachings of general experience, necessitating the correla­
tion of the formal provision with the actual social and economic order 
in order to arrive at the proper role of legal rule, apply equally to 
the legal order of the socialist countries. Particularly is this true 
where Soviet legislators rely on the experiences of the common his­
torical past. To this end, Section 1 of the Bulgarian law on Obligations 
and Contracts of 1950 provided that: 
This law regulates obligations and contracts in order to support the con­
struction of socialism, fulfillment of the national economic plans, and 
the realization of the rights of the toilers in the People's Republic of 
Bulgaria. 
According to Section 2 of the same law, if the law contains no direct 
rule covering the case: 
[A] provision which governs a similar case is applicable to the case not 
provided in it, if this corresponds to the rules of life in the socialist com­
munity. If this is not possible the general principles of the socialist law 
apply.'�� 
The Bulgarian formulation added a new element, which qualified 
the use of the analogy by demanding adherence to the general goals 
· of the legal order. It does not materially differ from the Italian formula, 
except that it lists specifically the constituent "rules of life in a socialist 
community." But even this formulation leaves little doubt as to the 
source of the inspiration for the Bulgarian provisions, and the mere 
detailed enumeration of social goals to be achieved in the course of 
law enforcement constitutes no guarantee of performance. In the final 
analysis, therefore, the technique is a different matter from the polit­
ical or social content of the legal rule. The former is apparent from 
the form of the legal rule, the latter from its actual operation in life. 
Thus are set forth the scope and the method of the presetJt study. 
45 D.V. 215/1950. Bulgarian Civil Procedure as amended in 1930 provided 
in section 9 as follows: "The courts shall decide according to the exact 
meaning of the laws in force. If these are incomplete, unclear or con­
tradictory, the courts shall decide according to the general meaning of 
the laws; in case of a gap in legal provisions with respect to a given 
matter, they shall decide according to custom, and in the absence of 
such, according to justice." 
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The task is to establish, on the basis of external criteria, the origin 
of Soviet legal institutions and to confront their original purpose with 
their role and function in the Soviet polity. In a sense, the institutions 
of Soviet law are treated as part and parcel of the legal tradition of 
Europe; and the question is, what is their role in a social and economic 
order which claims to have achieved higher standards of liberty and a 
more perfect realization of the postulates of social justice? 
JURISPRUDENCE OF STATE WORSHIPPERS 
The identification of Soviet legal thought with the policies of 
the regime is achieved in Soviet theory through concentration on 
the idea of progress, with the latter's postulation of a social environ­
ment highly influenced by the state and legal order. The final out­
come of state action is to achieve the merger of public institutions 
with social structures. By some process, the outlines of which are at 
present the subject of earnest discussion in leading Soviet intellectual 
circles, society is to emerge finally as the composite of the assumption, 
by the public institutions, of all the functions of the state, while never­
theless parting with none of their own. Although highly purposive and 
teleological in their formulations, Soviet jurists, in working out the 
grand lines of the process of transition to higher forms of social exist­
ence, are not concerned with the doctrines of Marxism. Their concern 
is chiefly with the practical problems of lawmaking as responses to 
the social needs-such responses being occasioned by commands from 
the leadership of the Party.46 
The pattern of Soviet theoretical thinking is thus linked with 
two .main trends of thought in the West, which make either the state 
or society the frame of reference within which problems of legal order 
are considered. Hence, in order to provide proper perspective for 
the problems discussed in this study, some restatement of the principal 
theoretical propositions concerning the relationship between the state 
and the operation of the legal order within the social structures ap­
pears useful if not essential. In particular should be noted those prop­
ositions which have exerted an influence on the theoretical formula­
tions of Soviet scholars. 
46 Hazard, "Le droit sovietique et le deperissement de l'.£tat," in 8 Travaux 
et conferences, Universite Libre de Bruxelles 15 ff. (1960). 
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In this connection, two trends of thought seem to be of impor­
tance. In the first place, the normative school has provided the material 
for the construction of Soviet legal concepts; and secondly, the modem 
sociological school has stimulated Soviet theoretical speculations. It 
would be futile to seek recognition of Soviet indebtedness to the 
thought of Western European scholars. Soviet thinkers are precluded 
from such acknowledgment by the theory of the qualitative difference 
of Soviet institutions from their counterparts in the free world. Never­
theless, Western European legal thought provides a capital guide for 
the analysis of Soviet reality. 
In this context, the idea of the rule of law within the framework 
of the constitutional government (Rechtsstaat) deserves special at­
tention. Such was a logical derivative of the idea of natural law. The 
function of the Rechtsstaat is to administer justice to all. It is not merely 
to protect individuaf ·status, but to establish every individual in his 
right status. The concept of the rule of law in this form originated 
with a group of liberal jurists (Gneist, Lorenz von Stein, Bahr, and 
others) .  Embracing the legal ideology of the French Revolution, 
and in particular the doctrines of Montesquieu, they assimilated such 
theories for the use of German jurisprudence. 
In the early formulations of the rule of law, the idea of law 
was distinct from the idea of the state. The state was governed by 
law, but it became Rechtsstaat when it was governed by the right 
law. Although differing from the public order described by Montes­
quieu in his claim of integral governance by the law, it did not differ 
in nature from the state of the eighteenth century. As a consequence, 
it had to be controlled. As Otto Bahr put it: 
mo make the Rechtsstaat come true it is not sufficient that public law 
be expressed in statutes; there must also be a judiciary qualified to estab­
lish what is right in the concrete case and thus give an indisputable 
foundation for the rehabilitation of Jaw where it has been violated. •7 
In time, the idea of judicial control was supplemented by the 
idea of the independence . of the administrative mechanism of the 
47 Bahr, supra note 32, at 8; Mohl, "Gesellschaftswissenschaft und Staats­
wissenschaft," 7 Zeitschrift fiir die gesammte Staatswissenschaft (1851); 
Stein, System der Staatswissenschaft (1856); Stein, Der Be griff der 
Gesellschaft (1855); Gneist, Zur Verwaltungsreform und Verwaltungs­
rechtspfl.ege in Preussen (1881); Gneist, Der Rechtsstaat (1872). 
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state from the political elements in the higher echelons of government. 
An additional supplement was the theory that statutory enactments, 
although representing the pressure of politics on the system of public 
authorities, become divorced from their makers. The state in this 
role was conceived as the supreme association, though but one of 
many in the social structure. Its primary function was to assure unity 
of all social elements. 
Further in this direction was the identification of integral govern­
ment by law with the state, as the legal order itself. Thus, the state 
became only a name for the legal order. Kelsen, who extended this 
line of thought to its ultimate conclusions, stated the point in truly 
magisterial terminology: 
The state as a legal community is not something apart from its legal 
order, any more than a corporation is distinct from its constitutive or­
der. . . . We must admit that the community we call "State" is "its" 
legal order.48 
Identification of the state with the law was the last step in the 
process of rejection of natural law theories. Individual rights coulci 
not be conceived otherwise than in relation to the positive legal order. 
As such they depended on membership in the specific polity. Indi­
viduals had rights not as humans but as citizens. 
The integral identification of public order with legal order con­
stituted a first step in the direction of the total separation of laws from 
the transcendental values which constitute the legitimacy of the legal 
rule. The development of democratic institutions had identified the 
right law with the idea of the formally right law adopted by the repre­
sentatives of the people, or rather by their majority. Once this hap­
pened, the way was open for all theoretical speculations stressing the 
formal aspects of legal rule, and for the method which was char­
acterized by the progressive elimination from legal inquiry of all ele­
ments of reality which were unsuitable for the employment of the 
method. Starting with the age of reason, through the historical school 
and down to the period of positivistic orientation, progress in the 
techniques of legal method signified a constant narrowing of experi­
ence, on which each succeeding generation of learned jurists relied 
for the materials for their scholarly theories. Juridical speculation was 
48 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 182 (1945).  
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finally restricted to the legal rule itself, exclusive of social trends, 
scientific developments, and technical developments affecting social 
and economic facts, which in tum affected the meaning and the func­
tion of legal institutions. The task which Kelsen envisaged for legal 
science was the building of a theory "resulting from the comparative 
analysis of the different positive legal orders." 49 
It was little realized that in the quest for a pure science of law, 
the very idea of restraint in lawmaking, which after all constitutes 
the soul of legal order, is lost. Jean Domat, in attempting a systematic 
arrangement of all the laws of the realm of France, differentiated those 
which were made by the king from those made by the Church. Simul­
taneously, he recognized the force of custom, the rules of law found 
in the Digesta or Codex Justinianus and also some that were made by 
the decisions of the courts. Not all of these laws, however, belonged 
to the same order, as some of the rules were unchangeable, while 
others were imposed at will. Nevertheless, they could not be contrary 
to the laws that were unchangeable, and no one could change laws 
resulting from the nature of things or discoverable by reason. 
For Bodin, the supreme authority was subject to the authority 
of natural and divine law and the law of all nations. While supreme 
authority was exonerated from following the positive law of the state, 
owing to its power to enact new positive laws, it could not alter the 
laws which concerned the state of the realm. The king had to respect 
the property of his subjects and honor royal contracts. Both Domat 
and Bodin would have recognized the value of the Kelsenian inquiry, 
but would not have agreed that it could provide the material to build 
a general system of legal theory. Social reality, which they contem­
plated, told them that such was a futile endeavor. 
Stammler, who represented another trend in the same general 
direction, concerned himself exclusively with the normative and formal 
aspects of law: ''The pure forms . . .  are conceptual methods of order­
. ing . . . .  " In his opinion, any endeavor to establish an ideal legal sys­
tem with a concrete content was futile. It was not possible to conceive 
49 "The general theory, as it is presented in this book, is directed at a 
structural analysis of positive law rather than at a psychological or 
economic explanation of its conditions, or a moral or a political evalua­
tion of its ends." Kelsen, supra note 48, at xiii-xiv. 
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of a legal system which would have a content, however limited in its 
subject matter, which would nevertheless hold good for all times 
and for all peoples. Only pure forms could claim an absolute validity 
of conceptions, and this held true in legal questions as well. Experience 
regarding the normative and formal aspects of the legal rule might 
be arranged according to a fixed and mandatory plan, valid for all 
ages and social conditions. "There are certainly," as Stammler as­
serted, "pure forms of juristic thought which are unconditionally 
necessary as ordering principles for any content of law." 110 
Along different lines, neo-Kantians argued that legal science 
differed from sociology, which was a natural science (Kausalwisse� 
schaft), since legal theories were directed only to the "ought" and 
not to the social fact. Their successors, however, abandoned this dis­
tinction. Thus, sociologists of the positivist conviction claimed that it 
was possible to discover by observation and experience absolute 
mechanical social laws, such having produced all social, political, and 
legal institutions irrespective of human willP 
The positivist sociologist considered the legal norm as a social 
fact in the same sense that Kelsen regarded sociology, i.e., as natural 
science. The most extreme among them, the Nordic school, in fact, 
identified legal analysis with the study of the exercise of power. 
The basic principle of the Nordic theories is the categorization 
of the various phenomena observable in social life into those which 
really matter for the determination of the nature of law and such as 
are important for its analysis. These are to be separated from those 
which constitute legal ideology, sham structure, a figment of imagina­
tion, if not a pure superstition. Stripped of those elements, law is 
but ''a link in the chain of cause and effect. It has a place among the 
facts of the world of time and space." The binding force of law, 
separate from the process of its enforcement, exists, according to this 
view, as a reality only as an idea in the human mind. Law is a fact 
50 Stammler, Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft 17 ( 191 1 ) ;  Stammler, "Funda­
mental Tendencies in Modern Jurisprudence," 21  Mich. L. Rev. 862 ff. 
( 1923 ) .  
51  Verdross, Abendlandische Rechtsphilosophie 180 (1958 ) ;  Pound, supra 
note 18, at 161-62; 1 Pound, Jurisprudence 304 ( 1959) ;  Cohen, "The 
Place of Logic in Law," 29 Harv. L. Rev. 630 ff. ( 1914-16); Olivecrona, 
Law as Fact 16-17 ( 1939 ) .  
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only in the form of pressure exercised on the population. This distinc­
tion, according to Olivecrona, constitutes a dividing line between 
realism and metaphysics, scientific method and mysticism.112 
Somewhat naively, Olivecrona announced that "words" printed 
in the law books were facts, as were ideas evoked in the mind of the 
reader of these words. But if this is reality, in what sense do these 
words in the law books differ from other words in other law books, 
which constitute ideology? In the mind of the judge who renders 
sentence, opined Olivecrona, printed words of the statute met and 
merged with the ideology.11s 
Law as social fact, according to the Nordics, is the norm which 
concerns the application of force. Right and might are not opposites, 
and the relation between those who decide what is to be law and 
those who are subject to the law is one of power. Identification of 
power with the law is complete; power functions through law.114 
Lundstedt, the most radical of the Nordic school, rejected that 
"body of concepts properly called legal ideology, under whose con­
tinued domination jurisprudence has remained in a d�plorable state 
of prescientific wordmongering." Rather, he identified law with the 
very life of mankind in organized groups and with the conditions 
which made social coexistence possible-with the controls which made 
it possible for man to exist in society. Social control consisted of 
legislation and of the legal machinery in action. For Lundstedt, legal 
machinery had one purpose only, and that was "checking the impulses 
of the people" in following their otherwise natural inclinations to make 
use of existing commodities within their reach.1111 
Lundstedt rejected the view that law was the result of a conflict 
between the individual and the collectivity, thus providing a setting 
for the concept of individual rights as counterpoised by the rights 
of the community. "It is impossible," said Lundstedt, "except in an 
imagination entirely divorced from reality, to take the whole and set 
it up in contrast to its parts." Nevertheless, he admitted that it was 
52 Olivecrona, supra note 51,  at 17. 
53 ld. at 19-20. 
54 Ross, On Law and Justice 52-53, 58 ( 1959) ;  Olivecrona, supra note 
51 ,  at 1 34 fl. 
55 Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised 9, 86, 301-2 ( 1956) .  
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possible to speak of "the rights of state against an individual, and vice 
versa." M 
The crux of the matter is that even the state of the rule of law 
is capable of injustice. Such is clearly demonstrated in the fate of 
the minorities and the ever-recurring phenomenon of exceptional 
legislation. To give an example from French practice, it is enough 
to quote the case of the decree law of November 3, 1939, which 
amended Article 83 of the French Criminal Code, and treated as 
crimes "all wilfull acts which by their nature could obstruct national 
defense," if such acts could not be qualified as an offense against the 
external security of the state. After the liberation of France, Executive 
Order of December 26, 1944, created a crime of national indignity, 
which consisted of "wilfull direct or indirect assistance to Germany or 
her allies, or of an attack on the unity of the nation, or on the liberty 
of the French or equality between them." Simultaneously, special 
tribunals were established for trying such offenses. Quite apart from 
the question of whether these measures were dictated by real ex­
pediency, their conflict with the fundamental principles of the French 
criminal law is evident. One might say that this type of legislation is 
in conflict with the very idea of the state, which is considered by the 
positivists to be the legal order itself. However, positivist jurists con­
cede that, according to their criteria, exceptional legislation and retro­
active laws constitute valid rules. Thus, a Danish representative of the 
Nordic school admitted that : 
It has been maintained that Hitler's rule of violence was not a legal order, 
and juridical "positivism" has been accused of moral treason . . . .  But 
a descriptive terminology has nothing to do with moral approval or con­
demnation. While I may classify a certain order as a "legal order," it is 
possible for me at the same time to consider it my highest moral duty 
to overthrow that order. 57 
LEGAL THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
Thus, the theories of the normative school permitted contem­
plation of the systematic arrangement of legal institutions and rendered 
thereby great services to academic studies and legal instruction. On 
56. Jd. at 33. 
51 Ross, supra note 54, at 31-32. 
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the other hand, practical problems, which were the result of the 
changing content of the legal rule, called for a new approach, more 
closely connected with social realities. One of the first questions which 
had to be answered was where to find a scientific guide for the 
action of public authority when the social premises of the existing 
legal order underwent a process of change. The very life of modem 
society had made obsolete the rules of the Code and required the 
various organs of the state, the courts and administrative authorities, 
to discover new meanings and functions for the legal provisions. The 
guide to such actions had to be found in the social sciences, where 
the modem jurist was enjoined to seek understanding of the conflicts 
of interests and to ascertain the purpose of the rule of law. Hence, the 
new trend in jurisprudence abandoned the pretence that law con­
stituted a self-contained discipline and invoked, by way of supplement, 
the use of auxiliary disciplines.�8 
From these auxiliary guides into social reality, the jurist learned 
that the central position, which until then firmly belonged to the 
state, now belonged to society. This called for re-examination of 
basic issues and conceptions. Liberty and property rights were no 
longer conceived to be absolute values limited only by the regard for 
the liberty and property rights of others. Individual rights became 
subordinated to the necessity of conforming with the social order. 
Property, while serving the individual, constituted a factor in the 
general welfare : "Property belongs to an individual on the strength of 
the fact that he belongs to the human society; it constitutes a part 
of the patrimony of all." This was the. new dogma.�9 
The old position of exclusive reliance on positive law, i.e., law 
formally introduced by the competent authorities of the state, was 
no longer adequate. Society was now viewed to tie governed by its 
own rules. In consequence, only a portion of the elements of the 
58 Geny, supra note 19, vol. 1 at 2-3. 
59 Renard, Propriete privee et propriete humaine 2-3 ( 1926) : "Beginnings 
of the new jurisprudence which rejected formal methods of legal inter­
pretation may be traced to Jhering who insisted on the interpretation 
according to the social purpose of the law which is determined by social 
goals and not by the individual will." See also 1 Pound; Jurisprudence 
335; 1 Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht 74-75 (4th ed. 1904);  Jhering, Der 
Besitzwille, ix-x ( 1 889) .  
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positive law was formally given. Others had to be found through the 
process of interpretation. Law was partly science and partly tech­
nique. Legal rule was conservative and constituted a drag on social 
development. One of the functions of modem jurisprudence, then, 
was to gain an up to date understanding of the needs of society. It 
was to promote reinterpret�tion of the rule of law, not only in terms 
of the ageless tenets of legal method, but also in aecord with social 
realities. Hence, the state, but not the legal rule, was relegated to 
subsidiary status in social ordering. Law was conceived as a function 
of social rule, the litigious aspect of law enforcement becoming re­
duced to a matter of technique. Law enforcement was viewed as one 
of the numerous reasons for upholding the legal rule: 
It is quite obvious that a man lives in innumerable legal relations, and 
that with few exceptions, he quite voluntarily performs the duties in­
cumbent upon him because of these relations. One performs one's duties 
as father or son, as husband or wife, does not interfere with one's neigh­
bor's enjoyment of his property, pays one's debts, delivers that which 
one has sold, and renders to one's employer the performance. . . . The 
jurist of course, is ready with the objection that all men perform their 
duties only because they know that the courts shall eventually compel 
them to perform them. If be should take the pains, to which, indeed, be 
is not accustomed, to observe what men do and leave undone, be would 
soon be convinced of the fact that, as a rule, the thought of compulsion 
by the courts does not even enter ilie minds of men.6o 
A different school of thought claimed that: "fundamental changes 
in society are possible without accompanying alterations of the legal 
system." 61 Karl Renner, one of the most distinguished representatives 
of this trend, has suggested the existence of a basic dichotomy be­
tween the normative functions of the legal order and the creative 
functions of social laws. Each of these two social orders, in his view, 
governed separate realms. The law was addressed to individuals, but 
was unable to command the economic development of society: 
The relations between the individual and the natural object, the technical 
power of the �an, the productive capacity of the individual, all those 
60 Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law 21  ( 1936) . 
61 Renner, The Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Functions 
251, 255 ( 1949 ) ;  cf. Weber, On Law in Economy and Society 35-36 
( 1954) .  
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develop under the eye of the law but not by means of the law . . . . Where 
it aims at the control of groups the law cannot do more than to address 
itself to the individual . . .  the law must resolve all collective relations 
among men into rights and duties . of individuals. Wherever men enter 
into a definite but extralegal relationship, as for instance in the form 
of cooperation for manufacture, or a body of factory workers, in actual­
ity they constitute groups whose collective actions are beyond the reach 
of law. Even a casual gathering of the individuals, such as a crowd, de­
velops potentialities for social action outside the direct control of the 
law.62 
Consequently, for Renner, legal rule was not a relevant social 
rule. It could not influence the development and transformation of 
social forms of action. Economic developments, however, did affect 
the legal rule, and deprived of legal force those formally binding 
legal rules which no longer applied to changed economic and social 
conditions. 
The function of the jurist, in Renner's analysis, was to provide 
the bridge between. these two phenomena, i.e., to link the legal order 
with the state and the social forces. Social facts thus were correlated 
with the legal order by providing a foundation for its operation. The 
legal and social orders acknowledged their allegiance to the central 
principle of social organization, described variously as "a complex of 
social facts involved- in the manifold associations and relations which 
make up human society" (Ehrlich) ,  "social interdependence in the 
economic order" (Duguit) ,  or "social solidarity" which constitutes 
the principle of law (Bourgeois) . es 
The institutions · which translate social action into the forms 
current in legal commerce have been variously conceived. Jellinek, 
still standing astride the two systems of rights and the mechanism of 
social functions, resorted to the device of fiction. Thus, true con­
tracts involving individual will were arranged in the same category 
with the quasi contracts which clothe · social action. 64 Hauriou de­
veloped the theory of the institution, which he conceived to be an 
"association of human activities" endowed with significance and con-
62 Renner, supra note 61,  at 255. · 
63 1 Pound, Jurisprudence 335 ff.; Leroy, supra note 37, at 38, 277-78. 
64 Jellinek, L'etat modeme et son droit 74 ff. ( 1904) ; cf. 1 Pound, Juris­
prudence 341; Pound, supra note 18, at 84. 
Terms of Reference 31 
tinuity in a social milieu. The state was one of these institutions. Along 
with other institutions, it provided anchorage for the legal system. 
Renard developed Hauriou's concept still further. Institutions 
represented, to Renard, not only the elements of stability and con­
tinuity, but contained as well an element of progress. While the con­
tractual forms of relations were sporadic, and represented little or 
no continuity, institutions represented the dynamism of social life. 
Renard's new jurisprudence was addressed to the problem of 
liberty in the sense that it tended toward subordination of the in­
dividual will to the rule of reason. Individual will left to itself was 
an · anarchistic element. Social order grounded on the principle of 
social discipline provided the element of balance in the conflict of 
antagonistic forces. The element which unified all people was reason. 
Therefore, the legal system should be redirected from the principle of 
individual will and contract to the principle of order based on in­
stitutions and reason. 
In other words, reason was identified with the scientific approach 
to the problem of lawmaking. Isolated from politics, the latter was 
to be directed only by the scientific findings of the supporting sciences 
which analyzed and established the needs of society. The age of 
politics, with its struggle for freedom, had passed. Freedom had been 
won. The need now was for a better rule of law more adapted to social 
needs.65 
Various authors of the modem sociological school differ in their 
understanding of the role of the state and of the legal order. Socialist 
theories of social change reserve to the state its traditional role as 
guardian of public order. Contrariwise, the main trend of sociological 
jurisprudence calls for a more active role for the state and legal order. 
However, in the system of social organizations the state is only one 
of several constituents, though perhaps the most important. In order 
to be creative, the law would then be required to seek harmony with 
the social rule. 
65 "(L]e virement de l'institutionnel au contractuel denote habituellement 
une malaise, le virement du contractuel vers l'institutionnel un progres." 
Renard, La tbeorie de l'institution 30 (1930) ; also id. at 445-46. Cf. 
Rommen, supra note 47, at 40-41, 55, on the relationships lex-ratio and 
lex-voluntas. 
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According to Duguit, formal standards of legality are not ade­
quate criteria by which to test the validity of the rule of law. The 
latter was that rule which promoted social solidarity. The force of 
law rested in the fact that the people's individual consciences were 
persuaded that this norm could be enforced. Law existed and was 
valid independently of the technique of enforcement by the state. 
But fundamentally, it was not the creation of the state, although 
formally it appeared to be. 
These two concepts, the purposive character of the legal rule 
and the state of individual conscience, determined in Duguit's analysis 
the content and binding force of the law; and on this basis, legal rules 
were integrated with social laws. On this basis also, individual rights 
and interests were identified with the interests of society at large.66 
The sociological school argued against the division of the legai 
system into public and private law, and against the concept of state 
sovereignty. Duguit considered both to be contrary to the principle 
of solidarity. Renner, on the other hand, rejected private law al­
together, as in his opinion it was a system of rules which delegated 
the exercise of public power to private entrepreneurs. The homogeneity 
of the legal system warranted full judicial control of all aspects of 
social activity, whether within the jurisdiction of public authorities, 
social organizations, or private entrepreneurs. 
No less important among the contributions of the sociological 
school were the reforms which increased judicial control of proceed­
ings in civil causes. Thus, with a view to arriving at the material 
truth, the court was permitted to control the flow of evidence and to 
decide for itself what evidence it needed in order to discharge its 
responsibilities. Furthermore, the court was given great powers to 
expedite proceedings in the cases before it. After the reform of German 
civil procedure in 1924, which may be taken as typical of the reforms 
introduced in the period between the wars in the European countries, 
the parties, by joint agreement, could no longer suspend proceedings 
in the case until further motion. The court, on the other hand, could 
order the parties to continue the pleading unless good cause was 
66 1 Duguit, Traite de droit constitutionnel SG-81, 93, 174 (1927); cf. 
Willoughby, The Ethical Bases of Political Authority (1930). 
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shown. Also, as social harmony was the primary value of which laws 
were required to take account, European courts were instructed to 
favor in each stage of proceedings amicable settlement of litiga�ons, 
and to render necessary assistance to the parties to that effect. 
In the field of the criminal law, the sociological sehoul made the 
courts chief instruments of modem penal policy. Criminal courts were 
accorded great powers of punishment, of judicial pardon, and the 
application of preventive, correctional, and therapeutical measures. 
Their aim in the disposal of criminal cases was to assist those who 
promised a return to normal life. 
Of similar import were the powers accorded to the civil courts 
in regard to enforcing private contracts and adjusting relations between 
individual parties according to broader social interests. In particular, 
courts were accorded great powers in the distribution of risks result­
ing from the hazards of modem life. An interesting indication of the 
trend of thought initiated by the sociological school was the proposal 
contained in the draft of the German Civil Code which was prepared 
at the beginning of the present century. According to this proposal 
the court could, in adjudicating a case, adapt the stipulations of a 
private contract to the requirements of public utility and in accordance 
with the commands of morals.67 
At the tum of the century, the work of the sociological school 
was beginning to produce practical results in the form of legislative 
reform.es Its main achievement was the recognition by the legal pro­
fession and the legislators of the need to utilize the new techniques 
for the purpose of realizing the eternal goals of the rule of law within 
the context of new social conditions. 
· The. sociologists have demonstrated that, in order to provide a 
balance between individual rights and the general welfare and security 
of all, the rule of law must abandon its abstract and general form 
and become a more flexible tool of social ordering. Sociologists have 
67 For the listing of the most important works of the early period of the 
sociological school see 1 Geny, supra note 19, v ff.; cf. Leroy, supra 
note 37, at 84. 
68 Pound, "The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence," 19 The Green Bag 
607 (1907). 
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also taught that it is necessary to take account of social and economic 
disparities rather than to insist on the equality of all members of the 
community under law. 
· 
This shift in the ideas concerning the function of the rule of 
law was occasioned by the realization of social environment as the 
milieu which shapes the forces of progress responsible for the condi­
tions of life. In addition, it has been recognized that the role of the 
state has had to be correspondingly enlarged in order to maintain 
social peace. The state, although no longer enjoying the pre-eminence 
accorded to it by the positivists, bas t:emained the most important 
and most general social institution affording protection to individual 
rights. In the final analysis, then, sociologists have added a new di­
mension to the concept of legal order, though still inspired by the idea 
that the rule of law represents a balance between the general welfare 
and individual liberty. 
Chapter II 
LAW, STATE, AND SOCIETY 
GROWTH OF THE SOCIALIST RECHTSSTAAT 
A collective work of Soviet jurists to celebrate forty years of 
Soviet legal order has stressed that the Soviet system has resulted 
from the achievement of the masses: 
The Soviet state emerged not on the basis of some written statutes, but 
as a result of the direct initiative of the masses, which had destroyed in 
the course of the revolution of the old order, the old legality, the old 
system of authorities, which have created in its stead its own system of 
power, its own governmental agencies.l 
While this description is undoubtedly true regarding that part 
of the process which consisted of overthrowing the old regime, the 
Soviet regime itself was rather the result of political and military 
action conducted from the center. The victory of the Bolshevik Party 
was followed by the gradual integration of the revolutionary authorities 
into a single system of controls. Before its accomplishment, however, 
large parts of Russia lived without any system of government and 
without a legal order. 
Decrees and instructions which flowed from the center of the 
revolutionary government might give the impression that from the 
very beginning the new regime was firmly entrenched and was able to 
afford new freedoms and a new social structure to the working masses 
of Russia. The Soviet professors, in continuing their description of 
the initial years of the Soviet order, have painted a grandiose picture 
of the various programs of social reform which occupied the minds 
of the new leaders: 
1 Sorok let sovetskogo prava 16 (1957). 
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It is enough to become acquainted with the first decrees of the Soviet 
power to realize how energetically the law making of the masses de­
veloped. . . . History shows that building the new social and govern­
mental order in our country is indissolubly linked with the historic decrees 
of Soviet government on peace, on land, on establishment of the Council 
of People's Commissars, on the workers inspection, on the.nationalization 
of banks and basic means of production, on the eight-hour working day, 
on the judiciary, etc. 
In the same breath they admit, however, that the legislative activ­
ity of those days was far from being conceived as a measure of govern­
ment. Rather, it was regarded as an act of propaganda and of class 
warfare. Lenin, speaking to the Eighth Party Congress, indicated that 
not all of these decrees could be enforced at once and fully. They 
were only a form of an appeal for bringing the masses into the polit­
ical struggle on the side of the Bolshevik Party: 
[S]hould we have refrained from pointing the way in the new decrees, 
we would have been traitors to socialism. . . . Our decrees were an ap­
peal, but not an appeal in the formal meaning such as "workers arise, 
overthrow the bourgeoisie." No, it was an appeal to the masses, to under­
take a concrete task. Decrees were instructions, calling for a mass partici­
pation in practical work.2 
Thus, the first decrees of the Soviet government were not de­
signed to possess absolute binding force, even in the· eyes of their 
authors. They were, according to the definition of Trotsky, "the pro­
gram of the Party uttered in the language of power" and, as such, 
"rather a means of propaganda than of administration." 8 In 1917 
Lenin wrote: 
It does not matter that many points in our decrees will never be carried 
out; their task is to teach the masses how to take practical steps .... We 
shall not look at them as at absolute rules to be carried out under all 
circumstances.' 
2 Id. at 47-48. 
3 Trotsky, Moia zhizn 65 (1930). 
4 16 Lenin, Sochinenia 149 (1924). As to the temper of the times, see 
Hazard, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society 2-3 (1960). The author 
wishes to acknowledge his debt to this capital work on the formative 
years of Soviet legal institutions. Cf. also Reisner, "Law, Our Law, 
Foreign Law, General Law," in Soviet Legal Philosophy 93 (Babb transl., 
1951). 
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Similarly, the beginnings of the Soviet courts had little in com­
mon with the regular administration of justice. There was no order 
or plan in the activity of the various self-styled courts and tribunals, 
such as are now included in the genealogy of the Soviet judicial sys­
tem. Rather, the revolutionary administration of justice was character­
ized by the activity of several self-organized courts, which took their 
authority from the general spirit of revolt, and not from the central 
authorization. 5 
According to the description of a Soviet historian of the early 
days of the Soviet order, the revolutionary administration of justice 
began with the activity of several self-organized courts and revolu­
tionary tribunals, avowedly created by the decrees of the Central 
Executive Committee of the Soviets. The first was the "Petrograd 
War-Revolutionary Committee" whose "penalizing activity became 
one of the sources of the new law and the new socialist legality." 
Several other courts followed, such as "Provisional People's Courts," 
"Courts of Social Conscience," "Inquiry Commissions," etc.6 
These courts made their own rules and established their own 
powers, in such terms as, for example: 
Courts of authority, enjoying full confidence among the people; Courts 
of conscience, not bound by any existing laws. . . . (Rules of the People's 
Provision Court of the Government of Kuznetz). 
The Rules of the Provisional Revolutionary Court of the Govern­
ment of Novgorod provided: 
The Court decides on the issues by conscience, on the basis of its own 
conviction. (sec. 15.) In imposing punishment upon the guilty person, 
the court is not bound by any existing laws, but is authorized to use the 
existing criminal laws for non-obligatory reference. (sec. 18.) 7 
Developments in the first years of Soviet lawmaking and the 
administration of justice in Russia were dramatically but neatly sum­
marized in the Guilding Principles of the Criminal Law of the RSFSR 
of December 12, 1919, which stated: 
5 Cf. Stuchka, "Otchet Narodnago Komissara Iustitsii," 1 Proletarskaia 
Revolutsia i Pravo 33 (No. 1, 1918).  
6 Gertsenson et  al., Istoria Sovetskogo ugolovnogo prava 81,  101 ( 1948). 
7 Materialy Narkomyusta 42-48 (1918). 
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The proletariat, having won power in the October Revolution, smashed 
the bourgeois apparatus, which served to oppress the working masses . 
. . . It is self-evident that all the codes of the bourgeois law, all bourgeois 
law as a system of legal rules, had the same part to play, namely to 
maintain by organized force the balance of interests of the various classes 
of society to the advantage of the ruling classes. . . . Since the proletariat 
could not adapt to its purposes the bourgeois codes of the outlived epochs, 
which ought to have been placed in historical archives. Without special 
rules, without codes of law, the armed masses have been and still are 
coping with their oppressors. In the course of the struggle with their 
class enemies the proletariat is applying various measures of force, but 
it has applied these during the early period without any special system 
as each case required and without organization. The experience of the 
struggle has accustomed the proletariat to uniform measures, has led 
to systematization, has given birth to the new law. Almost two years of 
this struggle have already provided the opportunity to present the results 
as a concrete manifestation of proletarian law; to draw conclusions and 
the necessary generalizations. 8 . 
While the political aspects of legalistic anarchy were gratifying 
to the new aspirants to the control of government in Russia; the 
absence of legal order was not an unmixed blessing. The official 
optimism of the leaders found the situation on the legal front in­
spiring and promising of new solutions to problems of law and justice 
within the framework of the new socialist civilization. This was 
paralleled, however, by the more sober tone of practical measures, by 
which it was sought to channel revolutionary sentiment into some 
common pattern of action. While accepting the repeal of the old laws, 
the new regime suggested adoption of orderly procedures in the 
process of repeal. The Decree of December 7, 1917, on the Judiciary 
instructed the new People's Courts, which were to supplant the courts 
of the Tsarist regime, to apply the laws of the previous government 
insofar as they were not abrogated by the Revolution and did not 
contradict the "revolutionary conscience and revolutionary concept 
of law." The second decree on the Judiciary, enacted in February 
1918, created District People's Courts. These were to dispose of the 
cases pending in the old courts, and were instructed to follow judicial 
statutes of 1 864 regarding their procedure. Further, the new judges 
8 Sob. uzak. sec. 590 (no. 66, 1919). 
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were required to state the reasons why the court in each case "abro­
gated one law or another as obsolete or capitalist." Finally, the Statute 
on the People's Courts of the RSFSR of November 30, 1918, definitely 
prohibited any citation of prerevolutionary law in court decisions. The 
courts were instructed to "render their decisions on the basis of the 
enactments of the Workers and Peasants Government and of the 
revolutionary consciousness of the judges." 9 
The text of the enactments would suggest that the Soviet govern­
ment moved step by step in order to replace an orderly administration 
of justice with a regime of anarchy and terror. In fact, anarchy and 
lawlessness were present; and while the regime depended on anarchy 
for the success of the revolution, it attempted to put some order into 
the operation of its own courts by the correlation of this activity to 
such laws as were available. The Decree of November 1918 seems to 
indicate that the regime recognized for the time being the futility of 
its attempts in this direction. Consequently, one may question whether 
successive steps toward freeing people's courts from the bondage of 
the laws of the old regime were the result of the growing revolutionary 
temper of the Soviet leadership, or rather that the regime was forced 
to accept the existing situation.10 
In spite of the official optimism of the leaders, the initial practice 
of the Soviet courts held little promise that their activities per se 
could lead to a system of socialist law. A Soviet historian of the early 
days of the administration of justice indeed demonstrated that with­
out central action no systematic and orderly application of common 
standards of justice would be possible. Lynch trials were quite com­
mon. On many occasions criminals were shot without trial. Sentences 
of death were imposed frequently by popular vote and sometimes were 
carried out by burning. In a village near Orlov, a man was put to 
death by 59 votes against 40. Sometimes whole groups of people 
suspected of robbery, and on one occasion a pregnant woman, were 
burned at the stake while the whole community watched. Some death 
sentences were executed by cutting the convicted man to pieces, or by 
9 Grzybowski, "Continuity of Law in Eastern Europe," 6 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 48-49 (1957). 
10 1 Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law 280 (1948). 
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throwing him onto hay forks. When a Red Army soldier was put on 
trial for killing a thief, his fellow soldiers nearly revolted because 
they were unable to grasp what the offender's crime was.11 
The action of Soviet authority took two courses. In the first 
place, as their control over the country increased, the central author­
ities replaced local courts with their own institutions. These possessed 
standardized organization and standardized jurisdiction and operated 
on the basis of uniform procedural legislation. Secondly, the regime 
sought to replace vague ideas about revolutionary justice with statutory 
enactments which finally grew into a system of codes. 
Not in all these fields were Soviet policies clear and well reasoned 
from their inception. The initial concern was with the mechanism 
rather than with the substantive law. While a uniform system of 
courts was established with considerable dispatch, their operation 
and manner of rendering justice belied their uniformity of organiza­
tion.12 Not only was the regime little concerned with legal refinements 
in the enforcement of the legal order, but it experienced great doubts 
as to some of the fundamental questions of the legal order in a 
revolutionary country. In particular, the regime was troubled by the 
question of what kind of law a socialist country should have. 
The original ideas as to the kind of law a socialist country might 
need were related to the modem trends in Western European thought. 
This latter tradition tended to favor free judicial interpretation of 
statutes rather than the formal analysis of text. One might have serious 
doubts whether extremist views on the subject entertained by some 
of the Soviet jurists in leading positions were widely shared by their 
colleagues. Nevertheless, the Commissar of Justice considered the 
situation in which courts were called upon to administer justice with­
out any substantive law whatsoever as a great achievement of the 
revolution. Viewing the situation in the Russian Courts at the be­
ginning of 1919, he stated: 
Neither Roman law nor bourgeois law gave such authority to a judge. 
Perhaps we can find soine analogy in more ancient primitive law. But 
one has only to consider the whole complexity of contemporary social 
relationships and to contrast these with the primitive use which was de-
ll lsayev, Obshchaia chast ugolovnogo prava 63 ff., 86 (1925). 
12 Hazard, supra note 4, at 477. 
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veloped into a norm by the elders by custom, and by other sources of 
primitive law to grasp the immeasurable difference between the sources 
of primitive law and the new law created by the proletarian revolution.18 
He emphasized that: 
The bourgeois judge can only complete the statute by interpretation. 
The scope of the proletarian People's Court is much wider .. In its basic 
function-criminal prosecution-the People's Court is absolutely free 
and is guided above all by its consciousness of law.H 
He was certain that "the proletariat was not disappointed when 
it gave the courts such a strong weapon as the freedom of law mak­
ing.'� 111 
The idea that the socialist order of economy might dispense 
with an elaborate legal system was not a Soviet invention, but was 
born in Western Europe.18 In the initial years of the revolutionary 
state, the new legal order was identified directly with a set of principles 
born out of the revolution. The Decree of November 23, 1917, de­
scribed them as "revolutionary consciousness of law.'' The Decree of 
March 7, 1918, had a similar provision which prescribed that since 
the courts were not restricted in their functions by any formal law, 
they should be guided by their "concept of justice." The third Decree 
on Courts of July 20, 1918, mentioned again "socialist conscience" 
as a source of law, along with the decrees of the revolutionary govern­
ment. The same provision also appeared in the Decree of November 
30, 1918, which provided that "in deciding all issues, the People's 
Court shall apply the decrees of the government of the Workers and 
Peasants, and, in case of the absence of a decree or its incompleteness 
shall be guided by the socialist consciousness of law.'' 
Thus, the Soviet judge was to be free from any familiarity with 
the legal rule except for a few applicable governmental decrees. This 
position was eventually confirmed by the Party program adopted at 
the Eighth Party Congress of the All Russian Communist Party 
13 Kurskii, "Novoe ugolovnoe prave,'' 2 Proletarskaia Revolutsia i Pravo 
24 (No. 2-4, 1919); cf. Timasheff, "The Impact of the Penal Law of 
Imperial Russia on Soviet Penal Law," 12 American Slavic and East 
European Rev. 445 (1953). 
14 Kurskii, supra note 13, at 47. 
15 Id., at 55. 
16 Cf. supra Chapter I. 
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(March 1919) .  Then the judges, elected by the Soviets, were in­
structed to realize the will of the proletariat by applying their decrees. 
In the event of absence or incompleteness of the latter, they were to 
follow their socialist consciousness of law,17 
However, there is evidence that even at that early stage there 
were doubts in high governmental circles as to the wisdom of unguided 
judicial lawmaking, particularly as the number of decrees enacted by 
the new regime grew considerably. In this connection, the Sixth All 
Russian Extraordinary Session of the Soviets passed at the end of 
1918 a resolution "on strict observance of laws." The resolution stated 
that "the working class of Russia has during one year of revolutionary 
struggle laid foundations for the laws of the RSFSR," the strict ob­
servance of which was declared to be indispensable for the further 
development and the strengthening of the Government of Workers 
and Peasants in Russia. The resolution further called upon all citizens, 
official persons and authorities to obey strictly the laws of the RSFSR.18 
The first step toward providing some order in the administration 
of justice by the new courts was the promulgation of the so-called 
"Guiding Principles," adopted on December 2, 1919.19 By this means 
was initiated a specifically Soviet legislative technique of providing 
central government directives for the creative improvisation of the 
legal order by the lower echelons of authority. After the federal struc­
ture was adopted, the Guiding Principles were to provide those basic 
guide lines to be followed by the legislation of the federal republics. 
The purpose, of course, was to maintain the uniformity of those 
legal aspects which constituted the basic principles of policy. Contrary 
to later practice, however, the Guiding Principles of 1919 were to be 
directly enforced by the courts, which were, nevertheless, to enjoy . 
a large measure of freedom in devising rules of law applicable to in­
dividual cases. 
The Guiding Principles did not constitute a complete code of 
criminal law. Rather, their purpose was to "make a balance sheet 
of achievements, and, for the sake of economy of effort, to establish 
rules and methods of defeating the class enemies for· the transition 
17 Cf. Hazard, supra note 4, at 62. 
18 Sob. uzak., sec. 908 (No. 90, 1918). 
19 ld., sec. S90 (No. 66, 1919). 
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period of the proletarian dictatorship." Their function may be com­
pared, therefore, to that of the General Part in the criminal codes of 
Europe. The latter provide guidance for the courts in terms of penal 
policies; whereas, a special part provides penalties for individual 
crimes. 
The second step was the enactment of a series of codes for the 
Soviet state. 
In the system of codes, which represented a response to the new 
situation under the NEP (New Economic Policy, 1921-1927) when 
the Russian economy was to return temporarily to capitalist forms 
of production, only the criminal law was to retain the unadulterated 
character of a class measure. The new labor code was to establish a 
regime in which the Soviet worker would again be employed in a 
private enterprise. The civil codes, the first in Russian history to 
provide a uniform private law for the entire country, were also to 
protect the interests of the national economy by promoting condi­
tions which would favor industrial enterprise. Only the criminal law 
was to protect the interests of the socialist order of things, and only 
in the field of criminal legislation could the experience of the revolu­
tionary period be used. 
The first move for a full-fledged criminal code preceded by some 
time the advent of the NEP. Such proposals were formulated by the 
Third All Russian Convention of the Workers of Soviet Justice 
(June 1920).  The code itself was the result of a number of drafts. 
In the course of the discussion, it was also proposed that Soviet courts 
should return to the criminal code of 1903, which was a progressive 
piece of legislation and an outstanding example of modem legislative 
technique. Commissar of Justice Kurskii came out with a proposal 
which he believed would salvage as much as possible from the experi­
ence of the socialist administration of justice. He proposed that the 
Code should refrain from providing a full list of definitions covering 
all possible offenses. In addition to a general part stating the general 
purpose of the penal policy and general principles of criminal law, 
the Code should contain, he believed, only a few general characteris­
tics of crimes which the courts would apply to individual situations 
by the method of analogy.2o 
20 Materialy Narkomyusta, vol. 11-12 (1921). 
SO Soviet Legal Institutions 
The Code as it was finally adopted employed a number of the 
proposals advanced by Kurskii. Such was thought to be essential in a 
Code without a full list of crimes. 
In the first place, the Code of 1922 gave a material definition of 
a crime as an act dangerous to the social order (Article 6): 
Crime is  every socially dangerous act of omission endangering the founda­
tions of the Soviet system and legal order established by the Govern­
ment of Workers and Peasants for the period during the transition to 
the communist system. 
Furthermore, the new Code defined the dangerous character of 
the offender in terms of activity harmful to society or seriously im­
periling social order. It also formulated the principle of analogy which 
was to remain the feature of Soviet law until its removal in 1958. 
Article 10 of the Code of 1922 stated: 
In case of absence of a direct provision for a particular kind of crime 
in the Criminal Code, the punishment by means of social defense shall 
apply, ... according to those articles of the Criminal Code, which pro­
vide for crimes most similar as to importance and kind. 
FROM POPULAR TO THE SCIENTIFIC LAW 
One of the architects of the Soviet legal system described the 
situation in the early days of the revolutionary regime as follows: 
... our Marxists were utterly devoid of interest in problems of law 
and legal ideology, notwithstanding the fact that even the revolution it­
self and the period of war communism following thereafter posed prob­
lems of the utmost importance ... as to the relations of the proletariat 
to law. 
He continued: 
This accounts for the astonishing sobriety and reality of principles and 
the plans established exclusively on the basis of expediency rather than 
upon the basis of justice or of formal principles of abstract authority.21 
Absence of theoretical formulations in the official doctrines on 
legislative policies did not leave the early Soviet lawmakers without 
guidance. Indeed, Soviet legislators fell back on the well established 
doctrines and teachings of modem legal science. So, for instance, the 
21 Reisner, supra note 4, at 92. 
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Section on the Judiciary in the 1919 Communist Party Program in­
dicated that the Soviet courts were applying such advanced institu­
tions as suspended sentence, public censure instead of punishment� 
and labor instead of confinement. Further, the formula to be employed 
by the courts in supplying the law in the event of statutory silence 
sounds very familiar to the ear of one conversant with Article 1 of 
the Swiss Civil Code or Article 12 of the Italian Civil Code of 1 942.22 
Professor Hazard has called attention to the resolution passed by the 
general assembly of Moscow judges, which protested against setting 
aside a court sentence by an administrative authority. It is significant 
that the resolution, introduced by Pashukanis, gained acceptance in 
spite of the doctrine of the unity of the People's power-a rule of 
Soviet constitutionalism.23 The resolution of the Third All Russian 
Convention of Workers of Soviet Justice, referred to above, in recom­
mending codification of the Soviet criminal law, expressed the con­
viction that a codified statute was a better method of assuring the 
proper administration of justice than by appealing to the revolutionary 
or proletarian consciousness or conscience. 
The jurists who sat in the councils of Soviet government were 
concerned with the improvement of the quality of Soviet Codes once 
they had been enacted and with the assurance of higher standards of 
the administration of justice. Their purpose was to avoid favoritism 
and partiality, and to assure the intervention of the class principle 
only in cases where the interests of society as a whole, in terms of 
the communist doctrine, were involved. 24 
The process which took place in the post-revolutionary years in 
the Soviet Union cannot be interpreted by. the conflict between the 
two prevalent orientations of the day. The first of these had called 
for the organization of national life and governmental action according 
to that understanding of Marxism which was inclined to see in legal 
institutions something which was characteristic of the capitalist society. 
The other had followed the so-called legal line which posited the use­
fulness of the legal rule in the period of transition to higher forms of 
social organization. In the final analysis, the political conflict purged 
22 Hazard, supra note 4, at 62. 
23 Id., at 17. 
24 ld., at 433. 
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both doctrines in favor of Stalin, who could neither be accused of being 
legalistically minded nor sympathetic to the doctrines of Kurskii, 
Stuchka, and Pashukanis. The conflict between the two groups, in 
essence, centered upon the point of whether a modem legal system 
could be devised for Russia without employing techniques belonging 
to the European tradition. There was no conflict as to political or 
social aims of the legal order. Russian jurists, who supported the 
legal line, wanted socialist law to correspond to certain standards of 
codification and to certain formal standards of operation. In a sense, 
Russian jurists, though revolutionaries, could not escape their own 
background. As Max Weber said: 
[A] body of law can be "rationalized" in various ways and by no means 
necessarily. in the direction of the development of its "juristic" qualities. 
The direction in which these formal qualities develop is, however, con­
ditioned directly by "intrajuristic" conditions; the particular character 
of the individuals who are in a position to influence "professionally" 
the ways in which the law is shaped. Only indirectly is this development 
influenced, however, by general economic and social conditions. The 
prevailing type of legal education, i.e., the mode of training practitioners 
of the law, has been more important than any other factor.25 
Thus, the conflict between the two tendencies was resolved by 
the introduction of legal doctrines inspired without exception by the 
patterns and models borrowed from the West. 
The problems of simplicity in court structure, of the involvement 
of the lay element, and of the informality of judicial procedure were 
major issues of legal reform in the West. European jurisprudence had, 
in fact, devoted great attention to these questions since the second half 
of the nii:teteenth century. The crop of civil and criminal procedures 
produced in the interwar years was inspired by the same ideas. 26 Soviet 
criminal legislation represented an effort to formulate the penal policies 
of the Soviet state in the terminology of the Italian Scuola Positiva.21 
Institutions of the Soviet Civil Code of 1 922 were framed upon the 
patterns borrowed from the two modem codes of Switzerland and 
Germany. And, many of its provisions were incorporated from the 
draft of the Russian Civil Code prepared before the War.28 
25 Weber, On Law in Economy and Society 97 (1954) .  
26 Cf.  supra at  15 ,  38-39. 
27 Cf. infra at 184, 190, 200. 
28 1 Gsovski, supra note 10, at 24-25; cf. Timasheff, supra note 13. 
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In spite of the official theory that Soviet law was the product 
of popular ideas of law, the initial years witnessed a great concern 
with the modem techniques of criminology of Western Europe. In­
deed, extensive researches were conducted in the best traditions of 
the sociological school of Liszt.29 
Long after that period and well into the post-Stalinist period, the 
Full Civil Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court had adopted a di­
rective which stated the simple convictions animating the work of 
Russian jurists of the initial years, before Stalin's ascendance to power: 
In every state, irrespective of its type, civil procedure in its broadest 
form . . .  serves to protect civil rights, property rights, and claims based 
on those rights. The qualitative difference of the socialist state and law 
from the state and law of the exploiters, different class nature of the 
administration of justice in the socialist state, are unable to affect this 
function of the civil procedure, as long as the state and law shall con­
tinue to exist-which is and will be, to afford protection to private 
rights in the form of state coercion. so 
These borrowings did not prevent the products of socialist law­
making from being inferior. The Criminal Code was a mixture of 
ideas and concessions made to extraneous influences. The Civil Code 
was a hasty and inexpert work which again fell short of the great 
models which it endeavored to imitate. Even so, Soviet legislation, 
with all its imperfections, was not responsible for the questionable 
conditions of the administration of justice and the level of juristic 
thinking in the Soviet Union. The regime in Russia which followed 
the ascendance to Stalin's power was not a Rechtsstaat, but a police 
state. 
THE PATTERN OF STALIN'S STATE 
Leon Duguit had made his principle of social interdependence 
the starting point for an attack on the concept of sovereignty. The 
state was not an institution with a distinct personality, and public 
power was not separate from social facts. The state had to enact laws, 
but these laws were to correspond to the fact of social interdependence. 
The state had to conform to the laws which it made; and judges, ad-
29 Cf. infra at 206. 
30 Decision of the Full Civil Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court of 
Feb. 12, 1955, PiP 290 (No. 7-8, 1955). 
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ministrators, and legislators were to act within the powers which it 
created until it was changed or abrogated. 
For Duguit, the existence of social groups and the principle of 
social interdependence dictated the content of laws and determined 
mutual relations between the mechanism of government, the social 
structure, and the rule of law. As the content of the legal rule was 
the result of social solidarity, the governing apparatus could not be 
sovereign. As society did not perform public services itself (Duguit 
rejected the concept of public power), society was not sovereign. In 
other words, the identification of the content of the legal rule with 
the content of social solidarity and the integration of the mechanism 
of government into the social structure resolved the problem of the 
state and social relations. In addition, it eliminated the need for the 
concept of sovereignty as an attribute of the state, as something 
separate from the social milieu. Society was simply the environment 
in which was produced the phenomenon of the state, which, in tum, 
was the division between the governing group and the govemed.81 
The first Soviet theoretical answer as to the place of each of 
three components, the state, the law, and the society, in the process 
of change was dictated by the conviction that social action (class 
struggle) was the motor of progress. According to Stuchka, Pashu­
kanis, and their followers, law had a function in the society, but once 
the institution of property disappeared, the state and law would dis­
appear as well.82 Action by the state could produce little change in 
social structures. Even the act of nationalization (particularly national­
ization of the land) and expropriation of the exploiting class did not 
by themselves constitute a transition from the lower level of social 
existence to higher forms of cooperation. This would take time and 
would be achieved by the establishment of new economic institutions. 
3 1  C/. supra at 38 ff. 
In contrast with Duguit, Karl Renner denied the state and law a· 
creative role in social processes. For Eugen Ehrlich law enforcement 
was a social process, and individual response in terms of obedience to 
the rule of law was ·predicated on facts independent of the state power. 
Nordics, on the other hand, reduced the problem of the correlation of 
the social structures, the state, and the legal rule to the issue of exercise 
of power in order to realize the interests of the state. 
32 Pashukanis, Allgemeine Rechtslehre und Marxismus ( 1929); Stuchka, 
Introduction a Ia theorie du droit civil ( 1926). 
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In fact, the theories of Pashukanis described quite correctly the 
situation in Russia as it existed after the Revolution, and particularly 
under the NEP. However, once the state undertook to manage and 
plan for the economic development of Russia, a new theory had to 
be worked out. 
The new theory was the result of a clash between two Marxist 
orientations. The deterministic interpretation of history, stressing the 
spontaneity of social processes, was superseded by the theory which 
insisted that Marxist determinism and concern with the economic 
forms of social activity were compatible with intervention in order to 
hasten the march of history. The policy of the five-year plan brought 
about a flood of regulations, directives, instructions, and other enact­
ments to marshal national resources and organize industrial enter­
prises, to regulate consumption and production, and to bring about 
a conscious and planned realization of socialist society. Direct ties 
between the legal rule and economic life were not broken, but strength­
ened. If, as according to Pashukanis, law was bourgeois and the 
economy was socialist, then under Stalin's theoretical assumption, 
both law and economy could be socialist in content and function. The 
nature of the legal rule was determined not so much by its institutions 
and forms, as by its social purpose. 
The Soviet mechanism of change thus represented a marshaling 
of all three elements-law, social structures, and the state-combined 
with the principle of a deterministic concept for the purpose of social 
action. As a Soviet scholar wrote at the time when the Soviet Union 
was facing mortal danger of German aggression: 
Every society, irrespective of its form, follows laws based on objective 
necessity. In the socialist society this necessity acts as the economic law 
conditioned by the external situation of the society, by all historical 
antecedents of its development; this objective necessity perceived by 
men, infiltrated into the conscience and the will of the people--in the 
persons of the builders of the socialist society, as the leading and or­
ganizing force of the society, the Soviet state and the Communist party, 
directing the activity of the masses.sa 
This objective necessity was translated into direct and concrete 
commands of Soviet laws. Thus, Vyshinskii, attacking legal "nihilism" 
33 Pod Znamenem Marksizma 45 (No. 7-8, 1943 ) .  
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and sociological tendencies in law, wrote: "Stuchka and his adherents 
liquidated law as a separate, specific social category, they drowned 
law in economics, deprived it of its active creative role." 34 
As an important Soviet jurist wrote at the time when five-year 
plans became a permanent factor in Soviet life: 
[I]t would be a mistake to consider economy as the only factor deter­
mining the understanding of the historical processes. One must take 
into consideration Marxian teachings on the mutual relations between the 
basis and the superstructure and of the bearing which the superstructure 
may exercise in tum upon its economic basis, so as to cause its further 
development and change. Politics are not a mere impression moulded 
from economy, as the vulgar materialists try to represent them, but the 
conclusion drawn from a generalization of the economy. 
Politics are fully expressive of the economic level which conditions the 
class content of the state activity, in shaping by legal regulation the rela­
tions between the classes, the influence of the state on the development 
of the sciences, of arts, and vice versa the influence of the superstructure 
on the economic basis. 
Politics, state and law-represent the three sides of a single process; 
politics (a full expression. of the economic system) constitutes a trans­
mission belt which sets law and state in motion and correlates their 
cooperation and relationship.811 
If for the principle of social interdependence the principle of 
inexorable progress is substituted, the theoretical construction of the 
Duguit type resembles Soviet formulations of the correlation of the 
society, state, and law .. The real difference, which on first sight does 
not seem to be of key importance, is in the concept of the role of 
the elite. The governing group bad to render public services and was 
bound by its own laws. According to Trainin, the policy of the Soviet 
government and of the Communist Party was· determined by actual 
economic conditions, not by the content of the law. This was because 
. the governing group had a better understanding of the tasks which 
faced society than the rest of the social structure. 
34 Vysbinskii, Teoria gcisudarstva i prava 78 ( 1945) .  
35 Trainin, "Gosudarstvo stroiushchegosia kommunizma," Izvestia Akademii 
Nauk SSSR, Otdelenie Ekonomiki i Prava 7-8 (No. 5, 1945) ;  cf. Guins, 
Soviet Law and Soviet Society 4 ( 1954). 
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The Soviet Constitution of 1936 affords to citizens the right to 
form associations as well as the unlimited capacity to join already 
existing ones (Article 126). The best among them may join the Com­
munist Party, which holds a central place in the entire spectrum of 
social and governmental organizations by providing a nucleus in the 
state and social organization. Thus, what had begun as a concept of 
right, has ended as the principle of order, in much the same manner 
that democracy is predicated upon the citizen's willingness to par­
ticipate in the government of the community. 
Georges Gurvich in his systematization of legal sociology dis­
tinguished between kinds of law, frameworks of law, and systems of 
law. A system of law, in his view, consisted of a number of frameworks 
of law within which various kinds of law competed. Translated into 
less technical terminology, any legal system of a polity consisted of 
a number of legal orders such as state law, cooperative law, family 
law, and trade union law. Within their framework, these legal orders 
accommodated different kinds of law such as feudal ... aw, bourgeois law, 
American law, etc. Without going into further analysis of this formula­
tion, it is enough to state that the present chapter is devoted to an 
examination of the various frameworks of law and their correlation 
within the legal Soviet order. This approach will permit the tracing of 
the interconnections between various social organizations and the sys­
tem of Soviet authorities. It will further permit the distinction between 
those parts of the framework of law of each social group which con­
stitute a genuine part of the framework from others which represent 
an intrusion originating outside and, in the final analysis, representing 
a distortion of the group's social function.36 
The theories of Gurvich are, as is already obvious, the result 
of the observation that a legal system of a polity is never the product 
of a single lawmaking agent. Rather, it is viewed as owing its existence 
to the interaction of many sources. Law consists of frameworks born 
of the needs and functions of what Gurvich calls real collective units. 
Through these frameworks are introduced elements of a legal system 
36 Gurvich, Sociology of Law 198-203 (1942). 
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which either reflect specific rules for various social groups or for 
various alien kinds of law.a7 
Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution, which contains the prin­
ciple of the penetration of the Communist Party into the viscera of 
each social organization, represents the basic plan for the correlation 
of social forces and the integration of social and governmental organ­
izations. These latter include local administrative authority, profes­
sional organizations, and economic institutions. The characteristic 
feature of the social and political order of the Soviet society is that 
none of these organizations exclusively belongs to any of the two 
categories-society or state-and each of them owes its existence to 
the fact that it constitutes a channel for the coordination of human 
masses. 
The Soviet administrative system, which finally emerged as a 
single system of elective authorities throughout the federal Union, has 
its roots in the dual tradition of public administration in Europe. Ac­
cording to this pattern, national affairs are handled by the central 
government with field offices, while local affairs are administered by 
local elective institutions. These latter are sometimes limited only to 
the communal level and sometimes are organized on the territorial 
basis; nevertheless, in p�ciple they remain independent on each level, 
and are not subject to the control from the national center. In pre­
revolutionary Russia ( 1870),  territorial and municipal government 
had been a center of important governmental reforms, and quite 
early some of the revolutionary parties saw in the institutions of local 
government a beginning of the future socialist regime for Russia. The 
Bolsheviks, however, came out against such notions and favored a 
single system of elective authorities handling all aspects of adminis­
trative activities, both national and local. World War I greatly weak­
ened local government in Russia, and after the revolution, earlier 
territorial and municipal government played practically no part in 
the establishment of the new order. Functions of local government, if 
there were any left, were taken over by the revolutionary soviets­
workers, peasants, or soldiers-which provided foundations for the 
future system of Soviet administration. Quite soon, it was resolved 
37 Gurvich, L'6xperience juridique et Ia philosophic pluraliste du droit 
138ft. ( 1935) .  
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that all distinction between local and national affairs should disappear 
from the jurisdiction and powers of the administrative authorities of 
the revolutionary state. This approach to the management of public 
affairs was combined with the repudiation of the system of the sepa­
ration of powers. 88 Local revolutionary Soviets wielded, whenever and 
wherever they could, dictatorial powers without distinction of func­
tions, and frequently clashed with more specialized agencies of the 
new political order, i.e., judicial agencies. Following the adoption of 
the Soviet Constitution of 1 936, the Soviets were reorganized into 
Soviets of deputies of the workers and peasants, elected for each level 
of public administration. 
The chief method of integration of various agencies belonging 
to the various levels of government, whether federal or local, is the 
power of the purse which under the Constitution of 1936 (Article 14 
(k)) belongs to  the Union. 
In the West of Europe, the original theory of the independent 
commune, exercising its quasi-natural right to self-government, 
greatly lost its appeal. It was replaced by the theory that the essence 
of public administration consisted in the exercise of public power 
irrespective of the type of administrative authority, and later by the 
view that public services were the responsibility of both local govern­
ment and centralized administration. The result has been the integra­
tion of administrative systems through the method of delegated powers 
and a general increase of local responsibilities. This has occurred, how­
ever, without prejudice to the original powers of local government, 
which still retained exclusive jurisdiction, subject to none other but 
judicial control. 89 
In the Soviet Union, however, the end result has been a unitary 
system of administrative authorities, with no real means for the for­
mulation of policies regarding local interests.40 
38 Cf. Siezdy sovetov v postanovleniakh i resolutsiakh 121 ( 1939) .  
39 Gneist, Self-government; Kommunalverfassung und Verwaltungsgerichte 
in England ( 187 1 ) .  
40 Gsovski & Grzybowski, Government Law and Courts in  the Soviet Union 
e.nd Eastern Europe 71  ff. ( 1959) .  
In Eastern Europe only Yugoslavia and Albania followed the Soviet 
example. In Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, 
councils of all types continued in the tradition of local elective govern-
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The principle which aligns the Soviets with the social structure 
is visible already in the election procedures. The Soviets are prin­
cipally representatives of social organizations. In the initial period, 
social organizations of the proletariat and of __ the poorer peasantry 
- nominated their representatives without any intermediate process of 
voting. After 1936, members of _the Soviets were_ elected by general 
vote, but from a single list of candidates nominated by social orgattiza­
tions, which amounts to very much the same thing.41 
Th� local Soviet is not the only basis on which the identifica­
tion of the official authorities with social organizations takes place. 
Terms of reference which determine social functions and responsi­
bilities of the governmental · authorities, and at the same time public 
·functions of the social organizations and. their place in the social 
structure, indicate a great shift in the nature and character of their 
functions. 
Any generalization aiming to distinguish between social and gov-
---
ment parallel With the agencies of centralized administration. Only at 
a later date were their functions coordinated with those of the cen­
tralized adtillnistratiori,. and an integrated system of administrative 
authorities established. Cf. Grzybowski, "4 continuite legale dans les . 
democraties populaires," 54 Rewe Politique et Parlementaire 57 (July. 
1952) .  Ct. also Grzybowski, "Continuity of Law in Eastern Europe," 
6 Am. J. Comp. L. 58 ( 1957).  _ -
41 Organization of the executive apparatus of the Soviets in the Soviet 
Union reflects a recent trend toward deep· involvement of. the masses in 
the activities of the official mechanism of Soviet· polity and identification 
of the state with social action. Social activists perform - official functions 
either as auXiliaries of the Soviet state or as social organizers. Accord­
ing to >StatiStics published in 1959, in the territory ot the Soviet Union 
there were 121 ,000 commissions· of the Soviets, each in charge of various 
aspects of local adtnjnistration. In discharging · their responsibilities 
the5t1 commissions, consisting of deputies to the Soviets, mobilized the 
cooperation . of a great number of the s_o-called social activists - affiliated 
with various social organ1zations representing associationS of the citi· 
zens either on the professional or territorial basis. This .permitted the 
commissions to tackle various admip.istrative problems which called for 
a concentrated effort and a departure from routine procedure with the 
assistance of those organizations including street committees, commis­
sions for cooperation in the maintenance of housing units, village as-· 
semblies, comradely courts, parents' associations, committees for .the 
protection of social order, people's militia, etc. Vlasov, Studenikin, 
Sovetskoe administrativnoe pravo 37 ( 1959). 
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emmental functions is open to criticism. It seems, however, that 
economic activity, as a matter of principle, must be considered a social 
function rather than one typically within the scope of the govern­
mental responsibility. Marxist theories, as well as practical solutions 
in open societies, have tended toward assigning the management of 
economic institutions to the field of social responsibility. In the modem 
state, public enterprises, engaged as a matter of public policy in eco­
nomic activities, follow the organizational pattern and the techniques 
of management of private economic institutions. Finally, according to 
the ultimate pattern of society under communism, responsibility for the 
processes of production is to be with the associations of producers.42 
In the Soviet polity, however, the process of the distribution of 
responsibilities for various aspects of governmental and social services 
led to a pattern of jurisdiction which contradicts these assumptions. 
Initially, Lenin was inclined to stress the need for preserving a de­
gree of independence of social organizations, particularly trade unions, 
from interference by the state. The soviet state, Lenin argued, was not 
the state of the workers. It was still the state of workers and peasants. 
In addition, it had been "bureaucratically deformed." Although the 
trade unions should not indulge in systematic opposition, they were 
still bound to defend themselves from interference by the state be­
cause : (a) its policy might at times be the result of conflicting interests 
of workers and peasants and (b) elements of arbitrary bureaucratic 
rule might lead to defense of their rights on the part of the workers.43 
When Lenin tendered this advice to the workers' organizations, 
the revolutionary state had had some experience with the workers' 
ability to handle nationalized industries. At the outset of the revolution, 
the Bolshevik Party called for workers' participation in the control of 
private factories. As the revolution and the nationalization of Russian 
industries made progress, this gave the workers full control of the 
economic institutions of the country. Workers' management at the 
factory level was combined with a most rigorous regimen introduced 
in the field of industrial relations under the Labor Code of 1918,  and 
with a rigid system of administrative control from above. Conse-
42 Friedmann ed., The Public Corporation, A Comparative Symposium 
(1954). 
43 Deutscher, Soviet Trade Unions 56 ( 1950).  
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quently, Lenin's remarks, made on the eve of the NEP, could be 
understood as anticipatory of changes which removed trade union 
control of the factories and of a return to a more conservative under­
standing of their responsibilities. Under the 1922 Labor Code, work 
contracts were again emphasized, collective bargaining was reintro­
duced, and the trade unions again became social organizations not 
fundamentally involved in the administration of economic resources.44 
Once ousted from management, the trade unions never returned 
to their previous positions. However, the era of the economic plans 
meant a new manner of involvement by trade unions in administrative 
responsibilities. The expansion of industrial plants was identified with 
the realization of the goals of social action by the workers' organiza­
tions; and the workers' struggle was identified with the struggle for 
fulfillment of the plan. At the same time, trade unions were given an 
auxiliary role in the administration of welfare services. 411 
In their new position, the trade unions were directly involved in 
sharing the risks of economic ventures undertaken by governmental 
enterprises. And this was true in spite of the fact that their position 
vis-a-vis management differed little from that in the capitalist economy. 
The Sixteenth Congress of the Party ( 1930) insisted that the trade 
unions should take into consideration in their collective agreements 
the financial status of enterprises, and that their responsibility should 
cover also the financial and production aspects of the enterprises. In 
1933, the Central Board of the trade unions assumed the functions of 
the People's Commissariat of Labor, and trade union bodies in fac­
tories replaced the labor inspectorates in enforcement of the protective 
provisions of labor legislation. The final step which identified trade 
union interests with that of management was the reform of the wage 
system by introducing piece rate as the center of the new system of 
remuneration. 46 
The basic dogma of the system of public authority, in which there 
is no hard and fast rule separating governmental and social functions 
44 Deutscher, supra note 43, at 14 ff., 62. 
45 Gsovski, supra note 10, at 387, 810-1 1 in vol. 1 and 342 in vol. 2; 
Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 40, at 1413. 
46 Id. at 1413 ff. 
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and in which responsibilities overlap, is the axiom of the identity of 
interests with a corresponding tendency by various agencies of govern­
ment and of social organizations to assume functions which do not 
belong to their spheres of activity. Since the state and society are identi­
cal in class, there is no reason why various functions and responsibili­
ties should not be freely handed over from center to center. This was 
vividly demonstrated by the Polish and Hungarian revolts in 1956 and 
by the challenge of the new workers' councils, which took over govern­
ment enterprise. There was nothing contrary to the basic doctrines of 
Marxism about the workers if dissatisfied with the activities of their 
organizations, the socialist government, and the trade union commit­
tees, delegating new bodies to remove shortcomings and improve per­
formance. Gomulka observed in the challenge of the workers' councils 
and the plans to provide interenterprise institutions a threat to the very 
existence of the workers' state: 
Workers' councils extended upward in all branches of national economy 
would need some supreme authority. Would this authority be the gov­
ernment itself? The government cannot be the supreme authority for 
social organizations such as workers' councils. The alternative, therefore, 
would be to create a new body, either through direct or indirect elections. 
And thus we see that this concept leads us astray. It appears that the 
government must cease to concern itself with the national economy and 
then it becomes superfluous as there is another central body . . .  which 
has taken over the management of the national economy of the country. 
And in order to do this, the second body must take over from the gov­
ernment central planning, management of banks, procurement, distribu­
tion, etc. In other words, it must take over all government powers.47 
The real cause for the political and social amorphism of the 
social organizations of socialist societies consists in the absence of 
identification of individual organizations with the social stratum which 
they claim to represent, rather than in their exercise of public power or 
control over social services. The fact that collective agreements, in 
fact, constitute a rule of law, or that the very process of negotiation is 
of public interest and therefore must conform to certain procedures, 
by itself is not harmful to the feeling of allegiance of the membership. 
The process of institutionalization of social functions is not contrary 
47 Nowe Drogi 1 1-12 (No. 6, 1957) .  
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to the identification of social organizations with class or group inter­
ests."' 
In the Soviet system, however, trade unions are organized to 
conform to their counterparts in public administration. Furthermore, 
trade unions exercise their functions, such as participation in the 
administration of the factory, the administration of social services, 
participation in the institutions handling labor disputes and enforcing 
labor discipline in the factories, in a manner which offers little oppor­
tunity for demonstrating a protective attitude toward their member­
ship. This attitude-bureaucratic deviation-is facilitated by the fact 
that, as elsewhere within the Soviet system, the representative principle 
of trade unions suffers. 
Furthermore, most trade union functions within the economic 
system of the Soviet state stem from the external authorization of the 
state or of the Party. This applies particularly to participation of trade 
unions in planning processes, in supervisory and inspection activities, 
and in the administration of public welfare selvices financed by the 
state. It is the public authority which involves social organizations in 
the administrative duties, and the trade unions acting on behalf of the 
state must assume responsibility for shortcomings in the performance 
of these services. If trade union legislation is examined in terms of the 
criteria suggested by the Gurvich concept of frameworks and kinds of 
law, it would appear that the law of Soviet trade unions contains little 
of its own legislation. Its functions aild social role are determined by 
legislative activity from without, thus constituting an alien element of 
legal rules within the trade union framework. 49 
The central principle of the integration of all public and social 
authority is state ownership of the means of production. This makes 
of the management of economic enterprises, the exercise of public 
power, and renders industrial relations, employment policies, and 
business transactions a matter of governmental policy.110 Article 1 of 
48 Bouere, Le droit de greve 142 ( 1958) and the literature cited at 142. 
49 Deutscher, supra note 43, at 121; Gsovski, "Elements of Soviet Labor 
Law," Bull. No. 1026 of the U.S. Dep't of Labor ( 1951 ) ;  Aleksandrov, 
Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo 50, 56, 271 (1954) ;  Kiselev, "0 pravovom 
polozhenii profsoiuznykh organizatsii v SSSR," SOP (No. 4, 1956).  
50 ''The country which has gone furthest in applying the Marxist theory of 
the socialization of means of production, Soviet Russia, had politically 
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the draft of the General Principles of the Civil Law Legislation of 
the USSR and the Union Republics states that: 
Soviet civil legislation regulates property relations and related non­
property relations for the purpose of strengthening and developing the 
socialist system of economy and social ownership, creating the material 
and technical base of communism and satisfying the material and 
spiritual needs of citizens more and more fully. 
Public policy stated in these terms is safeguarded, in addition to 
the monopolistic ownership of the means of production, by the mo­
nopoly of forming juristic persons to organize industrial enterprises, 
distribution, and service industries and to promote production and 
control consumption. 
With few exceptions in the agricultural sector of the national 
economy, juristic persons are designed to assume charge of the na­
tional economic assets which constitute the property of the state. In 
their corporate character, they are representative of the legal capacity 
which is centralized in the institution of the socialist state. According 
to Article 26 of the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 : "The state bas 
legal capacity. Its legal capacity comprises all rights and obligations 
which by their character do not attach only to man." 
Consequently, socialist rules regarding the establishment of 
corporations could dispense with all those elaborate provisions which 
have aimed at protecting the safety of commerce and safeguarding the 
public interest. A juristic person is created by an administrative act, 
which assigns to the former its respective duties and means of per­
formance according to the economic plan. �1 The fiction that a 
corporate body exercises its proprietary rights in the same manner as 
a physical person is replaced by the reality that a corporate body is 
a government organization. As a socialist jurist formulated it: 
The power aspect of the new legal entities (government enterprises) in 
the midst of all other legal entities within the framework of the national 
and legally not only retained the trappings of sovereignty, but reached 
new heights of concentrated state power." Friedmann, Law in a Changing 
Society 299 (1959). 
51 Cf. art. 20 of the Draft of the Civil Law Principles of the USSR and 
the Union Republics. Cf. also Saleilles, De Ia personalite juridique ( 1922) ;  
Rumelin, Metodisches uber juristische Personen ( 1 891 ) ;  Michoud, 
La theorie de Ia personalite morale (1906-1909) .  
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economy represents a socially correct solution in the development of a 
country on the road to socialism. 
A government enterprise becomes an indispensable participant in the 
process of production, and an essential channel for the execution of the 
national economic plan.G2 
In this context, the character of business transactions and con­
tractual engagements assumes a new character, which in the West has 
hitherto been limited to situations involving agreements settling col­
lective standards and conditions of employment. In the socialist legal 
order, public law character extends to all transactions of the govern­
ment corporations. Conceived and executed with reference to the 
provisions of the economic plan, the business activity of socialist 
enterprises constitutes a legal framework for the coordination of 
human activity (labor) and natural resources in order to implement 
a public policy within the "jurisdiction" of each individual economic 
institution.113 
THE LEGISLATIVE TECHNIQUE 
Wide distribution of governmental responsibilities between the 
official agencies of government and the organs of the society also takes 
place in the field of legislation. While the constitution of the socialist 
state specifies the authorities holding legislative powers, normal cri­
teria of sources of law in Soviet society mean even less than in 
traditional constitutional arrangements. Nor are the material criteria 
infallible. Soviet legal theory, which states that the real source of law 
is the will of the ruling class and that the force of legal enactment is its 
true reflection, again is little more than a programmatical phrase. 
Although the theory of the sources of socialist law limits the 
power of lawmaking to those authorities representative of the people's 
power, i.e., to the Soviets alone, the body of Soviet law includes vw:ious 
52 Vasiliev, Grazhdansko pravo narodnoi Respubliki Bolgarii, obshchaia 
chast 239-40; cf. Bolgar, "The Magic of Property and Public Welfare," 
2 Inter-Amer. L. Rev. 288 (1960) ;  Savatier, Metamorphoses economiques 
et sociales du droit civil d'aujourd'hui 6 ff. (3d ser. 1959) ;  Serick, Rechts­
form und Realitet juristischer Personen ( 1955). 
53 Vasiliev, Generalni dogovori ( 1958) ;  Hazard, Law and Social Change 
in the USSR 50 ff. ( 1953) ;  Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 40, at 
1413 ff. 
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enactments from other sources. These sources, although not in form 
but certainly in content and significance for the public policy of society, 
represent a type of legislation which sometimes far outweighs legisla­
tion derived from formal sources of lawmaking. Pronouncements of 
leaders and the directives and instructions issued by social organiza­
tions and executive agencies of government constitute an important 
source of regulations, affecting the life of private citizens very much 
in the manner that a formal law does. 54 
These various acts are covered by a new term of normative acts 
which, in the words of a Polish jurist: 
[E]ither establish new institutions for the socialized sector of the na­
tional economy or introduce important changes in our civil law. Among 
those of supreme importance are the instructions of the highest authori­
ties of the economic administration of the country. There is no doubt 
today that these are sources of the civil law and abrogate within the 
jurisdiction of those authorities the provisions of the civil codes. 55 
The number of these normative acts is extremely large, and their 
great proliferation adds to the uncertainty as to the legal situation in 
the socialist countries. Furthermore, there are no satistics, no adequate 
compendia with a systematic arrangement of various regulations. Ac­
cording to an estimate made public a few years ago in Poland, the 
number of normative acts which the central authorities made binding 
upon the courts was in the vicinity of 10,000 enactments.116 
In addition to the normative acts of the highest category, each 
local administration has the right to issue regulations. These, too, 
constitute the law, unless found contrary to some higher regulation. 
Some indication of the size of the legislative output is the growth of 
various official and unofficial publications, law gazettes, local official 
gazettes, reporters for special branches of administration, and technical 
publications containing standards worked out for use in national in­
dustries, which have a bearing on the private rights and calculation of 
wages and either directly or indirectly affect the operation of govern­
ment. But in addition, it has appeared from time to time that a key 
54 Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 40, at 41-42. 
55 Wolter, Prawo cywilne, c�c og6Ina 49 ( 1955) ;  1 Gsovski, supra note 
10, at 222-24. 
56 Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 40, at 730. 
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regulation, which on occasion had vitally affected legal commerce, had 
been issued in the form of a circular letter which was never published. 
Thus, a circular of the Central Board of the Trade Unions of Poland 
changed the law on collective agreement; and the sale of real estate 
was prohibited in a circular addressed by the minister of justice to 
the notaries public.57 
It seemed for a while that this practice would be seriously cur­
tailed after the official policy of the socialist countries tended to 
emphasize a need for restraint in the flow of regulatory activity. How­
ever, it is clear now that the practice of normative acts will survive the 
drive for the reform and reorganization of the legal order in the social­
ist states. The only practical step in this direction would be to grant 
binding force only to certain types of enactments. This was the princi­
ple of the hierarchy of statutes developed in the nonsocialist countries. 
Then the courts would be able to reject administrative regulations 
contrary to, or issued without or beyond statutory authorization. This, 
however, is a step which would affect vitally the 'government's ability to 
implement expeditiously their current line of policy. The need for the 
continuance of this latter practice was recognized in Article 1 (par. 2) 
of the Polish draft of the Civil Code ( 1960) ,  which provided that its 
force extended to relations between governmental organizations only 
insofar as these relations were not regulated in a different manner by 
another statute or regulation issued by the highest governmental au­
.thorities. Thus, precedence was afforded to ministerial instructions . 
. A large bulk of normative acts belongs to the field of economic 
administration because neither the economic plan nor the system of 
planned contracts between enterprises and agencies involved in its 
enforcement are able to provide for all contingencies arising from 
business activities. Furthermore, factory managers are administrative 
officers. In consequence, they require authorization to change the 
techniques or policies which in the West would be dictated by condi­
tions · of the market, but which in the socialist economy must be re­
placed by administrative regulations. In order to keep the economy 
going, it is necessary that administrative authorities on all levels adjust 
the premises of the plan and of the standard contractual engagements 
57 Grzybowski, "Reform and Codification of Polish Laws," 7 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 395 ( 1958) .  
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between the socialist business partners, and that they determine more 
closely business operations either for industrial branches or within each 
governmental enterprise. Some illustration of the great number of 
regulations issued in this connection is obtained by examining the 
legal reform introduced by the General Law of Management of Work­
ing Collectives in Public Economic Institutions and Higher Economic 
Associations of July 2, 1950, in Yugoslavia.58 In order to bring order 
into the mass of earlier enactments, a special Executive Order on 
Bringing into Conformity the Decrees of the Federal Agencies with 
the new Economic System was necessary.59 This listed 468 decrees 
enacted in the period of 1 945-1950 as abrogated. In addition, an 
unspecified number of decrees issued on the basis of those expressly 
abrogated regulations were declared repealed. At the same time, 17  6 
decrees were still retained on the statute books. 
A similar operation was again repeated in Yugoslavia after the 
enactment of the Constitutional Law of January 13,  1953. Following 
the reorganization of the Yugoslav Federation, the Federal Executive 
Council enacted the Executive Order on the decrees of Federal Agen­
cies of September 21,  1953. This terminated the force of 865 de­
crees.60 
In both cases, repeals on federal levels were followed by mass 
repeals of legislation enacted by the individual republics of the Yugo­
slav Federation. Serbia, for instance, repealed in January and May 
1 953 some 575 decrees concerning the management of the national 
economy, still retaining 80 such decrees. In April 1954, Croatia re­
pealed 600 similar decrees, still retaining the imposing number of 194 
legal enactments of this type. One can only speculate as to the number 
of similar regulations on still lower levels of economic administration 
which all have their own specific spheres of responsibility. 
Socialist courts are also engaged in vigorous lawmaking. Although 
the official theory is that the courts are excluded from the process of 
lawmaking, the very nature of the legal system in which they operate 
forces the socialist courts to contribute to the development of socialist 
· 58 Law No. 391, S.L. 22/1952. 
59 Law No. 389, S.L. 40/952. 
60 Maksimovich, "Experiments in Legislative Technique in Yugoslavia," 2 
Highlights 385-86 (1954). 
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law in a manner very reminiscent of court practice in the common law 
countries. A fast tempo of change and a great output of legislative 
material compel the courts to interpret the legislation in force, either 
in a manner which brings it closer to the current political line of the 
regime (although contrary to the express wording of the law),  or in a 
manner which amounts to the virtual repeal of outdated but not yet 
formally abrogated enactments.61 
In addition to providing a more general guidance for the lower 
courts, particularly when urgent interests of the regime call for immedi­
ate support for its policies from the entire mechanism of the state and 
of social organizations, an institution of directive rulings by the highest 
tribunals of the law bas been created. Its purpose is to restate, in 
connection with the enforcement of specific legal provisions, those 
policies of the regime which are contrary to the express wording of the 
law or to reverse time-honored interpretations of the legal rule. Di­
rective rulings are issued on the initiative of the Minister of Justice, 
the Attorney General, or the Chief Justice. According to the Polish 
Judiciary Act of 1950, which in this respect follows the standard pro­
visions found in the judiciary acts of other socialist countries, the 
purpose of the directive rulings is to determine "concrete tasks of the 
administration of justice, and the manner of their performance in 
accordance with the economic, social, and political conditions of the 
country within the limits of the laws in force." Directive rulings are 
binding on lower courts, and violation ·of their terms constitutes an 
appealable error. In fact, directive rulings formulate governmental 
policies not contained in the statute. Among the jurists of socialist 
countries there is a good deal of controversy on the subject. According 
to some, rulings are new legislation. Others, quoting the provisions 
of the constitutions, deny that they have such an effect.62 
Soviet techniques of lawmaking cannot be interpreted as having 
no principle by which to determine the legitimacy of legal rules and 
thereby to bring the disiecta membra of the legal order in a socialist 
61 Grzybowski, supra note 9. 
62 Gsovsk.i & Grzybowski, supra note 40, at 534,641;  Sipkov, "The Bul­
garian Supreme Court and Its Directive Rulings," 6 Highlights 139 ff. 
( 1958);  Grzybowski, "Directive Rulings of the Supreme Court in Crimi­
nal Matters,'' 6 Highlights 149 ff. ( 1958) .  
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state into a single system. The techniques of lawmaking reflect the 
peculiarities of the social organism and the relationship of its various 
parts to the problems of public policy by which it lives. Social change 
and the emergence of modem societies have made obsolete all theories 
that laws come from a single source. In the France of the early civil 
code, this theory was based on the idea of the superiority of the statute, 
which provided a firm guidance to the courts. In the Anglo-American 
tradition, the courts were the source of the law, and statutes had to be 
tested in the courts in order to become part of the legal system. 
Modem life destroyed the fiction of the internal symmetry of the legal 
order. It was discovered that modem societies live by law from many 
sources, and that legal systems supplemented by rules from various 
social centers obtain their cohesive character from the interplay of 
social forces, which all have an interest in maintaining the social and 
legal order. 
A socialist legal order of the Soviet type is the product of the fast 
rate of social change, of the great flow of legislative enactments from 
numerous sources, and of the experimental character of governmental 
policies. Thus, Soviet law represents not a system, but rather an 
armory which stores various instruments of policy to be used according 
to the needs of the day. The content of the legal rule is no longer 
important. Rather, the question is how it is used. The old law may 
always be infused with new meaning to achieve the social aim accord­
ing to the current line. Uniformity of the legal system, normally 
guaranteed by the formal hierarchy of various statutory enactments, 
was replaced by the singleness of inspiration which is assured by the 
place of the Communist Party in both the social structure and the 
mechanics of govemment.63 
RESPECT FOR LAW IN THE SOCIALIST SOCIETY 
The appearance of public authority in any other role than that of 
a law enforcing agency represents a disturbing factor in legal com­
merce. Disguised as fiscus, and assimilated almost totally to the private 
bolder of rights, the state enjoys privileges and is free from execution. 
As an administrative authority, charged with duties and given the 
power to manage social interests and render services, it is judged in-
63 Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process 1 12-13 ( 1921 ). 
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competent in the fulfillment of its obligations or negligent in the per­
formance of its duties, according to standards falling far short of those 
which apply to private persons or corporations in a similar situation. 
The state cannot go into bankruptcy; and for moral weaknesses, a 
polity is not answerable in law. 
The difference in standards is due to a number of causes. A 
partial explanation is afforded, however, by the more rigid procedures 
which a public authority must follow, by the stricter accounting stand­
ards which prevail as to financial policy, and by a greater limitation of 
action owing to the public interests involved. 64 
As the state and public authority became more involved in social 
and . economic activity, their impact upon the respect for rule, and 
generally upon law enforcement, has increased. In open societies, this 
influence is tempered by the fact that the public management of na­
tional economic interests is still an exception, and that public corpora­
tions tend to assume the coloring of private economic institutions in 
order to avoid political control of their economic activities. 6� In the 
socialist world, this aspect appears in altogether different proportions. 
This is due to the fact that, as a rule, socialist countries manifest 
planned economies, the government owning the industrial plant and all 
the means of production. Standards and methods of law enforcement 
64 Gsovsk.i & Grzybowski, supra note 40, at 507; Orlovskii, "Zadatchi 
pravovoi nauki v svete reshenii XX siezda KPSS," 26 Vestnik Akademii 
Nauk 5 (No. 8, 1956).  
In regard to this problem in the legal practice of  the Western 
societies, abundant illustration is to be found in the splendid study by 
W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society. Cf. Ransom and Luck v. 
Surbiton B.C. [1949] 1 Ch. 180 and William Cory & Son, Ltd., v. City 
of London Corpn. [1951] 2 K.B. 476, cited by Friedmann at 364, and 
East Suffolk Catchment Board v. Kent [1941] A.C. 74, also cited by the 
same author at 365. 
The problem of methods to assure respect for the legal rule on 
the part of public authority or public corporation represents an important 
issue in the legal practice and theory today. There is a tendency to 
follow a course normally effective in relations with private persons or 
corporations. However, it has also beeri pointed out that the fact that 
fines must come from the public budget limits their effectiveness. In 
this connection see the discussion in Dennings, The Changing Law 
( 1953) at p. 28 of the case of the Yorkshire Electricity Board which was 
fined for erecting a building without proper license. 
65 Friedmann, supra note 42. 
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and the formal respect for law in socialist countries are primarily in­
fluenced by the nature of government operations. In addition, there is 
the influence of the character of the governmental machinery itself. Its 
design is to effectuate government purposes according to the standards 
set up not so much in legal rule as in the directives and inspiration 
emanating from the party. 
In the course of 1958 and 1959, the Polish Fishermen's Associ­
ation, which bas a fishing monopoly in all inland waters in Poland, 
sued some thirty government enterprises for polluting streams and 
rivers. The pollution bad caused damage to the fishing industry and 
to the national resources of primary raw material and had violated 
antipollution legislation. According to statistics submitted to the 
courts, there were at that time some 700 major industrial establish­
ments (all of them government-owned) which were guilty of such 
practices. The Association won its cases and proceeded to file some 
more, but the end result was not the enforcement of the rule of law. 
The Association was adjudged damages, which were promptly paid, 
and the enterprises continued in their disregard of the laws in force.66 
Obviously, the regime could enforce its own laws in terms of the 
physical means of enforcement, but was prevented from doing so by 
higher policy. It was cheaper to pay damages, and even fines, from the 
budgets of the enterprises and to provide appropriate sums for these 
and similar contingencies than to engage in large reconstruction and 
rehabilitation projects. Indeed, this latter could change the plans of 
individual enterprises and affect the calculation of the cost of industrial 
construction in Poland on a national scale. In the final analysis, then, 
the fishing rights of the Association were transformed into the right to 
sue for damages. Full enforcement was simply not feasible politically. 
The cost of industrial construction, however, is not the only 
reason for these and other manifestations of disregard by governmental 
authorities of administrative regulations providing for orderly pro­
cedures in industrial activity. Industrial expansion is conceived in 
terms of revolutionary enterprise. As such there is neither time nor 
room for restriction in the name of vested rights, even though these 
vested rights are none other than those of the community at large. 
The Soviet polity, striving to cover in one leap the progress of the 
66 Pietek, "W imieniu ryb," PiZ, Jan. 1 1, 1959. 
74 Soviet Legal Institutions 
decades, has found it easier to make up for the neglect of the past by 
re-creating the atmosphere of the industrial revolution in the West, 
when profit and cheap expansion were the only law. 
This is especially apparent regarding the legal force of all those 
administrative regulations issued by the local authorities. After the 
1956 upheaval in Poland, during which a marked tendency toward 
decentralization of governmental authority had developed, public 
opinion began to press for greater respect by central authority for local 
conditions, sanitation, urban development regulations, and building 
and zoning restrictions. Socialist industrial and urban planners now 
claim that they have mastered the anarchistic tendencies marking the 
capitalistic forms of industrial organization, and that the socialist state 
has found a formula for balancing the various interests which claim 
precedence in any development program. Under socialism, they claim, 
it will be possible to avoid the monstrosities created in the period of 
early capitalist development. In fact, however, as the Polish press has 
disclosed, industrial ministers demonstrate an attitude quite similar to 
that of capitalist industrial pioneers in seeking the best locations with­
out regard to local urban development plans. 
This attitude of the higher authorities toward the responsibilities 
and plans of the lower echelons of administration is further compli­
cated by the absence of proper administrative procedures tending to 
coordinate official actions from various centers. This difficulty, in tum, 
is compounded by the absence of a strict delimitation of powers be­
tween the central and local government regarding the residual preroga­
tives of the local government. In 1959, considerable uproar was caused 
by the fact that after the municipal government of a Polish city had 
reserved a certain area for suburban development, one of the industrial 
ministries then declared its intention to use the same area for the 
construction of apartment blocks according to plans kept secret from 
eyes of the local authority. In the meantime fat;nilies had built their 
houses, paved the streets, paid the cost of sewage and other services, 
planted their lawns and gardens. In spite of this, however, the ministry, 
using its powers of a supervisory authority, proceeded with the annul­
ment of the deeds issued by the city fathers, evicted individual owners, 
and proceeded with the construction of its apartment blocks.67 
67 Mlynczyk, "Rzecz o grzechach administracji,'' PiZ, Dec. 13, 1959. 
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A Polish analyst of the administrative mechanism of the Polish 
state has traced its shortcomings to two causes. In the first place, 
administrative authorities have no respect for their own decisions and 
those of other government departments. In the second, the administra­
tive machinery of the popular state is staffed by two categories of civil 
servants, each with a different role within the same governmental 
setup. Those in office on the strength of an electoral mandate enforce 
the policy, but not the law. Those constituting the professional estab­
lishment of governmental agencies, on the other hand, are saddled 
with the responsibility of finding the law to substantiate the decisions 
of political leaders. Matters are complicated by the fact that basic 
policy decisions come to the executive departments from the party 
centers, which are involved in the planning and supervision of govern­
ment operations through its members in key positions.68 
· Thus, respect for legal rule is affected by Party control of the 
governmental apparatus in two directions. In the first place, the 
concept of the socialist state and the legitimacy of governmental opera­
tions imply an institutional reliance upon Party motivation: 
No institution, organization, or person could or should stand above the 
Central Committee, above the Politbureau. No decision of importance 
should be made without the Central Committee's consent and approval. 
This should become an iron law to all . . .  ;�19 
Secondly, construction of the legal rule must follow the inner 
meaning of the socialist law. This, in tum, is always the actual will of 
the people. As the Polish Supreme Court stated : 
Interpretation of the law should not be concerned with its literal mean­
ing but should aim at the realization of its social purpose and take into 
consideration that it is an expression of the will of the broad social 
masses.70 
While conformity to the policy line is assured, the authority of 
the law as clear guidance for private parties, courts, and government 
departments must suffer. This reflects not only on the official life pf 
the state and of social organizations, but, in the final analysis, on the 
68 Ibid. 
69 Rabotnichesko Delo, Feb. 4, 1950. 
70 PiP 14�50 (No. 7, 1950).  
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relations between individuals in respect of their private rights, as well. 
Insufficient law enforcement regarding private relations in social­
ist societies is the direct result of a system which sanctifies outside 
intervention in the performance of government business. The Party 
exercises influence through public propaganda campaigns, through 
the personai intervention of Party members with the governmental 
apparatus, or through Party spokesmen. As a result, the process of 
government follows channels which cannot be contained within regular 
procedures defined by the law or within the official edifice of the state. 
Socialist public order sanctions private deals and the exercise of per­
sonal influence by persons in high party positions. Further, this is true 
not only regarding the shaping of governmental policies, but also 
regarding their implementation by the government agencies. This 
result is observed in the role of Party committees at all levels of gov­
ernment operations, in economic administration, and in the factories. 
The 1957 reform of the economic administration of the Soviet Union 
was specifically designed to bring the Council of National Economy, 
which had taken over the functions of the economic ministries, under 
closer supervision of the provincial Party secretaries. 
While this system of operation has obvious advantages with rela­
tion to the high degree of response of the governmental setup to Party 
demands, there are compensating disadvantages; inasmuch as the 
Party may influence the governmental machinery all along tlie line, 
there results great possibility for the abuse of personal power. This 
disadvantage is compounded by the difficulty of distinguishing between 
legitimate uses and abuses of influence. While no regime may boast a 
foolproof system for excluding abuses of power and of official au­
thority, the Soviet order is particularly susceptible to such short­
comings owing to the manner of governmental operations. 
Examples of a quite unfortunate state of affairs, in regard to the 
protection of individual rights in socialist countries, are to be found 
in all provinces of official activity. There are cases of systematic pre­
vention of criminal prosecution of embezzlers of government property, 
of refusal to execute sentences passed by criminal courts, of lack of 
respect for decisions of courts made in civil causes, and of eviction of 
lawful owners from their apartments. In practically all these cases, the 
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press had traced failures in law enforcement to the personal influence 
of important Party members.71 
One of the students of Soviet life has thus summed up the reasons 
for this state of affairs : 
Two basic causes seem responsible for the disrespect for Jaws, courts, 
and government attorneys as Jaw enforcement agents. One cause is the 
attitude of party organizations and their leaders that they are above the 
Jaw. Party members constitute a higher class of citizens, and the Party 
has its own code of behavior. Its censure and discipline take precedence 
over court action, and its members are under special protection. This 
protection extends not only to Party members directly, but also to their 
families and to nonrelated persons involved in illegal activities which 
the Party condones. . . . It seems that Soviet bureaucrats have not been 
trained to perform duties and functions with a view toward conformity 
to provision of the law. The reason for this seems obvious. In the past, 
whenever the law in force and the rights of the individual conflicted 
with the policy of a government agency, laws and rights gave way to 
policy. One might even say that whenever a major policy change oc� 
curred, it almost invariably involved violation of the Jaws in force and 
of the vested rights of the individuals. 72 
A vast majority of the cases which affect adversely private rights 
and general law enforcement result from the exercise of Party influence 
to force the authorities to depart from normal procedures and to dis­
regard express provisions of the laws in force. There are, however, 
broad areas in which rights and law enforcement suffer owing to their 
direct connection with the production processes and their dependence 
on performance. Particularly is this true with regard to industrial rela­
tions and the provisions of the labor law. 
In Soviet practice, the provisions of laws governing the field of 
labor relations are translated into reality by means of collective agree­
ments. As everywhere else, conditions of labor are not subject to con­
tractual stipulations, and departures from the standards established in 
the contractual transaction are permitted under specific conditions and 
in accordance with the legal rule administered by the public authority. 
71  Kryvickas, Illustration of the Rule of Law in Lithuania, 6 Highlights 
193-204 ( 1958 ) ;  Rusis, Law Enforcement in Soviet Latvia, 6 Highlights 
273-87 ( 1958) .  
72  Rusis, supra note 7 1, a t  286-87. 
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At the same time, rights contractually established and formulated in 
labor law as general standards are made relative by a system of de­
vices. These include the piece rate system, the provision of the wage 
fund in terms of a share in the general plan of costs and profits of the 
economic venture, and the cession of the administration of the labor 
Jaw and of the collective agreements to the trade unions themselves. 
Thus, trade unions are turned into public agencies which have the 
authority to depart from the stipulated standards of labor conditions. 
At the same time, they remain financially interested in the success of 
the economic venture. In this system, the risk of economic operation 
is borne by factory crews in the form of the extension of working 
hours, the violation of provisions concerning overtime pay by means 
of voluntary production campaigns, and the lowering standards of 
work safety and hygiene conditions. The relaxation of the administra­
tive regime in Polish factories after the October 1956 upheaval re­
vealed a complicated situation in the national industries of the country 
whereby factory managers were forced to resort to the systematic 
violation of the labor law as the only method of efficient administra­
tion.18 Thus, standards of performance realistically determine the 
conditions of labor and are to be found in the calculations of the 
economic plan. 
The over-all effect of the deep involvement of the entire govern­
mental and social mechanism in economic management is that the 
attention of the entire society and of law enforcement agencies is 
directed toward collective achievements rather than in the direction of 
realizing the individual's status. The very ethos of the legal rule is to 
emphasize the significance of collective action. By this means, the 
general welfare is guaranteed in terms of positive gains. This is the 
function of law enforcement; its role in determining individual rights 
is de-emphasized. The center of legal order is not the bill of rights 
contained in the socialist constitutions. It is, rather, the economic plan 
administered by the Party. In consequence, the litigious aspect of Jaw 
enforcement is no longer a social technique for bringing about social 
harmony, but is, instead, adjustment and conciliation with a view 
toward assuring the realization of social aims. 
73 Grzybowski, ''Trade Unions in Communist Poland," Problems of Com· 
munism 16 fl. (No. S, 1956). 
Chapter m 
FORMS OF ADJUDICATION IN 
SOCIALIST ECONOMY 
FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE 1 
In the course of the debates at the Third Congress of Workers of 
the Administration of Justice (1920), a proposal was made for the 
abolition of lay judges on the bench of the People's Court. The repre­
sentative of the Commissariat of Justice, however, came out strongly 
in defense of the lay element. Lay judges, he maintained, were neces­
sary "so that the court would always be the most living, the most 
authentic echo of that concept of law which had currency among the 
population, so that in the decision and sentence of a court there would 
be made apparent that concept of the people, and that the court, and 
so-called 'public opinion' would not present two points of view having 
nothing in common as has been the case in the former court." 2 
The attitudes of those members of the Congress who were critical 
of the lay element stemmed from the increasing momentum of a 
tendency toward greater stability and expertise in the administration 
of justice. The question was raised of the codification of the procedural 
and substantive laws of the Soviet Republic. In addition, it was insisted 
that greater stability and uniformity of judicial practice were desirable. 
Consequently, lay judges, whose role on the bench had been useful in 
the revolutionary period, were now thought to be an obstacle in the 
orderly pursuit of justice. Thus, professionalism constituted the pre­
eminent goal of the critics. 
However, in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, other values were 
1 For the full discussion of these two terms see Weber, On Law in Econ­
omy and Society, ch. 8, at 224-55 (1954). 
2 Hazard, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society 104 (1960). 
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of greater importance. In the Soviet society, courts were to reflect 
popular convictions as to what was right and wrong. It was also ob­
vious that judicial effectiveness would suffer if its action demonstrated 
differences of views on problems of law and order. The solutions 
adopted showed a clear preference for the idea that, in the adffiinistra­
tion of justice, political orientation should predominate. The people's 
courts, although guided by recognized rules of procedure, were still to 
be bound by revolutionary concepts rather than by formal rules of 
law�8 
In contrast with the past, the presence of the lay judges on the 
bench indicated that Soviet courts had broken away from the tradition 
of formal justice administered by the imperial courts of Russia. 
The debates at the Third Congress cast a good deal of light on the 
intentions of the architects of the Soviet court system. Integration of 
lay and professional judges on one bench, according to the pattern of 
the German Schoeflengerichte, was intended to assure that Soviet 
courts would always act in public as a source of one official attitude. 4 
In a sense, the Soviet judicial reforms undid the transmission to 
Russia of the achievements of the French Revolution, which had re­
formed the courts of France. French reformers had been dissatisfied 
with the courts of the ancient regime, which had been staffed mostly 
by lay judges and governed by antiquated laws. Drafters of the French 
Civil and Criminal Codes saw the cause of the unsatisfactory per­
formance of the old court system in the bad laws and the absence of 
professional legal education on the bench. They were convinced that 
3 C/. supra at 44. 
4 Debates at the Third Congress of Workers of the. Administration of 
Justice explain why Soviet leaders preferred the German court pattern 
to the French for the organization of the judiciary in the revolutionary 
state. In the German Schoeft'engerichte lay judges are organized with 
their professional colleagues in one bench, which renders its decisions 
by the majority vote in all stages of the proceedings. The French jury 
system (at that time) accorded distinct roles to the professional and 
lay judges in the court. This permitted distinguishing between their 
respective pronouncements and, generally, their functions. The jury was 
thought to represent a concept of justice more closely reflecting the 
current public opinion than professional judges. For obvious reasons 
Soviet leaders aiming at the great ideological cohesion of the society 
thought this was to be avoided. Cf. Kucherov, Court, Lawyers and 
Trials Under the Last Three Tsars 214ft'. (1953). 
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injustice could be avoided if laws were good and just, and were 
interpreted in a scholarly manner. Portalis, who fought for greater 
respect for the courts of the new order, claimed that their role would 
be beneficial if the level of judicial interpretation were raised: 
Jurisprudential construction (par voie de Ia doctrine) means to grasp 
the proper meaning of the laws, to apply them with discernment, to 
supplement them in cases where there is no specific rule. Without this 
kind of interpretation, how can one imagine the fulfillment of the office 
of the judge? 5 
The chief object of Portalis' argumentation was to demonstrate 
that the administration of justice might be conceived as a separate 
department of government. He was opposed to the ideas that French 
courts were unable to fill the gaps in the law and that cases where no 
rule applied should be referred to the legislature for proper legislative 
action. Formality in the administration of justice in conjunction with 
scholarly legal method would, he believed, assure independence of the 
courts and thus expand the field of their activity. At that time, the 
defender of judicial independence could not foresee that formal justice 
meant also a serious restriction of judicial activity. It guaranteed to the 
parties maximum control over the proceedings and the greatest op­
portunity to present their interests. But it was also conservative; and 
a formal interpretation of the law made it difficult for the courts, as 
was later discovered, to adjust the rule of law to the process of social 
change_. 
Because of its characteristics, formal justice, although able to 
provide a main channel for the administration of justice in the modem 
state, has been subject to attack from many quarters. It was con­
sistently supported only by those who wielded economic power and 
were interested in freedom from public control. Formal justice was 
opposed by authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies because it less-
5 Portalis, Discours preliminaire, Projet de Code Civil presente par Ia 
Commission nommee par le Gouvernement, le 24 Thermidor an 8, at xi; 
"Les parties qui traitent entre elles sur une matiere que Ia Joi positive 
n'a pas definie, se soumettent aux usages reyus, ou a l'equite universelle, 
a defaut de tout usage .... Les lois intervenues sur des affaires privees, 
seroient done souvent suspectes de partialite, et toujours elles seroient 
retroactives & injustes pour ceux dont Je litige auroit precede !'inter­
vention de ces lois." ld. at x.i-x.ii. 
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ened individual dependence on the state and public authority, thus 
limiting the power of the state. It was attacked by conservative tend­
encies because of its rationalistic, antiemotional attitude to social 
processes. At the same time, it was opposed by radical and democratic 
movements which sought to promote social change in the interest of 
higher standards of social and political jristice.6 Finally, formal justice 
was subject to attack on the purely practical ground that, in some 
situations, reference to legal standards alone was not able to provide 
an efficient basis for the solution of minor criminal cases and private 
law conflicts. 
The usual policy in modern states has been to reserve room for 
both types of administration of justice and to accommodate within the 
system of courts dispensing formal justice a method permitting a more 
flexible approach to settling disputes and even to administering crimi­
nal justice. A historical perusal of the jury trial in criminal cases in 
Europe discloses that its ratio existendi consisted in its ability to pro­
vide an opening for substantive justice. 7 Another reason for departing, 
6 Weber, supra note 1, at 228-29. "[T]he development of the trial into a 
peaceful contest of conflicting interests can contribute to the further 
concentration of economic and social power. In all these cases formal 
justice, due to the necessarily abstract character, infringes upon the 
ideals of substantive justice. It is precisely this abstract character which 
constitutes the decisive merit of formal justice to those who wield the 
economic power at any given time and who are therefore interested in 
its unhampered operation, and also to those who on ideological grounds 
attempt to break down authoritarian control or to restrain irrational 
mass emotions for the purpose of opening individual opportunities and 
liberating capacities. To all these groups nonformal justice simply repre­
sents the likelihood of absolute arbitrariness and subjectivistic instability. 
Among those groups who favor formal justice we must include all those 
political and economic interest groups to whom the stability and pre­
dictability of legal procedure are of very great importance, i.e., partic­
ularly rational, economic, and political organizations intended to have 
a permanent character. Above all, those in possession of economic 
power look upon a formal national administration of justice as a guaran­
tee of 'freedom,' a value which is repudiated not only by theocratic or 
patriarchial authoritarian groups but, under certain conditions, also by 
democratic groups." 
7 "When, for example, French jurors, contrary to formal law, regularly 
acquit a husband who has killed his wife's paramour caught in the act, 
they are doing exactly what Frederick the Great did when he dis­
pensed 'royal justice' for the benefit of Arnold, the miller." Weber, 
supra note 1, at 229. 
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in the settlement of civil and criminal cases, from strict law enforce­
ment was that sometimes the interest of the parties and of the society 
was better served by the process of composition and official concilia­
tion. Thus, justices of the peace in the French and Anglo-Saxon tradi­
tions have played a useful role. Those judicial administrations which 
provide a level at which simple justice is handled by laymen take 
account of the fact that strict observance of the legal rule would be 
of little importance in the settlement of disputes where minor infringe­
ments of the law or those of small value are invoived. The function of 
justices of the peace is primarily, and particularly in regard to civil 
law litigation, to arrive at the composition of cases to the satisfaction 
of everybody concerned, or to a decision which follows rules which 
tend to reflect substantive rather than formal justice.8 
In spite of serious doubts as to the usefulness of the institution of 
the jury in the American court system, it is admitted that in the conflict 
of formal and substantive justice an important step forward in the 
evolution of legal ideas has been achieved in many cases.9 
Social change, by producing a new attitude in the courts and 
among the professional lawyers to the problem of law enforcement, 
delivered the most serious blow to the idea of formal justice. It was 
In monarchial regimes of the nineteenth century, jury trial of politi­
cal crimes, or offenses committed by the means of press, served to pro­
tect political tendencies and movements which though contrary to those 
protected by the legal order and political regime found support in the 
popular sentiment. 
8 Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Das Imperium des Richters 167 ff. (1908). 
9 Tort law was one of the important fields of litigation which was strongly 
influenced by the common sense of justice or prejudice evinced by 
juries. Dean Green's description of the method by which juries in­
fluenced the progress of law provides a classic example of a conftict 
between formal and substantive justice and the contribution of the lay 
judges to the formulation of the new legal standards: "Seemingly juries 
saw only parties before them, and placed the risk where they thought 
it could be best borne. The judges had been interested in principles; 
juries were interested in doing justice between the parties. The judges 
evolved a nice scheme for determining responsibility, the juries gave 
verdicts which wrecked the scheme. Juries held their ground here until 
legal theory could catch up with the new order of things which had 
emerged under the very eyes of the judges without most of them noticing 
it." Green, Judge and Jury 122-23 (1930). Cf. also 2 Harper & James, 
The Law of Torts 890-92 (1956); Holmes, Common Law 110-11 
(1881). 
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claimed that in the new conditions, the judicial function could not be 
confined to the formal construction of statutes and to strict adherence 
to the "stare decisis" where the courts had reigned in the past.1° Fur­
thermore, the very concept of the judiciary as a symmetrical system of 
courts was shattered. In order to meet new situations in the areas of 
new legal regulation, special courts and tribunals were established with 
an organization indicating that their role was something more than the 
administration of formal justice. They had to take into consideration 
community interests, ethical and political interests, and the demands 
of social justice. Other semijudicial bodies were charged with func­
tions which combined adjudication with conciliation and mediation.11 
In the general movement of modem societies from the principle 
of formal toward substantive justice, the concept of the judicial in­
terpretation of statutes was greatly modified. In the wave of reform, 
civil procedures in a number of countries were amended to give the 
courts greater powers to act as arbitrator and mediator. In this way, it 
was sought to promote the amicable composition of differences be­
tween the parties. In addition, the courts were awarded greater powers 
in the discovery of material truth, thereby facilitating the discovery of 
the essence of litigations. 
Further, the courts reinterpreted old laws and were given new 
directives in order to redistribute the hazards of modem life according 
10 Cf. supra at 39; also Pound, ''The Need of a Sociological Jurispru­
dence," 19 The Green Bag 607 (1907). 
11 E.g., French provisions for arbitration and conciliation of labor industrial 
conflicts under the law of Feb. 11, 1950, as amended by the law of 
July 26, 1957 (J.O. of July 28, 1957, 7459); cf. West German Law of 
Sept. 3, 1953, on Labor Courts. 
Tsarist Russia had only the beginnings of the modem social legisla­
tion. In the period between the wars in all countries of Eastern Europe, 
which at present belong in the Soviet sphere of influence •. various forms 
of adjudication of disputes in the field of industrial relations, whether 
individual or collective, were adopted. As a rule labor courts were 
concerned with confticts regarding individual contracts of work, while 
-various arbitration and conciliation boards dealt with collective aspects 
of industrial relations. Cf. Grzybowski, "Evolution of the Polish Labor 
Law 1945-1955," in Legal Problems Under Soviet Domination 90 (1956); 
Gruenbaum-Ballin & Petit, "Les conflicts collectifs du travail . et leur 
reglement dans le monde contemporain (greves, procedures de con­
ciliation et d'arbitrage) ," Travaux et recherches de L'Institute de droit 
compare de L'Universite de Paris, ix (1954). 
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to a new pattern. The old liability doctrine was abandoned as the 
courts were enjoined to take account of the economic inequalities of 
the parties. Finally, the role of the court as social arbitrator within the 
limits of the legal order was recognized.12 
While this new orientation toward problems of modem life was 
taking place within the framework of the traditional mechanism of the 
administration of justice, new courts, tribunals, and conciliation boards 
came into existence. Responsible for maintaining social peace and 
balance within new areas of social action, they reflected in their organi­
zation the fact that their function was not the scholarly interpretation 
of the statutes but was rather the combination of judicial with adminis­
trative action. In organization they resemble the Soviet people's courts, 
with the representatives of conflicting industrial and social interest 
seated together with the professional judge as umpire. Thus, formal 
justice received a function within a structure serving primarily as an 
instrument of substantive justice. 
This complicated mechanism of social adjustment stands in a 
singular relation to social and economic reality. In a sense, its function 
is to preserve the conditions which make possible the existence and the 
function of the public organization and of the state itself. On the other 
hand, its role is to serve social and economic interests. It is no longer 
feasible for the courts and the judiciary to live in another age.18 
CONTRACTS IN PLANNED ECONOMY 
The system of judicial and quasi-judicial institutions in charge of 
adjudicating and adjusting disputes in the Socialist polities of the 
Soviet type is highly reminiscent of judicial institutions in the free 
world of the civil law tradition. A special quasi-judicial branch, 
roughly corresponding to the commercial courts of Europe, handles 
12 C/. Frank, Law and Modern Mind 126-27, 157 (1936). 
13 With reference to the judge-made law in the course of the nineteenth 
century Dicey was convinced that: "However this may be, wa. may, at 
any rate as regards the nineteenth century, lay down that as a rule 
judge-made law has, owing to the training and age of our judges, tended at 
any given moment to represent the convictions of an earlier era than 
the ideas represented by the parliamentary legislation." Dicey, Relation 
Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth 
Century 390 (1952). 
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litigation arising out of business transactions. Litigation between in­
dividuals is assigned to courts of general jurisdiction, while labor 
disputes take special channels. 
The jurisdictional competence of judicial institutions in the Soviet 
polity is determined by the relationship of the cause at issue to the 
central piece of economic legislation-in a socialist state, the economic 
plan. In the broadest sense, the plan sets out all those conditions which 
in an open society are left to the free interplay of economic forces. 
While in the free societies a transaction translates the conditions of the 
market into business relations, in the socialist economic order it 
translates into similar relations the provisions of the plan. 
Litigation, which is the responsibility of the Government Arbitra­
tion Boards, stands in the most proximate relationship to the economic 
plan. Labor disputes are also intrinsically related to the provisions of 
the plan. In this latter instance, however, the provisions of the plan 
are translated into more concrete terms by the intervening method of 
collective agreements concluded between the tiade unions and indus­
trial branches. However, not all the issues arising in the course of 
labor-management disputes may be decided exclusively with reference 
to the terms of the plan. Private litigation before the people's courts is 
of such nature that it can be decided in a manner which only sporadi­
cally will require intervention of the agent representing the over-all 
interests of the community. 
This gradation is also reflected in the procedural characteristics 
of ea,ch of these three types of causes alluded to above. Conflicts of 
interest arising from business transactions within the socialist sector 
of the economy are handled according to the rules of nonadversary 
procedure. Another field where nonlitigious methods have wide appli­
cation is the field of industrial relations. The prevalence of non­
adversary techniques and the resort to arbitration and conciliation are 
influenced by the fact that the nationalization of the means of produc­
tion has made the state and its v_arious organizations the principal 
business partners, as well as the only industrial and commercial em­
ployer. 
A Soviet textbook on civil law, a collective work of a group of 
leading jurists, characterized the function of contractual engagements 
between the enterprises which belong to that circle of business institu-
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tions which correspond in most general terms to the business work in 
the free societies as follows: "The question of concluding a contract is 
not a private business of the two managers of the socialist enterprises; 
concluding such a contract is the function of government." 14 
Business transactions in the socialist system are, in consequence, 
official acts which implement in detail the directives of governmental 
policy as formulated in the plan which occupies a central place in the 
entire system of rules regulating this activity. The Czechoslovak Civil 
Code of 1954 thus determines the place of various pieces of legislation 
within a special order ·of precedence regarding their force for the de­
termination of mutual rights and duties between the parties (sec. 
212): 
( 1) The uniform economic plan shall be enforced through contracts 
specifically adapted to the needs of economic planning (economic con­
tracts). Competent organs shall create specific obligations according to 
the requirements of economic planning. 
(2) To the thus created legal relationships, the provisions of this law 
shall have application, in the absence of provisions to the contrary.15 
14 1 Genkin, Bratus, Lunts, & Novitskii, Sovetskoe grazhdanskoe pravo 
397 ( 1956 ) .  
15  E.g., Article 2 of the Draft o f  the Principles of Civil Legislation of the 
USSR and of the Union Republics. Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 
(Law No. IV) Sec. 199: "In order to realize the obligations arising from 
the people's economic plan, contracts shall be made, unless statute ex­
pressly provides otherwise. The basis for such contracts shall be the 
approved Plan." Sec. 297: "Socialist organizations--if statute does not 
provide otherwise, shall enter into contracts with each other for the 
detailed determination and performance of all of their mutually exist­
ing obligations regarding product delivery, construction and other per­
formances coming within the scope of their enterprises, for the realiza­
tion of the people's economic plan (plan contracts)." East German 
Gesetz iiber die Vetragssystem in der sozialistischen Wirtschaft (Vertrags­
gesetz) of Dec. 1 1 ,  1957, provided as follows, Sec. 23 ( 1 ) :  "The pur­
chaser is obliged to submit to purveyor an offer for a contract or, if 
such is impossible for him, to request the purveyor to make a contract 
or, if such is impossible for him, to request the purveyor to make an 
offer for a contract. This shall be done ... within a month from the 
day on which the temporary or final government assignment was de­
livered." Sec. 1: "Socialist enterprises are under obligation to make con­
tracts regarding those of their mutual relations which, on grounds of 
and in concurrence with the goals of the people's economic plan, con­
cern the purveyance and sale of products or production and sale of 
work or other performance." 
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The special position of contractual engagements between the units 
of the economic order of the socialist state is further strengthened by 
the general provisions of the civil codes of the socialist countries. These 
emphasize the fact that the over-all purpose of planned economic ac­
tivity applies to all aspects of legal commerce under the rules of the 
civil law. Article I of the Draft of the Priniciples of the Soviet Civil 
Legislation (1960) defines the purpose of its provisions as follows: 
Soviet civil legislation regulates property and related non-property rela­
tions for the purpose of strengthening and developing the socialist system 
of economy and socialist ownership, creating the material and technical 
base of· communism and satisfying the material and spiritual needs of 
citizens more and more fully. 
The Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 states that: 
( 1) This Act regulates the property relations involving material value 
and certain personal relations of the citizens, as well as of the state, eco­
nomic and social organizations, with the object of meeting systematically 
and to an ever increasing extent the material and cultural demands of 
society and of building socialism. 
(2) The provisions of this Act shall be construed in full conformity 
with the economic and social order of the Hungarian People's Republic. 
Article 343 of the Polish draft of the Civil Code (1960) states in 
its provisions on the law of contracts: 
[S]ocialist organizations are obligated to cooperate both in concluding 
contracts as well as in their execution, taking into account the influence 
of their action on the execution of the contract by the other party, on 
the meeting the needs of economic life, efficiency of production processes 
and commerce, and on safeguarding the national economy from losses. 
Thus, while maintaining the fiction that the general provisions of 
the civil law apply also to the contractual relations between the socialist 
economic units, economic contracts, in fact, constitute a separate cate­
gory of legal transactions. This is due not only to the application of 
special legal provisions not included in the civil codes, but, in addition, 
to the fact that civil codes themselves provide separately for the 
interpretation and enforcement of such contracts. These special re­
gimes, either within or without the civil codes of socialist countries, 
follow from the fact that public authorities, responsible for perform­
ance of public duties, are partners in socialist economic and legal 
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commerce. This is reflected in three institutions which constitute the 
heart of the law of contracts of the socialist economic sector: (1) the 
duty to contract, (2) the effect of administrative action on the terms 
of the contract, and (3) the consequences of nonperformance and 
default of the parties. 
The institution of the duty to enter into the contractual relations, 
which is imposed upon the socialist enterprises, endeavors io combine 
two opposite principles of action. These are: a contract which is an 
expression of individual calculation, and the central direction of the 
national economy according to the plan. "Planned contracts" between 
socialist enterprises, states a Soviet civil law treatise, "represent a 
formulation of planned assignments received by the parties of the 
contract." 
Soviet Contract is a form of liaison between the individual socialist 
enterprises directed towards the best accomplishment of the general 
socialist plan. This task is equally in the interests of both parties. The 
fact that both parties have this task in common results in the equality 
of socialist organizations as parties to contracts. The equality of parties 
is secured by the national economic plan itself and is reflected in all 
normative acts (laws and decrees) relating to contracts between the gov­
ernment agencies engaged in commerce and industry . .. ,16 
Originally, the assignments of the plan were distributed by two 
types of contracts. General contracts were entered into between the 
central government agencies in charge of the industrial branches which 
determined the distribution of the national product according to the 
plan of the distribution: consumption, production, investment, re­
serves, etc. Within this basic breakdown of production and distribu­
tion· assignments, enterprises, factories, and distribution chains deter­
mined concrete obligations, fixing dates of delivery within the general 
terms of the accounting and financing system. In order to assure an 
orderly conduct of business according to the plan, these types of con­
tracts were to be entered into promptly, and a special system of pre­
contract disputes was devised.17 
In this system of strict military-like discipline, direct dealings 
1 6  1 Sovetskoe grazhdanskoe pravo 369 ( 1950-5 1 ) .  
17  Gsovski & Grzybowski, Government, Law, and Courts in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe 1 150 ff. ( 1959). 
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between individual units of the Soviet economy were frowned upon 
and were permitted only when expressly provided for by the regula­
tions issued by the higher administrative authorities. By the end of 
1935, the policy was changed and the government began to favor 
direct dealings between the individual enterprises.18 On January 15, 
1936, this practice was sanctioned as a regular form of business 
relations.19 
In 1949, however, the Council of Ministers reversed this practice 
and ordered that the method of contracts general and local be tried 
again.20 
The resolution of the Council of Ministers of May 22, 1959, 
again changed the method of business transactions between the units 
of socialist economy. The practice seems to demonstrate that the sys­
tem of contracts general and local was a failure. Since 1952, the 
prevailing tendency has been to rely on direct contracts for business 
transactions between government enterprises. Critics of the previous 
system have pointed out that contracts general; although conceived as 
an institution of civil law, have in fact acquired the character and the 
function of an administrative act. This, of course, was inconsistent 
with its form of a contract. Fine points of law notwithstanding, what 
was more important, the system of two-staged contracts was cumber­
some and took a long time to take shape. In addition, the necessity of 
waiting for the yearly elaboration of an intricate system of contractual 
obligations between the parties, so as to provide a basis for economic 
cooperation between Soviet enterprises, contributed to a yearly lag in 
business transactions. Contracts general were concluded late, and 
without them all transactions were fundamentally illegal. Enterprises 
which proceeded with their usual deliveries without adequate con­
tractual engagements were exposed to the danger of financial loss. The 
practice of legalized ex post deliveries made prior to concluding con­
tracts general undermined the sense of the system and reduced it to a 
purely superfluous formality. The final blow to the system of two-
18 Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of Dec. 14, 1934, 
Concerning the Making of Contracts for 1935, Sob. zak. SSSR sec. 45 
(1934). 
. 
19 Sob. zak. SSSR sec. 27 (1936). 
20 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of April 21, 1949, Sob. zak. 
SSSR sec. 68 (1949). 
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staged contracts was delivered by the administrative reform of 1957. 
This reform abolished the centralized economic management of the 
country from the federal and republican level, and replaced it by 
economic districts under councils of national economy. Thus, the idea 
of contracts general, as based upon the idea of the central management 
of national economy, was rendered completely out of tune with the 
real situation.21 
The 1959 Resolution of the Council of Ministers on Deliveries 
simplified the system. It provided for one type of contract to be con­
cluded in the execution of instructions concerning the distribution and 
supply of technical equipment and materials for production purposes 
directly between the interested enterprises. In regard to articles of 
general consumption, direct business relations were to be established 
between the producing enterprises and distribution centers, which then 
were to enter into contractual arrangements with their units of the 
distribution network.22 
While undoubtedly simplification of the system of contractual 
relations might contribute to a more efficient handling of the distribu­
tion of goods, the essential nature of contractual relations between the 
units of the socialist economy was not affected. The validity and tenor 
of their mutual obligations are primarily determined by the dispositions 
of the economic plan, and their authority is based on the instruction 
of the administrative act. 
In Poland, where a system of planned contracts, similar to that 
introduced in the Soviet Union by the Resolution of 1949, has been 
in existence since 1950, a decree of May 16, 1956, on Contracts of 
Delivery 23 introduced a method of direct contractual engagements 
betWeen the enterprises. Although it simplified the method of business 
transactions, it failed to convert them into the civil law institutions. 
This is apparent from the provisions of the decree that in case the 
directly interested parties should fail to reach an agreement, the 
mutual obligations of the parties are to be determined by a joint 
21 Bratus, "0 nekotorykh chertakh istorii sovetskogo grazhdanskogo prava," 
SGP 97 {No. 1 1, 1957) .  
22 Lys, Lesnik, & Borzova, "Struktura dogovomikh sviazei i nekotorye 
voprosy u1utshenia organizatsii materialno-teknicheskogo snabzhenia," 
SGP 85-92 (No. 2, 1960). 
23 DU 16/87. 
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decision of higher economic agencies to whom the interested enter­
prises are subordinated.24 
Thus, the core of the system is in the intimate relationship be­
tween the contractual agreements, the plan, and the decisions of the 
higher government authorities.25 The logical consequence of this fact 
is that should a change occur in the policy decisions as they are 
formulated in the plan, the contracts between trading partners are 
directly affected. A typical provision, in this respect, is the Bulgarian 
Statute on Obligations and Contracts of November 2, 1950, which runs 
as follows: 
Sec. 6. . . . If a contract is concluded in connection with the fulfillment 
of the planned task, the repeal, lapse or change in this task has retroactive 
effect on the provisions of the contract, its repeal, its validity in the 
future, or the change in its provisions.28 
The Hungarian Civil Code, which contains a full treatment of all 
aspects of contractual relations under the economic plan, provides in 
Section 403 that in case the plan or some specific task included in it be 
cancelled, all contracts concluded with reference to the assignment are 
accordingly modified or cancelled. Similarly, the arbitration board 
might "within the limits of the plan and their statutory authority 
modify, terminate or dissolve any planned contract." 
Administrative control extends also in other directions. In coun­
tries which, as in Poland, still allow some degree of private enterprise, 
administrative directives limit the choice of partners for socialist trad­
ing in order to restrict private economic initiative.27 According to the 
24 Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 17, at 1335. 
25 Sec. 400 (1) of the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 states: "The enter­
prise approved plan and instruction issued by mutual consent of the 
directing organs shall determine the content of the plan contract. In 
case of construction contracts, the state may provide that technical plans 
and budgets shall be basis of the contract." The Code further provides 
that (sec. 409 (3)) a statute may provide that the rules on plan con­
tracts shall apply to contracts between socialist enterprises even if such 
are not intended for product delivery, construction, or other under­
taking. 
26 D.V. No. 275/1950. 
27 Polish Decree on Delivery Contracts of Dec. 28, 1957 (DU 3/7/1958) 
provided that: "Delivery contracts, construction contracts and general 
service contracts over certain value may not be given to private entre-
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Draft of the Polish Civil Code, "Separate provisions determine in what 
cases state organizations may not make contracts with other persons, 
or may take them only under specific conditions." Thus, contractual 
activity is another channel for the implementation of government 
policy. It may require that needs of economic enterprises be satisfied 
according to a scheme of distribution worked out centrally in order to 
promote newly opened sources of supply of raw materials and semi­
finished products. Quite frequently, new sources offer products in­
ferior in quality or on a noncompetitive basis. However, the support 
for the new production is a matter of policy. 
The direct relationship among business deals, the economic plans, 
and the instructions of governmental agencies is further illustrated by 
various regulations concerning substitute methods for creating quasi­
contractual obligations. These tend to emphasize the fact that the 
complex system of agreements between socialist business partners 
represents the mechanism of the socialist economic system. Conse­
quently, remedial and corrective provisions for meeting the default of 
one of the parties has had to be designed in a manner differing funda­
mentally from similar institutions of the civil law. Under the traditional 
legal system, the purpose of such provision was to indemnify the 
innocent party. Under the socialist legal system, on the other hand, it 
is to assure greater discipline in the legal commerce between the 
business partners. 
According to the Soviet draft of the Principles of civil legislation 
of the USSR and the Union Republics ( 1950) , Article 35: 
In the case of obligations between state organizations, collective farms 
and other cooperative and public organizations, the payment of a forfeit 
(fine, penalty) for non-fulfillment or improper fulfillment of an obliga­
tion and the recovery of damages do not constitute a release from ful­
fillment of an obligation in kind except in cases where a plan assign­
ment on which the obligation is based has lost its force. In the case of 
obligations between the above-mentioned organizations, agreement of 
the parties concerning limitation of their responsibility, as established by 
preneurs on the basis of public bidding." The purpose of this provision 
is on one hand to restrict the economic significance and, in general, 
the expansion of private enterprise and on the other to aim at the 
elimination of competition between the government and private economic 
initiative. 
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USSR and Union-Republic legislation is not permitted. The release may 
be effected only by the decision of the higher authority. 
Consequently, in addition to the system of planned contracts, the 
higher authority may, in the process of adjustment of the plan to the 
realities of the economic conditions of the moment, act to establish 
mutual obligations in organizing economic or commercial activity. The 
Polish Draft of the Civil Code (1960), provides (Article 364) that 
an administrative instruction may obligate a socialist organization in 
favor of another party in the same manner as a contract. Further, the 
Code provides (Article 365): 
Provisions of the foregoing article apply accordingly if a socialist or­
ganization was instructed to modify or dissolve a contract, or refrain 
from performance of a contract.2s 
Another aspect in which the economic conditions of the country, 
influenced by the governmental policies, determine the nature of the 
contractual obligation is that of the contract of work. In a planned 
economy, the terms of employment constitute one of the basic condi­
tions determining the cost of production and the share of the national 
product which remains to implement governmental policies of in­
dustrial expansion. Viewed from the central position of the economic 
plan, labor conditions are not a matter of individual accommodation, 
but of basic decisions concerning the size of the workers' share in the 
gross national product. Looked at from the center; wages and marginal 
benefits, representing an individual entitlement under a contract of 
work and the terms of the labor law, represent planned participation 
of an individual worker in the general framework of labor conditions 
in the productive processes managed by the state. As the interest of the 
state is determined by the terms of the plan, fluctuations in the fulfill- . 
ment of its tasks occurring in the course of the period of its operation 
are adjusted by proper management of the wage fund. From this 
28 Polish Decree of Dec. 28, 1957, supra note 27, stated (art. 7): "In ex­
ceptional cases .. . the Council of Ministers may authorize supreme 
governmental agencies to issue decisions instructing subordinate units 
of the socialized economy to make deliveries to other units of the so­
cialized economy without entering into contracts. These instructions 
create rights and obligations for the recipient and purveyor in lieu of 
contracts." 
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vantage point, it is also difficult to see the conflict of interests between 
the two sides in industrial relations. Indeed, the interests of the state 
and of the workers are considered identical. A Soviet scholar describ­
ing changes which have occurred in labor legislation in the people's 
democracies, stated that: 
In countries of people's democracy, labor organization and wages are 
put on a scientific basis after the example of the Soviet Union. . . . (A 
scientific basis is provided by the fact that social-labor relations are in 
fact) material relations independent on human will .... People cannot 
exist without producing the means of their existence ... the material 
character of social-labor relations consists in their dependence on the 
level of development of the productive forces; qualitative changes in the 
level of their development unavoidably result in changes in social­
labor conditions.29 
Thus, the contract of work as a method of a personal coming to 
terms is only a formula for the statement that a set of predetermined 
conditions applies with regard to a concrete individual, provided that 
some terms of the contract are related to the calculations of the plan. 
In this doctrine of the function of the contract of work in the 
general setup determining industrial relations, the axiom that economic 
management is a public function of the worker's state is of central 
importance: 
In the popular state the function and the tasks of state administration 
are basically different. Its basic function is a creative and planned in­
fluence on the formation of the economic foundations for the construc­
tion of a new social order. In this perspective restriction of administrative 
activity to the forms typical for the bourgeois state of the liberal period 
... would serve no purpose ... administrative acts in the fields of rela­
tions between the state and the individual in the new type of economy 
have acquired a different nature; now their purpose is not only the pro­
tection of individual rights, but primarily, through the regulation of 
rights and duties of the individual, his integration in the planned social­
ist construction.so 
Thus, the function of the collective agreement is to translate the 
provisions of the plan into concrete conditions of individual enterprises 
29 Aleksandrov, Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo 7 (1954). 
30 Jaroszynski, Zimmerman, & Brzezinski, Polskie prawo administracyjne, 
c�c og6lna 324 (1956). 
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and work establishments. Wages and working conditions are thus 
worked out as a result of the successful accomplishment of planned 
assignments. The very procedure for fixing various elements of the 
working conditions by government decree and in consultation with the 
central trade union authorities reflects the change in industrial rela­
tions from the contest of human wills into the creative influence of the 
socialist worker on the industrial environment.81 
Thus, in final analysis, the nature of the legal transactions out of 
which litigious causes arise have little in common with transactions 
under the rules of the civil law. In open societies, the intervention of 
the administrative authority into economic and social life, when it 
assumes the forms of private law activity, has caused a good deal of 
doubt as to the nature of such action.82 In the socialist society, eco­
nomic management is always a matter of public policy.88 The process 
of expanding the activities of the socialist state means gradual restric­
tion of the provinces of life subject to the rule of civil law in its tradi-
31 Cf. Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 17, at 1446-47, 1465-66, 1542-43; 
Aleksandrov, supra note 29, at 198-200. 
32 Cf. supra at 17-19. ''The distinction between 'administration' and 'private 
law' becomes fluid where the official actions of the organs of official 
bodies assume the same form as agreements between individuals. This 
is the case when officials in the course of their official duties make 
contractual arrangements for exchange of goods or services either with 
members of the organization or with other individuals. Frequently such 
relationships are withdrawn from the norms of private law, are arranged 
in some way different from the general legal norms as to substance or 
as to the mode of enforcement, and are thus declared to belong to the 
sphere of 'administration.' As long as claims treated in this way are 
guaranteed by some possibility of enforcement, they do not cease to 
be 'rights,' and the distinction is no more than a technical one. However, 
even as . such, the distinction may be of considerable practical signifi­
cance." Weber, supra note 1 ,  at 48. 
33 "In People's Poland one of the functions of the state is to direct national 
economy." Decision of the Polish Supreme Court of May 5, 1949, ZOIC 
13 (1950). Art. 18 of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the 
Soviet Union and of the Union Republics stated: "The state is the sole 
owner of all state property, regardless of what it is or who manages or 
uses it." Cf. Venediktov, Gosudarstvnennaia sotsialisticheskaia sobstven­
nost 4 (1948): "All government property, whoever controls it, forms a 
single fund of state socialist property; the right of property of that fund 
is vested in the Soviet people as represented by the socialist state." 
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tional sense. Recent socialist codes leave little doubt that truly private 
law transactions, particularly those between individuals, are reduced 
to insignificant proportions, and although in all probability they will 
continue to be present until the final millennium, their social function 
is quite unimportant. 
ADJUSTMENT AND CONCILIATION 
When the Soviet government embarked upon the experiment of 
providing a separate channel for the adjustment of conflicts arising 
within the socialist sector of economy, there was little awareness of 
the impact which the method of planned contract would have upon 
the techniques of adjudication and upon civil law institutions in the 
future. In 1932, Commissar of Justice Krylenko wrote : 
I believe that in our society there can be no difference between the nature 
of cases coming up for arbitration and those coming before courts of 
justice, no difference in the methods of passing of them and no dif­
ference in the principles of substantive or procedural law applied.84 
Writing in 1943, Ginsburg, a Soviet scholar of note, stated: 
The state arbitration system is the economic tribunal for the period when 
the foundations of the socialist economy and of the second five-year plan 
are laid. It is a tribunal, since its method consists of the use of state 
compulsion for the enforcement of economic and contract discipline. 
It uses compulsion to accustom economic agencies to discipline. How­
ever, methods of its work, its organization, and the principle on which 
its rulings are based contain a number of new elements; these elements 
reflect a new climate of economic development and the full victory of 
socialism and transform the state arbitration system into one of the 
agencies of economic administration which use the methods of struggle 
for economic accounting and contract discipline. Bll 
The state arbitration system was established in the Soviet Union 
in 1931. And after World War II, with proper modification, it was 
34 Krylenko, "Sudebnaia sistema i Gosarbitrazh," SGP 39 (No. 7-8, 1932). 
35 Ginsburg, ''Voprosy sovetskogo khoziaistvennogo prava na dannom 
etape," in Voprosy sovetskogo khoziaistvennogo prava, Part I, p. 14 
(1943) ; cf. Shkundin, "Gosudarstvennyi arbitrazh i arbitrazhnyi protsess," 
in Arbitrazh v sovetskom khoziaistve 20 (1938);  Berman, "Commercial 
Contracts in Soviet Law," 35 Cal. L. Rev. 205 (1947) .  
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adopted in the socialist countries in Eastern Europe as an indispensa­
ble appendage of economic planning.36 
The 1960 regulation defining the duties of the State Arbitration 
Board under the USSR Council of Ministers 87 leaves little doubt as to 
the nature of the Board's functions. In addition to protecting property 
rights of disputing parties, it also enforces a policy which aims at 
promoting the efficiency of the economic mechanism of the state. Its 
decision must foster the cooperation of governmental enterprises, 
facilitate the fulfillment of economic plans and prevent a narrow and 
self-centered approach to business transactions. The Board is called 
upon to "assist in the fulfillment of plans and assignments for deliveries 
of products and other obligations and also in the elimination of short­
comings in the economic activity of enterprises, organizations and 
institutions which came to light . . .  in the course of hearings . . . .  " 
The most important function, however, follows from the arbitral 
activity itself. The Board is enjoined to cooperate with the federal 
government of the Soviet state in determining the terms of trade in 
individual types of goods. It is also authorized to issue instructions 
concerning the procedure for "receiving products and goods in terms 
of quantity and quality." 
The State Arbitration Board representing the apex in the hier­
archy of such institutions in the Soviet Union, has special duties in the 
area of foreign trade. It is authorized to adjust or annul the terms of 
contracts between the parties for the purpose of achieving conformance 
to the regulations and governmental directives in force. In addition, 
it negotiates proper changes in contract terms, and codifies and 
arranges systematically the laws and regulations governing Soviet 
foreign trade. 
According to Article 5 (point d) : 
In order to assure the necessary uniformity in the settlement of disputes, 
(the Board) studies and generalizes the experience of state arbitration 
boards, or economic councils, ministries and agencies, instructs them on 
question of the application of the regulations on deliveries of products 
· 36 Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 17, at 585-87, 719-29, 820-21, 893, 
1147-51, 1199, 1220-23, 1259-61, 1288-93, 1376-80, 1449-51; Hazard, 
Law and Social Change in the USSR 50 ff. (1953) ; Berman, supra 
note 35. 
37 Sov. iust. 30-32 (No. 12, 1960). 
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and all other All-Union normative acts regulating economic regulations, 
and instructs state arbitration boards on questions of statistical accounting. 
It also reports to the government on the most flagrant violations of 
"state discipline and of legislation regarding the quality and com­
pleteness of products, as well as on manifestation of local tendencies 
and on other violations of socialist legality in the economic work of 
enterprises, organizations and institutions." 
The importance of these functions to the operation of the planned 
economy was enhanced by the 1957 reform of economic management 
in the Soviet Union. The reform's main achievement was in removing 
the bulk of administrative functions from the level of the federal 
government. In fact, it substituted for the economic ministries at the 
center a system of territorial councils of national economy. At the 
same time, however, the over-all direction of the planned economy 
in terms of national goals and targets remained in Moscow. In this 
situation, the federal echelon of the arbitration mechanism serves 
primarily as an analyst of the progress of business operations in the 
entire Soviet empire. In this manner it permitted intervention from 
the center for the purpose of maintaining the unity of the national 
economy and the assurance of the soundness of its business activity. 
In this vast array of responsibilities, arbitral functions serve only 
as a means of achieving other more important results. The Board 
acts as an economic and social organizer, advisor as to sound business 
practices with reference to Soviet legal regulations, legislator in the 
field of the actual conduct of business activities, and as a source of 
information for the federal government in the proper enforcement 
of the economic policies of the state, leading eventually to the mod­
ification of tasks and assignments. 
The characteristic feature of the Board's activities, particularly 
regarding the function of adjusting conflicting interests, is that it pays 
no attention to the principle of the sanctity of contracts, which else­
where constitutes the core of judicial functions. The issues in each 
case before the board are defined not so much in terms of contractual 
performance as by conformance to the economic plan, which provides 
the rationale and content of the contractual activity in the first place. 
Obviously, the role of the plan is basically different from the role of 
the Civil Code with regard to contracts between private parties. Con-
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tracts in the former instance are truly only a form of "liaison" which 
could as well be established by the decision of a higher economic 
authority. Thus, decisions of the economic arbitrator can be made 
exclusively in terms of economic policy and without reference to 
abstract rules of law.ss 
This type of judicial action has but limited application in labor 
disputes, which constitute another category of litigious issues arising 
out of economic planning in the socialist polities of the Soviet type. 
Labor disputes involve personal interest. In the final analysis these 
are expressed in concrete claims based variously on the provisions 
of governmental decrees, on the collective agreements, or on the labor 
code. And the decrees, agreements, and code are couched in the form 
of abstract commands addressed to a multitude of legal relationships 
in the area of industrial relations. 
Thus, the presence of personal interests influenced the techniques 
devised in the Soviet Union for the settlement of labor disputes. In 
so doing, conciliation was combined with an· opportunity for a ju­
dicial review of the disputed issues. 
Litigations arising in the area of industrial relations fall into three 
broad categories. ( 1 )  Some disputes arise from the struggle of labor 
organizations for improvement in labor conditions and a larger share 
in industrial profits. These are hardly disputes in the legal sense of the 
word, representing rather a form of social struggle. Nevertheless, the 
modem state seeks to regulate the process of adjustment of conflicting 
interests in order to assure the welfare of the entire society. (2) Some 
disputes arise from the enforcement of the provisions of the law 
governing labor conditions and are handled by public agencies ex- · 
ercising supervisory and punitive powers to maintain certain stand­
ards. These include the hygiene and safety of work, employment of 
certain categories of workers, hours of work, conditions of work, 
etc. ( 3 )  Other disputes result from individual contracts of work and 
concern individual claims for minimum pay, leave, terms of contracts, 
etc., which are handled by the regular courts of justice. Such courts 
are normally specially organized for that type of dispute, and proceed 
according to the normal rules of judicial procedure. 89 
· 
38 See note 16 supra. 
39 See supra at 84. 
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Originally, all types of disputes under the Labor Code of 1 922 
and the Law of August 1928 were handled by the piece rate and 
confiict boards, which applied conciliation and arbitration to cases 
within their jurisdiction. Gradually, however, many of their functions, 
e.g., determination of the standards of output and piece rating, were 
taken over by the administrative agencies of the Central Boards of 
the Trade Unions, which assumed the functions of the Commissariat 
of Labor. The only jurisdiction left to the boards was, in consequence, 
the settlement of individual disputes, preliminary to transferring the 
case to the court. 40 
The edict of January 3 1 ,  1 957,41 abolished the old boards. In 
their stead, labor dispute boards were established, whose only func­
tions have been to deal exclusively with labor disputes concerning 
claims arising out of the contract of work and to enforce the labor 
regulations in force. In no case have labor dispute boards the right to 
intervene in order to improve either labor conditions or to raise the 
rates of pay. The board consists of an equal number of representatives 
of management and of the factory committee, and its decisions are 
taken unanimously. If either party is dissatisfied with the ruling of the 
board, it may file a suit in the competent court. 42 
According to the draft of the Basic Principles of Labor Legisla­
tion of the USSR and of the Union Republics, which was published 
in 1959, the 1957 regime is to continue without change.48 
From the decisions of labor boards, appeal lies to the local trade 
union committees. These also have jurisdiction to deal with contro­
versies not settled in proceedings before labor dispute boards, i.e., 
where the necessary unanimity was not reached. Courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction only in cases involving dismissals, or where either of the 
parties is dissatisfied with the decision of the trade union committee. 
Labor dispute boards have been introduced into all Eastern 
European countries of popular democracy,44 thus replacing methods 
of settling labor disputes which were modeled after patterns evolved 
40 1 Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law 803-4 (1948). 
41  Vedomosti, item 58 (1957). 
42 Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 17, at 1449-51. 
43 Sots. zak. I-XIV (No. 1 0, 1959). 
44 Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 1 7, at 1470-72, 1494-95, 1 520-22, 
1546-47, 1565-67. 
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in the industrial societies of the West. Polish developments in this 
connection are highly instructive. 
In pre-World War II Poland, labor disputes were handled by 
labor courts in which lay judges represented the interests of both 
worker and employer.45 Conciliation was used in order to settle col­
lective grievances and to establish future conditions of work, and was 
obligatory only in disputes which "could endanger national economic 
interests." In making their decisions, conciliation boards had to take 
into consideration the "interests of employers, and those of labor, 
and also the economic and social welfare of the nation." 46 
After the war, labor courts were reconstituted in their old form, 
and shop committees were given jurisdiction to conciliate disputes 
between the workers and management of individual factories. All 
cases which could not be settled amicably within the factory were 
sent to the District Inspectors of Labor, a government agency which 
enforced the laws concerning general labor conditions. In 1950, 
pursuant to the reorganization of the Polish judiciary along Soviet 
lines, labor courts were abolished and labor cases were transferred 
to ordinary courts. In 1951, labor arbitration boards were introduced 
in all Polish industries, and in 1954, in all government enterprises 
and institutions as well.47 
Labor arbitration boards have jurisdiction in all labor disputes 
except those involving the use of dwellings allotted to employees. 
These disputes concerning financial responsibility for damage at­
tributable to the employees and those disputes involving personnel 
in higher managerial positions in the excepted areas are the responsi­
bility of the administrative authorities. 
An arbitration board is a replica of the Soviet model, and its 
decision requires unanimous agreement of labor and management 
representatives. In contrast with Soviet legislation, however, the 
Polish decree contains a directive regarding the nature of awards 
made by the arbitration boards. Thus, a board makes its decisions 
"having the interests of the working masses and the welfare of the 
45 Decree of March 22, 1928, DU 37/350, and 95/354 of 1934. 
46 Decree of Oct. 27, 1933, DU 37/313. 
47 Decree of Feb. 24, 1954, DU 10/35. 
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national economy in view, and taking into consideration the law in 
force, provisions of the work contract, and shop rules." 
In other words, its function is not limited to discovering the 
rights of the parties involved in the litigation. Rather, it is directed to 
seek the achievement of a compromise which would safeguard the 
interests of production, and of the larger interests of the society as 
a whole, although the issue is the alleged violation of a contractual 
stipulation or of the legal provision in force. 48 In the final analysis, 
it contains elements of administrative action aimed at the correlation 
and integration of individual claims into the general pattern of eco­
nomic policy. 
In the period which followed the 1956 upheaval in Poland against 
the harshness of Stalinist rule, doubts were expressed as to the pos­
sibility of achieving a greater respect for the individual rights of 
workers without a basic reorganization of the economic management 
of the country and the. replacement of the administrative rule by forms 
of economic initiative shaped by the institutions of the civil law. 
Insisting that respect for individual rights was incompatible with a 
high degree of centralization, one of the partisans of economic self­
government in the factories exercised by elective organs known as 
workers' councils, suggested that: 
mhe scope of the decision making of the administrative authorities should 
be seriously restricted. Relations between enterprises and central authori­
ties should assume the form of a system of contracts in which central 
authorities would act as representatives of the national interests, while 
workers' councils would act in the interests of the enterprises and of 
the crews. This arrangement would make possible a full participation 
of the crews in the factory management, . . .  leading to the separation of 
responsibility for the state of the national economy. 
In this pattern of economic management, administrative regula­
tion would no longer be the only source of mutual rights and obliga­
tions. Indeed, the revival of civil law to govern relations between the 
various units of the national economy either representing local or 
national interests would appear to be a logical consequence.49 
48 Grzybowski, supra note 1 1 ,  at 90-91. 
49 Grzybowski, "Polish Workers' Councils," 17 J. Central European Af­
fairs 284-SS (1957) .  
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CIVIL CAUSES AND PUBLIC INTEREST 
The forms of judicial procedure followed by Soviet courts of 
general jurisdiction result from the fact that only occasionally will 
the public interest of the socialist society claim recognition. Article 
2 of the Draft of Principles of Civil Procedure of the USSR and of 
the Union Republics limited the jurisdiction of Soviet courts to cases 
involving disputes arising from civil, family, labor, and collective 
farm legal relations. These, as a rule, cannot be expected to affect the 
economic and social policies of the state. 
In such circumstances, the forms of civil procedure appear to 
the lawyer's eye to be an external form not directly related to the 
social or economic order of the polity: 
Civil procedure in each state, irrespective of its type . . .  serves to uphold 
civil law relations and claims arising therefrom. The qualitative differ­
ence of the social state and legal order as compared with the state and 
law of the exploiters, different class nature of the administration of jus­
tice in the states of a socialist type have not affected the nature of this 
function of the civil procedure, which, as long as the state and law 
shall continue-is and will be to afford to individual claims protection 
through state power.M 
At the same time, the protection of private rights cannot but 
be affected by the fact that the legal protection of private rights is 
extended by the public authority. Such is inspired by the policy aim­
ing primarily at the realization of general welfare. The Soviet draft 
of the Principles of Civil Procedure makes it clear that collective 
interests take precedence over individual claims (Article 1 ) :  
The aim of Soviet civil procedure is to ensure correct administration of 
justice in civil cases in order to safeguard the socialist system of economy 
and socialist property and the defense of political, labor, housing and 
other personal and property rights and interests of citizens protected by 
the law, and also the rights and interests protected by the law of state 
institutions, enterprises, collective farms and other cooperative and 
public organizations. 
Civil procedure should help to strengthen socialist legality and ensure 
precise and undeviating execution of laws by all institutions, enterprises, 
50 Decision of the Polish Supreme Court, Full Civil Bench, of Feb. 12, 
1955, PiP 120 (No. 7-8, 1955). 
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organizations, officials and citizens, and also educate citizens in a spirit 
of solicitous attitude towards socialist property, observance of labor 
discipline and respect for the rules of socialist society. 
From the most general point of view, these reservations as to the 
degree of legal protection afforded by the socialist courts to private 
rights and claims resemble similar reservations in the civil codes of 
the Western World which limit the enforcement of rights by the 
commands of public order and good morals.111 However, it is easily 
discernible that the reservations set out by the socialist codes refer to 
situations which represent concrete obligations of the socialist society 
vis-a-vis its individual members. The socialist judicial process seeks 
to meet higher and more concrete standards of individual behavior 
by more precise and powerful methods of intervention by public 
authority in individual litigations in order to protect those collective 
demands. 
In this respect, socialist judicial procedure represents only an 
aspect of similar solutions in the judicial procedures of open societies. 
Modem codes have given effect to the principle that on some occasions 
the court, in response to broader interests, has the power to go beyond 
the wishes of the parties to the case and proceed ex officio. This is 
particularly true of proof adduced by either of the parties, which the 
court may consider as insufficient. It may then demand the submission 
of additional evidence if it appears to be in the public interest to probe 
deeper into the real nature of the issues at stake. However, this power 
of the court may be limited by agreement of the litigants, and settle­
ment between them always constitutes a barrier to its action. 
In the socialist legal order, the criterion of interest which author­
izes the demand for legal protection exceeds the persons of the liti­
gants or those who are under legal duty to represent them. Article 
6 of the Draft of the Principles of Civil Procedure provides that : 
A court begins examination of a case upon the application of the in­
terested person, or upon the application of a prosecutor, and also upon 
the application of a governmental, trade union, or other public organiza­
tion or individual citizen if under the law the case may be instituted 
independently of the demand of the interested person. 
51 E.g., art. 6 of the French Civil Code. 
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In other words, a claimant may find himself involved in legal 
proceedings without making a move himself, a situation which is 
highly reminiscent of proceedings before the volost courts in Imperial 
Russia, where the interested party was merged in a collective action 
of the village community of which he was a member. Elsewhere, 
where more traditional criteria of legal interest prevail, thus giving 
the right to resort to judicial protection, this possibility has been almost 
exclusively limited to matrimonial causes. 52 
· Of the third parties entitled to take part in the civil suit, the 
most important is the public prosecutor. His participation in the 
trial is mandatory whenever the law so provides, and where the court 
calls for it. Otherwise, he may always institute civil proceedings, 
practically without restriction or limitation. Article 23 of the Draft of 
Principles of Civil Procedure states the limitation : "if the safeguarding 
of state or public interest or of the rights and legally protected in­
terests of citizens demand this." In contrast, other agencies of govern­
ment and public organizations may enter a case or be called upon to 
participate only in cases where the law expressly provides for it 
(Article 24 of the Draft) . 
The Soviet court has full control of proceedings and is not re­
stricted to the evidence offered by the parties. In Soviet civil pro­
cedure, the inquisitorial principle has found its full expression; the 
usual reservation that court action would be barred by the joint op­
position of the parties to the litigation is not the law in the Soviet 
judicial procedure. Furthermore, amicable settlement, the withdrawal 
of the claimant from the case, and the agreement to submit disputed 
issues to settlement by arbitration require approval by the court. 
Finally, appellate proceedings favor public interest. Here also 
Soviet procedure followed the well-beaten path of similar institutions 
in the civil procedures of Western Europe. The appeal by the public 
authority in the defense of the law, known to some European civil 
procedures, is based on the fact that only at that final stage of the 
proceedings may the importance of the judicial decision for the 
public order be properly appraised. Thus, the representative of the 
state is permitted to step in and intervene to uphold the principle of 
legal order. This right is reserved exclusively to the attorney general 
52 See supra at lOS. 
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(procureur general) , and proceedings in the case have no effect on 
the case itsel£.53 
In the Soviet Union, the institution of the Supreme Court has 
been devised to serve exclusively that type of action, and private 
parties have no access to it. In addition to various other methods of 
Supreme Court supervision of lower courts, public prosecutors, pres­
idents of the courts (therefore courts higher than people's courts) ,  
and their assistants have the right to move for the reopening of finally 
decided cases. Under the draft of the principles of civil procedure, it 
proposed that this right be exercised only within a period of three · 
years from the moment of the final determination of the case. 54 
The Polish Supreme Court, in a decision of the full civil bench, 
explained the meaning of the reform of Polish civil procedure intro­
duced after the Soviet pattern as follows : 
The quest for the determination of material truth is one of the principles 
of the socialist order, and is expressed in a number of positive rules of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. . . . These provisions were enacted still by 
the bourgeois legislator, but only now they are fully enforced . . . .  In 
particular, article 2 1 8  section 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure should 
be construed . . .  that it instructs the court . . .  to adopt an active attitude 
in the course of the proceedings and to bring to light true circumstances 
of the case. 611 
At the same time, Polish courts have distinguished between var­
ious categories of cases, depending upon the nature of the interests 
involved: 
The inquisitorial principle . . .  is not equally applicable to all cases . . . .  
It should have full application, when the interest of the People's state 
is at stake. 
The Court supported this position by pointing out that similar 
practice is followed by the Soviet courts. 56 
The difference in the degree of legal protection offered to the 
public interests, as compared to the private causes, extends also to 
53 Morel, Traite elementaire de procedure civile 515 (1949) ; cf. Dalloz, 
1 Nouveau repertoire de droit 436 (1957). 
54 Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 17, at 531-34. 
55 Civil Bench CPrez 195/52, PiP 536 (No. 10, 1953). 
56 Decision of July 5, 1952, C. 1285/52 ZOIC 81/53; cf. also the Decision 
of the Polish Supreme Court of Oct. 3, 1951, C. 223/50, ZOIC 12/51. 
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other fields of legal regulation. In a case involving shortages, the 
Polish Supreme Court stated that the one-year statute of limitation 
under Article 4 73 of the Polish Code of Obligations for the recovery 
of the shortages did not apply to the socialist employer. The court 
reasoned that : 
The statute of limitation provided in the Code concerns claims arising 
exclusively from the contract of work. However, the present claim arose 
not from a contract of work, but from the fundamental principles of 
the popular legal order (which calls for a special care for the socialist 
property) .117 
Another example of this type of reasoning was evidenced in a 
case in which the Polish Supreme Court stated that the mere breach 
of a contractual obligation · constituted a cr:iminal offense only when 
it affected the interests of the state. Otherwise, it gave grounds to a 
claim for damages under the general rules of civil law. When a private 
party was involved, the breach resulted in liability ex delicto.118 
The presence of dual standards within the same order of legal 
procedure is due to the basic change which occurred with the transi­
tion of the national economy from private enterprise to socialist 
planning. The concept of the state as the subject of proprietary rights, 
and therefore as assimilated in their exercise to all other subjects of 
the private legal relationships, has disappeared.119 
In all its forms-acting through the medium of government 
enterprises, socialist organizations, governmental agencies, and elec­
tive institutions--the state exercises public power and enforces public 
policy. The Polish draft of the Civil Code of 1955 stated, in the at­
tached report of the codification commission, that it objected to the 
concept of the treasury as a party to legal transactions or as a subject 
of rights and duties in its own capacity as apart from the state con­
ceived as a public power: 
This recalls the bourgeois theory which makes a distinction between two 
fields of state activity : one in the province of public law and the other 
57 Decision of Dec. 4, 1 951, C. 1539/51, PiP 372-73 (No. 8-9, 1952); 
cf. Shargorodskii, "Tolkovanie ugolovnogo zakona," Uchonye zapiski 
Leningradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta 306 (No. 1, 1948). 
58 Decision of Jan. 1 ,  1 955, ZOIK 29/55, PiP 510 (No. 3, 1955). 
59 Cf. supra at 16, 86 ft. 
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in the province of private law. . . . The state as the owner of national 
property unifies indivisibly the quality of authority with that of owner­
ship.eo 
This development reflects, in an interesting manner, on the mean­
ing and function of procedural institutions. In its traditional form, 
the state, in its autonomous function as guide for the conduct of all 
members of the society, had a concrete interest in upholding the legal 
rule. Socialist legal order is identified with the policy of the socialist 
state.n And, therefore, the institution of appeal in the interest of 
the law has assumed a new meaning. The intervention of public au­
thority in civil trials in the form of a motion for the ex officio reopen­
ing of the case simply cannot be limited to the reconsideration of the 
legal issues involved without materially affecting the substantive in­
terests involved. 
60 Nagorski, "Draft of the New Civil Code for Poland," in Studies of the 
Polish Lawyers in Exile in the U.S. 69 ( 1956 ) .  In the case of the Soviet 
telegraphic agency Tass, sued for libel in Britain, the defendant claimed 
diplomatic immunity and submitted a certificate from the Soviet Am­
bassador to the United Kingdom which stated that Tass "constitutes a 
department of the Soviet state . . .  exercising the rights of a legal entity." 
77 Journal du droit international 892 ( 1950) .  
61 Jaroszynski, Zimmerman, & Brzezinski, Polskie prawo administracyjne, 
�c og61na, 343 ( 1956) :  "In the absolute state bureaucracy was not 
bounded by its own acts . . .  in the capitalist legal order . . .  individual 
rights were a limit to the revocability of the administrative acts. In the 
socialist state all these moments are no longer valid, as public administra­
tion is a part of the social order . . . .  Those aspects of life which demand 
some stability will call for a degree of stability of the administrative 
act. . . . Acts of the administration of creative nature . . .  , the legislator 




Standards of human behavior in relation to the exercise of in­
dividual rights are necessary in any legal system. Their function is 
to correlate legal provisions with individual activities and to provide 
uniform criteria for their evaluation. In legal systems closer to our 
world, these standards are personified under such concepts as "average 
prudent man" or "bonus pater familias" (Articles 450 and 1 374 of 
the Civil Code of France). In addition to providing a yardstick for 
the evaluation of human actions, these concepts serve also in the 
elaboration of legal rules to assure desired social goals. In other 
words, the legislative technique in our mass society is that the legal . 
rule addresses itself not to a number of real individualities but to a 
standard model, i.e., to a hypothetical member of human society.1 
The more realistic this model is and the closer its approximation 
to what people and individual members of a polity . actually are, the 
greater will be the chances that the legal rule will command "natural" 
obedience. Contrariwise, the more removed from reality or the less 
average the model to whom the law appeals, the fewer are the chances 
of success of the legal order. 
As with everything else which pertains to social order, the proper 
correlation of a legal command to the model human being to which 
it is addressed is only one of the reasons for the success of the rule of · 
law. A highly reformist legal order which operates with an idealistic 
model type may still be successful, if social regimentation, either by 
force or in combination with ideological doctrines, is adequate. On 
1 Savatier, Metamorphoses economiques et sociales du droit civil d'au· 
jourd'hui, 6-7 (ser. 3, 1959). 
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the other band, a legal order conservatively conceived will be out­
dated and its institutions will have to be adapted to new conditions, 
if owing to social change a new type emerges, widely differing from 
the model envisaged by the legal order. 
It seems, therefore, that a prescription for a legal order, which 
will fulfill its role of providing standards for human behavior with 
economy of force, must depend upon a keen understanding of actual 
social conditions and a feeling for the future. The model type of the 
member of a society to whom the legal rule is addressed is one of 
those characteristic features of the social order which determines its 
character. 
Examples of unrealistic concepts of the model type are quite 
numerous. Among the most significant of such legislative errors were 
the provisions of the French Civil Code which took no account of 
the Frenchman's inclination to form associations. This mistake was 
corrected by later legislation, including the Code de Commerce. Of 
even greater significance was the general attitude of the legislators 
of the nineteenth century toward workers' associations. A most 
characteristic statement of the hostility toward workers and profes­
sional associations in the name of individual liberty was the French 
decree of March 2-17, 1791 ,  which instituted a prohibition of 
workers' and employers' associations for the purpose of exposing 
fully industrial relations to the impact of the forces of the market. 
These laws were followed by a long list of prohibitions against form­
ing associations and were reinforced by penal provisions for viola­
tions of their rules. They were gradually reversed by a series of laws 
beginning with the decree of February 25-29, 1848, and ending 
with the law of July 24, 1 867. The latter re-established the freedom 
of professional associations. 
Other countries of Europe have undergone similar experiences. 
Thus, Great Britain authorized workers' association in 1824; whereas, 
in Germany, the recognition of workers' rights to form associations 
had to await the passage of the law of June 21, 1861.2 
While the French Civil Code was predicated upon a single con­
cept, i.e., of a hypothetical Frenchman, and purported to implement 
the postulates of equality and liberty by determining the rights of 
2 Bouere, Le droit de greve 20-40 ( 1958). 
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all members of the French society in a single act, no modem legal 
system may operate on the basis of a single standard of behavior and 
a single model type. One may say that the progress of modem 
societies is characterized by the emergence of an ever-growing num­
ber of social types to whom various legal rules address their com­
mands, without prejudice to their universality. These rules take into 
account special obligations, as well as professional functions and 
qualifications. Doctors, lawyers, soldiers, businessmen, journalists, 
members of the trade unions, etc. are called upon to adhere to higher 
standards of behavior than other members of the soCial order. Their 
privileged position, a position of trust, is thought to be counterbal­
anced by higher obligations. Enforcement of these standards is often 
guaranteed by special provisions of the criminal law, prescribing 
responsibility for negligence or failure to act when another person 
would escape responsibility. Or enforcement may be occasioned by 
special charters of professional associations, which thus become uni­
versal laws to the same extent as provisions of the criminal law pro­
viding for qualified penal sanctions. 8 
In the forty years of Soviet legal order, it is possible to dis­
tinguish at least three model types, i.e., the average Soviet man, to 
whom Soviet law has addressed it commands. 
In the legal theory of Pashukanis, the citizen of the revolutionary 
state was an economic man who differed little from a member of 
capitalist society. This was because the capitalist institutions of law 
and barter, as means of regulating human relations, continued to 
function in the Soviet economic order. The emergence of the new 
man was predicated upon the fulfillment of the new economic order 
in which economic relations would no longer be regulated by law, 
but by administrative arrangements and planning. Then homo so­
vieticus would cease to be a legal concept. It would become rather a 
social category, as the law was to disappear together with the laws of 
value and the market. 
This concept of Soviet citizen was replaced by that of an inte­
grated man whose duty and instinct was discipline. The new man 
3 C/. Grzybowski, "Soviet Reform of Criminal Law of 1958," 6 Osteuropa 
Recht 114 (1960); cf. Soviet Criminal Code of the RSFSR regarding the 
responsibility for economic crimes, or for disregarding of authority. 
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was the product of a re-evaluation of the political and social situation 
in Russia. It was accepted as axiomatic that the victory of socialism 
was a concrete fact and not relegated to an unknown future, and 
that a classless society had been created as a result of the reforms 
initiated by the regime. By the same token, the law governing the 
Soviet Union was promoted to the rank of the socialist law.4 
Socialist law was thought to be inspired by the postulate of 
subordination of individual rights to the collective interests of society: 
Not Roman law based on private property ... but the public law prin­
ciple provides a foundation of ... Soviet socialist civil law. This prin­
ciple found its expression in our code of civil procedure (of 1923) 
which in Article 2 stated the right of the procurator, both to initiate 
proceedings or to enter the case, irrespective of the wishes or motions 
of the parties, in any phase of the proceedings, if ... this is required by 
the interests of the state or of the working masses.5 
The Stalinist concept of the Soviet man was the result of an 
evolution of ideas in Soviet psychology, connected with the decision 
to reshape through a series of economic plans the economic potential 
of the Soviet Union, and later, of the satellite countries. The concept 
of the individual in a socialist society (or rather in a society which 
builds socialism) has been formulated in terms emphasizing its 
ideological importance. It is thought to have a political and social 
meaning. Its appearance was the result of the victory of that tendency 
in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which favored active 
implementation of the rules of history. These rules were said to lead 
toward the communist society. A plan was preferred to spontaneity. 
Determinism was played down, and emphasis was placed on the 
consciousness of the members of the socialist society. The individual 
was considered capable of response to social incentives, able to train 
and reform himself. The influence of the individual on his environ­
ment was stressed. While social institutions were tightly integrated 
into the mechanism of the state's undertaking of the task of social 
economic reconstruction, demands and opportunities for the indi­
vidual increased.6 
4 Vyshinskii, Osnovnye zadatchi nauki sovetskogo sotsialisticheskogo prava 
38 (1938). 
S Vyshinskii, supra note 4, at 54. 
6 Bauer, The New Man in Soviet Psychology 2-24, 128-50 (1952). 
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As a Soviet author explained, the chief characteristic of the 
Soviet citizen is his ability to identify his interests with those of his 
nation and with its ideology: 
The harmony of the national and individual interests in the socialist com­
munity finds expression in the identity of two great forces, the people 
and communism.7 
Employment in governmental enterprises and institutions repre­
sents the most important form of individual participation in the 
social and economic activity of the socialist order. In consequence, 
work determines individual status irrespective of all other criteria 
of social status. A Soviet jurist who wrote on the development of 
Soviet labor law ( 1 949) thus described the legal position of the 
Soviet worker under Stalin's regime: 
In the socialist society there is no difference in principle and quality be­
tween draftee l�bor and labor performed by voluntarily entering into 
labor relations by taking employment. When we say that in the socialist 
society the principle of voluntary labor is recognized, we are not speak­
ing of some kind of abstract principle of free labor and trade in a liberal 
and bourgeois sense, a principle which would be treated as a value per se. 
Under the conditions of socialist society ... it is impossible to secure 
the principle "from each according to his ability" without pressure by the 
state and law regarding the universal duty of work.s 
The collapse of Staliti's regime initiated a new attitude toward 
labor. For quite some time changes in production methods, refine­
ments of modem industrial equipment, the need for higher skills in 
the labor force, and individualization of human contribution in the 
processes of production militated against the militaristic approach 
to the discipline of labor. It thus became necessary to adopt new 
methods of control and to base the participation of the Soviet citizen 
on a higher degree of voluntary support for the regime and its policy. 
The Draft of Basic Principles of Labor Legislation of the USSR and 
of the Union Republics defined the new policy as follows: 
Soviet social order established all conditions for stimulating and de­
veloping among the working people a new socialist attitude to labor. In 
7 Aleksandrov, 0 moralnom oblike sovetskogo cheloveka 30 (1948). 
8 Dogadov, ''Istoria razvitia sovetskogo trudovogo prava," Uchonye Zapiski, 
Leningradskogo Universiteta 163, 168 (No. 2, 1949). 
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socialist society a n  increasing role belongs to moral incentives to labor 
for the good of the society. One of the manifestations of the new attitude 
to labor is demonstrated by the active participation of the working peo­
ple in industrial management and general all-national socialist competition 
which aims at raising the productivity of labor, and continued raising of 
social welfare. 
Communist forms of labor are on the increase. Simultaneously with the 
gradual disappearance of the fundamental difference between intellectual 
and physical forms of labor ... are created conditions for the transforma­
tion of work into a primary necessity of life for all members of society. 
A major role in the education of workers in the communist attitude to 
labor and the realization of the workers' participation in industrial man­
agement, increasing their material welfare and level of culture belongs 
to the trade unions. 9 
Thus, the discipline of regimentation has been replaced by the 
discipline of voluntary involvement in the affairs of the state and social 
organizations. Soviet society and homo sovietic� . have arrived, ac­
cording to this view, at that point in the general progress of the tech­
niques of social ordering where it is possible to realize the highest 
ideal of social discipline. At the same time the highest degree of free­
dom is possible, since the ultimate attainment of social discipline 
will be followed by the disappearance of all forms of state coercion. 
This moment will arrive, Lenin predicted: 
[W]hen all will learn to govern, and will really manage social production 
themselves, they will themselves be in charge of accounting and control 
... then avoiding this, all-national accounting and control shall become 
so extremely difficult and exceptional, and will be followed indeed by 
such quick and serious penal repression ... that the necessity to abide 
by simple, fundamental rules of social life shall become a habit.9a 
A draft of the law regarding the increased role of society in the 
struggle with violations of Soviet legality and rules of socialist co­
existence provided in Article 1 : 
Each Soviet citizen has a duty not only to obey the laws, conform to the 
discipline of labor, protect and strengthen the state and social property, 
follow the rules of socialist coexistence, but also to insist on the same 
from other citizens and actively to struggle with all anti-social doings.10 
9 SGP 3-4 (No. 10, 1959). 
9• Lenin, The State and Revolution, 33 Soch. 155. 
10 Izvestia, Oct. 23, 1959. 
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The law thus proposes to establish a new relationship between 
the governmental mechanism of law enforcement and the functioning 
of social structures. They share the same role with the state, and the 
individual citizen is drawn directly into the processes of government 
and enforcement of the rules of social behavior, which consist of 
formal commands of the law and rules of socialist coexistence. 
Thus, the state aims at encompassing in the domain of public 
control that area of life which hitherto has been beyond the reach 
of legal rule. A higher stage of social development, in the opinion 
of the Soviet leaders, calls for the control of personal relations be­
tween the citizens of the soviet polity. While the province of laissez 
jaire was shrinking in the realm of contract and property, the province 
of personal relations remained the last bastion of freedom.11 
A high degree of regimentation of individual life in Soviet so­
ciety is a necessity. This follows from the need for new types and 
methods of social action in the achievement of social goals unrealiz­
able through normal methods of ordering and ·coercion. Some of the 
difficulties in this connection may be gauged from the decisions of 
the Polish Supreme Court, which has proved hesitant to enforce full 
control of private affairs. In one case, an employee, dismissed from 
service for refusal to participate in "social action," sued for damages. 
The Court stated: 
The duty of social work is one of the principles of socialist coexistence 
in the People's State. It is independent of the fact whether a citizen is 
employed by a socialist enterprise ... and violation of a duty of social 
11 In the words of Scrutton L.J. in the Court of Appeal: "[It] is quite 
possible for the parties to come to an agreement by accepting a proposal 
with the result that the agreement concluded does not give rise to legal 
relations. The reason of this is that the parties do not intend that their 
agreement shall give rise to legal relations. This intention may be im­
plied from the subject matter of the agreement, but it may also be ex­
pressed by the parties. In social and family relations such .an intention 
is readily implied . . . . " [1923] 2 K.B. 261 at 288. 
In the case of Balfour v. Balfour, Lord Atkin observed: "[l]t is 
necessary to remember that there are agreements between parties which 
do not result in contracts within the meaning of that term in the law. 
The ordinary example is where two parties agree to take a walk to­
gether or where there is an offer and acceptance of hospitality. Nobody 
would suggest in ordinary circumstances that those agreements result 
in what we know as contract. . .. " [1919] 2 K.B. 571 at 578. 
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work cannot be considered per se a violation of duties resulting from 
the contract of employment, and as such may not be used as a reason 
for the dissolution of the contract of work. On the other hand it cannot 
be ruled out that, in some circumstances a drastic non-compliance with 
the duty of social work may justify a loss of confidence in the employee 
so that continued employment even for a short period of time is no 
longer possible� This may, however, apply to exceptional circumstances, 
which would indicate such a hostility toward the institution in which 
the employee works, that leaving him there would jeopardize the work 
of the institution.12 
The high standards of conformity by the Soviet masses has been 
achieved by propaganda and by the monopoly of all forms of po­
litical and social advancement. The new tasks, however, call for a 
much broader and deeper degree of conformity and for the rise of 
labor productivity. In particular, the improved situation in the supply 
of durable consumer goods has opened new channels for effecting 
further the total conformity of homo sovieticus, not only in political 
and social ideals, but also in the style of "socialist coexistence." As 
an editorial in the leading Soviet legal periodical pointed out: 
Until recent times, the problem of meeting the property interests of the 
citizens was linked in the Civilistic literature with the question of the 
transfer of objects of material value into personal ownership. In the 
present conditions of the developed communist construction, as never 
before, arises the necessity to develop legal provisions concerning such 
relations of the citizens with the socialist organizations, which would 
make available the use of various objects of material value without mak­
ing them personal property.1a 
This new development represents the single most important 
step in the reconstruction of the attitude of the Soviet citizen toward 
his social duties. The fact that social organizations shall control the 
means of adding meaningfully to individual existence, either through 
the control of recreation or travel opportunities, or ownership of car 
pools, or other means of recreation, while sharing with the state an 
interest in individual performance at the place of work and in various 
forms of social actions, will strengthen general discipline at work, in 
the streets, in public meetings, and even at home. 
12 Nowe Prawo (No. 4, 1955). 
13 "XXI sjezd KPSS i zadatchi pravovoi nauki," SGP 7 (No.2, 1959). 
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RE-EDUCATION 
In spite of the abolition of capitalist forms of economy, ideologies 
and habits rooted in capitalist forms of production have survived into 
the new social and economic order. Crimes, common weaknesses, 
and various shortcomings of human nature, which according to Marx­
ist doctrines were a reflection of the old order of the society, have also 
failed to disappear, and human nature continues to be out of tune 
with the new shape of things. As late as 1936, which was the year of 
the Stalin Constitution and its announcement of the liquid atio n of the 
classes, Pravda re ported with a good deal of exasperation: "Egotism, 
indifference, laziness and cowardice, will survive the abolition of the 
subdivision of the society into classes by which they were pro­
duced." 14 
Direct concern with the moral and ethical convictions of the 
socialist citizen was also caused by another phenomenon. As Soviet 
leadership and society have discovered, this called for an educational 
campaign since laws and regulations were unable to provide an effi­
cient remedy. As stated in a Polish periodical: 
A dissatisfied guest in a tourist hotel, a passenger whose bus is late, a 
client poorly served by the water department, etc., have no legal powers 
against the institutions which are obliged to serve their needs. The only 
remedy, writing complaints to the authorities, brings no results. This 
state of affairs is accepted as a necessary evil which will disappear in 
some indefinite future .... We remain powerless before the ill will and 
lack of courtesy shown by various people in various state-run enterprises. 
We still have the legal code of the capitalist system which simply did 
not envisage situations which occur today. In the capitalist system, in­
competence was restricted by free competition. Today we are ready to 
accept the principle of priority of national interests, and the resulting 
hierarchy of public needs, but this does not mean that we can tolerate 
the lack of legal equality in cases when we can afford certain services. 
. . . If for national reasons we cannot afford all types of public services 
as yet, we must nevertheless be assured that in the services we do have, 
we are equal partners and the law defends both sides.15 
Quite early, therefore, the general education of the public into 
the ways of the new social reality had to accomplish two goals. One 
14 Pravda, editorial, April 7, 1936. 
15 Przeglqd kulturalny, March 31, 1960. 
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consisted of eradicating the remnants of capitalism in the minds of 
the people. The second was to make the Soviet citizen conform to 
the new reality under socialism, and later communism. For the time 
being, the Soviet citizen, although not hostile to the regime, was found 
unable to participate spontaneously in the great task of socialist 
reconstruction without proper direction and control and a simultaneous 
process of re-education in the course of law enforcement. Many of 
the communist leaders were convinced, upon observing the state of 
the collective and individual mind in Soviet society, that the achieve­
ment of the final goal would depend upon the total reconstruction of 
the Soviet manY' 
From the very beginning, the courts were considered the most 
important instrument for the inculcation of the new attitudes. Vyshin­
skii, the standard bearer of the idea of the legal offensive in the 
struggle for more perfect forms of social life, was convinced that : 
The Soviet court participates directly in the historic venture of the con­
struction of the Communist society. Punishing pitilessly plunderers of 
the socialist property, thieves, swindlers, speculators, hooligans, do­
nothings, and absentees from work, our courts bum out the familiar 
stigma of capitalism which have still survived in Soviet life. Our Courts 
struggle against these survivals in the human conscience, ... educating 
the bearers of such survivals.tT 
The Soviet Supreme Court, in its directives issued by its Plenary 
Session, required the judges 
... to bear in mind when rendering judgments their most important role 
as acts of socialist justice which demand from the judge a particular 
consciousness of his responsibility for their correct political content. . . . 18 
The 1 926 Judiciary Act, which first formulated the educational 
role of the Soviet courts, defined their tasks to include, among others 
(Article 1c):  "To strengthen social and labor discipline and the 
solidarity of the toilers and to educate them in law." The 1933 Act 
used a somewhat broader formula : 
By all its activities, the court shall educate the citizens of the USSR 
in the spirit of devotion to the country and the cause of socialism, in 
16 Komarov, "K voprosu ob unichtozhenii klassov," SGP 11 (No. 3, 1936). 
17 Vyshinskii, Teoria sudebnykh dokazatelstv v sovetskom prave 25 (1950). 
18 Karev, Sovetskoe sudoustroistvo 23 (1951). 
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the Spirit of precise and unswerving execution of the Soviet laws, of 
watchful attitude toward socialist property, of labor discipline, of an 
honest attitude toward governmental and public duties, and of respect 
for the rules of socialist community life. 
The educational role of the Soviet courts was restated in the 
various legislative acts which followed the end of the Stalinist regime 
and initiated the reform of the legal system in Russia. 19 
In Eastern Europe, which became a part of the Soviet bloc, the 
educational functions of the socialist courts and of the socialist law 
were fully recognized. So, for instance, Article 40 of the Hungarian 
Constitution of 1949, stated that "courts of the Hungarian People's 
Republic shall . . .  educate the workers to respect the rules of social­
ist communal life. " A Czech textbook, commenting on Section 4 of 
the Czechoslovak law on the judiciary ( 1952) which contains a 
provision similar to that of the Hungarian Constitution, stated that it 
is a duty of the Czechoslovak court to educate backward citizens who 
have violated the laws of the country "under the influence of the 
survivals of capitalism in their minds. " 20 
19 Article 20 of the General Principles of Criminal Legislation of the 
Soviet Union and of the Union Republics stated: "A penalty ... aims at 
reforming and re-educating the convicted person in the spirit of an 
honest attitude toward labor, of strict execution of laws, of respect 
for the rules of a socialist community .... " 
A similar formula insisting on the education of citizens in the spirit 
of strict observance of Soviet laws and of respect for the rules of every­
day life in a socialist community is contained in the general principles 
of criminal procedure (art. 2) and in the general principles of legisla­
tion on judiciary which defines the duties of the Soviet courts as 
follows: 
"By all its activities the court shall educate the citizens of the USSR 
in the spirit of devotion to their country and the cause of communism, 
the spirit of precise and unswerving execution of Soviet laws, a solicitous 
attitude towards socialist property; observance of labor discipline; an 
honest attitude toward governmental and public duties; and respect for 
the rights, honor and dignity of the citizens and for the rules of socialist 
community life." 
The Draft of the General Principles of Civil Procedure was less 
specific and mentioned that the educational goal of the Soviet civil 
law courts was to instill into the minds of Soviet citizens a "solicitous 
attitude toward socialist property, observance of labor discipline and 
respect for the rules of life in a socialist society." 
20 Trestni Pravo (general part) 13 (1955); cf. also Hungarian Judiciary 
Act, Law ll, 1954 TV.; cf. Albanian Law No. 1284 of June 9, 1951, 
Homo Sovieticus 121  
In the process of re-education, remnants of the capitalist order 
were to be eradicated and replaced by obedience to socialist laws 
and adherence to the "rules of life in the socialist community." In 
this connection, the term "rules of life" seems to indicate a certain 
style of life under socialism. But this concept is also used with refer­
ence to more concrete tasks within the legal system. Thus, "rules of 
life in the socialist community" are held to constitute an additional 
source of rules for guiding judicial action when more specific rules 
are lacking. 21 They also provide a general guide for the validity of 
individual legal transactions.22 The "rules of life in a socialist com-
on the Judiciary (G.Z., Law No. 1284, No. 20, 1951). According to 
the Albanian Law on Government Attorneys (G.Z., Law No. 274, No. 
86, 1946) the duty of the government attorneys is to educate private 
citizens in the understanding of the law of communist order. The Polish 
judiciary act of 1950 (art. 3) calls upon the courts "to exert all their 
efforts to educate citizens in a spirit of loyalty to the People's Poland, 
so that they will observe principles of the People's legality, the discipline 
of labor, and will have a solicitous attitude to socialist property." 
21 Cf. supra at 24-26. 
22 C/. supra at 104-5. 
Sec. 9 of the Bulgarian Law on Contracts stated: "Parties have the 
right to determine freely the content of the contract as long as it is not 
contrary to law, to the national economic plan and to the rules of life 
in a socialist community." 
Article 58 of the Civil Code of the RSFSR permits the use of one's 
property within the limits determined by the law. Polish law on the 
General Principles of the Civil Legislation (art 3) stated: 
"Law shall be applied and construed in accordance with the prin­
ciples of the order and the aims of the people's state. Nobody shall 
use his rights in a manner contrary to the principles of social life in 
the people's state. Any legal transaction contrary to the law or rules of 
social life shall be invalid. Any declaration of will shall be interpreted 
in accordance with the principles of social life in the people's state" 
(DU 34/1950). 
The Czechoslovak Civil Code of 1950 expressed the same principle 
in somewhat different terms: "The Social order of the People's Republic 
and its socialist construction guaranteed by the constitution are the 
foundation of private rights" (sec. 1) . "Nobody shall abuse his private 
rights to the prejudice of the society" (sec. 3). 
The Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 contains the most developed 
system of provisions dealing with the effect of social and political condi­
tions in a socialist state on the private rights: (sec. 4) ( 1) "In exercising 
civil rights and performing civil obligations the parties shall show such 
conduct as to ensure that the enforcement of their interests be in con­
formity with the interests of society." 
122 Soviet Legal Institutions 
munity" thus appear in a double role. In the first place, they provide 
a general ethical and moral code of behavior for a member of so­
cialist society to guide him in areas of life which are not easily regu­
lated by the formal provisions of the law. In the second place, they 
provide a central concept in the legislative techniques peculiar. to 
Soviet lawmaking, which must resort to vague and broad formulas 
in order to meet constant fluctuations of policy. As conditions of life 
change, it becomes possible to force upon the Soviet citizen new, 
stricter, and more exacting standards of behavior. Thus, "rules of 
life" acquire new meaning tending toward ever higher individual 
involvement in the affairs of the socialist community. 
Soviet laws are deeply concerned with the enforcement of the 
new mode of life, which, however, seems to take root with great diffi­
culty. Hence, the resort is made to extralegal concepts which consti­
tute the rationale both of the legal order and of individual behavior. 
The common characteristic of the two orders, that established 
by the law in force and the other by the rules of life in a socialist 
community, is that they both contain identical commands vis-a-vis 
(2) "In civil law relations everybody shall act by mutual co­
operation and in accordance with the demands of socialist coexistence. 
Cooperation shall be achieved by strictly performing all obligations and 
by exercising all rights in conformity with the function of such rights." 
(sec. 5) (1) "Misuse of rights is prohibited by this Act.o:t 
(2) "The exercise of a right shall be deemed to be the misuse 
thereof if such exercise aims at an object incompatible with the social 
function of the rights, particularly where such exercise might result in 
damaging national economy, in interfering vexatiously with the citi­
zens, in prejudicing their rights and lawful interests, or in producing 
undue advantages." 
Polish Supreme Court, in one of the rare cases which involved the 
analysis of art. 3 of the General Principles of Civil Legislation, stated 
as follows: 
"Article 3 of the General Principles . . .  determines general principles 
of individual rights, stating that the use of individual rights is permitted 
inasmuch only as it is not contrary to the principles of life in a peo­
ple's state. . . . Consequently ... article 3 constitutes a valid defense 
against a claim addressed to the defendant, but it may not serve as a 
basis for independent claims to the creditor, in particular a claim for 
the reduction of the debt or any other modification of his liabilities or 
obligations. Such a claim would have to be based on a concrete legal 
provision permitting for the reform of the legal relationship between 
the parties." Decision of April 25, 1955, in PiP 529 (1955). 
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the socialist citizen in the form of two institutions: the economic 
plan 23 and labor discipline. Both are absolute. Human transactions 
contrary to the plan are not valid. Commands of the discipline of 
labor are equally absolute. As a Soviet treatise stated: 
Socialist labor relations can by no means be reduced to the rights and 
obligations of the parties .... The social position of the citizen as a 
member of the socialist enterprise cannot be defined in terms of rights 
and duties.24 
With reference to these two institutions of the Soviet social and 
economic order, commands and prohibitions are formulated in much 
the same manner as are good morals in civil codes, i.e., as determina­
tive of the proper attitude of the individual to problems of collective 
life. But their striking feature, directly pertaining to the task of re­
making the Soviet man, is the diversity of legal provisions concerned 
23 Cf. supra at 94-95. · 
As the Polish Supreme Court stated: "One of the functions of the 
state is the management of the national economy. Consequently, a 
violation of socio-economic interests of the state must be considered 
as the violation of public order .... " Decision of May 28, 1949, ZOIC 
13 ( 1950). 
This statement must be read with reference to the basic assumptions 
of the Soviet legal and social order. By itself a statement of this type 
means nothing novel, as economic life determines the content of human 
relations and conditions of individual life. According to the traditional 
view, a legal system operates independently of the economic laws, while 
socialist planners claim that the economic plan, which is a legal enact­
ment, has subordinated the laws of economy to human will. Economic 
planning integrated laws of economy into. the positive legal system. Cf. 
supra. 
"Such a phrase as laws of political economy, laws of history, laws 
of statistics has no dependence whatever on any conception of a tribunal 
or a lawgiver, or of doing justice. It signified only the normal results, 
as collected by observation or deduced by reasoning, of conditions, 
and (where human action is concerned) habits and motives, assumed to 
exist and to have effect. Whether we like these results or not, whether 
and to what extent these conditions are within the control of deliberate 
human action, and in what direction, if at all, we shall endeavor to 
modify the conditions or counteract the results,-may be matters de­
serving to be most carefully weighed; but they belong to a different order 
of consideration." Pollock, First Book of Jurisprudence for Students of 
Common Law 20 ( 1903 ) .  
24 Aleksandrov & Pasherstnik, Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo 120 ( 1952). 
124 Soviet Legal Institutions 
with the effect of legal transactions contrary to the economic plan or 
the consequences of the breach of labor discipline. Sanctions in civil 
laws applicable to breaches of rules of life in a socialist community 
are combined with criminal provisions in the penal laws. A proper 
labor record is not only a matter of the individual's economic po­
sition. It is also a matter of social status and is rewarded in many 
intangible forms, determinative of ethical level and progressive at­
titudes. The draft of the law on increasing the role of society in the 
struggle with violations of Soviet legality and the rules of socialist 
coexistence makes it quite clear that the main problem is the question 
of proper technique in achieving the basic target, i.e., the reformation 
of practical human ethics: 
Soviet citizens work nobly in all sectors of communist construction, 
honor strictly their social obligations, follow Soviet laws, and respect the 
rules of socialist life. However, there are still people who live an ig­
nominious life, commit criminal offenses and other anti-social acts. By 
their behavior they make it difficult for other Soviet people to live quietly 
and work, and cause damage to the society. It is necessary to struggle 
decisively with such violators of Soviet legality and rules of the socialist 
coexistence. However, not in all circumstances is it necessary to apply 
to them measures of administrative coercion, or penal repression. In a 
number of cases such people may be reformed under the influence of the 
collective.211 
A ruling for the guidance of Hungarian courts issued by the 
Supreme Court provides an illustration of the extent of the mental 
reorientation required from a member of a socialist society. The 
Supreme Court stated that the so-called stabilization clause provided 
for in private contracts was invalid because 
... at the time of the stabilization, it was the court's duty toward our 
people to regard the value of the forint with realistic optimism, faith and 
confidence, and this is still our duty. A covenant lacking these characteris­
tics may not be enforced by·the courts .26 
The ruling was issued despite the fact that an express provision 
of an act issued during the interwar period definitely permitted such 
25 Cf. supra 115. 
26 Biber, "Reevaluation of Money Claims in Hungary," 2 Highlights 228 
(1954); Leading Decision of the Hungarian Supreme COurt of March 1, 
1950, Pkt 5837/1949. 
Homo Sovieticus 125 
stabilization clauses in private contracts. An act of prudence per­
missible under the law, an act of foresight calculated to minimize the 
effect of economic instability, was declared incompatible with the 
duties of citizens toward society. The new social order required that 
a contract between private citizens be inspired by confidence toward 
the new state. Under the new order, the success of the individual de­
pends far more upon the success of the whole than upon his perspica­
city and the arrangements which he can personally make. The com­
petitive spirit of the capitalist economic system is replaced by the 
paramount interests of the whole. 
The need for the re-education of the new man is carried down 
to family relations. Divorce and guardianship cases are a mine of 
information on the struggle for the reshaping of the legal convictions 
of the citizenry at large. Thus, the Polish Supreme Court issued a 
ruling for the guidance of lower courts amounting to a real privi­
legium Paulinum: 
Conflicting ideologies on political and social questions, especially if one 
of the spouses represents a progressive conception of life, and the other, 
on the contrary, a backward one, justify divorce.27 
The reshaping of the national economy and the ideological 
reconstruction of society have given a new meaning to problems of 
guardianship and arrangements substituting for parental care. Thus, 
the East German Supreme Court ruled (April 27, 195 1 )  that, in 
general, antiquated notions such as raising a child in a family home 
was healthier and better than any other arrangement were no longer 
valid. It asserted that sometimes it is salubrious for the spiritual and 
physical welfare of the child to separate him completely from the 
influence of the parents. The court remarked that 
... in the new socialist order the weakened influence of the parents, 
particularly in divorced families, is fully compensated by the influence 
of the ideological youth organizations.2B 
· 
27 Dec. 11, 1951; cf. Schmied, "Das Familienrecht der Volksdemokratien, 
1945-1951," 17 Zeitschrift fUr ausllindisches und internationales Priva­
trecht 227 ff. (1952); cf. canon 1127 of the Codex Juris Canonicus of 
1917; Woywod, A Practical Commentary of the Code of Canon Law 
811 ff. (1948). 
28 1 OGDDR 136 (1951). 
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In the same spirit, the District Court of Moravska Ostrava 
(Czechoslovakia) ruled (January 28, 1953) : 
When deciding the question whether guardianship of a child should 
be left to its mother or to a social welfare institution, the probation of 
the mother during work is to be taken into consideration. If the mother 
is a shock worker, or a member of the Communist Party, the child can 
be left to her, as her moral and political qualifications guarantee honorable 
education.29 
In another case, the same court removed a son from the care of 
his parents and placed him under the guardianship of a social welfare 
institution. The court cited the son's nonaccomplishment of the shift 
in the mines, the parents obviously having failed "to educate their 
son in the proper attitude toward his working duties." so 
29 Socialisticka Zakonnost 20 (No. 1, 1953 ). 
30 Ibid. 
A Soviet manual for the people's assessors explained that "Soviet 
law plays an important and progressive role in strengthening and per­
fecting the productive relations of the socialist society. While fulfilling 
this function, Soviet law supports the development of productive forces 
of our society. Technical development, improvement of work habits ... 
constitute indispensable conditions for a gradual transition to com­
munism." Posobie dla narodnykh zasedatelej 9 (1955). 
An important tool in the implementation of the moral reconstruc­
tion program in the Soviet Union was created in the form of a net­
work of boarding schools following a recommendation of the Twentieth 
Congress of the Party. It expanded with great rapidity and has had a 
marked success. It is said that parents have swamped the new schools 
with requests for admissions. Schools are credited with important 
achievements concerning the development among their students of these 
moral virtues which should characterize good members of the socialist 
society. An article in Pravda by the director of the new school system 
listed these achievements in the terminology which is familiar to those 
who are conversant with those aspects of Soviet laws which describe 
the life in a socialist order: devotion to and love of work; ability to 
provide for their own needs; and students have become more polite, full 
of consideration for the collectivity in which they live. In order to im­
prove the performance of the schools the director asked for better co­
operation of the Komsomol (Organization of Communist Youth) in 
selecting leaders for the organization of Pioneers, an organization of 
Communist children. Kozmin, "Two Years of Boarding Schools," Pravda 
Oct. 9, 1958. Cf. Hazard, "Le droit sovietique et le deperissement de 
l':£tat, " in 8 Travaux et conferences, Universite Libre de Bruxelles 91 
(1960). 
Homo Sovieticus 127 
The educational quality of the Soviet legal system is due pri­
marily to the fact that rules of law are identical with rules of the 
moral code: 
Communist morals include observance of Soviet socialist laws, with the 
idea that this is the most important social duty .... Socialist law formu­
lates the same principles as do socialist morals. There is not, and can­
not be, a division between them. . . . Socialist law is an instrument 
adapted to the realization of the same goals as socialist morals. Social­
ist law does not know any other goals than to aid the destruction of the 
capitalist world and to build a new communist society. 
The unity of content of legal and moral command is, as a Soviet 
jurist has observed, a result of the fact of their common origin, i.e., 
from the economic conditions in a socialist society: 
Morals, as other forms of social consciousness-law, science, and politics 
--depend on social existence and on the economic conditions of the 
development of the society. 
Soviet morals support all those values, and only those values, 
which support the march of humanity toward communist forms of 
life. The most important is the abolition of contradictions between 
the individual and social interests: 
Li quidation of private property as regards means of production, has 
li quidated the contradictions between the individual and society. Social­
ist property, the economic basis of the new social ties between humans, 
is also the basis for new morals. Sl 
31 Aleksandrov, 0 moralnom oblike sovetskogo cheloveka 4-5, 30 (1948); 
cf. also Kareva, Pravo i nrastvennost v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve 
11-13 (1952); in a special audition, "Morals of yesterday and today" 
(May 12, 1961), Polish Radio complained of a discrepancy between 
public opinion and the courts as to what constitutes a criminal offense: 
"When criminal offenses in the classical sense are tried," the com· 
mentator stated, "public opinion and courts are in agreement. When, 
however, crimes against the state are prosecuted, not only public opinion 
sides with the offenders, but their fellow workers defend them, and wit­
nesses are reluctant to incriminate them ... . All that which is connected 
with traditional morals is properly understood by the public. However, 
offenses directed against new forms of life, resulting from socialist 
transformations, escape social censure." Reported by the FEC News 
from Poland, May 22, 1961. 
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Thus, the Soviet man has no need for an echelle de valeurs which 
would motivate his behavior as an independent factor of social life. 
The identification of morals with legal commands suggests that 
normal legal techniques are not sufficient to meet the needs for social 
regulation in the Soviet order. And, indeed, the commands addressed 
to citizens to improve their work habits, their sense of obligation 
toward society, and the sense of sacrifice and to see ·the welfare of 
their children in terms of their ability to serve the community are 
beyond the range of legal rule. Identification of the law with morals 
tends to formalize moral sanction and provide for effective channels 
for its enforcement in a manner highly resembling and indeed some­
times identical with the enforcement of the law.82 
The Polish Supreme Court drew the attention of the lower courts 
to the impact which the new morals have had on the problems of 
criminal law : 
Homicide under the stress of emot ion ... may mean something else in 
the capitalist state , and someth ing else in our society in v iew of the bas ic 
difference between bourgeois and socialist morals. 
A most classic example of the cr ime committed under the impulse of 
strong emotion is . . homic ide motivated by jealousy. At the bas is ... 
of the judicial practice in capitalist states lay morals qualitatively different 
from socialist morals . In People 's Poland , vengeance and jealousy arising 
from craving for po wer of man over man are considered as base emo­
t ions and c ontrary t o  the f oundati ons of her order, and in the pr ocess 
of li quidation through the raising level of culture. An offender gu ilty 
of the crime fr om such m otives cannot invoke a state of str ong emotion. 83 
A different use of the force of morals is represented by the tech­
nique which makes criminal trials in courts also trials by public 
opinion. This is expressed in the conviction that the interpretation 
of criminal law is a political interpretation.34 The administration of 
32 I Co 5/55 PiP 847 (1955); cf. Decision of the Polish Supreme Court 
of Sept. 18, 1952, No. C, 1283, ZOIC 84 (1953). 
33 PiP 895 (1952). 
34 "Any interpretation of criminal law is primarily a political interpreta­
tion. This fact is camouflaged by the bourgeois jurists who think that 
by acknowledging political interpretation of criminal laws they a dmit 
thereby the reactionary content of the bourgeois laws. Soviet science 
of criminal law declares openly that interpretation of criminal laws is 
essentially a political interpretation. The only correct and truly scholarly 
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justice in the socialist states emphasizes the need for direct involve­
ment of public condemnation in the process of sentencing by the 
court. In order to arouse the public, to involve the masses in the 
eradication of social errors, trials are held on the spot. Contrary to all 
precepts of orderly judicial procedure, journalistic campaigns are 
conducted demanding imposition of harsh punishments, making an 
example of the criminals, etc. A directive of the Soviet minister of 
justice instructed Soviet judges ( 1947) to concentrate on the propa­
ganda aspects of the case : 
The judge mu st know how to co nduct court proceedings and how to 
write the dec ision . . •  to show wi th the utmo st clarity the polit ic al sig nifi­
c ance of the c ase , so th at the defe nd ant and tho se present in the court 
could see clearly the policy of government i n  the court actio n.B5 
It is not surprising, in view of the growing involvement of social 
organizations in governmental functions, that the new tendency is to 
identify punishment with social censure. The new methods not only 
dispense with the legalistic mechanics of the judicial process but also 
with the institution of courts. The administration of justice, includ­
ing the imposition of severe punishments, is partly transferred into 
the hands of the public. Since the Twenty-first Congress of the Party, 
which was followed by a series of legislative measures seeking to 
draw social organizations into the process of enforcing the rules of 
life in socialist society, there is no longer a hard and fast distinction 
between the realm of judicial action and that of moral condemnation, 
between the technique of public censure and judicial process, be­
tween the correctional measures provided by the law and adminis­
tered by courts and those applied without the guidance of the law by 
social organizations.86 
C RIM ES OF OFFIC IALS 
A high degree of integration of individual life into the general 
scope of the activities of the state has blurred the line dividing what 
interpretation of criminal law is interpretation permeated by com­
munist partisanship." Chkhikvadze, Sovetskoe ugolovnoe pravo, obsh­
chaia chast 1 1 5-16 (1952) .  
35 Sots. zak. 5 (No. 2, 1947) .  
3 6  Cf. infra at 249 ff. 
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is private and accountable only in terms of personal responsibility 
from what is public and therefore subject to stricter criteria of ac­
countability. The extent of change in the position of the individual 
in socialist polity is intimately connected with changes which legisla­
tion and court practice have introduced regarding the criminal re­
sponsibility of public officials for violations of laws while in office. 
The principles governing the criminal responsibility of officials, 
as formulated in modem European criminal laws, are readily evi­
denced in the Polish Criminal Code of 1932, which may be taken as 
an expression of modern standards in the field of criminal legislation.87 
The Code, still in force, has a separate chapter dealing with offenses 
of officials. This covers various specific offenses such as abuse of 
power (Article 286 ) ,  disclosure of official secrets (Article 289) ,  
receiving material o r  personal advantage (Article 290) , etc. The 
Code also provides that, in addition to .those offenses directly con­
nected with the exercise of public duties, for any offense committed 
by an official in the performance of his duty or in connection there­
with, the court may impose a penalty higher by one-half than the 
highest penalty fixed for such an offense in the relevant statutes 
(Article 29 1 ) .  Public officials are defined as not only those in the 
service of the central or local government but also as persons charged 
with duties connected with the affairs of the central or local govern­
ment and employees of any public institution (Article 292) . 
As soon as the Code went into operation, controversy arose as 
to the meaning of the concept of "public official" and as to the defini­
tion of his offense. Polish courts tended toward a restrictive interpre­
tation of these two concepts. The Supreme Court considered as public 
officials only those who in some manner were connected with the func­
tions charged to public administration. The mere fact that a person 
was employed by the government was not .enough. He had to be 
respansible for public functions involving what was known in Eu­
ropean jurisprudence as "imperium," which might be rendered as 
"exercise of sovereign power." Persons employed in government 
economic enterprises, e.g., members of the administration ofnational 
37 Lemkin & McDermott, The Polish Penal Code and the Law of Minor 
Offenses (1939) .  
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forests, farms, or state railways, were not held to be public officials 
unless they exercised governmental functions based upon legislative 
authorization. For instance, a guard protecting game against poachers 
was under the protection of the law and was responsible for crimes 
committed in the exercise of his duties in this connection as a public 
official. 
After 1945, the continued expansion of government control 
over various fields of the national economy, i.e., the nationalization 
of trade and industry and the collectivization of trades, agriculture, 
and the professions, created a new situation. The administration of 
economic resources and the management of enterprises became func­
tions of the government. This, in fact, was reflected in a great number 
of laws providing for penal sanctions in connection with the responsi­
bilities and duties of the officials employed in new areas of govern­
ment activity. These new laws reflected a new attitude toward the 
two concepts which were restrictively interpreted before the war, 
namely, who was a government official and what constituted a crime 
in office. The Small Penal Code of 1946, which contained most of 
the regulations adapting the criminal law of Poland to new conditions, 
provided that employees of central or local government enterprises, 
or enterprises in which the government had financial interest or which 
were under its administration, as well as employees of organizations 
in charge of functions delegated to them by the central or local 
government, should be considered as officials. In addition, managers 
and employees of cooperatives and audit unions came under the 
penal legislation applicable to officials. 
Similar provisions have been enacted in other countries of 
Eastern Europe. In this field, as in other realms of socialist law, the 
purpose of the new legislation was to adapt the function of govern­
ment to new responsibilities which differed profoundly from what 
was traditionally considered to be the function of government. The 
purpose of the new laws was to initiate a new attitude on the part of 
a public servant toward his duties. It was also a method of re­
education. As a Soviet jurist wrote: 
The cau ses for the commission of criminal offen se s  by gove rnment o f­
ficia ls in the Soviet state have their root not in the sociali st social rela -
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tions . . .  but in the survival in the minds of the individual Soviet citizens 
of the remnants of bourgeois psychology and of morals, and views and 
convictions inherited from the b ourgeois feudal apparatus of Tsarist 
Russia.ss 
The central problem which the new socialist legislation faced 
was the necessity of combining governmental functions with business 
techniques. Soviet legislation endeavored to achieve this by dropping 
the distinction between those functions involving the exercise of the 
public power of "imperium" and other duties. Thus, for instance, 
"abuse of power" involved all departure from the normal operation 
of government institutions or enterprises which caused financial losses, 
the violation of the social order or the rights of citizens protected by 
the law. Departures from the normal operations of the enterprise 
might include, as a Soviet jurist explained: "nonfulfillment of the 
plan, improper distribution of manpower or violation of the adopted 
technical process." s9 
In addition, Soviet legislators considered as crimes and viola­
tions of official duties bureaucratic modus operandi and attention 
to formal aspects of official duties as opposed to the business-like 
management of economic assets. Hence, a group of crimes grew up 
under the denomination: "careless attitude to official duties" (Article 
1 1 1  of the RSFSR Criminal Code) and "bureaucratic attitude." 
Article 99 of the Criminal Code of the Ukraine defines the crime of 
the bureaucratic attitude as consisting of 
. .. formalistic attitude to official duties, demonstrated in ignoring gov­
ernmental or social interests or causing delays, or narrow mindedness in 
solution of problems, ignoring the control of the broad masses, and also 
careless and insensitive attitude to workers . . . .  
Furthermore, criminal liability in such situations was not predi­
cated upon intent. The result was that any type of action or �action, 
or simply the inability to make up one's mind, could be considered 
38 Kirichenko, Vidy dolzhnostnikh prestuplentii po sovetskomu ugolovnomu 
pravu 5 (1959) .  · 
39 For the detailed analysis and case material cf. Grzybowski, "Directive 
Rulings of the Supreme Court in Criminal Matters," 6 Highlights 149-60 
( 1958) ;  also Grzybowski, "New Trends in the Administration of Penal 
Justice in Poland (Offenses of Public Officials) ," 2 Highlights, 37-42 
( 1954) . 
. 
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as a crime, provided that a causal relation between it  and the economic 
failure of an industrial or business enterprise could be established. 
The new Soviet legislation focused the courts' attention upon 
the objective elements of the crime rather than upon the personality 
of the offender and his criminal intent. The fact that a government 
official caused damage to the national economy was considered a 
sufficient ground of criminal responsibility. In Eastern Europe, where 
modem legislation emphasized the subjective elements of crime, it 
was necessary to perform a major operation in order to adapt penal 
policies to the Soviet pattern. This was accomplished for the most part 
by the means of directive rulings by the Supreme Court, ordering the 
lower courts to enforce the old and new criminal statutes with regard 
to the damage aspect of official actions or inactions. 
So, for instance, in Poland the Supreme Court issued a directive 
ruling concerning criminal liability for crimes of officials committed 
under the influence of alcohol. In the code of 1932 such crimes were 
considered misdemeanors. Under the new ruling, however, the Court 
raised the degree of responsibility for offenses so committed to the 
responsibility for intentional crimes. On another occasion, the same 
Supreme Court instructed lower courts to measure their punishments 
according to the extent of the damage suffered by the public interest. 
The Court, however, admitted in the directive ruling that such was 
not the position of the Code itself, as the latter was concerned with 
the personality of the offender rather than with the extent of material 
damage. On a still different occasion, the Supreme Court identified 
this public interest with the fulfillment of the economic plan : 
The . plan is the fundamental law of the state an d everything that delays 
o r  hampers the execution of the plan constitutes a v iolat ion of publ ic 
interest wh ich is protected by the law.89a 
Under the Code of 1932, the adverse effect of a criminal act 
upon the success of the plan could be considered punishable only 
if the offender had this particular effect of his action or omission in 
mind. Under the new ruling, the personal attitude of the offender­
his intent, negligence, or recklessness-was no longer essential. 
Another feature of the impact of the Soviet model on the laws 
39" Ibid. 
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of the satellite nations is the considerable extension of the function 
of the public official. Such followed from the new functions of the 
state. As the Bulgarian Supreme Courts explained : 
The People's democratic state fulfills . . .  the fu nction of orga nizing the 
economy a nd directing the cu ltural educational  activities . This function 
is u nknow n to the bou rgeois state . The bou rgeois theory of the public 
law differe ntiates between acts of the state through which it exercises 
imperium . . .  from the acts throu gh which ·it develops its economic ac­
tivity . . . .  Such a theory cannot have currency in the people's demo­
c ratic law, a nd the people 's democratic state i n  which the functions of 
orga nizing the economy and leading the cultural-educational work a re as 
important as the other fu nction. The People's democratic state exer­
cises its fu nctions throu gh the cou ncil of ministers . . .  and the enter­
p rises . . . .  40 
When in 1951 Bulgaria adopted the new criminal code, it de­
fined (Section 333) as a public official 
. . . a nyone who is char ged with the performa nCe of service in a gov­
e rnment office, cooperative , or other public o rganization, or who is en­
t rusted with safe guarding public property-employed for a salary or 
gratuitously, permanently, or temporarily. 
The meaning of this provision is clear when it is realized that 
all employment in industry and trade is government employment. 
As mere custody (even temporary) of the government property is 
enough to qualify the custodian as a public official, there is hardly 
anybody in government employ who could not be subject to stricter 
liability as a government official. 
In its decision No. 37 of June 19, 1 952, the Bulgarian Supreme 
Court declared the manager of a cooperative to be public official 
because he held a leading position in a cooperative. Similarly, the 
Court held responsible any person who exercised an official function 
in the absence of the regular occupant of the governmental position. 
The same applied, the Court stated, to those who were giveL the 
trust of safeguarding public property, even if there was involved only 
transportation of such property from one place to another. In one 
case, the Bulgarian Supreme Court held that a person appointed by 
40 Sipkov, ''The Concept of Public Official and Offense in Public Office,'' 
2 Highlights 274 (1954 ) . 
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the village policeman to guard a piece of agricultural machinery was 
a public official. 41 
A full theoretical explanation of the conceptual revision applied 
to the term "public official" in the socialist order was given by the 
Polish Supreme Court in its decision of August 22, 1 950: 
The concept of the official is linked in the pre-war practice in the capi­
talist order with the exercise of the sovereign power. . . . Although the 
term official was popularly used to designate a white collar worker in 
general . . .  the Criminal Code used this term with reference to state 
and local government officials . . . .  In the capitalist order where economic 
activity was in the hands of the private owners, and the bureaucracy, 
both state and local, served to protect the domination of the exploiters, 
it had as such no economic functions . . . .  
The other characteristic of the bourgeois bureaucracy was its . . .  elite 
character which was among the others expressed in the different legal 
position of the government official. . . . In the new conditions of the 
People's Poland the- administration of justice must be aware of the 
change in the meaning of the concept "public official" and of the criteria 
of his activities . . . •  
Elite position, caste, privileges of the hireling class, separatistic tend­
encies of the "class of officials" must be replaced by the equaliza­
tion of all citizens on the basis of common participation in the manage­
ment of the socialized property and common responsibility for the de­
velopment and security of the state of the working people. 
In view of the liquidation of the exploiting classes, the vast majority of 
the society is employed by the state, or industrial and agricultural co­
operatives. . . . This fact has broadened the narrow traditional concept 
of the "official," as a servant of the oppressive apparatus of the exploit­
ing classes and fills it with an altogether new . . .  content. "The economic 
official" in the people's state is a co-manager of the economic assets, 
· which constitute the national property, and which is under the protec­
tion of the people's state.42 
This theoretical position led to some extravagant consequences 
in practice. "All persons," stated the Polish Supreme Court, "em­
ployed in a government or government-controlled enterprises and 
therefore also workers at the workbench, must be considered as 
government officials." 48 In another case, the same Court found that 
41 Sipkov, supra note 40, at 275. 
42 Case No. K. 430, PiP 195 (No. 12, 1950).  
43 Case No. K. 1290/48, Pip 639 ff. (No. 1 1 , 1952).  
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a milkmaid on a government farm might be prosecuted under Article 
286 of the Criminal Code, since Article 46 of the Small Penal Code 
of 1946 extended the application of penal provisions applicable to 
officials to the functionaries of government enterprises.44 
According to the resolution passed by the bench of seven justices 
of the Polish Supreme Court (June 1 6, 195 1 ) ,  even a barmaid in a 
government restaurant might qualify as a government official.411 In 
the Bulgarian practice, managers of cooperatives, storekeepers in 
cooperatives, cafeteria employees, and cashier-auditors in a co­
operative have been declared 
·
liable under the Code for crimes of 
officials.46 Soviet practice also tended to extend criminal punishment 
for crimes in office to persons engaged in purely technical functions. 
However, the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union put a limit to this 
practice and at the plenary session of November 30, 1956, refused 
to consider a crane operator, who had dropped sixteen bags of sugar 
into the sea while unloading a ship, as responsible for an offense in 
office.47 
· 
A purely pragmatic attitude defying any restriction of criminal 
responsibility either by the nature of the criminal act or by the class 
of persons involved was declared to be the rule in this type of criminal 
responsibility by the Polish Supreme Court: 
All offenses, and in particular those committed by officials, must be 
considered in connection with the nature, spirit, and direction of the 
present social and political organization of the State, and the present 
political reality. 
It is impossible therefore to consider offenses by officials from a purely 
formal or abstract standpoint, in view of the fact that various provisions 
regulating the scope of their powers, and providing restriction of their 
interference with the rights of the citizens have lost validity.4B 
A person performing certain services for a government office 
or enterprise may be considered as a public official and be punished 
as such even if he is not employed, occupies no position in a govern-
44 Case No. 1344/49, PiP 639 ff. (No. 1 1, 1952) .  
45  ZOIC 4 ( 1952) .  
46 Sipkov, supra note 40, at 272-73. 
47 Kirichenko, supra note 38, at 276. 
48 1 ZOIK 78 (1949) .  
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ment office or enterprise, appears on no payroll, and even when his 
services are gratuitous and constitute an act of personal courtesy. 
Thus, a hunter (a private person) who was authorized by the district 
hunting inspector in Bulgaria to issue hunting licenses to other per­
sons has been declared to be a government official. 
It is not essential that rights and authorizations exercised by a 
person should be officially defined in any manner. A private person, 
obliged by a contract with a government commercial enterprise in 
Bulgaria to purchase on its behalf and in its name dried prunes and 
nuts and to report the amount of money received and the purchases 
made, was declared by the Bulgarian Supreme Court (decision No. 
600 of September 18 ,  19 5 1  ) to be a public official : 
[A]s the text of Section 333 of the Criminal Code shows, the form of 
the act, on ground of which the work is assigned to a person or on 
ground of which he is under duty and obligation to safeguard public 
property, is of no decisive importance for the solution of the problem 
whether he is or is not a public official. 49 
Finally, it is not essential that obligations, rights, or powers 
should be precisely determined in connection with the economic, 
administrative, and professional tasks which are to be accomplished. 
Thus, the Supreme Court of Bulgaria stated that (September 18,  
1952) : 
Each person who is given or entrusted with a labor order, a task or 
service with salary and compensation in any form whatsoever, or with­
out compensation, and who is authorized to exercise administrative, 
economic or other functions, adherent to a public official or on the 
grounds of a given mandate, acts as a public official. Every employed 
person, no matter how unimportant his function in the entire system of 
government and socialist economy is, should be considered a public of­
ficiaJ.GO 
It is readily discernible that the practice of qualifying practically 
everybody who enters into some relationship with the government 
authority in a socialist state as a "public official" has contributed 
seriously to the harshness of Soviet penal repression. Its purpose is 
not only to prevent occurrence of crimes. In addition, the practice 
49 Sipkov, supra note 40, at 276. 
SO Ibid. 
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seeks to alert society to the need for singular effort and devotion to 
duty, exceeding a civil servant's loyalty to his office or function. As 
the Polish Supreme Court explained: 
In order to arrive at a proper understanding of charges brought against 
a government official occupying an economic post connected with his 
managerial activity, and ir. order to determine his responsibility, it is 
necessary to review his actions and omissions from the point of view of 
his duties of a good manager . . . . An official in such a post ought to take 
on his own initiative all measures to prevent loss or destruction of gov­
ernment property under his care, irrespective of whether his superior 
issued proper regulations. . . . Vigilance of that kind is obligatory in the 
system of planned economy, in which every public official ought to 
consider himself as co-manager of public property and to care for it in 
the same degree as if it were his private property.lil 
Stricter standards of criminal repression are necessitated in so­
cialist societies by the absence of that criterion of efficiency provided 
by the market which reacts to inistakes or omissions irrespective of 
the intent or degree of culpability. Although its mechanisms are the 
judicial process and moral condemnation of society, penal sanction 
for the lack of success in the socialist society, nevertheless, had to 
assume the role of an economic sanction. Again, Polish practice is 
perhaps the best yardstick for appraising the new methods. So, for 
instance, the Polish Supreme Court found a captain of a harbor tug 
guilty of a criminal offense committed in office when he caused a 
collision with another ship. In describing the facts which in its opinion 
established the captain's guilt, the Court stated: 
The . accused, overestimating the resistance of ice, ordered higher speed 
than required, with the result that his order to reverse speed came too 
late. 52 
Similarly, Soviet courts consistently followed the practice of 
imposing harsh penalties for shortages caused by the inability to 
maintain proper accounting procedures. And this was true even 
though the error was due to illiteracy, or to lack of training and ex­
perience. That sentences of this type were still occurring after World 
War II seems to indicate that competence and qualifications were not 
51 ZOIK. 19 ( 1951) .  
52  PiP 650 ( 1950) . 
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necessarily the qualities deemed essential for making appointments 
to official positions.53 
In Poland, court practice followed strictly the Soviet pattern. 
So, for instance, the Supreme Court rejected an appeal from a lower 
court conviction by a manager of a cooperative whose failure to keep 
proper books resulted in chaos in the affairs of a cooperative. The 
defendant claimed that he had no training and no idea of book­
keeping. The Court stated that this fact alone constituted no defense.114 
In 1951,  a manager of a cooperative meat factory was found guilty 
because two other employees of the factory were processing meats 
from illicit slaughter, although it was proved that the accused had no 
knowledge of their practices. 55 In another case, the Supreme Court 
upheld the conviction of a forester who, owing to drunkenness, ne­
glected his duties. His negligence resulted in several thefts in his 
section of the forest. The accused was, nevertheless, found guilty of 
abuse of power, a crime which under the Code of 1932 required in­
tent.56 
A considerable number of criminal cases involving the criminal 
responsibility of officials result from the conflicting criteria which 
decide the promotion of communist officialdom to leading positions 
in the economic or public life of the country. Some cases make it 
clear that some of the defendants had gained positions as a result of 
the "social promotion," which is a by-word for political reliability. 
As progress from capitalism to socialism means growing integration 
of various aspects of human activity into various forms of collective 
effort, the expansion of governmental function is also the process of 
constant re-education of members . of the socialist society in the new 
forms of cooperation. Thus, a Bulgarian jurist explained the ethos of 
the reform of criminal law in his country, respecting its provisions 
concerning the responsibility of officials, as aiming at the application 
of stricter criteria of "criminal responsibility which will make its 
educational impact upon a greater circle of persons." 57 
53 Kirichenko, supra note 38, at 44. 
54 Case No. K. 287/51, PiP 654 (195 1 ) .  
5 5  Case No. I.K. 1690/51/1, PiP 568 ( 1953 ) .  
5 6  Case No. I.K. 1946/51, PiP 148 ( 1953) .  
51  Busov, luridicheska misul 37  (No. 2,  1953 ) ;  cf. Mead, Soviet Attitude 
Towards Authority, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Problems of Soviet 
Character, in particular at 44-51 ( 195 1 ) .  
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A more recent trend in criminal practice of the Soviet Union,58 
started by the pronouncement of the Twenty-first Congress of the 
CPSU, to the effect that the Soviet Union has passed over to the 
period of communist construction, blurs even further the dividing 
line between government officials and private citizens engaged in 
work or performance of duties of public significance. One of the 
distinctions between the two categories of citizens had consisted of 
special protection to those who discharged public functions. The 
transition to communist forms of economic and social organization, 
which called for the cooperation of the people in enforcing the rules 
of life in a socialist community, also brought the demand that special 
protection be given those who, endowed with a greater sense of re­
sponsibility, took upon themselves the enforcement of the more per­
fect code of social behavior. As a Soviet jurist proposed: 
It would be well to institute certain legal guarantees of the safety of 
citizens who voluntarily participate in the drive on law violations. The 
Draft Law on Increasing the Role of the Public in Combating Violations 
of Soviet Laws and the Rules of Socialist Society stresses that the activity 
of citizens in upholding public order and combating law violations is 
under the protection of the law. Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics 
are charged with establishing criminal liability for insulting, committing 
violence upon, and threatening reprisals against citizens in connection 
with the performance by them of their duty in the safeguarding of public 
order. The draft also formulates the principle of encouragement for 
citizens' taking an active part in the struggle against public disturbances 
and crime. Article 17 plainly states that these citizens shall be encouraged 
by state agencies and public organizations. 59 
LIBEL 
The insulation of individual honor against libel represents a 
minor incident in the emergence of the socialist legal system. The 
problem of affording such protection is directly related, in the new 
regime, to the political role of the press. The latter bas become one 
of the most important instruments of social control and official action. 
Its duty is to inform and exhort and to expose the enemies of the 
58 Cf. infra at 249 ff. · 
59 Denisov, "0 sootnoshenii gosudarstva i obshchestva v perek.hodnyi ot 
kapitalizma do kommunizma period," SGP 29-40 (No. 4, 1960).  
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new order and the shortcomings of governmental and social organiza­
tions. It, indeed, leads the official apparatus of both government and 
society in joint actions. 
The growing complexity of the mechanism of the state and the 
social structure of Soviet society has been accompanied by the in­
creasing importance of the press. In Soviet reality, the criticism and 
initiative of the press represent the only efficient means of cutting 
through the tangled web of Soviet agencies and of striking directly at 
problem spots in the social or economic life of the polity. Conse­
quently, to impede its action in the name of individual interest would 
be tantamount to raising an obstacle to a social action in which an 
attack on a person would be only an incident. 
In this method of social control, the position of the individual is 
determined by the principle of self-criticism. It is the duty of the 
Soviet man to embrace and emulate the criticism by the press and to 
assist in the elimination of mistakes and shortcomings. The nature 
of this response is dictated by the fact that press criticism is not solely 
a matter of objective truth. In addition, there is involved a question 
of party policy, which uses it as a method of progress. Zhdanov, the 
Party's expert in matters of philosophy in the days of Stalin, ex­
plained the function of criticism and self-criticism as follows : 
In the new Soviet society . . .  the struggle between the old and the new, 
and consequently transition from the lower into the higher takes place . . . 
in the form of criticism and self-criticism, which forms the real force 
of our progress, and a mighty weapon in the hands of our party. Un­
doubtedly this is a new pattern for progress, new type of development, 
the new dialectical Jegality.eo 
Thus, suits for libel and damages in this context have disappeared 
from the dockets of the socialist courts. 
Inasmuch as the authority of the press as a social censor reflects 
the authority of the party, the ideological upheaval in Poland in the 
fall of 1956, resulting from the moral crisis in the Party ranks, has 
produced a significant · change in the attitude of the courts and of 
those who have suffered from the methods so employed by the press in 
the process of social control. Protection of individual dignity became, 
in consequence, an issue of great practical importance, and a number 
60 Zhdanov, Voprosy fi.losofii 270 {No. 1 ,  1947) .  
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of libel suits against the communist press acquired the significance 
of political action to restore some of the personal freedom lost in 
the Stalinist period. 
Under Article 255 of the Criminal Code of 1932, the accused 
was free from liability if the facts were proved to be true. Truth was 
a good defense. However, if the allegation was made publicly (and 
through the press) ,  the law required that the accused prove addition­
ally that he acted in defense of a well-founded public or private in­
terest, either of his own or affecting other persons, and libel did not 
pertain to facts from the private or family life of the injured party. 
The revival of the provisions of Article 255 of the Criminal Code 
has greatly restrained the censorial and educational activities of the 
press in Poland. As a countermeasure to these undesirable develop­
ments, the government has ordered that a draft of a new press law be 
prepared for enactment by the legislature. The regime hoped, by 
thus relaxing the strict provisions of the Code regarding criminal 
responsibility for slander, that some degree of freedom of action 
might thereby be restored to the government press. 
It has been proposed to distinguish between private libel and 
libel committed by mass communication media. In the first instance, 
the former provisions of the Code would apply, and private persons 
would continue to be responsible under the strict rule of responsi­
bility. In the second instance, i.e., libel by mass communication 
media, good faith would constitute a sufficient defense. Thus, under 
the proposed regime, defense would be easier in cases in which pos­
sible damage to individual honor and dignity was greater, while a 
priv!).te slanderer would have to prove the facts alleged against the 
injured party.61 
In the discussion which followed, partisans of the strict legal 
protection of individual dignity insisted on continuing the old pattern 
on the ground that there was no compelling reason for departing from 
it: 
Criticism represents an important force of progress under any, not only 
a socialist order. However, honest criticism and criticism attacking per­
sonal honor are two different things. 
61 Sawicki, "Dobra wiara a znieslawienie w projekcie prawa prasowego," 
PiZ, Jan. 25, 1959; Papierkowski, "Niebezpieczne prawo," PiZ, April 
19, 1959; Merz, "0 dobra wiare," PiZ, June 16, 1959. 
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They went on to claim that there were no specific reasons why the 
protection of human dignity should be less important under socialism 
than under any other social order.62 
In opposition to the view stressing the need for the strict pro­
tection of human dignity, the apologists for the less strict approach 
claimed that : 
In the socialist order criticism is a vital necessity for social develop­
ment; its function in our society is basically different from that in a 
society which is based on the system of exploitation of man by man. 
The reason for different standards, they continued, lay in the 
nature of the interests involved. Although an innocent person might 
suffer harm, socialist criticism was in the interest of all.68 
The proposed solutions are not a novelty in socialist legislative 
techniques. Indeed, the duality of approach in the legal protection of 
individual and socialist interests is typical of the criminal law of the 
Soviet type. Crimes which are not characteristic of the socialist social 
and economic order, i.e., those which represent an attack on tradi­
tional social and ethical values, are prosecuted according to the nor­
mal rules of responsibility. In these instances, the type of guilt (in­
tentional and nonintentional) is decisive to determine criminal liabil­
ity and severity of punishment. Definitions of crimes against the new 
regime tend to establish absolute criteria of responsibility. Punish­
ment and its measure are determined exclusively by the objective 
criteria of social danger.64 
In all likelihood, the Polish press law will be adopted as pro­
posed by the government; otherwise, its ability for political action 
would be seriously curtailed. The very fact, however, that public 
pressure has brought about some limitation on governmental power 
to initiate political campaigns by means of attacking individual honor 
is highly significant. It suggests that a degree of the autonomous 
status of individual existence has survived the process of socialist 
integration. 
In this respect, Poland is not an isolated example. In Hungary, 
Decree No. 17 of 1959 and the executive order adopted by the 
62 Papierkowski, "A jednak contra legem," PiZ, Aug. 23, 1959. 
63 Merz, "A jednak zgodnie z ustawll." PiZ, Aug. 23, 1953. 
64 Cf. infra at 185 ff. 
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Council of Ministers of the same year on the responsibility for press 
offenses provide a mechanism for the defense of private honor against 
attack by the press. A journal is under obligation to publish, on the 
demand of an injured party, a refutation of charges which appeared 
in its columns. Criminal responsibility has been provided in the fol­
lowing situations : ( 1 )  seeking material advantage for publishing or 
not publishing a press material; (2) press activity without proper 
license; (3)  failure to comply with a duty to publish a refutation; 
( 4) willful publication of false information together with the refuta­
tion of earlier charges.ec� 
The new press law of Yugoslavia, enacted in the fall of 1960, 
followed the Hungarian pattern. It gave the citizen the right to de­
mand equal space and display in the newspapers, magazines, and 
radio and television programs for the purpose of refuting allegations 
made by public information media. 86 
REGIME OF PROPERTY 
The theory of absolute rights inhering in the individual has always 
been little more than a symbol. Indeed, rights have always been sub­
ject to limitation by the interests of the colleCtivity. It is enough to 
point to the antiquity of the institution of emine�t domain in its 
various forms and to modem developments reflecting on the in­
stitution of property and the freedom of contract to see all individual 
rights qualitatively restricted: a system of relative rather than ab­
solute concepts. Even in the face of these limitations, however, it 
would be unrealistic to rule out of the legal system the idea of rights 
as defining the autonomous position of the private individual vis-�-vis 
the surrounding reality of persons and things. 
One of the fundamental bases of the claim by the Soviet legal 
and social order to an exceptional place in human history lies in 
its novel approach to the institution of private rights, which are 
totally subordinated to the interests of society. Section 1 of the Soviet 
Code of 1922 declared that: ••The law protects private rights except 
as they are exercised in contradiction to their social and economic 
purpose." 
6S Obzor Wengerskogo Prava (No. 3, 1959). 
66 Arts. 7, 34-51,  Sl. L., No. 4S, 1960. 
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However, it seems that the heart of the matter is not in the 
conditional guarantee of private rights, but in the presence of power­
ful forces of social change which affect the position of the individual 
in regard to collective existence. Provisions similar to that in the 
Soviet Code are a common feature of all civil law legislation which 
endeavors to describe systematically various aspects of human and 
social relations.67 Policies of government, either in the form of the 
nationalization of the means of production or of planned transforma­
tion of the economic and social structures, cannot be related to the 
provisions of the Civil Code in the Soviet order. In this respect there 
is little difference regarding the function of civil law provisions be­
tween the socialist order and the traditional society. The civil law 
must be regarded as consisting of general statements of principle, 
the contents of which are shaped by events beyond its scope. 
While initially the provisions of the Soviet Civil Code offered 
some ground for apprehension as to the position of private rights 
within the civil law of a socialist society, socialist codes enacted in 
Eastern Europe make it quite clear that they are not intended as 
instruments of change. Under the Hungarian Code of 1959, the exer­
cise of civil rights and performance of civil obligations must conform 
to the interests of society. Further, civil law relations must be char­
acterized by mutual cooperation in accordance with the demands of 
socialist coexistence. And finally : "cooperation shall be effected 
through strict performance of obligations and by exercising all rights 
in conformity with the function of such rights." 
Section 5 of the Hungarian Civil Code prohibits the misuse of 
private rights and lists the following instances as constituting typical 
examples of the violation of this rule : exercise of a right with an ob­
jective which is incompatible with the social function of the right; 
the exercise of a right which might damage the national economy; 
exercise of a right in a manner interfering vexatiously with citizens; 
prejudice of their rights and lawful interests, or in procuring undue 
advantage. 68 
67 Bolgar, "The Magic of Property and Public Welfare," 2 Inter-Amer. L. 
Rev. 283 1f. ( 1960) ;  cf. art. 226 of the German Civil Code, art. 2 of the 
Swiss Civil Code, and arts. 135 and 187 of the Polish Code of Obliga­
tions. 
68 Art. 3 of the Polish Law on General Principles of Civil Law of 1950; 
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These and similar formulations found in the civil codes of East­
em Europe represent a fairly static set of circumstances aimed at 
maintaining a balance between the exercise of individual rights and 
the interests of others, and not at creating a mechanism of change. 
If the latter were so, the mechanism of social change would be ad­
ministered by the courts and the lawyers. It is easy to · see that this 
is not the function to which either courts or the legal profession of 
the socialist countries aspire.69 
While the civil codes of Eastern Europe do not shape the course 
of history, they nevertheless bear the marks of social development. 
In consequence, the institutions of socialist civil legislation offer an 
important avenue for the exploration of social realities.70 In partic­
ular, the provisions of property law in the Soviet Union and other 
socialist countries in Eastern Europe allow a glimpse of the elements 
determining the role and the social position of the individual in a 
society which is involved in a process of rapid transformation. In this 
connection, three major pieces of civil legislation, the Hungarian 
Civil Code of 1959, the Draft of the Principles of Civil Law Legisla­
tion of the USSR and of the Union Republics of 1960, and the Draft 
CzechQslovak Civil Code of 1950, sees. 1 and 3;  Bulgarian Law on 
Contracts of 1950, sec. 2. 
Art. 47 of the Polish Draft of the Civil Code stated: "Legal acts 
aiming at the establishment, change or abolition of a legal relationship 
produces not only those results which are directly aimed at, but also 
those which are the consequences of a statutory provision or follow from 
the rules of social coexistence." Art. 40 (sec. 1 )  of the same Draft pro­
vided that: " . . .  a legal transaction contrary to law, or concluded with 
a purpose of obviating its provisions or · contrary to the principles of 
. social coexistence is null and void." It further stated in art. 54 (sec. 1 )  
that: "Declaration of will must be construed according to the circum­
stances of the case, and wi� reference to the rules of social coexistence." 
Finally, art. 309 (sec. 1 )  exhorts the debtor to "perform in accordance 
with the terms of his obligations, in conformity with its social purpose, 
and principles of social coexistence." 
69 Differences in the role of law and of the legal profession in the socialist 
and open societies in enforcing the policies of social change provide one 
of the most significant illustrations of the differences between the social­
ist and traditional techniques of government. In the free societies courts 
and lawyers are a vehicle of change. 
70 Cf. art. 1 of the Soviet Draft of Principles of Civil Legislation of the 
Soviet Union and Union Republics, and also sec. 1 of the Hungarian 
Civil Code of 1959. 
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of the Polish Civil Code of 1960, offer an up-to-date review of the 
state of civil law institutions in the socialist countries. 
Polish and Hungarian provisions regarding property differ from 
the Soviet Draft in this respect; in neither of the former countries 
was socialist economic order connected with a nationwide nationaliza­
tion of landed property, as in Russia. Therefore, although the larger 
farming estates were liquidated, there remains a considerable amount 
of private farming in both countries. The law, of course, must take 
account of this situation. 
The Soviet Draft is based on the recognition of two types of 
property, socialist and personal. The Hungarian Code and the Polish 
Draft, on the other band, introduce · an additional category of indi­
vidual (private) property, · which includes ownership of means of 
production (land) . 
The Polish and Hungarian Codes suggest that state property, 
cooperative property, and property in ownership of other socialist 
organizations form one category. However, cooperative property 
poses certain problems both theoretical and practical since the co­
operative movement and cooperative property relations in Poland 
and Hungary are based on individual ownership of land. As a rule, 
collective farms are formed by pooling the land owned by individual 
peasants. And while they join various cooperative organizations, they 
still continue to own such land as their share in the cooperative ven­
ture. It is true that their rights as regards this land are circumscribed 
by the fact that a member of a collective is unable to dispose of it 
except by testament and then only to the benefit of other members 
of the collective, but he is still the owner of his land. Unless there 
is a different provision in the statute of a collective, only crops and 
trees become the property of the cooperative. Buildings and other 
fixtures on the cooperative's land may become cooperative property 
only if its statutes rule so. Consequently, the inclusion of coopera­
tive property in the category of socialist property is a somewhat 
dubious operation. This is demonstrated by the fact that in 1956, 
both in Poland and Hungary, a considerable amount of cultivated 
land was withdrawn from co'operative farming and, without changing 
owners, was transferred from the socialist to the private category 
of property. 
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Personal ownership serves physical persons and cultural needs 
only. It includes objects which serve the satisfaction of the "personal 
and cultural needs of the owner and those living with him in com­
mon household." Included are such items as a one-family house, a 
one-family apartment, household articles, clothing, motor vehicles, 
etc. Here also belong small means of production which serve to 
satisfy personal needs. 
The scope of personal ownership varies according to the eco­
nomic situation of the person involved. The dividing line runs be­
tween rural and industrial environment, according to the situation 
of the owner within the social and economic stratification of Soviet 
society. For example, a member of a collective farm may own things 
denied to a town dweller. Examples are: buildings, animals, poultry, 
and other objects necessary to engage in the limited production of 
food on a garden plot. On the other hand, there are things not availa­
ble to a member of the agricultural sector which a town dweller may 
own. A successful city dweller may own a house in the city and a 
summer home in the country. H he can aftord it, he may own an 
automobile; and there is no reason why he should not own a horse, 
if he likes horseback riding. Yet, the Soviet farmer is expressly pro­
hibited from owning a horse. In Hungary and Poland, however, 
peasant-owned horses belong to the category of private property. 
Thus, it is possible in these two countries for a horse to be a socialist 
horse if it belongs to a cooperative; a personal horse if his owner 
rides him for pleasure and is not a farmer; or an individual-property 
horse if its owner is a farmer. In the Soviet Union, where no indi­
vidual property is legally permitted, a horse could be either a socialist 
or a· personal horse. 
The classification of rights of ownership is tied to the gradation 
of the protection offered by the law to each of these three classes of 
property. The property of the state as the foundation of the social 
and economic order calls for the highest degree of protection. The 
Polish Draft assures this property a "singular protection." Of the 
property in private (individual) ownership, only the property of the 
working peasants and artisans "enjoys the support of the state" or 
"the protection of the state." Personal property is under what the 
Polish Draft calls a "full protection." 
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The system of gradation of legal protection under the law is 
the result of the contemporary situation in the social and economic 
order in Poland. It still includes important elements of individual 
ownership of means of production (land) ,  which is under the pro­
tection of the law. This is because the protection of private property 
is an indispensable condition for the prosperity of agriculture and its 
contribution to the welfare of the nation. The Polish Supreme Court, 
in its plenary session of February 27, 1960, issued the following 
directives for the guidance of the courts: 
The interest of the people's state in the increase of agricultural produc­
tion of food in order to improve a continued rise in the supply of food 
articles to the growing population, and in order to assure the socialist 
industry the necessary raw materials, requires to take preventive meas­
ures against an excessive atomization of the existing farms at the present 
stage of development of our economy. It is necessary to maintain the 
largest possible number of farms, which would provide adequate outlet 
for the labor of a peasant family, to provide it with a main means of 
support, and assure a constant technical progress in agriculture.n 
In other words, the degree of protection afforded is the result 
of the actual interests of the state in the existing state of things, and 
this dictates a conservative approach which would seem to favor 
viable individual enterprises. However, the Supreme Court also sug­
gested that, once the government deemed it important to change its 
policies, the restricted disposal of landed property by inheritance or 
contract would be removed. Thus, when the Supreme Court directed 
that judicial policy had to preserve agricultural farms of a certain 
size, it was not concerned with the protection of individual rights but 
with the preservation of an agricultural organization which would 
be able to feed the urban population. Protection of individual owner­
ship is an incidental question and represents only a technique. 
These policies are not contradicted by the fact that the long­
range policy of the regime seeks to limit the types of property rela­
tions in socialist society to only those two types which are at present 
admitted in the Soviet law, and which are typical of the social and 
economic order in which all means of production belong to the state. 
Personal property, which results from individual participation in the 
71 Decision of Feb. 27, 1960, 1 CO 34/59, PiP 832-34 (No. 4-5, 1960). 
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socialist processes of production and services, represents a system 
of incentives to promote the productivity of labor. As such, it has 
a positive function and deserves effective protection. 
The property of the state is the foundation of the regime. In 
addition, it is an instrument of its policy of social change whereby 
it seeks to achieve higher forms of social and economic organization, 
calling for as effective a regime of protection as is feasible. The realm 
of socialist property may grow, but never diminish.72 Private prop­
erty relations represent an order of things which must eventually be 
replaced by the new order of things. It deserves legal protection as 
long as it has a useful function. 
The property regime as outlined in the Soviet Principles of Civil 
Legislation ( 1960) also contains, though in less visible form, a germ 
of the incipient change which will further simplify the property 
regime in the Soviet Union. The Soviet property regime is based upon 
two types of property, socialist and personal. Socialist property 
(Article 1 8 )  consists of state property (property of all the people) 
or collective farm property. The latter category of collective, or co­
operative, property is limited to the membership of each collective, 
or of a cooperative association or of the common ownership by 
several collective farms or cooperative associations. Similarly, per­
sonal property appears in two forms, depending on the environment, 
i.e., urban or rural. 
The reason for this distinction becomes clear with the con­
tinuing discussion of the reorganization of the types of legal relations 
in the period of communist social and economic order. They will be 
characterized by the complete assimilation of these two population 
groups as to the types of objects which shall be available for them. 
The rural population, collectively engaged in agriculture, will have 
to give up the continued use of garden plots and the management 
of individual household economies, including animals and poultry, 
which is permitted under the present regulations. 
72 Sec. 9 1  of the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 provides: "Such means of 
production as not declared state property may be capable also of private 
ownership. The private property of peasants and artisans working in­
dividually-as individually acquired property-enjoys the support of the 
state . . • .  The private property must not prejudice public interest." 
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Another feature of the future regime of property relations will 
be the gradual concentration of ownership of durable consumer goods 
(automobiles, private houses, and perhaps major items of sporting 
equipment) in the hands of social organizations. Thus, cooperative, 
and therefore socialist ownership, will be extended, and the institu­
tion of personal ownership, restricted. This regime may be intro­
duced as preliminary to a system in which the use of such items, or 
at least some of them, will be made generally available to the mem­
bership of the social organizations through the network of their 
various establishments. It has been suggested that in order to make 
the first step in the direction of communism, the present owners of 
automobiles and houses should vest their property rights in a col­
lective consisting of similar owners. In this manner, a collective use 
of such consumer goods would be established and personal ownership 
would cease.78 
An even greater integration of property relations within the 
socialist sector would consist of a gradual liquidation of the group 
ownership of collective farms. One of the modem developments in 
the Soviet economy is the practice of forming business associations 
by the collective farms for the purpose of promoting industrial or 
service (transport) enterprises to serve specific needs of their mem­
bers. According to the Draft of the Principles of Civil Legislation of 
the USSR and of the Union Republics ( 1959) ,  the property of such 
associations constitutes the property of the collectives. It is, there­
fore, separate from the property of the state. It was proposed that 
these interkolkhoz enterprises be classified as state property (property 
of all the people) .  Furthermore, it was suggested that the so-called 
indivisible reserve funds of the collective, which provide means for 
capital investment for collectivized agriculture, should be put under 
national administration. The purpose would be twofold:  to imple­
ment a general agricultural policy and to finance other sectors of 
national economy as well. As these funds are replenished by yearly 
appropriations from the net income of the collective farms, such a 
73 Cf. "XXI sjezd KPSS i zadatchi pravovoi nauk.i," SGP 7 (No. 2, 1959) ;  
Stepanyan, "Kommunizm i sobstvennost," Oktiabr (No. 9,  1960) ;  
Aleksieiev, " 0  zakonomemostiakh razvitia sovetskogo prava v period 
razvemutogo stroitelstva kommunizma," SGP 1 0-20 (No. 9, 1960) .  
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move again would amount to a conversion of important items of 
group ownership into the outright ownership of the state. 74 
Special protection of socialist property is primarily expressed 
in the fact that law makes it impossible to transfer objects of social­
ist ownership to any other ownership. The transfer of property from 
one socialist juristic person to another has no legal significance, as 
it always remains in state ownership. Socialist juristic persons "merely 
exercise right of ownership vested in the state in their name with 
regard to assets in their management" (Article 122 of the Soviet 
Draft).  Article 19 of the Soviet Draft states tersely: 
The state is the sole owner of all state property, regardless of what it is 
or who manages or uses it. State organizations exercise within the limits 
established by the law only the rights of possession, use and disposal 
of state property attached to them in accordance with the aims of their 
property and the purpose of the property. 
According to the Hungarian Code, the state's right to own all 
property which is not fit for personal ownership is safeguarded by 
provisions regarding the acquisition of ownership of objects which 
have no owner (Section 1 27) .  Objects which constitute social prop­
erty, or of which the state or a cooperative have been wrongly dis­
possessed, can never become the property of another person by 
prescription. This, however, does not apply to movables capable of 
personal ownership (Section 121 ) .  Article 165 of the Polish. Draft 
of the Civil Code provides that the owner of the land may renounce 
his property, which then goes to the state. Under the Albanian Code: 
Private ownership of land may be terminated by a decision of the com­
petent government agency. Such a decision may be taken either because 
of an attempted transaction concerning the land, because of neglect in 
farming it for a period of two years, or if the owner moves to another 
locality and therefore is unable to cultivate it personally.711 
Article 201 of the Polish Draft rules that the statute of limita­
tion does not apply to a claim for the surrender of a movable ob-
74 Kozyr, "Aktualnyie problemi kolkhoznoi sobstvennosti na sovremennom 
etape," SOP 60-80 (No. 8, 1960) ; Aksenenok & Ruskol, "Neobkhodimo 
dalneisheie sovershenstvovanie pravovogo regulirovania khoziaistvennoi 
deiatelnosti kolkhozov," SOP 60 (No. 1 ,  1959 ) .  
1 5  Gsovski & Grzybowski, Government Law and Courts in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe 1 195 ( 1959) . 
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ject if such a claim is based on "state ownership and is directed 
against a physical person or a non-state organization." The Soviet 
Draft rules out all forms of transfer of state property to private citi­
zens unless specifically authorized by the laws in force (Article 20) : 
State property . . .  is not subject to alienation by citizens, except in the 
case of housing and other types of property whose sale to citizens is per­
mitted by the USSR and Union Republic legislation. 
A dichotomy in civil law regulations in the sphere of property 
relations reflects the structure of economic controls in a socialist 
state. The state holds a monopolistic position regarding the owner­
ship of means of production, while the citizen's property rights are 
restricted to consumer goods. Some variation from this scheme oc­
curs in agriculture-on a considerable scale in the satellites, and less 
in the Soviet Union itself. 
Since there is a conflict between the actual condition of property 
relations in the socialist societies and the pattern pronounced by the 
principles of Marxism, there is an internal contradiction within the 
legal systems of socialist societies. On one hand, in the interest of 
current reality, the law takes account of the actual situation and ex­
tends its protection. On the other hand, it tends to accommodate 
social change, which is a matter of social and economic policy, to­
ward a uniform system of social and economic relations based on 
the total control by the public authority of all means of production. 
INHERITANCE 
The institution of inheritance in the Soviet orbit likewise re­
flects the impact of governmental policy upon the provisions of the 
civil law. It bas served in the past as an instrument for the reshap­
ing of property relations according to the socialist model. In those 
provinces of social life where this has been accomplished, its present 
shape differs little from the provisions of the civil law in traditional 
societies. In other provinces of life, where a change is still to be ef­
fected, inheritance continues to be used as an instrument of g<?vem­
mental control. 
A Soviet decree of April 1917 abolished inheritance altogether, 
in line with the ideological stand of Marxism, according to which 
inheritance was a pillar of the capitalist system of economy. Later, 
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in a number of successive laws the institution of inheritance was 
re-established, and followed, on the whole, the traditional lines of 
the European Codes. 76 The Draft of Principles of Civil Legislation of 
1960 provides only a partial answer to the question as to what future 
Soviet law will be, as it leaves important details to be filled in by 
legislation of the individual republics. However, it continues a 
tendency to liberalize further the provisions of Soviet inheritance. 
Thus, it rules that the testator shall have the right to "will all or part 
of his property to one or several persons either included or not in­
cluded in the circle of heirs by law . . . .  " This would be impossible 
under the law which is now in force, for he must choose his heirs 
from the circle of persons included in the three classes of statutory 
heirs. The Draft also provides for a statutory share of inheritance to 
certain of the statutory heirs, but its size and to whom it will go is to 
be determined by the Union Republics. 
The Polish Draft of 1960 continues the system of the devolu­
tion of estates as enacted by the two decrees of 1946. It is highly 
reminiscent of the Soviet system of inheritance as devised in the 
Draft of 1960, but it must be stated at once that under the Polish 
law which is now in force the power of the testator to select the heir 
freely by testament was never restricted. 
The Hungarian Code of 1959, in an obvious effort to preserve 
national institutions as far as compatible with the socialist order, 
differs widely both from the Polish and Soviet pattern. Legislation 
enacted prior to the Civil Code of 1959 had abolished some medieval 
institutions, including separate inheritance systems either for certain 
classes or for certain groups of population, had limited the classes of 
heirs, and had removed all discrimination between illegitimate and 
legitimate children. 77 
However, the 1946 reform maintained a separate system of in­
heritance for ancestral property. Thus, in absence of descendants 
and testamentary disposition, property devolving upon the decedent 
from his ancestor was to be returned. to the line of the ancestor 
whence it came. 
The Code provided for a far broader circle of heirs by law 
76 Jd. at 1 171-74. 
77 ld. at 1300-1. 
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than did either of the two drafts. The first class of heirs consists of 
children. Where no issue is left, the surviving spouse inherits the 
entire estate. Where no spouse is left, parents and their issue, then 
grandparents and their issue, and finally more distant relatives are 
entitled to inherit. The main feature of Hungarian inheritance is the 
life interest of the spouse in the entire estate. Children may, how­
ever, seek restriction of this right if the needs of the spouse are met 
by other inherited assets or by the spouse's property and earnings. 
Provisions on the inheritance of ancestral property no longer 
have practical significance, but are still included in the Code. 
The Hungarian Code has no restriction on testamentary dis­
position as to the selection of heir or heirs, or of their shares, except 
to the extent of the statutory share which obligatorily devolves upon 
certain statutory heirs. rs 
The People's Republics in Eastern Europe have never adopted 
the Soviet pattern regarding the general system of inheritance. In 
theoretical writings, the shift from the original position of the com­
plete abolition of the institution of inheritance to its re-establishment 
is explained by the fact that the original abolition was a tactical move 
in the struggle against the capitalist system. However, once the state 
became the sole owner of all means of production, there was no need 
to continue the system. The inheritance of items acquired by the 
workers of the socialist countries through their own labor promotes 
thrift and constitutes an added incentive toward raising productivity 
of labor. In addition, it assists the government program of raising 
the general standard of living and welfare of the people, increases 
family cohesion, and strengthens the ties of the socialist community.79 
No less important has been the fact that since nationalization in 
most of the Eastern European satellites never assumed such drastic 
forms as in Russia, some degree of protection for the property which 
was still left in private ownership had to be devised. 
General relaxation of the rules of inheritance is not a uniform 
pattern and indeed favors disposal of property within the urban sector 
of the economy. For other sectors of the economy, particularly for 
agriculture, far less liberal regimes continue in force. 
78 ld. at 1 302. 
79 Gwiazdomorski, Prawo spadkowe 15 ( 1959 ) .  
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In the Soviet Union, the basic unit in the regime provided for 
peasant's estates is the peasant household. This is an association en­
gaged in joint farming operations and consists of those related by 
blood and of all those who de facto belong to it. As the life of the 
Soviet peasant family centers around the bouse and the garden plot 
which household members f�um together, by law the share of the 
deceased member of the family in the community property is not sub­
ject to inheritance but automatically devolves upon its surviving 
members.80 
With the exception of Northern Albania, the institution of the 
peasant household was foreign to the legal tradition of Soviet-con­
trolled Europe. Nevertheless, an institution similar to Soviet peasant 
inheritance has made its appearance in the satellite countries. In a 
purely Soviet form, it has been introduced into Rumania and Albania. 
In other countries, the inheritance of peasant estates is subject to a 
regime which tends to further the continuation of a household and of 
the farm as an economic unit, 81 thus achieving the same results as 
the Soviet system of inheritance. 
DAMAGES FOR MORAL WRONGS 
Article 140 of the Civil Code of the RSFSR provides for dam­
ages only in the event of material wrong. This, in tum, may consist 
only of restitution or, when this is not possible, in payment of dam­
ages. Soviet authors support the position of the Soviet Code by the 
argument that monetary damages cannot be a substitute for moral 
wrong. Criminal repression in the socialist state is thought to repre­
sent. an adequate guarantee of protection of individual rights, and 
consequently, criminal punishment declared by the court should 
represent an equivalent for moral wrong. Furthermore, Soviet jurists 
80 Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 75, at 1 170-71. 
8 1  "Property and Inheritance Rights of Peasant Members of the Collective 
Farms in Romania," 2 Highlights 15 (1954). Cf. Polish Law of July 
3, 1957 (DU 39/172} ;  cf. also the Directive of the Polish Supreme Court 
of Feb. 27, 1960 (i  CO 34/59}, which introduced a separate regime for 
the devolution of peasant estates by setting a minimum size of peasant 
farms, in order to maintain efficient farming units. Nowe Prawo 570-73 
( 1960);  cf. also Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 75, at 196, 1234, 
1300, 1 380. 
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declare, constantly improving conditions of life in the Soviet order 
represent a higher guarantee and a better means of securing the 
happiness of the individual and recompensing his sufferings-even 
those resulting from moral wrongs-than any damages which a 
court could possibly decree from the defendant. In addition, dam­
ages are said to constitute a form of income without work, and 
therefore are contrary to the socialist prohibition of unearned in­
come. But-what is most important-the idea that health, life, honor, 
or any other aspect of human existence can be expressed in a sum 
of money is said to be a purely bourgeois idea and contrary to the 
high respect of socialist society for the human individual.82 
In fact, Soviet solutions may hardly be deemed a highly ad­
vanced answer to the new situations arising from the social and 
economic changes which have exposed human existence to addi­
tional hazards� The imperial law of Russia (Afticle 670 of the Tenth 
volume of the Code of Laws) had provided no legal basis for the 
modem concept of damages to compensate for moral wrongs, and 
the Soviet system followed the old path by adding new argumenta­
tion for an old position. In addition, it was realized that in the chaotic 
conditions of industrial expansion involving a policy of drawing into 
industrial production vast masses of inexperienced and half-literate 
peasants, a liberal policy with regard to loss of life, health, or limb 
by the new workers would place a strain on governmental industries. 
Thus, Soviet industrialists have maintained the old position because 
it was cheaper for the state. 
Once the Soviet law crossed the western frontiers of the Soviet 
Union on its civilizing mission of socialism, its position in this respect 
caused serious doubts. Particularly was this true in a number of 
Eastern European countries where interwar legislation followed liberal 
standards evolved in Western Europe. 
In the Polish case, the Code of Obligations of 1933 followed 
the example of the Swiss Code of 1907, which in its Article 40 pro­
vided for damages for moral wrongs due both to the victim and to 
relatives. In the Polish legal system, the Swiss formula was also 
reflected in a number of special laws which provided for moral 
82 Fleishits, Obiazatelstva iz prichinenia vreda i neosnovatelnogo obogash­
chenia 18, 29, 224 ( 1951 ) .  
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wrongs such as dealing with copyright, protection of industrial prop­
erty, unfair trade practices, press legislation, etc. In this situation, 
the adaptation of the new legal concepts involved a conflict between 
the doctrinal viewpoint and well-rooted legislation as to what was 
right in the public mind. The matter was complicated by the fact 
that both the public and the legal profession on both sides of the 
bar were well aware that the institution of damages for moral wrong 
was intended to favor the economically weaker classes, and there­
fore constituted a progressive phenomenon. 
In the first years of the new regime, Polish courts continued 
to award damages for moral wrongs. Later, in a series of decisions, 
the Polish Supreme Court began to seek means of justifying the 
practice of awarding damages with the principles of new legality. 
So, for instance, in the decision dated December 5, 1950, the Court 
found that in principle damages for moral wrongs were not contrary 
to the ideological principles of the new order. It stated that, as a 
matter of fact, the new order provided for a possibility of income 
without work, pointing to monetary awards and prizes to artists, 
scholars, leaders of labor, etc. 83 In another case shortly thereafter, 
the Supreme Court pointed out that pensions, leave pay, and other 
forms of payment, legal in the Socialist order, bore no direct rela­
tion to work performed. 
In this case the Court of Appeal propounded a thesis . which 
reflected the influence of the Soviet point of view. It stated: 
To award damages for moral w rong resulting from phys ical o r  moral 
suffering would in the first place challenge o ne of the fu ndam ental 
p rinciples of the socialist order, nam ely that wo rk is the basic source 
of income of a c itizen, and that award ing such damag es would force 
the Treasur y of the State o r  a government enterpris e, whos e income goes 
to the t reasury, to make expe nd iture cont rary to the social o rd er of the 
p resent day Poland. 
The Supreme Court rejected this point of view. Article 165 of 
the Code of Obligations, the Court stated, also applied to a socialist 
enterprise. Otherwise, it continued, another principle of the rules 
of life in a socialist community would be violated, namely, "that 
83 PiP 172 (No. 7, 195 1 ) .  
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there must be no conflict between the interests of individual human 
beings and those of the collective." 84 
The first breach in the tradition was made by a decision passed 
by the bench of seven justices of the Supreme Court which consid­
ered the question of damages to the members of the family of the 
deceased. In this case, the Court stated that awarding damages for 
moral wrong to the members of the family was "contrary to rules of 
life in a socialist community." 85 
The new line was again reversed after October 1956, when blind 
imitation of Soviet institutions ceased to be obligatory. The matter 
of damages for moral wrongs accruing to the members of the sur­
viving family was brought up again and reviewed by the Plenary 
Session of the Polish Supreme Court on January 1 ,  1957. The Court 
admitted that the bench of seven justices had gone too far. It stated 
that provisions of the Code of Obligations regarding this matter had 
been kept on the statute book, in spite of the fact that in the mean­
time a partial reform of the civil law had occurred. In fact, the Su­
preme Court stated, the Draft of the new Civil Code continued the 
institution of damages for moral wrongs, thus preserving the tradi­
tional Polish attitude. Furthermore, the Court added the following 
argument from the armory of socialist legality : money is a basic 
means of the distribution of social product in the socialist economy, 
and a feeling of satisfaction resulting from the possibility of meeting 
one's needs in greater measure may follow a monetary award. The 
Government also thought fit to use the same means on some oc­
casions.86 
At the background of this ideological storm in the juristic teacup 
stood the fact that provisions of the Swiss Code of 1907 and of the 
84 Decision of June 5, 1951,  Case No. C 649/50, ZOIC (No. 34, 1952 ) ;  
also PiP 312  (No. 2 ,  1952) .  
85 Case No. C 15/5 1,  ZOIC; Case No. 3 ( 1953 ) ;  Nowe Prawo 53 (No. 12, 
1953 ). 
86 That compensation paid to the members of the immediate family of 
the deceased admitted by the Code is not contrary to socialist morals 
is also proved by the well-known fact of payment by the government of 
certain monies to members of the families of miners who lost their 
lives in a catastrophe. Decision of Jan. 29, 1957, Case No. 1 CO 37/56, 
PiP 1 141-43 (No. 12, 1957 ) .  
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Polish Code of 1933 were designed as means of equalization and 
distribution of the hazards of modem life-favoring the economically 
weaker in a free enterprise system. Once the state took over the 
management of the industrial establishment in Poland, some en­
thusiasts were inclined to the protection of the interests of the new 
employer on the theory that he represented the interests of all. 
In East Germany, the Supreme Court established the principle 
that the claim to a pension by the surviving spouse, following the 
accidental death of a wage earner, must be calculated in relation to 
the economic position of the surviving person. The Court ordered 
that the property status and actual earnings of the surviving spouse 
be taken into consideration, as well as his working and earning 
capacity in case he was not working. 87 
Of the three pieces of civil legislation, only the Polish Draft 
of 1960 provides for damages for a moral wrong. However, it is 
restricted to the injured person alone and does not accrue to his 
family (Article 833, Section 1 ) .  Otherwise, restitution of the actual 
loss may be sought in the form of a periodic payment for the loss of 
the working ability. Or it may be sought to cover the cost of main­
tenance due from the deceased to the members of his family, who 
were a statutory charge on the deceased, and also all those whom 
the deceased provided voluntarily with means of subsistence. 
Under the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959, the only form of 
damages for personal injury is an annuity due to the injured person 
or to the members of his family or his kin entitled to claim main­
tenance from him (Section 357 (2) ) .  Under the Soviet Draft of Prin­
ciples of Civil Legislation ( 1960) , diUDages for injury or loss of life 
are due only where social security benefits do not provide for full 
compensation, either to him or to the members of his family who 
were dependent on the deceased or who were entitled to be sup­
ported by him (Article 77) . 
COPYRIGHT 
Since the very beginning of the debate regarding the protection 
of the rights of authors, it has been clear that such could be realized 
87 Decision of March 3, 1959, Case No. 2 Uz V 7/58, Neue Justiz 391 
(1959) .  
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only in a regime recognizing the social implication of creative ac­
tivity. A work which is not made accessible to the public brings no 
fruits of his labors to the author. Publication makes the public a 
partner in the creative process, and its rights deserve recognition. The 
reporter to the French Constituante on the draft of the copyright 
law stated that: "It seems that from the moment an author has put 
his work into the hands of the public . . .  the writer has made the 
public a partner of his property rights . . . .  " 
The legislative solutions proposed and adopted by the legis­
lators of the French Revolution defined this partnership and estab­
lished a pattern which was to persist until our times. The law of 
January 19, 179 1, and the Decree of the Convent of July 19-24, 
1 793, recognized the exclusive rights of the author to his work dur­
ing his lifetime and for some time after his death, and the unlimited 
rights of the public thereafter. 
In the Soviet order, authors' rights appeared again in a different 
dimension. The regime was intensely interested in controlling in­
tellectual activity as a means of political action. The nationalization 
of printing facilities and of sources of raw materials for dissemina­
tion of intellectual works, as well as the institution of economic 
planning, called for the definition of mutual relations, not only be­
tween the author and the public, but between the author and the 
regime as well. The political significance of copyright regulations is 
thrown into sharp relief by the fact that the Soviet nio.del of the copy­
right law was reproduced in the satellite regimes without serious 
departure from its main characteristics. Whereas in other provinces 
of legal regulation socialist governments have been inclined to con­
tinue local traditions, in regard to copyright the reception of the 
Soviet model was complete. 
The proper provisions of the copyright law are comparatively 
simple and quite orthodox. The rights of authors to the products of 
their literary, scientific, and artistic activity were recognized during 
their lifetime without limitation and for fifteen years after death. 
Copyright was declared inheritable. sa 
88 Unesco, Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World (1956) : Bulgaria, 
Law of Nov. 16, 1951 ,  IPNS, July 10, 1956; Czechoslovakia, Law of 
Dec. 22, 1953, Sbirka No. 1 15/1953; Poland, Law of July 10, 1952, 
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The exercise of the copyright and the administration of all re­
lated problems were entrusted to a network of social and govern­
mental institutions which participate in the process of planning ar­
tistic, literary, and scientific productions, the enforcement of uni­
form standards of conditions of publishing and production contracts, 
and in the raising of the new generations of artists, writers, scholars, 
and scientists. In the socialist society, all of these aspects of intel­
lectual life become a matter of social concern. The purpose of copy­
right legislation, as the Bulgarian copyright law stated, is to "protect 
the interests of the authors by harmonizing them with those of the 
people" (Section 1 )  . 
The mechanism which the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe 
have set up in order to harmonize the rights of authors with those · 
of the society consists of three elements : ( 1 )  authors' unions; (2) 
special funds administered by government or social agencies to pro­
mote creative activity in the arts and literature; (3)  the supervisory 
governmental body which determines general conditions of artistic 
and literary production and the program and policy of promoting 
various activities in this field. This high governmental agency is 
either a ministry of culture or a department or an agency subordinate 
to it. Sometimes a separate agency is attached to the office of the 
prime minister, which testifies to the singular importance of cultural 
life in the socialist society. 
Authors' protective organizations, including the Writers' Union, 
exercise wide powers. They have the exclusive right to represent indi­
vidual authors in their dealings with the publishing houses and . other 
institutions engaged in the production of artistic works and to make 
publishing and production contracts. They also collect the fees and 
honorariums, and deduct a fixed percentage from them for the fund 
to promote artistic activity. Their duty is to initiate legal action to 
protect authors' rights and to prevent violation of a copyright. 
Funds are designed to promote and foster literary and artistic 
---
DU 234/1952; Albania, Law of Sept. 24, 1947, GZ 19/1951 ;  Rumania, 
Decree of June 18, 1956, B.O., June 27, 1956, No. 18, and Aug. 3 ,  
1957, No. 21 ;  USSR, Law of May 16,  1928, Sob. zak. SSSR, No. 27/1928, 
sees. 245 and 246; cf. articles 80-86 of the Draft of Principles of Civil 
Legislation of the Soviet Union and of the Union Republics. 
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activity in the fields of belles lettres, music, plastic arts, and in partic­
uhir to encourage and recruit newcomers to the professions. Authors' 
protective organizations also participate in the fixing of rates of 
honorariums and fees by government decree and in working out the 
yearly programs of artistic and literary production. These various 
functions are distributed among three elements of the administration 
of cultural production according to a pattern which varies from 
country to country. In Hungary, for instance, such functions as the 
collection of fees and the contractual relations of authors with pub­
lishing institutions, which elsewhere belong to the Writers' Q'nion, 
are handled by the governmental agency (Office for Copyright Pro­
tection) .  In Poland, the Academy of Science is drawn into the ad­
ministration of cultural production. 
The paramount feature of these social and government opera­
tions is the planning of culture. As a recent Soviet treatise explained 
the functions of the various governmental organizations in this field : 
The pro gressive gro wth of socialist culture constantly ur ged the estab ­
lishment of or ganizational forms and insti tutions which would direct the 
activit ies of the publishin g, cinemato graphic and other enterprises . ... 
The Ministry of Culture of the US S R  also directs the activity of the 
un ions of the workers of the creative professions . . .. 89 
The technique of control is primarily a system of economic 
incentives. According to the Directive of the Council of People's 
Commissars of June 28, 1934, the purpose of the Fund for the Pro­
motion of Literature is to establish a 
.. . cooperation with the members of the Union of Soviet Writers by 
means of improvin g their standards of l ivin g and their material situa ­
tion , and to give suppor t to the cadres of the ne w writers by means of 
creatin g for them indispensable conditions for the ir e xistence. (Sec ­
tion 2) .oo 
In regard to the forms of contractual relations between authors 
and publishing institutions, socialist copyright laws feature short­
term publishing contracts. They also contain a general prohibition 
89 Antimonov & Fleishits, Avtorskoe pravo 36 ( 1957) .  
9 0  Sob. zak. SSSR 39/31 1, 1934; cf. Antimonov & Fleishits, supra note 
89, at 38-39. 
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of permanent acquisition by a publishing institution of the copy­
right of an artistic work. 
Soviet jurists are of the unanimous opinion that under the so­
cialist law the copyright is no longer a property right. The fact that 
the interests of society in the exploitation of intellectual and artistic 
production have found an institutional expression bas moved Soviet 
jurists to point to the fact that it is influenced essentially by the 
government monopoly of publishing and that it is a part of the 
general process of production. Authors have no right to reproduce 
and circulate their works except through government channels. On 
the other hand, government enterprises must obtain agreement to 
reproduce the works of individual authors.91 
As to the nature of the copyright under socialism, two theories 
have been advanced by Soviet jurists. One school of thought favors 
the view that a socialist author is a worker entitled to fruits of his 
labor in a socialist society: 
As any other toiler, the author bas the right to remuneration in ac­
cordance with the quality and quantity of his labor, if the product of 
his labor is used by society. Here lies the difference in principle of 
Soviet copyright from the copyright of capitalist countries.u2 
Others favor a doctrine which views authors' rights as under 
a separate category, belonging neither to that of property rights nor 
to the field of labor regulation. They point out that one of the char­
acteristics of Soviet legal solutions in this field is that authors are 
guaranteed remuneration for their intellectual or artistic labor. Fur­
thermore, they claim that under socialism, authors' rights are not 
property rights and their works are not commodities. This is because 
the law opposes a permanent transfer of the copyright and limits 
the rights of the publisher to a short period of time only, after which 
91 Pasherstnik, Teoreticheskie voprosy kodifikatsii obshcbesoiuznogo zakono­
datelstva o trude 3 1  ( 1955 ) ;  Genkin, "Predmet i sistema sovetskogo 
trudovogo prava," SGP (No. 2, 1949) ;  Antimonov & Fleishits, "Avtorstvo 
i trudovoe pravootnoshenie," SGP (No. S, 1956) ;  Antimonov & Fleishits, 
supra note 89, at 3, 16-17; 2 Grazhdanskoe pravo 264 (1944). 
92 Gordon, "Poniatie sovetskogo avtorskogo prava," 1 Uchonye Zapiski 
Kharkhovskogo luridicheskogo lnstituta 100 ( 1939) .  
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the right of reproduction reverts unrestricted to the author him­
se1f.D3 
The Draft of the Principles of the Civil Legislation ( 1960) 
seems to favor the second theory. Thus, the provisions dealing with 
copyright were included in a separate section of the Civil Code, and 
the treatment is separate from the institutions of property. 
THE NEW BALANCE 
The position of the individual in the socialist society was af­
fected by two movements : by the expansion of the responsibilities 
and powers of the state and by the change in the character of the 
civil law. New legal solutions have removed in effect all differences 
between various functions of the state, either in its sovereign capacity 
or as owner of property, lumping them into a single category. Civil 
law in the traditional sense has little application to relations be­
tween the individual and the state. It governs partly the process of 
acquisition through purchase and sale of consumer goods distributed 
by the state and loan and credit operations with the government 
banks. The legal nature of these transactions, however, is seriously 
in doubt. The supply of goods and credit operations are a matter of 
public policy; and with the expansion of the concept of public of­
ficials, even the very act of purchase and sale over the counter en­
gages public authority. Furthermore, conditions of sale and credit 
are not determined by the provisions of the civil law, but by the 
terms of the economic plan. 
Otherwise, all relations between the state and the individual, 
in particular those governed by the labor law or other governmental 
services which constitute the foundations of individual eXistence in 
the socialist order, e.g., social security, are under the rule of law 
which expresses the public policy of the state. 
Moreover, legal transactions which regulate economic activity 
in the socialist economic system do not engage individual responsi­
bility. They take place exclusively between socialist juristic persons 
representing various levels of public authority. Individual participa-
93 Fleishits, Lichnye prava v grazhdanskom prave SSSR i kapitalisticheskikh 
stran 164 ( 1941 ) ;  Antimonov & Fleishits, supra note 89, at 59-61. 
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tion in the economic processes is an act of public or social service. 
Thus, the very use of civil law terminology in major pieces of legisla­
tion, which are called codes of civil law, is more a matter of tradi­
tion and convenience than of the nature of their institutions. Except 
for a few areas of legal regulation such as inheritance or family law, 
the rest of the civil law belongs to the field of public administration, 
involving, as in copyright and industrial property legislation, indi­
vidual participation in the enforcement of public policy. 
Individual life was even more profoundly affected by the process 
of change which transformed mutual relations between the official 
system of legal regulation of public life in the socialist state and 
those other sources of social ordering which are characteristic of 
modem industrial societies. In the traditional system, the law took 
account of those local habits, customs, and commercial practices 
which affected the tenor of legal rule to the extent that they were 
not contrary to public policy. References in the civil laws to general 
concepts such as good morals, general principles of law, and condi­
tions of trade recognized the autonomous existence of the parallel 
system of social ordering which formed individual personality and 
shaped individual existence with reference to standards which were 
not imposed by the force of the state. 
Under socialism, public authority and the rule of the socialist 
law have permeated all those innumerable forms of human coexist­
ence and social and economic cooperation, with the result that all 
nonstate sources of social ordering have become carriers of public 
policy. Rules of life in the socialist community, or rules of social 
coexistence, as those extra- or para-legal codes or standards of be­
havior are variously called, are only channels for the integration 
of all individual and collective life into a single pattern of which 
the rule enacted by the government is the center. Social organiza­
tions, professions, and economic institutions are identified with the 
state, and the position of the individual members of social and eco­
nomic institutions is accordingly affected. 
The expansion of governmental responsibilities and social change 
in the West have also affected the perspectives of mutual relations 
between the individual and collective life. In the mind of the drafters 
of the Civil Code of France, different criteria of action apply in 
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these two provinces. The legislator bas a duty "to discover for each 
matter the principles which would favor the common weal . . .  ," and 
the judge has the task of "putting these principles into action to adapt 
and extend them, by a wise and reasoned application, to private 
situations . . . .  " 94 
In modem societies it is no longer possible to see the problems 
of balance between collective and individual interests in such simple 
equations. But the axiom that the function of law is to protect indi­
vidual existence against the encroachment of those who wield power 
has still remained the important duty of public authority. While the 
government has assumed new responsibilities in the adjustment of 
economic and social forces for the purpose of eliminating harmful 
forms of competition, the restriction or elimination of private initia­
tive is not understood as eliminating the need for the protection of 
private interests. The question of providing protection has simply 
moved into another dimension, since the conflict of interests is a 
fact of life. In new conditions, modem courts and modem legisla­
tion have been able to afford protection to individual interests, in 
their various forms, sometimes merged, into the collective form of 
social cooperation. The response of the socialist state to changed 
conditions was to assume direct responsibility for the management of 
social and economic affairs, thus eliminating the need for imposing 
or affixing liabilities and duties upon individuals. This policy, it is 
claimed, brings about harmony of the individual and social interests, 
reducing the problem of legal protection to the problem of managerial 
responsibility for the efficiency of service. 
In opening societies, the function of judicial control has retained 
its full significance. New powers and responsibilities of public author­
ity call for additional expansion of judicial control, both for gov­
ernment departments and in regard to the action of departmental 
or private tribunals, which all affect the economic and social posi­
tion of the individual.Dtl 
The legal protection of individual rights and interests in open 
94 Portalis, Discours preliminaire, Projet de Code Civil presente par la 
Commission nommee par le Gouvernement, Le 24 Thermidor an 8, at 
vii. 
95 Denning, The Changing Law 20-37 ( 1953 ) .  
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societies is predicated upon the decentralization of governmental 
responsibilities, which permits operation of public services under the 
uniform cloak of law. 
In Tamlin v. Hannaford, involving the effect of the nationaliza­
tion of British railways upon private rights, the British Court held 
that: 
In the eyes of the law, the corporation is its own master and is an­
swerable as fully as any other person or corporation. It is not the Crown 
and has none of the immunities or privileges of the Crown. Its servants 
are not civil servants and its property is not Crown property. It is as 
much bound by Acts of Parliament as any other subject of the King. 
It is, of course, a public authority and its purposes, no doubt, are public 
purposes, but it is not a government department nor do its powers fall 
within the province of Government. 96 
In France, a distinction was made between government-organized 
private corporations and public corporations having the character 
of a public agency. Neither of them is free from judicial control. 
Government interests in the form of private corporations act as 
private parties, subject to courts of general jurisdiction. In accord­
ance with the doctrine of separation between acts of public authority 
and those pertaining to the management of governmental proprietary 
interests, public corporations are controlled either by administrative 
courts or by courts of general jurisdiction.97 
In most general terms, the mechanics of the approach of West­
em societies to the needs of our times consists of a pragmatic cor­
relation of all methods of social and economic action with the rule 
of law and available methods of judicial control. To the mechanism 
of control are added new institutions, frequently representing a 
combination of the judicial and social element. A legal framework 
for the complicated mechanism of social and governmental action 
96 [1950] 1 K.B. 1 8. 
97 "In the welfare state, the private citizen is forever encountering public 
officials of many kinds: regulators, dispensers of social services, man­
agers of state operated enterprises. It is the task of the rule of Jaw 
to see to it that these multiplied and diverse encounters are as fair, as 
just, and as free from arbitrariness as are the familiar encounters of the 
right-asserting private citizen with the judicial officers of the traditional 
law." Jones, ''The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 
1 56 ( 1958) .  
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is provided by public and private law alike, and formal justice with 
judicial action in its traditional form of scholarly interpretation of 
laws retains its place. The result is individual participation in all 
levels of social and economic activity.98 
The tendency of the modem phase of Soviet law is to continue 
the policy of subordination of individual interests to the commands 
98 This is particularly well illustrated by the variety of forms and devices to 
fit in the initiative of public authority to provide services or organize 
an industry into the national economies of the free society. Cf. the fol­
lowing individual contributions to Friedmann ed., The Public Corpora­
tion, A Comparative Symposium ( 1 954) : 
Sawer, "The Public Corporation in Australia," at 10: "In the field 
of central government, the corporate structure might be followed for 
two reasons which continue to have importance to the present day. 
Firstly, the 'Crown' as a legal personality was a most unsatisfactory 
basis for the organization of any enterprise which might be involved in 
daily dealing with property and in litigation, owing to the cumbrous 
procedures connected with Crown property and the strict limitation on 
Crown liability to legal action. Secondly, an activity identified with the 
Crown almost inevitably became a political activity, and this might be 
either bad for the activity or embarrassing for the politicians." C/. also 
38-39 and 38 n. 1 ,  citing "Commonwealth Hostels Ltd. v. Bogle," 26 
Aust. L.J. 589 ( 1 952 ) ;  Argus L.R. 229. 
Hodgetts, "The Public Corporation in Canada," at 62, 64, 65-70, 
and 84-86 these remarks: "Parliament and even the responsible minister 
must show confidence in the corporation by refraining from breathing 
down the neck of management. On the other hand, the Canadian system 
of parliamentary government can impose responsibility only on the 
ministers of the Crown. Hence the public corporation cannot be used 
as a means of evading ultimate responsibility. Where to draw the line 
between the claims of managerial autonomy and the claims of parlia­
mentary responsibility remains for Canada a problem that has been 
seriously posed rather than solved by contemporary use of the public 
corporations." 
Drago, "The Public Corporation in France," at 108-19, and in 
particular the following statement at 125: "It ought to be added that in 
accordance with the principles of the 'gestion privee,' the public cor­
porations can act like private individuals and in that case are subjected 
to the civil law. As regards the industrial and commercial corporation, 
the presumption must be reversed; their activities correspond to those 
of private enterprise and they are therefore governed by private law 
and subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts . . . .  " 
Friedmann and Hufnagel, "The Public Corporation in Germany," 
at 1 38, and the following at 141-42 : "In the first place it is now gen­
erally established that the legal relations between the Anstalt and third 
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and the interests of society, and to eradicate from the psyche of the 
Soviet citizen the element of assertiveness in regard to the rights of 
the individual. Social reforms on which communist society is predi­
cated stress coordination, discipline, and conformity. The message 
of the social order in the Soviet society addressed to the individual 
is that through collective action the welfare of the individual is to 
be achieved. The state and public authority appear in the pu blic eye 
as the benefactors of all. 
A report on the Soviet social security system thus described the 
general meaning of social security in Russia: 
Thus, the ove rwhelming feeling that one gets about the Soviet p rog ram 
is that, like all othe r aspects of the Soviet society and economy, it is in­
tended to be fo r the bene fit of all pe rsons as a whole rathe r than to 
p rovide for individual needs . .. .  
This imp ression is fu rthe r st ren gthened by the fact that the Soviet social 
secu rity p rog ram is non -cont ributo ry insofar as the wo rke rs cove red a re 
parties are governed by public law unless there are clear indications to 
the contrary. For example, the citizen who acquires a library ticket or 
who is admitted to a public bath does not enter into a contract but 
he is admitted to certain facilities by virtue of public law concessions 
granted by the public authority. This does not mean that he is without 
remedy but in case of any dispute it is the administrative not. the civil 
courts that will decide." Cf. also, at 144-45: "It goes without saying 
that the legal status of this form of public enterprise differs radically 
from the 'Offentliche Anstalt.' They are legal persons of private law. 
They are, like every other commercial company, fully liable in contract 
or in tort. Their property transactions are governed by private law, 
and any legal dispute concerning them comes before the civil and not 
the administrative courts. The public character of their activities lies 
in the economic and political field; it is not reflected in its legal form. 
Again, the internal organization of these enterprises was, of course, 
that of the commercial company . . . .  
"A predominant purpose of the establishment of public enterprises 
in the form of commercial companies was the emphasis on technical 
expertise, rather than civil service administration." 
Friedmann, "The Public Corporation in Great Britain," at 165-66: 
"Shortly after the nationalization of a number of basic industries by 
the Labour Government, the present writer suggested a division of the 
most important public corporations into two types: the industrial or 
commercial corporation, on the one hand, and the social service cor­
poration on the other. Later a third type, termed a supervisory public 
corporation was added." C/. also at 185.  
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conc erned. Th e en tir e cos t i s  m et b y  con tribu tions f rom th e em ploying 
en ter pris es and from th e g en eral r ev enu e-a poin t of ten r epea ted in 
Sovi et sourc es and by Sovi et r epr es en ta tiv es a t  in terna tional m eetings. 
Tha t th e wor kers ar e in fac t "gra teful "  for this financing basis is indi­
ca ted by th e comm en t  tha t  is so of ten h eard : "Th e gov ernm en t  is pro ­
vid ing all th es e social b en efits for us fr ee of charg e." 99 
In fact, the report goes on to say, whatever the financing ar­
rangements of social security in the Soviet Union, in the final analysis 
its .cost comes from the national economy and, strictly speaking, 
from the workers' pockets. In terms of controls, this attitude pro­
vides an important channel of psychological influence over the mind 
of the masses. 
Another example of integration of the Soviet man with the 
official apparatus of the government is the Soviet institution of com­
plaints, which is the main means of public defense against the arbi­
trary action of the governmental authority. Its general usefulness for 
the regime consists in the check it provides against the irregularities 
in the operation of the governmental institutions. The control which 
a complaint initiates is a matter of internal process and is exercised 
with reference to general provisions regulating governmental action, 
rather than in response to a demand for the protection of individual 
rights. Its general form (the absence of the personal involvement 
of the complaining individual) will tend to de-emphasize the element 
of individual participation in the action aiming at the preservation 
of public order.1oo 
99 Social Security in the Soviet Union, Draft of the Report by the U.S. 
team that visited the USSR, 8-9 (1959). 
1 00 Cf. infra at 235 ff. 
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SOCIALIST LEGALITY 
SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE REFORM OF SOVIET LAWS 
In 1917, Russia was a country deeply rooted in the pre-industrial 
era. Not only was its economy predominantly agricultural, but it 
was backward in terms ·Of the techniques of production and social 
relations as well. The comparatively recent abolition of serfdom had 
failed to sever the bonds between the lower and higher strata of so­
ciety which characterized the medieval forms of life. And the in­
cipient growth of the industrial economy, although contributing 
significantly to the process of social and economic change in Russia, 
was as yet unable to affect the style of life of the large peasant 
masses which constituted the bulk of the population. 
The revolution, however, violently disturbed this pattern. In­
deed, Russia began to experience a period of great social mobility, 
as the masses moved both from the countryside to the cities and up 
and down the social ladder. 
The physical movement of the human masses was coupled 
with a great ideological upheaval involving a revision of basic con­
cepts regarding the role of the individual in the social order. In­
volved were confticts of various doctrinal formulations on the his­
torical predictions of Marxism and a political struggle involving 
purges and the physical liquidation of opponents, including those 
who at one time occupied highest positions in the government of 
Revolutionary Russia and in the ideological and moral leadership of 
the new order. 
At the same time, the regime was tackling the enormous task of 
transforming the illiterate peasant mass into an industrial labor force. 
It was necessary to train the new workers in basic industrial skills 
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and urban ways o f  life and t o  educate industrial, social, and business 
leaders on a grand scale. The forced expansion of the Soviet economy, 
beginning with the Five-Year Plans, was made possible only through 
this immense transfer and training of the labor force. This process 
was nearly complete by the end of the thirties, and in the late forties 
and early fifties the process of adaptation of the masses of peasantry 
from the countryside to urban surroundings and exacting industrial 
employment was well advanced. The Soviet labor force began to 
resemble in behavior, attitude toward work, mode of life, and com­
mon interests their counterparts in the industrial economies of other 
countries.1 
This development in the growth of the Soviet labor force was 
paralleled by a number of refinements taking place in Soviet indus­
tries. These latter were reflected in the methods of achieving progress 
in labor productivity and in greater perfection in the end result of 
the productive processes. 
An expert in Soviet labor relations has suggested that there 
have been three periods in that country's improvement of the ef­
ficiency and productivity of labor. When Soviet industry was primi­
tive and economic expansion still a matter of large-scale construction, 
military discipline was the most efficient regime for coordinating the 
efforts of workers, the majority of whom were peasants. Thus, shock 
work was said to characterize the first Five-Year Plan. Since 1935, 
however, when the foundations of the Soviet industrial plant had been 
laid and the equipment in Soviet factories was becoming more 
sophisticated, the method of sheer intensification of mass labor was 
no longer useful, and a new method featuring individual performance 
was needed. To serve this new need, Stakhanovism was invented. 
Such, together with a number of similar competitive schemes, re­
mained the chief method for raising the productivity of the labor 
of factory crews for almost two decades. It was an improvement 
because raising the productivity of labor was predicated upon the 
improvement of the production processes and upon the mastering of 
techniques. 
1 About 25 million people moved from rural to urban areas during the 
period 1926-1939 alone. Cf. Eason, "Population and Labor Force," 
in Soviet Economic Growth 114 (Bergson ed., 1953). 
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After World War ll, Stak:hanovism was no longer satisfactory. 
At this point, emphasis was shifted from record-breaking to indi­
vidual initiative, to the intelligent employment of modem factory 
equipment, and to the extension of automation methods in various 
fields of industrial production.2 
In the first period, after an initial phase marked by the regime's 
endeavor to win the masses to its side, the emphasis of Soviet legishi­
tion was on the stabilization of social conditions in the Soviet 
economy and enforced government control of the labor market. 
Its aim was to raise the discipline of labor. It struggled against the 
rapid turnover of labor, labor migration between industrial centers, 
and against absenteeism, all of which were causing enormous losses 
in Soviet industries. 
The Soviet regime was handicapped by the deplorable state of 
the cities and by a shortage of urban accommodations and consumer 
goods--even of staple foods. To meet those conditions, economic 
incentives were replaced by a system of military discipline as the basic 
· approach to the management of labor. The 1933 decree introduced 
the "labor book." Under the 1940 decree, a worker was prohibited 
from leaving his employment without the permission of the manage­
ment, under penalty of two to four months of imprisonment for 
noncompliance. A system of penalties was established for unexcused 
absence from work. A worker could be moved from employment to 
employment or even to another enterprise. The government estab­
lished a system of trade schools and training centers where young 
workers were trained in industrial skills. They were admitted either 
on their applications or on the basis of draft, again under a regime 
characterized by army discipline.8 
After 195 1, the labor regime was somewhat modified as sanc­
tions became less severe. Finally, the decree of April 25, 1956, ac­
knowledged the fact that a new regime for industrial relations had 
become possible because: 
2 Gliksman, "Recent Trends in Soviet Labor Policy," 79 Monthly Labor 
Rev. 772 (1956). 
3 Schwarz, Labor in the Soviet Union, 95 ff. (1952); Guins, Soviet Law 
and Soviet Society 150-81 (1954); Kulski, The Soviet Regime 404 
(1954); Gliksman, supra note 2, at 767-75. 
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Labor discipline at enterprises and institutions has been strengthened 
as a result of the growth of the working people's consciousness and the 
rise in their living standard and cultural level.4 
Thus, it was implied that the presence of economic stimuli re­
moved the necessity for harsher methods of discipline. The reform of 
1956, however, did not produce the emancipation of the worker in 
the same sense as occurred in the West. The regime of control was 
continued in force. Subtler methods of regimentation were intro­
duced. Severe penalties were replaced by differentiation in social in­
surance and pension benefits according to the employment record, 
thus favoring those who stayed with their jobs. Furthermore, disci­
pline through a system of penalties, including those imposed by the 
courts, was replaced by public censure organized and administered 
by the workers.5 More recently, an amelioration in general conditions 
of the industrial worker was enacted, introducing two important 
improvements in the worker's status. The Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet enacted the Decree (January 25, 1960), subsequently ap­
proved by the Supreme Soviet on May 7, 1960, which removed in­
equalities in sick pay benefits due to the interruption of employment: 
[W]orkers and employees who have left their previous jobs of their 
own free will are to be paid temporary benefits in all cases on a common 
basis, regardless of the amount of time they have worked on new jobs. 
[W]orkers and employees dismissed on their own will retain uninterrupted 
seniority, if they begin work within one month after the day of their 
dismissal. 6 
One can still distinguish sectors of economic life in the Soviet 
Union where, owing to local difficulties, the organization of new in­
dustries is undertaken in conditions resembling early methods, and 
the recruitment of new workers and their movement into new areas 
of expansion assume the shape and atmosphere of military cam­
paigns. But on the whole, the stability of labor has been achieved, 
production processes have been mastered, and alternate methods of 
social control to enforce the discipline of labor have been developed. 
4 Vedomosti (No. 10, 1956). 
5 Gliksman, supra note 2, at 775. 
6 Vedomosti (No. 4, 1960). 
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The consequence of these achievements has been the enactment 
of more humane labor legislation. 7 
A similar process of relaxation by the regime bas taken place 
in other fields of Soviet law. Thus, police powers have been circum­
scribed and their activities in the field of the administration of justice 
placed under the control of the public prosecutor. Control from the 
center over local authorities has been relaxed, the institution of in­
heritance liberalized, and progressive reform of criminal law under­
taken. 
The general change in the methods of enforcing government 
policies in the Soviet Union and other socialist states of Eastern 
Europe has called for new qualities in the system of rules governing 
life and legal commerce in Eastern Europe. As Professor Fuller 
observed when confronted with a specimen of Soviet legal thought: 
Most definitions of law mistakenly try to make it equivalent to an 
authoritative ordering of social relations, but this does not expose its 
real essence. The ideal type of an authoritative ordering would be a 
military company marching in perfect step, ready to follow every com­
mand of its captain. Yet such a phenomenon is not only not legal in 
nature, but actually stands at the opposite pole from law. This is true 
generally of mere relationships of power. Slavery, for example, requires 
no legal form. If the relation of master and slave is in any sense legal, 
it is only because the master can exchange the slave for other goods, 
or because the law recognizes some semblance of a right in the slave 
against the master. Law appears as a distinct social phenomenon not 
when we have one man standing over another, but only when we have 
men standing toward one another with rights and duties.s 
The rule of law represents a technique which operates by a 
clear assignment of roles in legal relationships, and this is the quality 
of which the Soviet legal system was almost completely deprived 
during the life of Stalin. The bulk of the legal regulation of that 
period consisted of ad hoc commands. Sometimes issued in abstract 
form, they never served as standards of permanent conduct. As an 
editorial in the leading Soviet legal publications stated: 
7 Barton, "The Current Status of the Soviet Workers," 9 Problems of 
Communism (No. 7, 1960). 
8 Fuller, "Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study in the Development of 
Marxian Legal Theory, " 47 Mich. L Rev. 1160 (1949). 
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Law called for the new normative acts, and they were issued and fre­
quently they were found to be in conflict with the articles of the codes 
in force, which officially were not amended, and also with other earlier 
normative acts. The mass of such careless, frequently contradictory legal 
material obstructs its application to concrete cases.9 
When in 1956 the Twentieth Party Congress called for the 
return to the rule of law in the Soviet Union, it had two aims in 
view. In the first place, the abuse of power was to be discontinued. 
In the second place, the laws of the Soviet Union were to be reor­
ganized into a clear system of rules. However, this was not under­
stood as a change in the basic premises of the Soviet regime. The 
rule of law in its new meaning would still be subordinated to the 
needs of the national economy which would continue to be ad­
ministered by the government according to the plan. Furthermore, 
the leading role of the Communist Party within the social and gov­
ernmental apparatus was reaffirmed.10 
Thus, the role of the Soviet legal experts was limited primarily 
to a systematic organization of the body of Soviet law with a view 
toward making the law a more useful standard for the guidance of 
the citizens and law-enforcing authorities. Only secondarily were 
Soviet lawyers called upon to devise more perfect legal solutions 
for the purpose of achieving technical improvement rather than a 
more progressive rule. While it is in the tradition of the European 
jurist to work for the reform of the legal rule on the basis of an 
independent scientific analysis of social reality, in the Soviet Union 
the professional authority of the jurist is highly circumscribed. In-
9 SGP 3 (No. 1, 1956) ; Orlovskii, "Zadatchi pravovoi nauki v svete re­
shenii XX sjezda KPSS," 26 Vestnik Akademii Nauk 5 (No. 8, 1956).  
10 Hazard, "Le droit sovietique et Ie  deperissement de l'£tat," in 8 Travaux 
et conferences, Universite Libre de Bruxelles 26 (1960) ;  Romashkin, 
"Razvitie funktsii sovetskogo gosudarstva v protsesse postroienia kom­
munizma," SGP 12, 15 (No. 10, 1958):  "Victory of socialism and com­
munism is possible not in the result of dying off of the economic­
organizing function, but in the expansion of that function. It is quite 
clear that while moving towards communism, the role of the planned 
direction of the national economy will acquire a growing significance. 
While progressing towards communism, grows and will grow the direct­
ing role of the communist party, which appears as a leading and direct­
ing force of the Soviet state, as the nucleus of all organizations of the 
toilers, both state and social." 
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deed, the formulation of the basic policies of the Soviet state and of 
the legislative program is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Party .U Thus, the role of the socialist jurist is not that of an inde­
pendent social or legal reformer. 
Within these limitations, however, socialist jurists hold a monop­
oly over the technique which alone is able to produce the advantages 
of orderly government and the enforcement of social and economic 
policies with least resistance and greatest economy of effort. Within 
these limits, the socialist jurist is responsible for the results of the 
legal reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
The return to socialist legality, to use the official language of 
the communist leadership, had two aspects. The first step was the 
re-establishment of legal order on the basis of the laws in force; the 
second was the reformation of the laws themselves and the raising 
of the general standards of government operations and legal com­
merce. 
Socialist lawyers have reaffirmed in new form the axiom that 
legality means observance of certain procedural forms: 
Socialist law and procedure endeavors to remove systematically from 
the positive law those provisions which are superfluous, insisting at the 
same time on a scrupulous enforceii).ent of these rules which it continues 
in force as indispensable. . . . Too iiberal an interpretation of the rules 
of procedure may easily lead ... to a violation of the rules providirig 
for the indispensable formalities, and thus result in a confusion which 
would undermine the principles of the socialist law of procedure.12 · 
As the rule of law consists also in the observance of forms, · 
one can detect among Soviet lawyers a conviction that socialist 
legality significantly depends on familiarity with legal techniques. 
Soviet lawyers, whether in practice or in academic circles, urge the 
importance of legal education and of refined legal thinking for the 
proper functioning of legal institutions. In the first instance, anxiety 
is expressed concerning the familiarity of the lawmakers with legisla­
tive techniques. Soviet lawyers urge that this inadequacy be remedied 
by expert assistance of trained lawyers. In the second instance, a low 
11 Hazard, supra note 10, at 26-28. 
12 Decision of the bench of seven justices of the Polish Supreme Court, 
of April 16, 1955, I.C. 20/55, PiP 677 (No. 10, 1955). 
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level of legal training is deplored among those called upon to en­
force the laws of the socialist state.13 
While in most of the satellite countries law courts are staffed 
by lawyers, in the Soviet Union even the recent reform of the 
judiciary failed to introduce the requirement of legal education for 
judges. The only steps toward assuring a higher degree of expertise 
on the bench were the extension of the tenure of office of elected 
judges from three to five years and the reorganization of the People's 
Courts by integrating one-judge courts into locality courts. In the 
latter instance, judges were assembled physically in one building 
on the basis of districts, localities, or wards for which these courts 
were competent. This created opportunities for handling the general 
business of the court by a more experienced member of the bench 
and for consultation and advice among the judges as to cases which 
they were called to decide. 
In the beginning of 1960, Dean Karev of the Moscow Uni­
versity Law School demanded that a candidate for judicial office have 
legal training. He also revealed on this occasion that 55.4 per cent 
of the people's judges had legal training acquired in Soviet universi­
ties, that 37 per cent had legal training of the high school type, and 
that only a small number of peoplfs judges had no legal training. 
The latter had acquired practical experience on the bench.14 
Another aspect of the work of the legal profession in socialist 
countries drives home the axiom that legality in the operation of 
government must proceed under conditions in which certain formal 
standards of action are met. These standards are necessary in any 
legal order, irrespective of the social order or political regime.15 
Essentially, these standards are not only the rules of operation 
of government, but constitute, as well, basic rules of judicial method 
which during the Stalinist period lost currency. The Polish Supreme 
13 "Za povyshenie roli pravovi nauki v kodifikatsii sovetskogo zako­
nodatelstva," SGP 3 (No. 1, 1956) ; Nabatov, "Strogo okhraniat prava 
grazhdan," Sots. zak. 19-23 (No. 12, 1960);  Ilyin & Mironov, "0 forme 
i stile pravovykh aktov, SGP 65-73 (No. 12, 1960) .  
14 Karev, "Dalnieshee sovershenstvovanie sovetskoi pravovoi sistemy," 
SGP 61-71 (No. 2, 1959) ;  cf. Strogovitch, "Nekotorye voprosy sudous­
troistva," SGP 72-83 (No. 7, 1959) .  
15 Cf. supra a t  104; Polish Supreme Court, directive ruling of February 
12, 1955, PiP 290 (No. 7-8, 1955) .  
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Court, in a decision passed by the full bench of the Civil Chamber, 
formulated the following directive for the lower courts: 
[P]opular legality means the duty of the citizens to respect the laws in 
force. While imposing this duty on the citizens, it is not permitted to 
obscure the actual meaning of the law and to expose citizens to unex­
pected situations.16 
This decision was passed after a long period of arbitrary repeal 
by the Polish courts of the laws which were deemed typical of the 
bourgeois social and economic order.17 This practice, however, 
jeopardized the position of individuals and undermined the very 
foundations of legal commerce. In order to break away from this 
trend, the Court declared that: 
It is a basic postulate of legality that, inasmuch as it is possible, the law · 
which was not formally repealed be given full effect, even if there is a 
need for the reform of that law. Until this reform is introduced, strict 
observance of those provisions which are still formally in force, is the 
duty of all . . . . 1s 
Another principle of the orderly processes of government which 
socialist jurists have endeavored to bring to the attention of Soviet 
administrators and government officials is the concept of jurisdiction 
and the formal legality of each act of a governmental authority. This 
means a considerable restriction of the freedom of higher authorities 
to tamper with the decisions of lower agencies. By this means it is 
sought to give effect to the laws providing for the distribution of 
authority and responsibility. As a Soviet lawyer wrote: 
In our opinion a decision of a lower Soviet may be changed oniy in 
the case of the violation of the law. The Constitution of the Union 
guarantees the rights of the Soviets directly elected by the population 
as agencies of self-government in their territory, by ruling that Soviets 
make their decisions within their jurisdiction determined by the law. 
Socialist legality is based on the principle of expediency, which is cor­
rectly interpreted. In other words, a higher Soviet has no right to deal 
with matters or change decisions which were already made by the lower 
Soviet within its jurisdiction. A decision of the lower Soviet has legal 
16 PiP 290 (No. 7-8, 1955). 
17 Grzybowski, "Continuity of Law in Eastern Europe," 6 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 44 ff. (1957). 
18 PiP 291 (No. 7-8, 1955). 
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force if it is within the jurisdiction fixed by the law, functions or rights 
of the lower Soviet. In practice higher Soviets, and especially their 
executive committees, frequently change the decisions of lower organs 
also for reason of expediency which is a violation of the principle of 
socialist legality and of the rights of the lower organs. And so for in­
stance in a number of provinces of the Russian SFSR and Byelorussian 
SSR, the organs of the regions deprive village Soviets of the right to dis­
pose of surplus funds, resulting from higher revenue than estimated in 
the budget. 19 
Another important development in the general tendency to give 
some substance to the principle of self-government in various fields 
of social activity-which is supposed to be the fundamental principle 
of the Soviet political order-was the directive passed by the plenary 
session of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union in December 1959 
in the matter of "Judicial practice in civil cases involving collective 
farms." The Supreme Court gave effect to the March 1956 Resolu­
tion adopted by the Central Committee of the Party and of the 
Federal Government concerning "the statutes of agricultural collec­
tives and further promotion of the initiative of their members in 
the organization of the Collective's industry and its administration." 
The resolution recommended and advised the collectives to assume 
direct responsibility for changes and amendments of their statutes 
according to local conditions. The Plenary Session of the Supreme 
Court had made it clear to the lower courts that, in deciding civil 
cases involving the activities of collective farms, courts ought to 
take into consideration that it is within the competence of the col­
lective's members to make decisions as to the disposal of collective's 
products and property, and to direct its activity in accordance with 
the Soviet law and decisions of the Party and government 
... that the statute of the agricultural collectives with its amendments, 
properly registered with the executive committee of the region represents 
the basic law of the kolkhoz activity .... The courts in their cases ought 
to apply the laws in force and the statutes of the collective farm con­
cerned.20 
19 Tikhomirov, "Nekotorye voprosy dalneishego razvitia miestnykh organov 
gosudarstvennoi vlasti SSSR," SGP 82 (No. 1, 1960). 
20 Bardin, "Novoe postanovlenie plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR '0 
Sudebnoi praktike po grazhdanskim kolkhoznym delam,'" SGP 12 (No. 
6, 1960). 
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A Soviet jurist drew the attention of the officials of social or­
ganizations in charge of public functions to the fact that these ac­
tivities, in contrast with the internal affairs of the organization, must 
conform to the provisions of the Constitution "which envisages the 
uniform subordination of all organizations and citizens to the law of 
the Soviet state." 21 
The significance of this discussion, which is barely sketched 
here, is that socialist jurists worked for the reconstruction of the 
foundations of the legal order from materials which were already 
available in the statute books of socialist legislation. New life bad 
to be put into institutions which under Stalin bad served to provide 
a fa�ade for administrative practices which were far from being nor­
mal governmental procedures. The effort of Soviet lawyers is directed 
toward the precise distribution of social functions so as to provide 
for a framework in which social discipline may be achieved by a 
method in which individuals, government authorities, and socialist 
organizations are placed not "standing over another" but "toward 
one another" with rights and duties. 
The work of Soviet jurists is part and parcel of a large program 
of social reform. It began in 1956 with the repudiation of some of 
the basic features of the Soviet regime under Stalin. Finally, the 
Twenty-first Congress of the Communist Party in 1959 declared that 
Soviet society bad reached the halfway mark on the road of its his­
torical progress and had passed into the period of communist con­
struction.22 Thus, the legal reform begun after 1956 bas acquired a 
new dimension and is geared now toward improving the general 
standard of the Soviet legal system and to the devising of new tech­
niques for fostering the emergence of the new society. 
REFORM OF CRIMINAL LAW 
The efforts of Soviet jurists to reform the Soviet legal system 
are motivated by the conviction that its institutions must meet cer-
21 Mitskevitch, "Razshirenie roll obshchestvennykh organizatsii v period 
razvemutogo stroitelstva kommunizma, " SGP 32 (No. 9, 1959). 
22 "XXI siezd KPSS i zadatchi sovetskoi pravovoi nauki, " SGP 3-1 1 (No. 
2, 1959). 
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tain requirements valid for all types of lawmaking. The patterns for 
modem laws are the result of centuries of scientific inquiry. A re­
fined legal system, which alone can meet the needs of modem so­
ciety, cannot deviate from certain generally accepted standards. This 
position, although formally concerned with technical aspects of law­
making, is not without its ideological content. Legal reformers of the 
West, striving for the solution of practical problems, have always 
seen their task in terms of social policies. Such, it should be noted, 
are also declared to be the purposes of law enforcement in socialist 
societies. So, for instance, the purpose of criminal law is not only 
to punish crimes. In addition, its function is to eliminate criminality 
and to provide a method for the effective rehabilitation of the crimi­
nal, thus implying a judgment as to what social needs are. It follows, 
therefore, that Soviet imitation of the models of Western lawmaking 
implies also adoption of the ideological positions which motivated 
those who devised them. 23 
This is particularly true with regard to the field of criminal 
legislation. Since the time of Beccaria and Montesquieu, it has been 
realized that only through the scholarly reform of criminal legislation 
and the efficient and prompt enforcement of scientifically determined 
penal policy could the desired two purposes be achieved. In the first 
place, criminal activity would tend to diminish; secondly, a humane 
system of punishment might be introduced. The French reformers 
realized that harsh punishments contribute to the brutalization of the 
social psyche and tend to make matters worse. The history- of Euro­
pean. legal thought has equated a liberal system of government with 
a humane penal policy. In this scheme of things, the basic object of 
the inquiry into the causes of crimes has been the person of the of­
fender as against the background of social conditions, in general, and 
special situations leading to the emergence and formation of criminal 
psychology. Methods of crime prevention and a program of rehabili-
23 An illuminating account of the currents of ideas in the socialist world 
at the present time is to be found in Hazard, supra note 10, at 26 ff.; 
cf. also, Ehrlich, "Uwagi o praworzl!dnosci socjalistycznej, PiP 233-52 
(No. 8-9, 1958). Ehrlich asserts that it is necessary to take account 
of the continuity of political ideas and that socialist legality and political 
institutions must expand social and humanitarian values formulated in 
the earlier social formations. 
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tation were thus formulated with regard to the individual concerned, 
not with regard to social conditions as such.24 
The initial Soviet position, which motivated some of the basic 
ideas of the Soviet criminal code, stemmed from the general inclina­
tion to regard social conditions as the prime object of legal regula­
tion. Pashukanis, who contributed largely to the "ideology" of the 
criminal legislation of his time, saw the axis of the reform movement 
in Soviet society in the departure from the contractual principle in 
criminal law. This, in his opinion, permeated the institutions of 
criminal law in the West. It was expressed, according to Pashukanis, 
in the fact that the offender knew "the amount of freedom which 
he pays as a result of the court arrangement." Instead, he suggested 
that the penalty be converted into a measure of expediency for safe­
guarding society and correcting a socially dangerous personality. 
Thus, socialist law needed no definitions of crimes, nor did the 
measure of social protection administered by the courts need strict 
and precise formulation, because that would again restore the con­
tractual principle in criminal law. And so, criminal legal science was 
also unnecessary. 25 
Although Soviet criminal codes, as they emerged after a num­
ber of amendments, have failed to incorporate the basic ideas of 
the ideologists of the Soviet legal order, they certainly evidence little 
attention on the achievements of criminological thought in the West. 
As a result, they were inferior products in terms of legislative tech­
niques. The RSFSR Code of 1926, which finally has assumed the 
position as model of criminal legislation for the Soviet Union, failed 
to provide a basis for an orderly administration of justice in the 
Soviet society. Constantly amended by inexpertly prepared insertions, 
the Code quickly became a shapeless mass of penal provisions, lack­
ing a central idea and even a formal order. It has also failed as an 
expression of a theoretical formUlation. 
Responsibility for this state of affairs is divided. On one hand, 
24 Grzybowski, "Criminal Law of France,'' in Essays on French Law, 47ft. 
(1958) .  
25  Pashukanis, "The General Theory of Law and Marxism,'' in Soviet Legal 
Theory, 221-25 (1951);  see supra at 46 in regard to the views of 
Krylenko and Kurskii;  cf. Starosolskyj, The Principle of Analogy in 
Criminal Law: An Aspect of Soviet Legal Thinking (1954).  
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Soviet jurists who experimented with lawmaking were not profes­
sionally prepared to draft a new code. Their successors, who added 
to the Code's provisions, had little concern for the central ideas of 
the Code or even its terminology. The general climate of the legisla­
tive work was initially characterized by lack of experience, a lack 
of concern and patience with technical aspects of the lawmaking, 
and an inclination, even among the leading jurists of the new elite, 
to look at things from the political rather than legal point of view. 
The central piece in the 1926 Criminal Code of the RSFSR was 
the analogy clause (Article 16), which permitted the imposition of 
criminal liability for a socially dangerous act not expressly proscribed 
by a criminal statute. Criminal liability was imposed under that 
article of the Criminal Code which most nearly approximated such 
an act.26 
This provision was in direct opposition to the principle, "nullum 
crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege," which since the French 
Revolution has been the fundamental rule of modem criminal law. 
Its juristic implications were perhaps most expertly formulated by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of certain 
Danzig decrees, which provided for the prosecution of acts "deserv­
ing of penalty according to the fundamental conceptions of penal 
law and sound popular" feeling, which was a Nazi formula for the 
Soviet revival of analogy in criminal law. The Court stated: 
A judge's belief as to what was the intention which underlay a law is 
essentially a matter of individual appreciation of the facts; so is his opin­
ion as to what is condemned by popular feeling. Instead of applying 
a penal law equally clear to both the judge and the party accused, as 
was the case under the criminal law previously in force in Danzig, there 
is a possibility under the new decrees that a man may find himself 
placed on trial and punished for an act which the law did not enable 
him to know was an offense, because its criminality depends entirely 
upon the appreciation of the situation by the public prosecutor and the 
judge. Accordingly, a system in which the criminal character of an act 
and the penalty attached to it will be known to the judge alone, replaces 
a system in which this knowledge was equally open to both the judge 
and the accused.27 
26 C/. Starosolskyj , supra note 25. 
27 The Permanent Court of International Justice, Ser. A/B, No. 65, 53. 
Cf. sec. 2 of the German Criminal Code as amended on June 28, 1935. 
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While the analogy provision was not the only cause of the harsh 
practices of Soviet courts, it was symbolic of the general attitude of 
the Soviet and satellite courts to the problems of law enforcement. 
The RSFSR Code of 1926 was imitated in detail by the other Soviet 
republics, and, after Soviet influence spread in Eastern Europe, also 
in a number of Eastern European countries, where analogy clauses 
and other features of the Soviet criminal law made their appearance 
in socialist legislation. 28 
The Soviet criminal code and its analogy clause has had a 
devastating effect on the level of legal practice and on law enforce­
ment wherever Soviet institutions have made their appearance. This 
was due to the fact that the Soviet architects of the new legal con­
cepts were guilty of a basic miscalculation in constructing a legal sys­
tem of ill-fitting parts, borrowed from foreign political and legal doc­
trines with little discrimination as to their origin or understanding of 
their real functions. 
The idea that courts ought to have great powers in meting out 
punishment was not a Soviet innovation. It was and still is current in 
legal thinking in the West, and is motivated by the need of the strict 
adjustment of punishment to the circumstances of each individual 
case and the personality of the offender. According to the founders 
of the sociological school of criminal law, vast judicial powers postu­
lated high expertise on the bench. Professional judges, well trained 
in law and in the basic techniques of criminal policy and assisted by 
the auxiliary services of modem penology, were authorized to apply 
judicial pardon or extraordinary reduction even below the minimum 
statutory limit. The central purpose of the vast judicial powers was 
to make law enforcement humane by eliminating the element of 
vengeance. Soviet criminologists have extended judicial powers even 
further and have entrusted them to a bench of laymen. By insisting 
on the objective criteria of crime, they have rendered the adjustment 
of penalties according to the degree of guilt impossible.29 
28 Cf. Grzybowski, "From Contract to Status, Some Aspects of the Re­
ception of Soviet Law in Eastern Europe," 2 Seminar 60ff. ( 1953) .  
2 9  Pound, "Individualization of Justice," 7 Fordham Law Rev. 153 (1938);  
Hall, "Nulla Poena sine Lege," 47 Yale Law J. 165-93 (1937) ;  Solnar, 
"Maintien ou abandon de Ia regie nulla poena sine lege," 17 Revue de 
droit penal et de criminologie 744-50 ( 1937) ;  Donnedieu de Vabres, 
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The death of Stalin made the reform of criminal law feasible; 
and in December 1958, fourteen laws were adopted which instituted 
a new trend in the criminal legislation of the Soviet Union.80 
The new laws fell into three categories. First, there were three 
statutes containing the basic principles of criminal law, the organiza­
tion of courts, and judicial procedure in criminal matters. These 
statutes required additional legislative action by the constituent re­
publics. The second group consisted of those statutes which came 
into force directly and uniformly throughout the Union without any 
additional action by the individual republics. Two principal statutes 
constituted this category-one pertaining to crimes against the state 
and another concerning military crimes. A statute abolishing the pun­
ishment of deprivation of electoral rights and another on changes 
in the election of the people's courts-which was connected with the 
new basic principles of the organization of courts-belonged to the 
same category. Another law which went into effect immediately was 
the Statute on Military Courts. The final category was made up of 
six statutes containing formal and transitory provisions for the in­
terim period before the new regime in the Soviet administration of 
justice was fully established. 
Some of the enactments of December 1958 constituted basic re­
forms affecting due process of law. Others, though less fundamental 
in scope and significance, were nevertheless of great practical im­
portance. In the first category of reforms, the issue of punishment 
La crise moderne du droit penal, Ia politique criminelle des etats autori­
taires 156 (1938) .  The only exception in the general adoption of the 
principle of the nonretroactivity of penal laws, except when more 
lenient than the law under which an offense was committed, represents 
the legislation of the Nordic countries. Danish criminal codes of 1866 
and 1930, contrary to the general European practice, have stated the 
principle of the analogous application of the criminal. statute to crimes 
not defined in the written law. Art. 1 of the Code of 1930 rules that: 
"only acts punishable under a statute or acts of entirely similar nature 
shall be punished . . � ." In fact, however, legal science has limited the 
application of the analogy clause thus formulated to situations in which 
western European courts also resort to the analogy technique. Cf. 
Hurvitz, "L'analogie dans le droit danois," Revue de science criminelle 
et de droit penal compare (n.s.) 1-5 ( 1950) .  
30 For details see Grzybowski, "Soviet Criminal Law Reform of 1958," 3 5  
Ind. L.J. 125-28 (1960).  
188 Soviet Legal Institutions 
by analogy was central to the whole range of questions involving 
the nature of judicial process in the Soviet Union. Its significance, 
involving basic attitudes toward the function and role of the state 
in relation to the individual, clearly exceeded the somewhat narrow 
limits of criminal law and judicial procedure. 81 Article 3 of the 
1958 Basic Principles of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the 
Constituent Republics signified the victory of the traditionalist tend­
ency. It stated that "only persons guilty of committing a crime, that 
is those who intentionally or by negligence have committed a socially 
dangerous act specified by the criminal statute, shall be held re­
sponsible and shall incur punishment." 
Modem criminal law is based on the proposition that the pur­
pose of punishment is primarily to correct and only in exceptional 
cases to eliminate. As a consequence, liability to punishment, as 
well as its type and severity, are related to the form and nature 
of subjective guilt which modem criminologists consider the surest 
guide to the personality of the offender. Absolute liability (objective 
criteria of responsibility) is little known to European criminal law. 
The commission of a punishable act requires either intent (dolus 
in its various forms, directus, indirectus, eventualis, preterintentional) 
or negligence (culpa). As a rule, a punishable act must be committed 
intentionally. If the offender is guilty of negligence he is liable to 
punishment if the law expressly provides for it. 82 
As legislative techniques developed, types of guilt were related 
to the classification of offenses. Crimes and misdemeanors as a rule 
require intent. In expressly provided circumstances, a misdemeanor 
may be committed through negligence, while petty offenses (police 
31 Cf. supra at 1 85-86. 
32 Art. 19 of the Danish Criminal Code stated: "As regards the offenses 
dealt with in this act, acts which have been. committed through negli­
gence on the part of the perpetrator shall not be punished except when 
expressly provided for . . .  " The Norwegian Criminal Code of 1902 
stated the same principle in a somewhat different manner (art. 40) : 
"Whoever acts without malicious forethought is not subject to punitive 
provisions of the present statute, unless it is expressly provided for, or 
undoubtedly results that the omission is punishable. " Italian pre-Fascist 
code also stated (art. 45) that a person is not subject to punishment 
if he did not intend (non abbia voluto) the result which constitutes a 
criminal act, unless the law provides otherwise. 
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transgressions) are liable to punishment without regard for the type 
of guilt (absolute responsibility), except when the law rules other­
wise. A full statement of the various forms of guilt seems to have 
been included for the first time in the Russian Code of 1903, and its 
classification has become almost a rule in modem codes. 88 The 
Yugoslav (1927) and Polish (1932) Codes have repeated it almost 
without change. 84 
Even these fairly detailed provisions have not satisfied European 
scholars, and one may note efforts at a closer definition of the condi­
tions under which the law should punish crimes committed by negli­
gence. The Swiss Code of 1937 (Article 18 ) rules that an offense 
committed by negligence is punishable only when the 
... perpetrator, out of carelessness contrary to his duties, has not fore­
seen or taken into account the consequences of his behavior. Carelessness 
is contrary to duty when the perpetrator has not exercised caution to 
which he is obligated either by the circumstances or his personal situa­
tion. 
The Greek Criminal Code of 1952, which included in its pro­
visions a short theoretical treatise dealing with various aspects of 
guilt and forms of criminal acts, introduced a small addition to the 
generally accepted limitation of criminal responsibility for acts con­
sidered punishable but committed without direct intent. Article 15 
of this Code states: 
33 Art. 48 of the Russian Code of 1903 ruled that an offense should be 
considered intentional not only when the offender desired its commis­
sion but also when he was aware of the possibility of the result, which 
constitutes the criminal nature of the act. An offense is committed by 
negligence not only when the offender failed to foresee it, although he 
could or should have foreseen it, but also when, having foreseen the pos­
sibility of the result, he lightmindedly supposed that he could prevent its 
occurrence. 
34 Provisions of the Italian Code of 1930 (art. 42) represent another type 
of formulation of the same set of ideas: "No one may be punished for 
an act of omission, or omission deemed by the law to be an offense, 
unless he has committed it with criminal intent, except in cases of 
crimes of transferred intent or crimes without criminal intent which 
are expressly contemplated by the law. The law determines the cases 
for which an agent is otherwise accountable as a consequence of his act 
of commission or omission. In regard to contravention, each person is 
answerable for his knowing and willful act or omission, whether it be 
with or without intent." 
190 Soviet Legal Institutions 
When the law requires that a specific consequence should occur as an 
element of a criminal act, the non-prevention of that consequence shall 
stand for causation only when the offender was under special duty to pre­
vent that consequence.s5 
The general meaning of the provisions of modem criminal codes 
concerning types of guilt in their relation to the classification of of­
fenses and the type of punishment is that while guilt by negligence 
extends the scope of responsibility regarding the type of criminal 
act, at the same time it restricts the class of persons criminally re­
sponsible for a negligent act or omission (special duties, violations 
of orders, etc.) and reduces the severity of punishment. 86 
The reform of 1958 has failed to change Soviet criminal law 
as to the determination of criminal responsibility according to the 
degree of guilt. The new law defines as criminal any socially dan­
gerous acts (of commission or omission) directed against the Soviet 
social and political order, the economic system, etc., if so specified 
by the statute.87 In addition, it defines criminal intent and negligence 
in much the same manner as the Russian Code of 1903, but fails 
to repeat the latter's general reservation that unless otherwise ex­
pressly provided for by a criminal statute, a prohibited act is pun­
ishable only when committed with intent.88 Contrary to modem 
practice, the Soviet statute lumps all punishable acts into a single 
category of socially dangerous acts. Although on occasion a distinc­
tion is made between more dangerous and less important crimes, a 
systematic grouping of offenses into classes according to their serious­
ness is avoided. In this manner, it is left to the judge to distinguish 
between intent and negligence; and unless expressly provided in each 
35 As to the position of Ferri on the question of responsibility for inten­
tional or nonintentional crimes, cf. 3 1  La Scuola Positiva 20-21, 135 
(192 1 ) ;  cf. Cuban Code of  Social Defense, arts. 18-20. 
3 6  E.g., ch. XXXIII of the Polish Code of 1932 on crimes causing public 
danger. According to the provisions of the Code of 1932, intentional 
crimes are punishable by imprisonment from 6 months to 15 years, 
while negligent commission of such crimes calls, as a rule, only for 
detention (from one week to one year) or a fine. 
37 Basic Principles of Criminal Legislation of the Soviet Union and of the 
Union Republics, art. 7 (1958). 
38 ld. arts. 8 and 9. 
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definition, the court has to give similar weight to intent and negli­
gence. 
Lack of differentiation between negligent and intentional offenses 
permits the measurement of punishment according to the objective 
criteria of social danger involved and not according to the personal 
relationship of the offender to the prohibited act. That this is to re­
main a feature of criminal legislation of the Soviet state in the future 
is already apparent from the two federal statutes on antistate and mili­
tary crimes. Regarding crimes which by their nature may be com­
mitted only intentionally, these statutes contain statements making 
intent a constitutive element of the crime definition. Sometimes the 
definitions of intent are somewhat vague, and give little concrete in­
struction for the court to go by ("weakening the state," "undermin­
ing . . .  a branch of economy") .  Thus, an unusually wide latitude of 
interpretation of the true purpose of the crime defined in the statute 
is permitted. In other cases, however, the statute fails to make clear 
the nature of guilt which renders an offender punishable.89 But in 
addition to those two groups, a considerable number of crime defini­
tions are couched in terms which make it clear that a serious penalty 
is threatened for the commission of an act which may be the result 
of either intent or negligence.40 Both the statute on antistate crimes 
and that on military crimes list a large number of offenses of this 
type. After a list of crimes, which either by their nature or by direct 
statement must be committed with intent, the statute on military 
crimes lists a large group of offe�ses which, although threatened 
with serious punishment, may also be committed by negligence. The 
mere loss of secret documents is punished by imprisonment for from 
two to five years. Article 24 of the same statute provides a stiff 
sentence of from six months to ten years for a careless attitude to­
ward service duties, a vague and all-embracing statement permitting 
a criminal prosecution for any dereliction of duty. The two statutes 
still leave many questions unanswered; but there is little hope that 
39  E.g., Soviet Statue on Crimes against the State, art. 8 (propaganda of 
war). 
40 Jd. art. 13 (loss of documents) ,  art. 21 (violation of rules of interna­
tional flights) ,  art. 22 (violation of rules of safety of traffic and ex­
ploitation of transport ) .  
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in other parts of the criminal codes, which still await enactment by 
the republican legislatures, a new approach to the question of guilt 
may be expected. 
The attitude of the Code of 1926 is quite orthodox in regard 
to crimes which are traditional and specially connected with crimes 
against the life, health, freedom, and honor of a person or against 
private property. A distinction between intentional and unintentional 
crimes is clearly made in the definitions and is properly reflected in 
penal sanctions.41 The type of guilt is not specified when only in­
tentional crime is possible. 42 Furthermore, there is no reference to 
criminal liability for negligence when failure to take action is criminal 
owing to specific obligations and duties resulting from the offender's 
qualifications or position. In such a case, a modem code would 
make it clear that negligence is punishable.48 
In defining crimes which constitute an attack on the new order, 
there is either no reference to the type of guilt, or it is described in 
different terms from those used in the general part. Article 5814 on 
sabotage speaks of conscious nonexecution or intentionally careless 
execution of duties. Sometimes no clear distinction is made between 
an intentional and negligent act, u which is also the case with respect 
to crimes particularly dangerous to the governmental order. 411 Some­
times a reference to negligence signifies that all forms of prohibited 
activity or inactivity from which damage results are punishable ir­
respective of the type of guilt. 46 The obliteration of the dividing line 
between intent and negligence is particularly striking in the definitions 
of economic crimes . 
. Additional light is thrown on Soviet legislative solutions of 
the question of negligent and intentional crimes by the extent to 
which this technique was followed by satellite criminal legislation 
41 Arts. 138 and 139 (murder and negligent homicide); arts. 142-47 (in­
tentional and negligent bodily harm). 
42 Art. 1 62 (larceny). 
43 Art. 176 (a captain's failure to give assistance to a ship involved in a 
collision with his own ship, if such assistance could be rendered with· 
out serious danger to his own ship, crew, or passengers). 
44 RSFSR Criminal Code of 1 926, art. 58'. 
45 Id. art. 59" (violation of rules of international aviation) .  
4 6  Id. art. 741• 
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in Eastern Europe. Of five criminal codes enacted there since 1945, 
two-the Hungarian Code of 1950 and the Albanian Code of 1952-
have adopted, in one form or another, the Soviet formulation of 
intent and negligence. The Hungarian Code differs from its Soviet 
model, stating plainly in Article 1 1  that "crimes committed by negli­
gence shall be punished except when the law declares that only an 
act intentionally committed shall be punished." The statement of the 
Minister of Justice, submitted with the bill to the parliament, ex­
plained that: 
[11he law declares that as a general rule crimes committed by negligence 
are punishable, except when the law states that only an act intentionally 
committed shall be punished. This represents a more satisfactory de­
fense of the society, because the social danger of negligence is frequently 
equal to that of intent, and sometimes even surpasses it. 
Other satellite codes, however-the Bulgarian Code of 195 1, 
the Czechoslovak Code of 1950, and the Yugoslav Code of 195 1-
state that crimes committed by negligence are punishable only when 
so provided by law. 
The Soviet approach to the question of guilt falls far short of 
the general European standards which, before the revolution, pro­
vided a model for the reform of Russian law. It denotes a total lack 
of concern with the personality of the offender as a factor in deter­
mining the nature and severity of punishment, and turns the ad­
ministration of justice in penal matters into blind retribution. 47 
On the other hand, the reform bears eloquent witness to the 
effort to make Soviet criminal law more humane. Under the old 
rule, juveniles were equally responsible with adults after reaching 
the age of fourteen. In a number of limited, most serious crimes, the 
age of responsibility had been lowered to twelve years, with no re­
striction to the kinds and types of penalty applied, including the 
death penalty. Under the 1958 General Principles of Criminal Legis­
lation, minors under fourteen are not liable to criminal prosecution. 
Those over fourteen arid not more than sixteen are criminally liable 
only for the most serious offenses, such as murder, rape, serious 
bodily harm, etc. Between sixteen and eighteen they are criminally 
47 Basic Principles of Criminal Legislation of the Soviet Union and Union 
Republics, art. 10. 
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liable as adults, with the limitation that if the youthful offender can 
be reformed without the imposition of penalty the court may so re­
frain. However, if the offense represents a great social danger, the 
court must apply coercive educational measures. What these measures 
shall be is left to the legislation of the individual republics. 
The new regulations on the treatment of juveniles thus represent 
a considerable improvement, although they are far from models of 
moderation. The general tendency of modem codes is to substitute 
educational measures for punishment as a matter of principle and not 
as a matter of exception. Indeed, the provision is made that even 
after the age of full responsibility is reached, the court may apply 
judicial mercy or educational measures.48 
The system of penalties provided in the 1926 Code was ex­
tremely complicated. In 1958 the number of penalties was reduced 
from eighteen to eight, retaining, however, the most important and 
traditional punishment in Russia, exile and expulsion. The maximum 
prison sentence has been reduced from fifteen to ten years; and in 
cases where previously, under the Code of 1926, a maximum sentence 
of twenty-five years imprisonment could be imposed, the maximum 
is now fifteen years. The death penalty is now imposed only for 
treason, espionage, subversion, terroristic activities, banditry, and 
murder, and in time of war, for the most serious military crimes. 
In no case is the death penalty mandatory. It should be mentioned, 
however, that treason covers a number of activities, among which is 
the refusal to return from abroad, for which the death penalty seems 
excessive. 49 
. There are special provisions concerning the penalties for juve­
niles and pregnant women. The death penalty cannot be imposed on 
juveniles under eighteen or on women who are pregnant either at 
the time when the crime is committed or the sentence is rendered, 
and such sentence cannot be carried out on a pregnant woman. The 
48 In the Polish Code of 1932 and the Greek Code of 1952 the age of re­
sponsibility began at 17  years, and educational measures or judicial 
mercy to the youthful offender could be applied until he was 20 or 21 
years old respectively. 
49 Basic Principles of Criminal Legislation of the Soviet Union and of 
the Union Republics, arts. 21-22; Law on Crimes Against the State, 
art. I.  
Socialist Legality 195 
maximum prison sentence for a juvenile under eighteen is ten years. 
Juveniles serve their prison sentences in separate labor colonies. 
Exile and expulsion cannot be imposed upon juveniles under eighteen 
or upon pregnant women.60 
One of the disappointments of the reform is the preservation of 
the penalty of the general confiscation of property. In the Principles 
of 1958, this appears as an additional penalty for the most serious 
crimes against the state or crimes committed for mercenary motives. 
A leading Soviet jurist, in an article which appeared in this country, 
has confidently forecast its repeal.61 Obviously this part of the re­
form failed because of the last-minute tug of war in the drafting 
committee. There is no record of the discussions of the committee, 
however, which makes it difficult to establish the reason for the re­
tention of this penalty in the arsenal of repressive measures. The 
confiscation of an offender's entire property was introduced as a 
typical measure to combat counter-revolutionary activities, and its 
presence suggests that however optimistic the official image of the 
ideological unity of Soviet society may be, it still needs bolstering 
up by exceptional measures. The Principles of 1958 continue a prac­
tice which the French bourgeoisie hoped to consign to the unreturna­
ble past in the Declaration de droits de l'homme et du citoyen. To­
gether with expulsion, exile, and long term imprisonment, the gen­
eral confiscation of property constitutes a measure which is testimony 
to the pessimistic attitude of the penal policies in socialist society 
and suggests sui generis elements of civil death. 
In contrast, the abolition of the penalty of deprivation of the 
right to vote strikes a somewhat bizarre note; One would suppose 
that in a socialist society which, according to the official line, is the 
first in history to realize the complete equality of citizens, the exercise 
of political rights would be one of the most cherished privileges, 
fully deserved by only the most loyal citizens. Obviously this is not 
so, if the deprivation of such right has no deterrent value.62 
50 Basic Principles of Criminal Legislation of the Soviet Union and of 
the Union Republics, arts. 22-23. 
51 Karev, "The Forthcoming Reform of USSR Criminal Law," Harv. L. 
Record (May 1 ,  1958). 
52 Polianski, Izvestia, Dec. 27, 1958. 
196 Soviet Legal Institutions 
At the foundation of the provisions guaranteeing a fair trial 
stands the conviction that, in the system of the separation of powers 
or of checks and balances, the courts constitute the branch of gov­
ernment specially designed to protect the rights of the individual. 
Under the Soviet rule of unity of powers, citizens are said to need 
no special protection against the agencies of the people's government. 
In theory administrative authorities of a socialist country have no 
policy but that determined by the well-understood interests of the 
people. However, this assumption bas not worked with the perfection 
expected, and Soviet legislators have felt obliged to proclaim anew 
the principle of judicial monopoly in imposing serious penalties. 
Article 4 of the General Principles of Procedure in Criminal Matters 
formally states that no person shall be put in the position of a defend­
ant otherwise than in virtue of, and in a manner prescribed by, the 
law. Article 7 of the same law states that the "administration of jus­
tice in criminal matters belongs exclusively to the court. Nobody may 
be declared guilty of committing a crime and be subjected to penalty 
except by court sentence�" The same principle is restated in the Gen­
eral Principles of Criminal Legislation, which asserts in Article 3 that 
criminal punishment may be imposed only by a court sentence. 
Legislative formulas adopted in the December 1958 laws, re­
stricting the exercise of judicial power exclusively to the proper courts 
of justice, were seriously affected and put in doubt by the policy of 
transferring some of the governmental responsibilities and public 
functions into the administration of social organizations.53 But by 
no means is this the only instance of administrative trespass into 
judicial functions which survived the reform of 1958. 
The Principles of Judicial Procedure in Criminal Matters of 
1958 have re-established the traditional terminology indicating the 
difference between a police and formal investigation, the latter being 
obligatory in trials of more important crimes (crimes against the 
state and military crimes) . Iri modem European criminal procedures 
such investigations are controlled, after the French pattern, by the 
court and are conducted by a judicial officer who enjoys all the 
privileges and bas the status of an independent judge. The strict 
connection between formal investigation and the disposal of a case 
53 General Principles of Criminal Procedure, art. 15 (1958). 
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is indicated by the fact that Soviet legislators have included herein 
the law on judicial procedure. But while judicial control of an in­
vestigation assures all the guarantees of a fair trial, the element of 
judicial guarantees is lacking in the Soviet procedure. Here the real 
difierence between police investigations and formal investigative 
proceedings is that the latter are conducted by the more experienced 
agents of the security police or the public prosecutor. 
The principle that pretrial investigations are controlled by 
the public prosecutor has also been uniformly adopted by the so­
cialist states in Eastern Europe, although actual solutions in imple­
menting the principle of procuratorial control differ from country 
to country. In some of the satellites, courts have been given a role 
in controlling the legality of the proceedings in regard to certain 
specific points, such as the legality of temporary arrest. In this re­
spect, the Yugoslav Code of Criminal Procedure is of singular in­
terest. The first Code of Criminal Procedure enacted in 1948 was 
an imitation of the Soviet pattern. After experimenting for five years 
with this type of judicial procedure, the Yugoslav Code of 1953 
vindicated the validity of some fundamental principles of law for 
all social orders. As it was originally enacted, the Code of 1953 
was a combination of two approaches. The distribution of jurisdiction 
was conceived, according to the general interests of the administra­
tion of justice, not only to expedite the investigation of crimes, but 
also to preserve certain fields of criminal investigation exclusively 
for the jurisdiction of the public prosecutor and the administrative 
authorities, especially the investigators of the Ministry of the In­
terior. In this category of proceedings, the public prosecutor con­
trolled the informal investigations and could address himself variously 
to the county court, to the investigating judge, to the district court, 
or to the police, with a request to investigate a case or a phase of 
it or to perform a function in the proceedings (Article 141 ) .  The 
Law of December 26, 1959, abolished this dichotomy by giving the 
investigating judge of the district court the overriding authority to 
assume, at any time, the conduct of any pretrial investigation (Article 
161), thus restoring the principle of the full judicial character of 
the pretrial proceedings. 
There are areas where the Procedural Principles of 1958 con-
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stitute a definite improvement over those of the Code of 1923. Article 
14 introduced an important innovation by incorporating into Soviet 
criminal procedure the Roman law principle "ei incubat probatio qui 
ait non qui negat." Thus, the Article stated that "neither the court, 
the prosecutor, nor the investigating agent has the right to impose 
the duty of furnishing proof on the defendant." In this connection, 
two other issues are important: the presumption of innocence and 
the status of the defendant. 
The presumption of innocence is dealt with in Article 43, which 
states : 
A conviction cannot be based on suppositions, and may be decreed only 
when in the course of trial the guilt of the accused in committing the 
crime has been proved. 
In regard to the second issue, the Principles of 1958 are less clear. 
In one place, they put the depositions of the defendant in the same 
category as those of a witness or of an expert, calling them testi­
mony (pokazania). In another, the procedural principles state that 
the defendant has the right, but not the duty, to give explanations in. 
connection with the charges against him. This suggests that the de­
fendant may either participate actively in the proceedings or remain 
passive, and that his position differs from that of a witness. 114 
The rights of the defendant circumscribe the powers of the 
court and the prosecution, and their exercise is subject to definite 
rules which, in the final analysis, constitute the essence of legality. 
Soviet criminal procedure still falls short of generally accepted stand­
ards in this respect, although in the 1958 reform, a definite attempt 
was . made to bring Soviet procedure in criminal matters closer to 
the established practice. This is especially evident in appeal pro­
ceedings. Contrary to the Code of 1923, the Principles of 1958 limit 
the right of the higher court to impose stiffer sentence only when 
the appeal is lodged by the prosecution or by the injured party. At 
the same time, the higher court always bas the right to go beyond 
the appeal if, in reviewing the case, it comes to the conclusion that 
a milder sentence would be more appropriate.CIG 
Generally speaking, the reform has produced more cohesion 
54 ld. art. 21. 
SS Id. arts. 44-45. 
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between the various parts of the Soviet legal system and in the 
machinery of criminal justice. In addition, it has removed some of 
the inherent contradictions by reinstating a number of the principles 
which are basic for any system of justice. It has also corrected some 
of the misconceptions and plain mistakes born of the endeavor to 
produce a socialist order equipped with institutions differing funda­
mentally from those of free societies. Thus, the humane aspects of 
the new provisions are not to be overlooked, although there is perhaps 
a greater distance between practice and the legal rule in the Soviet 
Union than in any other public order. 
However, some of the most important aspects of the Soviet penal 
policy have not been affected by the reform. The General Principles 
of 1958 provide no machinery for permitting the individualization of 
criminal cases in order to make proper use of the large punitive powers 
with which the law has equipped the Soviet courts. The most im­
portant element in the determination of criminal responsibility, the 
element of guilt, has remained blurred, and there is no direct con­
nection between the degree of guilt and the penalty. Elsewhere, mod­
em legislators have employed great ingenuity in order to assure as 
full and purposeful a realization of criminal policy as possible. This 
example has not been followed in Soviet law which still contains little 
more than high-sounding slogans having no coverage in the detailed 
provisions of the law. 
The same conservatism prevailed in regard to the principal fea­
tures of the administration of justice. It is still dominated by the 
person of the government attorney, who combines in his office the 
role of prosecutor of crimes and guardian of legality with the duty 
to enforce government policies and to protect the law. The prose­
cutor appears in the dual role of party before the court and supervisor 
of court practice. Furthermore, the government attorney represents 
the only element in the complicated machinery of the administration 
of justice in which the principle of professional proficiency has re­
ceived consistent recognition. 
Two aspects of the reform are particularly disappointing. In the 
first place, the conduct of pretrial investigations is left in the hands of 
the public prosecutor and police authorities. 56 This conservatism is 
56 Id. arts. 28-35. 
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the more surprising in that there is a definite tendency in other social­
ist countries of Eastern Europe to return the conduct of pretrial in­
vestigations, which are obligatory in all the more important crimes, 
to judicial officers. These officers act as judges and are subordinate 
exclusively to the court, before whom a government attorney has only 
the position of a party. The other disappointing feature is that little 
has been done to improve the professional qualifications and the 
performance of Soviet courts. No requirement of legal education or 
practice, which would have extended the principle of professionalism 
into the administration of justice, has been established. The serious · 
effect of the absence of trained personnel in the administration of 
justice is apparent from the low level of judicial work in the Soviet 
Union.117 
As early as 1927, Ferri, the founder of the Italian Positive School 
of Criminal Law, having come into immediate contact with the Soviet 
Criminal Code, complained about the verbosity and propagandistic 
passages in the Soviet statutes. Theoretical or political expositions 
are not needed in a well-written law. The same is also characteristic 
of the 1958 judicial statutes. Faced with untrained judges who have 
never been exposed to organized instruction in law, the Soviet legis­
lator feels compelled to lecture on the rudiments of the theory of 
criminal law. The low level of legal preparation prevailing in the 
Soviet Union makes it doubtful whether the use of modem legislative 
techniques is at all possible and practicable. The modem tendency 
toward simple phraseology and succinct definitions is based on the 
assumption that the bench, the prosecution, and the defense consist 
of highly trained jurists, familiar with the theory of modem criminal 
law ·and fully conversant with the va.rious penological theories. In 
countries with modem codes, judges must first refer the definitions 
of individual crimes to the provisions of the General Part which de­
termine the principles and purpose of the punishment of crimes, and 
secondly to legal theories learned from their professors which con­
stitute the ultimate terms of reference in order to fill a gap or clarify 
a doubtful point. 
57 For a comprehensive treatment see Gsovski & Grzybowski, Govern­
ment, Laws and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ch. 
lS ( 1959). 
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STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL POLICY 
Reform in Soviet criminal law has taken place in two areas. On 
the one hand, Soviet lawyers, in drafting Soviet statutes, introduced 
basic concepts of orderly and purposeful criminal policy. On the other 
hand, they found it necessary to clear the ground of fundamental 
misconceptions which were largely responsible for the harshness and 
low level of Soviet criminal justice in practice. As a leading Soviet 
jurist noticed at the moment when the new Soviet criminal statutes 
were being debated, one of the Stalinist cliches which had influenced 
the tenor of judicial action was demolished. The idea that the more 
socialist society moved toward communism, the harsher would be the 
forms of criminal repression against the offenders of the rules of 
socialist law was no longer recognized as valid. The other notion 
was based on the conviction that all crime constituted a remnant of the 
capitalist order, and that as socialist construction made progress, 
crime became more and more rare. Exceptional manifestations of 
criminality would then call for even stronger measures in order to 
hasten the arrival of the millennium. 
With the theory of the capitalist devil exploded, Soviet jurists 
were forced to abandon the sheltered theoretical position which 
absolved them from making researches into the real causes of crimes 
in socialist society. One leading jurist wrote with exasperation that 
Soviet legal science had done little to inquire into the causes of crime 
or into the effectiveness of the educational measures which the Soviet 
State was employing. The mere fact that there was among criminal 
groups a large number of youthful criminals, who were the product 
of the new social order, put a question mark over the validity of all 
stereotyped explanations. 11s 
This call for objectivity and attention to those facts and cir­
cumstances important for the disposal of criminal cases was reflected 
in an appeal for what the public prosecutor of the Moscow region 
called the raising of the level of culture of the pretrial investigations. 
Such was thought to be an indispensable condition for the realization 
of the postulate that only those whose crimes which were proven 
should be subject to criminal repression : 
58 Romashkin, supra note 10, at 14-16. 
202 Soviet Legal Institutions 
Tendentiousness, lack of objectivity, prejudicial inclination to produce 
a criminal charge in the examination of criminal cases (obvinitelnyi 
uklon) lead to serious mistakes. When we talk of the prejudicial inclina­
tion to prove a criminal charge we have in mind such activities of the 
inquisitorial, procuratorial and judicial authorities which lead to un­
founded accusations or illegal imposition of harsher penalties. Some­
times this prejudicial tendency is revealed in cases involving innocent 
persons. liD 
The term culture has 
. many meanings in Soviet parlance. In 
our present connection, it seems to signify a civilized approach to the 
administration of justice together with a proper understanding of the 
purpose of the prosecution of crimes. It means due respect for human 
dignity, elimination of lynch-law attitudes, striving to set an example 
by punishing an accused only after proper examination of all the cir­
cumstances of the case, and endeavoring to discover whether there 
is a legal foundation for the charge. 
Soviet legal periodicals have begun to publish various instances 
of such attitudes. So, for instance, a young man was found guilty and 
sentenced to ten years of deprivation of freedom for taking without 
authorization a ride in an army truck. His act was found to be a 
crime of causing damage to government property (decree of Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet of July 4, 1947 ) ,  though there was no evi­
dence that the accused intended to dismantle the truck of its parts 
or that he planned or actually had damaged it in any manner.69 
In another case, a people's court in Uzbekistan sentenced a 
dining room · supeivisor for causing a shortage of goods which were 
said to constitute government property. Owing to the defendant's neg­
ligence, some of the fruit which was in her care was spoiled. The 
public prosecutor lodged a protest against the sentence, which had 
pronounced the defendant to be guilty of negligence without explain­
ing what this negligence consisted of. Obviously, the Soviet court 
confused two ideas, one of negligence in the usual sense of the word, 
as a case of spoilage of fruit, and the other as denoting a state of 
mind, which caused criminal action or omission punishable in law.6t 
Frequently, harsh justice is the result of the poor professional 
59 Urakov, "Povisyt kulturu sledstva," Sots. zak. 12-16 (No. 7, 1960) .  
60 Sots. zak. 86-87 (No. 2, 1960).  
61  ld. 89-90 (No. 7,  1960). 
Socialist Legality 203 
preparation of Soviet judges, sometimes even on the bench of appeal 
instances, and their consequent inability to relate the facts of the 
case to the provisions of the law or the doctrines of legal concepts. 
Ideas and institutions, such as acting under emotional stress, self­
defense, and reduced criminal responsibility, have no concrete mean­
ing to Soviet judges who until quite recently worked in a regime which 
stressed prompt and formal crime repression calling for little refine­
ment in judicial action.o2 
Another area where the mechanical enforcement of the criminal 
statute has wide currency is that of prohibitions of certain trades and 
industries. In this regard, courts frequently dispose of cases without 
a proper examination of all the circumstances of the case, of the 
nature of criminal offenses as defined in the law, and of the purposes 
of criminal policy. Sometimes, high prison sentences are imposed for 
making articles for sale permitted by the law or from raw materials 
available on the open market. On occasion, criminal repression has 
struck at persons for whom sewing and producing items of clothing, 
underwear, etc., was the only possible means and source of support. 
In one case, a widow with three young children was sentenced to 
prison for making infants' clothing. Prison sentences have been im­
posed for making articles which are a legitimate object of private 
industry or for using small amounts of certain metals which cannot 
be used in private production. At the same time, certain consumer 
articles made of those metals (nails) are available on the market. 
A Soviet jurist has vigorously criticized these provisions, stating that 
they lead to an obvious misinterpretation of the law and, in most in­
stances, deserve no place in the statute book.63 Confronted with cases 
of this nature, the appeals of Polish lawyers striving for the humaniza­
tion of the socialist law become both urgent and realistic. 64 
While these various matters, which contribute vitally to the 
tone and climate of the life of the law in the Soviet Union, deal with 
peripheral issues of the Soviet penal provisions, Soviet lawyers have 
attempted some basic reconstruction of juristic concepts. After the 
62 Cf. procuratorial protests in Sots. zak. 79-80 (No. 12, 1960).  
63 Kozak, "Otvestvennost za zaniatie zapreshchonymi promyslami," Sots. zak. 
36-38 (No. 3, 1958). 
64 Hazard, supra note 10, at 26 ff. 
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analogy clause was removed, another central institution which highly 
colors Soviet practice of criminal law, i.e., the institution of social 
danger, came under consideration. Appearing in the Soviet Codes 
and also in the 1958 statutes, it persists as a constitutive element of 
crime definition. e11 
Article 7 of the General Principles of Criminal Law stated that: 
As a crime shall be considered, if it is so specified by a criminal statute, 
any social dangerous act (of commission or omission) attacking the 
Soviet social or political order; socialist system of economy, socialist 
property; persons; political, labor, property and other rights of citizens; 
as well as any other socially dangerous act attacking the socialist legal 
order, if so specified by a criminal statute. 
The doctrine of social . danger is one of the oldest concepts in 
criminal law. It formulates a basic reason for the prohibition of cer­
tain acts under the sanction of penalty, as each society protects those 
ideas, institutions, or assumptions which are fundamental in any legal 
order. Its role is to provide the reason for the legislative enactment 
of a legal prohibition of certain acts. The difference between the tra­
ditional law and the socialist legal concept begins at the moment when 
courts come into the general picture of law enforcement. In disposing 
of individual cases, courts are not primarily concerned with the aspect 
of social danger. Rather, they focus their attention upon the person­
ality of the offender and other specific circumstances of the case. 
A Soviet jurist has attacked the doctrine of social danger in con­
nection with recent plans for drawing in and engaging Soviet social 
organizations in the process of law enforcement and the struggle with 
criminal activity. He pointed out that the conviction that a criminal 
act inust produce a single type of reaction in the form of court punish­
ment has been replaced by a new approach. Now, the reaction of 
society to a criminal act may take any of the three forms. In the first 
place, the court may declare that a guilty person may be subject to 
educational measures which will engage social action as a chief meas­
ure of social defense. Secondly, in certain categories of offenses, the 
case itself may be transmitted to be dealt with by a social organization, 
which takes the place of the court. Thirdly, there is a possibility of 
65 Cf. supra at 185-86, 191  ff. 
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dealing with the case and of applying educational measures without 
formal sentence being passed either by the courts or social organiza­
tions. A multiplication of methods for disposing of criminal cases 
calls for a new approach to criminal activity and a careful study of 
the individuality of the offender. Such alone can provide a guide to 
the selection of the best method. 66 
Thus, after forty years of experimenting with criminal justice, 
Soviet jurists have discovered the importance of the teachings of the 
sociological school of criminal law, which has inspired the institutions 
of modem criminal law. 
Soviet jurists complain that in the Soviet Union itself little work 
has been done to provide the bar and the bench with a proper under­
standing of the issues involved. Again, the period of Stalinism seems 
to be responsible for the lag in this field. Prior to Stalin's supremacy, 
there were serious efforts to build up a theoretical basis for the 
criminal policy of the Soviet state. The official doctrine of law en­
forcement and of the nature of judicial decision left no room for legal 
refinement in Soviet courts. Courts were to be people's courts, guided 
by their feeling of what was right in a socialist order. They were to 
enforce a simple penal policy which distinguished between the enemies 
and supporters of the regime. Soviet jurists, more realistic than the 
architects of the Soviet legal order, have concentrated their attention 
on the study of the personality of the offender. Already in 1921 ,  an 
Institute for the Study of the Personality of the Offender was set up 
in Petrograd (Leningrad) .  Shortly afterwards, similar institutes were 
created in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Saratov, and Rostov-on-Don. In 
1925, Commissariats of Justice, Health,
· 
and Internal Affairs of the 
RSFSR acted jointly to create an Institute for the study of the causes 
of criminality and the personality of the offender in Moscow. In time, 
as Stalin's grip on the Soviet regime tightened, formal aspects of the 
criminal policy attracted attention. In 193 1 ,  the name of the institute 
was changed to the Institute for Criminal Policy and Correctional 
Labor, reflecting thus, in a truly classical Soviet manner, a new inter­
est of the regime--the collective aspects of social life. In due course, 
66 Utevskii, ''Voprosy ugolovnogo prava v projekte zakona," SGP 1 16-19 
(No. 1 ,  1960).  
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all the institutes and studies of the personality of the offender in the 
provinces were abolished.67 
The new policy had a profound influence on the state of legal 
science in the field of criminal law. Law books and treatises on crimi­
nal law of the Stalinist period reduced the problem of the personality 
of the offender exclusively to the formal aspects of guilt, accepting 
without demur the fact that, in most important crimes, absolute re­
sponsibility was being practiced.es 
Revived interest in the individual aspects of criminal responsi­
bility and attention to the personality of the offender were not purely 
academic quests. They were the natural consequences of the policy 
of Soviet authorities, which, since the decisions of the Twenty-first 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had called for 
a closer cooperation between society and the administration of justice. 
The Resolution of the Congress drew attention to the fact that greater 
emphasis should be placed upon the application of preventive and 
educational measures as a means of crime prevention, thus eliminating 
opportunities for formation of criminal individualities. 
In the implementation of the Resolution, the Supreme Court of 
the USSR and the Procurator General of the USSR each issued in 
July 1959 instructions to courts and subordinate personnel of the 
procuratura regarding judicial practice in imposing court sentences 
on offenders. Both indicated that in order to implement these di­
rectives of the Congress the policy of individualization in imposing 
sentences should be followed. The criminal policy of the Soviet stat­
utes, the instructions insisted, is based on the rule that all aspects of 
the case must be examined, including all mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances and the personality of the offender. This new policy 
is to provide a guide for differentiation ·between various cases. Further, 
it is directed to the discontinuance of the mechanical and automatic 
imposition of the penalty of deprivation of liberty for each criminal 
conviction, replacing it by social supervision and other educational 
and correctional measures. The purpose of criminal prosecution, both 
67 Utevskii, ''Novye formy i metody borby z prestupnostiu i lichnost 
prestupnika," Sots. zak. 14-18 (No. 2, 1960) ;  cf. Romashkin, supra 
note 10, at 14. 
68 Romashkin, supra note 10. 
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resolutions state, is to reform the individual and prevent criminal 
activity. In this connection, the usefulness of the actual carrying out 
of the sentence, or even of the act of sentencing, should be separately 
examined and gone into. Similarly, a system of conditional sentences 
and of paroling those who have partly served their sentences, deserve 
leniency, and have merited a conditional release from prison should 
be established. The question of the treatment and prevention of juve­
nile crime also came under special attention. In order to enforce a 
proper policy, it was thought social organizations should be brought 
into the process of the administration of justice. 
The instructions of the public prosecutor insist that this policy 
should be reflected, in particular, in pretrial investigations. Here all 
questions of expediency regarding various correctional, educational, 
and prophylactic measures should be probed and concrete steps sug­
gested in connection with the investigation of the case itself. This 
latter should always include an investigation of the personality of the 
offender. 
. 
Among others, the prosecuting and investigatory agencies were 
instructed-perhaps for the first time in the history of the Soviet 
administration of justice-to examine the expediency in each case 
of preliminary detention and to apply it only to cases where prelimi­
nary detention was absolutely indispensable in the interest of the ad­
ministration of justice. The instruction recommends that formal prose­
cution of offenses in courts should be limited to those cases where 
the social danger of the crimes committed is considerable. Otherwise, 
the question- whether the case should be disposed of through social 
organizations rather than by the courts should be gone into as early 
as possible.69 
These instructions and the response of Soviet jurists have intro­
duced a new dimension to Soviet administration of justice. One of the 
important tendencies which the instructions of the Supreme Court and 
69 Postanovlenie No. 3,  Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR, 19 lunia 1959 : 
"0 praktikie prymienienia sudami mier ugolovnogo nakazania," Sots. 
zak. 13-15 (No. 9, 1959) ;  "Prikaz Generalnogo Prokurora SSSR," No. 
43, 20 Jula, 1959, "0 praktikie organov prokuratury po privle­
cheniu k ugolovnoi otvietstvennosti i o usushchestvleniu nadzora za 
pravilnym prymienieniem mier ugolovnogo nakazania," Sots. zak. 16-19 
(No. 9, 1959) .  
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of the Prosecutor General demonstrate is the attempt to introduce 
some of the atmosphere of judicial procedure into pretrial investiga­
tion. This, of course, is an indispensable condition for the realization 
of the new postulates in the administration of criminal justice. Hence, 
the insistence on the impartiality of the investigating authorities, on 
the clarification of all circumstances which would support not only 
the accusation but also the defense, and on the making of pretrial 
investigation a stage at which the case could be disposed of without 
necessarily reaching the stage of the open trial. 
Recent Soviet legal thought aims at getting the administration 
of justice out of the official routines. It seeks to endow it with flexi­
bility in the application of the necessary techniques and broadening 
the significance of findings regarding the personality of the offender. 
Thus, the administration of justice is not to be limited exclusively 
to the question of the severity of the criminal repression or the form 
of the educational and correctional measures, but is to be employed 
in determining the question of the criminal responsibility itself. The 
fact that there may be a clue for the determination of guilt or its 
degree in the general behavior of the accused bas already been af­
firmed in some of the decisions of the Soviet Supreme Court. 70 
Post-Stalin developments in the field of criminal prosecution and 
the reaction of the Soviet legal profession to new opportunities to 
advance the cause of legal science, and in this connection the level 
of Soviet lawmaking and court practice, all bear the signs of great 
intellectual ferment. Discussions which take place seem to indicate 
that the Soviet legal profession is fully aware of some of the basic 
shortcomings of the Soviet laws, even in their reformed editions of 
December 1958. Whenever opportunity offered, Soviet jurists in­
sisted on a broader understanding of the new provisions in order to 
reach a higher level of refinement in the administration of justice. Of 
great assistance in this situation has been the new trend which dif­
ferentiates between various categories of offenses in order to permit 
disposal of cases involving minor transgressions by social agencies. 
This provided an opening for an attack, although in an oblique form, 
against some of the consequences of the doctrine of social danger on 
which the Soviet practice of absolute responsibility relied. 
70 Motovilovker, "Dokazatelstvennoe znachenie dannykh o lichnosti ob­
viniaemogo," Sots. zak. 32-35 (No. 9, 1959). 
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At the same time, there are serious obstacles to the efforts of 
Soviet jurists to lift Soviet law and court practice to that level of 
administration of justice enjoyed generally in modem societies. In 
the first place, the 1 958 statutes are still unable to accept the postulate 
of a uniform application of the principles of criminal responsibility 
to all categories of crimes. Rather, they still single out certain crimes 
which are not only threatened by harsher penalties, but are judged 
according to standards tending toward absolute justice. As long as 
this attitude prevails, Soviet jurists are helpless as they are unable to 
take a stand independent of political authority. As long as this state 
of Soviet criminal legislation is perpetuated, the effects of the doc­
trine of social danger in individual cases will limit the effectiveness 
of the doctrine of individualization.71 
Another major obstacle in the Soviet jurist's struggle for making 
the judicial process in the Soviet Union an efficient tool of criminal 
policy is that judicial technique itself is below the accepted standards. 
Its major feature is that, in accordance with the Western Euro­
pean tradition, pretrial investigations in the Soviet Union are also a 
part of the judicial process. But it is only a bastard child of this tradi­
tion, as only in form and not in substance do the pretrial investigation 
and the open trial constitute a single whole. In the traditional pattern, 
the unity of proceedings in these two stages is reflected in the unity of 
principle by which they are governed. Preliminary investigations are 
conducted by a judge, and both the defense and the prosecution have 
the right to participate in it. The secrecy of the proceedings is offset 
by the right of appeal to the court, and generally all acts of preliminary 
arrest and detention by the administrative authority are only prelimi­
nary to the judicial review of reason for arrest within a short and 
preclusive period of time (automatic habeas corpus) . 
In the Soviet Union, even after Stalin, there has been no judicial 
control of preliminary investigations. Further, there is no judicial ex­
amination of reasons for arrest, the defense has no right to participate, 
and the prosecution, with its unavoidable prejudice, dominates the 
proceedings. 
Furthermore, in the Western European tradition, evidence ob­
tained in the course of preliminary investigations must be examined 
again in the open trial. As a matter of principle, police investigations 
7 1  Utevskii, supra note 66, at 1 1 6-17; Utevskii, supra note 67, at 14-18. 
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and evidence produced in the course of preliminary investigation 
have no probative value in the trial court. 
In the free world, the tendency is to extend the rules applicable 
to the open trial to the proceedings in the pretrial investigations, 
thereby extending the protection of individual rights. Under the 
Soviet system, on the other band, administrative action in pretrial 
investigations not only is free from controls characterizing judicial 
process, but tends to influence materially the open trial in its most 
important aspects. This is due to the fact that evidence collected in 
the course of pretrial investigations constitutes evidence in court; 
and furthermore, that depositions of the defendant in the course of 
a pretrial investigation constitute such evidence.12 
This situation bas a profound influence on the course of the 
open trial. It voids the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the de­
fendant to legal defense. The defendant may exercise his right only 
in the open court, not in the pretrial investigations. However, in the 
Soviet system, pretrial investigation far outweighs in importance 
the open trial. It is there that issues are joined, evidence examined, 
the defense line is formed, and most, if not all, evidence inculpating 
or exculpating the defendant, including his own depositions and 
testimony, is gathered. Thus, the position of defense and prosecu­
tion is a very unequal one. Professional advice, matching the expertise 
of the prosecution, which may at times be higher than that of the 
court itself, is available to the defendant only in the latter stages of 
the proceedings. In the course of the pretrial investigations, the de­
fendant-generally under arrest-bas no right to communicate with 
the outside world with regard to the case against him or to question 
witnesses or experts. 
The case against Francis G. Powers, the pilot of the U-2 plane 
who was tried by the military collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court, 
is a typical example of the consequences of 'this state of affairs. On 
several occasions, the prosecution pointed out to the defendant that 
his depositions in the open court differed from those in the pretrial 
investigation. Furthermore, the court in sentencing him lumped to­
gether all the evidence which was produced in the open proceedings 
and that which was produced only in pretrial proceedings as sources 
12 General Principles of Criminal Procedure, art. 16 ( 1958) .  
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of information which convinced it of the guilt of the defendant. It 
appears from quotations of various documents in the Powers dossier 
that at least six volumes of such documents were involved. These 
were far more extensive than the slim pamphlet which covered the 
proceedings in the open court. It is matter of speculation what other 
"evidence" the dossier contained.73 
As a result of this basic debility of Soviet rules of procedure in 
criminal matters, various institutions modeled on those of civil law 
countries are simply empty and useless paraphernalia of a process 
which has little meaning. To give an example from the Powers case, 
the defendant was asked at the outset of the proceedings whether be 
had any objections regarding the person of his defense counsel, who 
was appointed by the court, and whether he agreed to grant this same 
lawyer access to the files of the case. After an affirmative answer the 
court proceeded with the examination of the case. This little cere­
mony presupposed that the Soviet lawyer was not familiar with the 
six-volume dossier of the case and that, in spite of this fact, be was 
able to participate actively in the trial, without even having oppor­
tunity to converse with his client. 74 
The Soviet answer to this type of criticism is that the judicial 
control of legality has been replaced by procuratorial control. :ln the 
Soviet federal system this concentration of legal control is vested in 
a central organization which owes its allegiance to the federal regime, 
and is said to provide a better instrument for the preservation of uni­
form standards of legality and a greater guarantee of correct law 
enforcement. 
To this argument two exceptions may be raised. The necessity 
for a procuratorial system of control over legality arose from the 
extravagant and, on the whole, unsuccessful effort to establish a 
purely popular system of justice; �oviet complaints against their 
own courts are the best witness of the results of this policy. Soviet 
people's courts, and frequently even higher courts, demonstrated little 
understanding of their functions; nor were they able to grasp finer 
points of law. Certainly, Soviet courts have failed as guardians of 
73 C/. Grzybowski, "The Powers Trial and the 1958 Reform of Soviet 
Criminal Law," 9 Am. J. Comp. Law 425-40 ( 1960). 
74 Ibid. 
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civil liberties and as barriers to the abuse of power by the adminis­
trative authority. 
While Stalin's regime lasted, the presence of the Procurator 
General of the Soviet Union, with his enormous network of offices, 
various means of information, and his vast powers to institute pro­
ceedings in the judiCial and administrative branches of government, 
was certainly no substitute for independent courts as a guardian of 
legality. Nowhere in the Soviet literature is it claimed that the pro­
curatorial service systematically attempted to enforce standards of 
justice. The reason for this is quite simple : the procuratorial organi­
zation is administrative in principle and is not independent. 
Yugoslavia experimented with many aspects of the Soviet legal 
system. After an initial period of a full-sc3:1e imitation of the Soviet 
system, it was discovered that the interests of the administration of 
justice were best served by a return to the traditional pattern. The 
reform of criminal procedure of December 26, 1959,75 shifted the 
control of all stages of criminal proceedings from the procuratorial 
offices, which are still charged with the general prosecution of crimes, 
to the courts. This is apparent in all those cases where the rights of 
the individual are involved in pretrial investigations. In its present 
shape, Yugoslav criminal procedures distinguish between two types 
of detention, according to the authority which decides to deprive a 
suspect of liberty. Anybody may apprehend a suspect at the scene 
of the crime in order to take him to the county court, to the police, 
or to the investigating judge of the district court. The police or a 
county judge may detain a person for three days only. Detention may 
be prolonged by a decision of the judge or the county court for valid 
reasons if more time is needed for the investigation. Arrest by the 
police or the county judge may be· extended for an additional twenty­
four hours in order to bring the suspe�t before the investigating judge 
of the district court. 78 
In more serious cases, the decision to impose arrest upon a per­
son may be issued orily by the investigating judge in the course of a 
formal pretrial investigation (Article 190) . An investigating judge 
may arrest a suspect without a formal pretrial investigation only if, 
15 Sl. L. 1953, as amended by.the Law of Dec. 26, 1959, Sl. L. 5/1960. 
76 Arts. 1 82 and 1 88 of the Code ·of Criminal Procedure. 
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within three days, he obtains from the public prosecutor a motion to 
institute a formal pretrial investigation. If the public prosecutor re­
fuses this demand, the suspect must be released (Article 1 84) . In 
addition, Yugoslav law rules that detention in the course of pretrial 
investigation is limited to a fixed period, after which the suspect 
must be released. 
The increased role of the judicial function in Yugoslavia is part 
of the general pattern of the decentralization of authority and of 
various forms of self-government introduced into the public life of 
that country, including management of the national economy. Le­
gality has been divorced from the tasks of administration and of the 
economic management of the country. 
In other socialist countries, in addition to the procuratorial con­
trol of pretrial proceedings, some of the criminal procedures provide 
for statutory possibility of two standards of proceedings, depending 
upon the type of matter involved. Criminal _procedures of Eastern 
Europe contain clauses indicating that special governmental interests 
may cause the investigating authorities to use the provisions regard­
ing temporary detention for purely punitive reasons. So, for instance, 
the Bulgarian Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 92 (a) ) rules 
that preliminary detention is mandatory in all cases of offenses against 
the political, social, and economic aspects of the regime. Furthermore, 
the Bulgarian legislators strengthened the power of the investigating 
authorities to restrict the liberty of the offender by providing that 
preliminary detention may also be imposed for important govern­
mental reasons (Article 93 (a) ) .  
Polish Criminal Procedure rules that preliminary detention may 
be applied if the social danger of the offense, owing either to its kind 
or to its prevalence, is considerable (Article 152 Section 2 ) .  Accord­
ing to the Rumanian Code of crjminal procedure, the investigator 
has the right to detain the suspect whenever so indicated in the in­
terest of public order and general security (Article 200 ( 8 ) ) .  There 
is no mandatory detention in Hungarian criminal procedure, but the 
Code states that if a criminal act belongs to the category of crimes 
directed against the People's republic,_ detention may last twice as 
long as preliminary detention in ordinary crimes (Sections 98, 99 
(3 ) ) . 
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With few exceptions, therefore, in the majority of Eastern 
European criminal procedures preliminary detention may be used 
as a form of criminal repression. In certain situations the socialist 
state desires to strike at the possible offender even before his guilt 
and criminal responsibility are established. According to the tradi­
tional pattern, detention imposed in connection with a type of offense 
was justified by the reasoning that the severity of a possible punish­
ment might induce the offender either to bide from justice or to in­
terfere with its course by some other method. The present practice in 
Eastern Europe blurs this line of thought and makes criminal pro­
cedure an instrument of political action. 
These various practices and applications of the rule of law to 
achieve special protection of governmental policies of the moment 
disturb the course of justice which is, or should be, centered on the 
implementation of the policy defined in the rule of law itself. Other­
wise, it becomes political justice. Institutional guarantees of the sub­
ordination of the administration of justice to the demands of govern­
mental policy are further aggravated by the practice of enacting 
exceptional statutes, which introduce drastic measures in order to 
stamp out abuses of power or offenses which, at a given moment, 
are declared as specially dangerous to the regime. 
Special legislation providing for the death penalty and for other 
special measures for embezzling, theft, or dishonesty in dealing with 
government property is an ever recurring phenomenon in Soviet 
life. It bas frequently been used as a shock device to strengthen 
standards of integrity among those responsible for handling or man­
aging governmental property. The Decree of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of May 6, 1961,  which introduced a death penalty 
for large scale embezzlers of government property in the Soviet 
Union, represents one of these measures. By such means the general 
pattern of law enforcement regarding the type and scale of punish­
ments provided for in the general laws of the country is greatly dis­
turbed. It must be said that they are not marked by great leniency 
against those who offend government or social interests.77 
Soviet reform of the criminal law and penal policy was further 
set back by the article of Prosecutor General of the Soviet Union 
77 Izvestia, May 6, 1961. · 
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Rudenko, which provided a theoretical explanation of the Decree of 
May 6, 1 96 1 .  Rudenko argued the necessity of the harsher penalties 
for the embezzlers of government property by reviving the Stalinist 
doctrine on stepping up the severity of criminal repression as Soviet 
society moves forward on the road to the millennium, although it 
was declared to be no longer a cornerstone of Soviet criminal policy.7B 
Thus, the general picture one obtains from contemplation of the 
life of law in the Soviet Union seems to suggest that it is influenced 
by the constant change of official opinion, purporting to be the ex­
pression of general convictions on some of the fundamental institu­
tions of the Soviet order. There is constant revision of views on the 
role of the courts, on the function of penalty, on the purpose of law 
enforcement, and on the significance of courts' paying attention to 
the social and political needs of Soviet polity. Since the May 1961 
decree, it seems that the policy of individualization and circumspec­
tion in the use of penal sanction is again being frowned upon. Courts 
are criticized for leniency, while only a few months ago they were 
criticized for their severity. Socialist legality now means the harsh 
prosecution of offenders, while a short time ago it was interpreted to 
mean particular attention to avoid meting out punishment in cases 
where guilt was dubious and to see the case in the terms of the in­
dividual situation of the accused. 
As a result, the very standards governing the rule of law, the 
function of administration of justice, the guarantees of human free­
dom, and the limits to powers of the state are in constant jeopardy. 
An objective attitude toward those concepts which in more traditional 
circumstances constitute the very foundations of collective and in­
dividual life is almost impossible for a member of socialist society. 
Indirectly, these constant changes of policy jeopardize the pros­
pects for re-educating the Soviet man. ,This is because the institutions 
of Soviet life appear as relative values and. not as constants, raising 
no doubts in the minds of the majority. In this situation, the prestige 
of the law cannot be great, respect for the courts cannot be firmly 
rooted, and the concept of socialist legality, which means so many 
things, has little practical content. 
78 Jd., May 7, 1961. 
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UNITY OF SOCIALIST CNIL LAW 
The program of legal reform in the Soviet Union and in the 
satellite states included the enactment of new civil codes which 
sought to provide a new basis for legal commerce involving property 
relations in the socialist society. Legislative work and theoretical 
thinking on the subject of the form, scope, and content of civil 
legislation and its place within the general framework of the socialist 
legal order was stimulated by the fact that the new political condi­
tions, which made legal reform possible, have also removed the stigma 
of unorthodoxy from the theories of the early Marxist theoreticians 
who were deeply concerned with problems of civil law. 
According to Pasbukanis, revolution per se will not destroy civil 
law and replace it automatically by some other higher type of regula­
tion: 
As state enterprises are subordinate to the conditions of turnover, the 
bond between them is molded in the form of arrangements and the form 
of technical subordination. Accordingly, the purely juridic-that is to 
say, the legal-form of regulating relationships becomes possible and 
neeessary. 
Gradually however, after the bourgeois civil law, inherited from 
the previous socio-economic formation, bad expended its utility, new 
relations between the economic units of the socialist order would 
be established. These, argued Pashukanis, would be based on a new 
type of regulation, i.e., administrative regulation, leading finally to 
a total disappearance of legal rule and to the emergence of the new 
economic order based on economic links between social functions.79 
In other words, �e realization of the program of socialist construction 
was linked to the transformation of the nature of legal rule. 
The theories of Pasbukanis, ythQ was an official leader of Marxist 
juristic thinking, have produced considerable r�sponse among Soviet 
\awyers. They have come up with various schemes indicating an 
Imminent transformation of the civil law of the Soviet state into what 
was called the economic law-a system of administrative regulations 
governing relations between Soviet ag�ncies of government in charge 
of the national economy of Russia. 
79 Pashukanis, supra note 25, at 165, 169, 179-80. 
Socialist Legality 2 1 7  
In particular, Stuchka conceived the pattern of transition from 
the civil law order into the economic law as the struggle of two sys­
tems. They were forced to coexist within the Soviet society for a time, 
i.e., as long as the Soviet economic system contained some elements 
of the private economy and some belonging to the socialist order. 
The anarchic character of the private economic relations was pri­
marily reflected in the institution of contract of sale and purchase, 
while the planned character of the socialist economy as its vehicle 
had a channel of administrative regulations. so 
Thus was devised a legal system governing property and con­
tractual relations of which the Civil Code was only a part of the legal 
order. This idea produced a considerable number of works, of which 
perhaps the most representative was produced by the first systematic 
treatise on the economic law of the RSFSR, which began with the 
analysis of the civil law in force. 81 
The first of the five-year economic plaps was greeted by this 
school of thought as the sign that their prophecies were beginning 
to take practical shape. Transformation of the Russian economy into 
a socialist system, in which only collective forms of economic activ­
ity were to survive, was understood to mean that the whole basis 
for civil law relations would disappear. It was thought then that 
contractual relations between government enterprises would be barred. 
As a result, two sets of business relations would be reflected in a 
dual system : those based on contracts between private individuals­
a marginal legal situation, and those based upon administrative regu­
lations between units of the socialist economy. The Civil Code would 
thus cover almost exclusively transactions between individuals while 
80 Stucbka, 3 Kurs sovetskogo grazbdanskogo prava 10 (1931 ) ; cf. also 
Basic Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR, a draft edited and 
prefaced by Stuchka ( 193 1 ) ;  also Amfiteatrov, "Osnovnye cherty 
zakonoproekta o dogovorakh ( 1934 ) ;  Hazard, supra note 10, at 62 ff. 
Although Stuchka and other writers of the epoch have never acknowl­
edged their indebtedness to Jellinek, their theories were a direct borrow­
ing from the writings of this influential and widely read legal writer. 
Cf. in particular Jellinek, Der Kampf des alten mit dem neuen Recht 
8-9 ( 1907 ) ;  also Jellinek, 1 Ausgewiihlte Schriften und Reden 396 
( 191 1 ) ;  cf. Grzybowski, supra note 17. 
81 Goighbarg, "Kboziaistvennoe pravo RSFSR," 1 Grazhdanskii kodeks 
( 1924).  
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administrative economic law, based on central economic plans, 
would govern the socialist sector.82 
This school of thought was violently condemned by Vysbinskii. 
As long as Stalin's regime continued, nothing more was beard of the 
schemes of gradual transition from the bourgeois legal system into 
a system of law which would reflect more truly the socialist manage­
ment of the national economy of the Soviet Union. Theoretical dif­
ficulties were solved by the declaration that all Soviet law was socialist 
law and that the Civil Code in force was a socialist code and an 
indispensable part of the Soviet legal system. Soviet lawyers were 
told to get busy with the practical problems of legal rules of socialism 
and to forget about theories of socialist law.88 
The decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union ( 1 956) to prepare and enact new codes 
of law in all provinces of socialist law revived the discussion of the 
systematic organization of the Soviet legal system. Also revived was 
the question of the duality of regulations pertaining to property re­
lations and business transactions. 
The tenor of the discussion which followed is perhaps illustra­
tive of the barrenness of intellectual life under Stalin: It demonstrated 
the absence of fruitful and significant ideas despite enormous experi­
ence in the field of economic relations. As the problem of the new 
codes came to the fore, the Soviet Union, for nearly four decades, 
bad experimented with socialist economic forms. In addition, new 
socialist communities in Eastern Europe bad come into existence and 
had been developing new economic forms as well as new forms of 
economic transactions between socialist states and enterprises on an 
international scale. Nevertheless, Soviet jurists found little to inspire 
them in the contemporary reality and turned rather to the ideas which 
were formulated in the beginnings of the Soviet State. 
This trend was obviously encouraged by the rehabilitation of 
Pasbukanis and Krylenk.o, the originators of the concept of economic 
law and of a legal order based on an administrative regulation of 
82 1 Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law 433 ( 1948) .  
83  Vyshinskii, The Law of  the Soviet State -53 ff. (Babb transl. 1 948) ;  
Grzybowski, supra note 17, at 73. 
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the economic activity in the socialist society. After twenty years in 
Siberia, one of the leading jurists of the initial years of Revolutionary 
Russia, Gintsburg, regained his freedom.84 
But it was also apparent that the freedom of intellectual specu­
lation which the Soviet jurists gained was limited, and they could 
hardly give free rein to their imagination by expressing preferences 
and offering suggestions regarding systematic arrangements of the 
Soviet legal system. The Yugoslav experiment with socialist law was 
condemned, and its patterns for socialist legal relations and theoretical 
solutions were rejected. Between the two extremes of the solutions 
adopted by Stalin's regime and the pattern of transition developed 
by Pashukanis and his school was all the room that was left for the 
exercise of the minds of Soviet jurists. The astounding fact that 
there was no discussion of the actual regime in the management of 
socialist industries or of organization of socialist agriculture once the 
program of legal reform was announced could perhaps be explained 
by the fact that such a discussion and suggested programs of reform 
would have offended the policy makers. And so discussion centered 
around problems of great theoretical attractiveness, although with 
little practical profit. 
Even contemporary changes in the administrative methods and 
new organization of industries in the Soviet Union following the re­
form of 1957 have attracted little attention from Soviet legal scholars. 
Changes taking place before their very eyes did not register as indi­
cative of social needs, nor as a manifestation of a process calling for 
a reformulation of the legal rule. 
This is even more surprising since the debate on reform was 
initiated by the realization of the disjointed and amorphous state of 
the Soviet legal system. While criminal and civil law were in a poor 
state of organization, the real problem existed in the field of admin­
istrative regulations, concerned with management of the Soviet na­
tional economy. There can be no doubt that Soviet lawyers were 
aware of this state of affairs. That there was no great debate concern­
ing these issues was due primarily, or so it seems, to the fact that these 
matters belonged to the central issues of the Soviet system of govem-
84 Hazard, supra note 10, at 62 ff. 
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ment, and that suggestions and discussions in this connection might 
involve fundamental axioms as to the nature and method of the social­
ist government. Btl 
Thus, the main issue of the debate on reform was the problem 
of the systematic arrangement of legal rules. Followers of the early 
school of legal Marxism suggested that instead of the division of 
law into public and private, a trichotomy be adopted, consisting of 
the following groups of legal rules :  the law of the state, economic 
law, and civil law. The first group would include rules to regulate 
the organization of government machinery and its public services, 
including judiciary and procuratura. The second would cover all as­
pects of economic activity of the state. Civil law would be exclusively 
concerned with the individual but would include some constitutional 
and political aspects of the legal position of the citizen, such as elec­
toral and other political rights. 
These suggestions for the reform of the Soviet legal system 
were the result of the conviction that regulations dealing with the 
management of the national economy have little if anything to do 
with the circulation of consumer goods, property relations, and other 
fields of law governing individual life. The rights of a Soviet citizen 
have been thus segregated into a separate category. In terms of con­
crete legislative proposals, partisans of the new category, economic 
law, proposed to limit future civil codes to property and nonproperty 
relations involving individuals only. Consequently a socialist civil code 
would be restricted to relations between individuals, those between 
85 Tadevosyan, ''Nekotorie voprosy - sistemy sovetskogo prava," SGP (No; 
1J, 1958 ) ;  Genkin, "K voprosu o sisteme sovetskogo sotsialisticheskogo 
prava," SGP (No. 9, 1956) ;  Shargorodskii & Joffe, "0 sisteme sovetskogo 
prava," SGP (No. 6, 1957 ) ;  Aleksieiev, "0 teoretichesk.ikb osnovakh 
klasifikatsii otraslei sovetskogo prava," SGP (No. 1 1 ,  1958);  Bratus, 
"0 nekotorykh chertakh istorii sovetskogo ·grazbdanskogo prava," SGP 
86-104 (No. 1 1 ,  1957) ;  Pavlov, "K voprosu kodifikatsii sovetskogo 
grazhdanskogo zakonodatelstva," SGP 39-49 (No. 8, 1959) ;  Denisov 
& Bernstein, "Osnovy grazhdanskogo zakonodatelstva i 'khoziaistvennoe 
pravo,' " SGP 48-60 (No. 5, 1959 ) ;  Aleksieiev, "Differentsiatsia grazh­
danskogo pravovogo regulirovania v sotsialisticheskom obsbcbestve," 
SGP 75-84 (No. 2, 1960) ;  Laptev, "K voprosu o khoziaistvennom 
prave," Voprosy Ekonomiki (No. 12, 1959) ;  Romashkin, supr� note 10; 
cj. also "Osuzhdenie voprosov sistemy sovetskogo prava i sotsialisticbeskoi 
zakonnosti,'; SGP 1 17-28 (No. 1 1 ,  1958).  
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individuals and socialist enterprises and economic institutions, and 
would include family law and such institutions as copyright and 
patents. 
Simultaneously, a separate code would include the totality of 
rules dealing with planning, administration of the economic enter­
prises of the state, and their business relations. 
The argument of the partisans of the new systematization is 
that the present system continues an artificial division of the rules per­
taining to a single field of social activity, i.e., the operation of the 
economic system of the country under two classes of rules, one deal­
ing with those relations which are based on the administrative sub­
ordination of economic enterprises to higher authorities of economic 
management, and the other on the contractual relations between 
them. The weakness of the present order is thought to be its predica­
tion upon a formal difference between the modes of regulating social 
relations, and not on their qualitative characteristics. Civil law, it is 
argued by the partisans of the economic law, is concerned with the 
satisfaction of the personal needs of citizens, while the economic law 
is a means of organizing the economic activity of socialist enterprises 
and organizations. The economic law should deal with the hierarchy 
of the economic administration, including economic councils and the 
legal position of economic enterprises. It should be directed toward 
their internal organization, economic planning, commercial basis of 
their operation, planned contracts, and government arbitration in set­
tling disputes between socialist organizations. 
Opponents of the economic codes have brought out serious 
arguments against segregating the rules regarding management of the 
national economy in a separate legal category. They have pointed 
out that not all the rules regarding the activities of economic enter­
prises have the same character. So,, for instance, there is a difference 
between business transactions among socialist enterprises and ad­
ministrative regulations regarding relations between the planning and 
supervisory authority and the enterprise itself. While in the first class 
of relations there are rights which have their basis in a contract which 
cannot be unilaterally changed, in the second type of relations this 
concept of rights does not apply. Thus interenterprise relations and 
business transactions have similar characteristics to those involving 
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individuals or socialist organizations and individuals. As such they 
may be subject to uniform treatment within a systematic arrangement 
in a single code of civil law regulations. 
Another objection is that proposals for the economic code dis­
rupt the unity of the institution of property. The conservative trend 
among Soviet jurists insists on the preservation of the idea of the 
· civil code in its present form and scope and argues that there is no 
valid reason for the segregation of property relations concerning the 
individual from the rest of the legal regulations concerning property 
relations between socialist enterprises. Civil law rules regarding 
property between individuals and socialist enterprises represent a 
channel tor including property relations involving individual existence 
into the general over-all planning activities of the state. Property rela­
tions between socialist enterprises represent a basis for property re­
lations between individuals, as their economic activity is indissolubly 
tied to the satisfaction of social needs. 
Furthermore, both the Party and the government are planning 
for a progressive relaxation of the centralized management of the 
national economy. Decentralization of administrative responsibility 
tends toward increasing the independence and initiative of economic 
enterprises regarding their business activities. In fact, civil law provi­
sions regulate all those relations which are characterized by the
' 
ab­
sence of administrative subordination, and the equality of partners is 
the basis of operations. The tendency is to restrict the method of ad­
ministrative handling of problems of the national economy and to 
favor a growing use of the channels of the civil law. This does not 
mean, say the defenders of the present scope and form of civil law 
regulation, that the traditional approach favoring the form of con­
tractual relations tends to disrupt the mechanism of planning by 
separating the plan from the planned_ contracts. While the plan rep­
resents a statutory obligation, it is put into effect by a contractual 
method, such constituting a better means of establishing relations 
between equal partners. 86 
86 Bratus, "Khoziaistvennyi dogovor kak grazbdansko-pravovaia forma 
planovogo razpredelenia produktsii," SGP_ {No. 2-3, 1953 ) ;  Bratus & 
Lunts, Voprosy · khoziaistvennogo dogovora 1 1-12 {1954) ; Bratus, "0 
normowaniu prawnym stosunk6w majlltkowych w ZSRR," PiP 630-43 
(No. 4-5, 1960). 
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A slightly different position was taken by a Soviet jurist who 
has proposed that the new Soviet civil code should take account of 
the changes in the property relations in the socialist economic order. 
In fact, he claimed that there is no longer one system of the civil 
law relations and that, therefore, several laws ought to be enacted. 
All of them, however, would still pertain broadly to the branch of 
civil law. Thus, he proposed to differentiate between the civil law 
of the socialist economy, the civil law of collective farming, the civil 
law of physical persons, and the civil law of foreign trade. 87 
In spite of the theoretical attractions of the early theories of 
socialist law, the traditional trends seem to have carried the day, al­
though not without some hesitations. Three major pieces of legisla­
tion which have made their appearance in the Soviet Union (Draft 
of Principles of Civil Law Legislation in the Soviet Union and 
Union Republic) ,  in Hungary (Civil Code of 1959 ) ,  and in Poland 
(Draft of the Civil Code) express the principle of the unity of the 
civil law. Thus, the tradition of the civil law countries of the West 
bas been continued. The Soviet Draft (Article 1 )  states that its 
provisions cover property and related nonproperty relations, with 
the exclusion of those based on the administrative subordination of - . 
one party to another or to the budget relations. The Polish Code 
(Article 1 )  states that it regulates civil law relations between· physi­
cal persons, between socialist and nonsocialist organizations, and be­
tween the physical persons and these organizations. It repeats the 
reservation contained in the Soviet Code by stating that the Code 
applies between state organizations only inasmuch as these relations 
are not differently regulated either by the laws in force or by the regu­
lations issued by the supreme authorities of the state administration. 
The Hungarian Code (Article 1 )  contains a similar regulation. 
The report attached to the Polish Draft reveals that the members 
of the codification commission dicf not quite see eye to eye on the 
various aspects of the scope and function of the Civil code in a socialist 
country. They were doubtful whether management of the national 
economy, owing to the nature of its regulations, constituted a 
proper subject for inclusion within the c!vil code. Consequently, they 
did not propose to deal with the organization of the socialist economic 
87 AJeksieiev, supra note 85, at 79. 
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units, quasi-corporations created by the government for the manage­
ment of various industries and services. 
In each of these civil law codifications, the law on obligations 
(contracts) constitutes the core of their provisions and raises impor­
tant problems of technique and theory, due primarily to the fact that 
most legal commerce in a socialist state is handled by governmental, 
cooperative, and social institutions of all types. 
The Polish approach took accrount of the fundamental differ­
ence between the dealings and transactions of socialist organizations 
and those involving individuals or individuals and socialist organiza­
tions. Thus, in order to preserve the unity of civil law but at the same 
time to recognize the special position of the socialist economic units, 
general provisions of the civil law were given a subsidiary role re­
garding the relations of socialist juristic persons. They apply only 
when other more specific provisions regulating economic cooperation 
and legal commerce between socialist units are absent. 
In the Hungarian Civil Code no such reservation has been en­
acted. However, separate provisions for legal relations between so­
cialist institutions are made whenever applicable. Thus, for instance, 
provisions on contracts deal separately with socialist contracts within 
the general framework of provisions covering all types of contractual 
relations. 
The Polish Code failed to provide in detail for the mechanism 
of contractual relations between socialist institutions. However, in 
the general provisions a special reservation was made as to the spirit 
in which contractual relations between the socialist enterprises ought 
to be entered into (Article 343 ) : 
[S]ocialist organizations are obligated to cooperate both in concluding 
contracts as well as in their execution, taking into account the influence of 
their action on the execution of th.e contract by the other party, on the 
satisfac�on of the needs of the economic life, efficiency of production 
commerce, and on safeguarding the national economy from losses. 
In addition to this general regulation and the initial reservation 
that the Code applies only in the absence of more specific rules, the 
Code made it clear that agreements be!_ween socialist business partners 
must follow government regulations as to form, content, and choice 
of partners in their business activity (Article 342, 344) . 
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The degree of influence of higher authority on the execution of 
contracts between socialist partners is especially visible in business 
deals connected with assignments of the national economic plan. 
Polish and Soviet drafts have kept the rules of the distribution of 
planned assignments between socialist enterprises outside the civil 
code. It was impossible, however, to avoid reference to administrative 
regulations of higher authorities in charge of economic management 
regarding the institution of contr3;ctual obligations between the parties, 
the · effects of the nonfulfillment of contractual obligations, and the 
decisions of higher authorities regarding the change or abolition of 
planned assignments. 88 
The scope of modem efforts at devising patterns for a socialist 
code discloses the fact that civil codes in socialist countries are pro­
foundly affected by the internal conflict, characteristic of the Soviet 
legal order, which pertains in the precarious position of individual 
rights and the stability of social structures. Nevertheless, the useful­
ness of a code of law predicated upon the free exercise of will in legal 
commerce is beyond doubt. The perspective of forty years of opera­
tion of the socialist economy in Russia has put a question mark after 
the theories of the Pashukanis school. Its ideas on the nature of legal 
rules within the socialist economic order have had some foundation 
in reality only in the initial years of the regimented and government­
directed transition from free enterprise to the government-owned 
and -controlled system of economic institutions and planned economy. 
Centralization of planning and the neat organization of economic 
activities according to administrative schemes, with economic minis­
tries on top, was a proper method and could produce desirable effects 
as long as investment, organization, and expansion and deployment 
of the industrial establishment were stressed, at the expense of service 
and consumption. However, once the economic machine reached a 
certain level of expansion, it was discovered that the very size of the 
economic mechanism and the multiplication of its parts called for a 
different method of cooperation in performing services and satisfy­
ing human needs. In this situation, methods characteristic of the 
market economy were the only answer. 
The solutions which finally prevailed were based on the simple 
88 Cf. supra at 85 ff. 
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reality of the nature of economic operations. Theories of the partisans 
of the economic law had to be relegated to limbo, because in spite 
of the centralized direction of the national economy, the contract 
has maintained its function in the socialist economic system. As a 
Soviet jurist wrote in 1959, when the question was debated again : 
Efforts to separate regulations of the circulation of goods between the 
socialist organizations, from the regulation of circulation between organ­
izations and citizens ( and also citizens) amount to denying the unity of 
economic circulation in the Soviet society. Previously some justification 
for such a denial was supplied by the view that means of production in 
the internal exchange are not goods. But at the present time Soviet 
economists have come to the conclusion that in view of the unity of 
the socialist economy, even the means of production are goods produced 
and circulated within the governmental sector, although there is no change 
in the person of the owner.s& 
Theories on the place of the civil law contract within the frame­
work of the Soviet legal system raise serious theoretical objections 
which cannot be answered by a dogmatic dictum, e.g., that goods dis­
posed in the trade between socialist units are goods in spite of the 
fact that the contract of sale and purchase produces no change in the 
person of the owner. It is realized that the contract theory is tied to 
the theory on the position of the juristic persons in the Soviet order 
in terms of their concrete rights. Their business independence is em­
phasized at the expense of the doctrine that socialist juristic persons 
represent only various forms of the activity of the state, which remains 
the sole owner of the means of production. Those who favor the con­
cept of the unity of the civil law and the contractual form of business 
transactions in the socialist sector of economy would insist on dis­
tinguishing those activities of the state which engage the action of 
governmental agencies from those which are exercised through the 
operation of juristic persons.90 
The heart of the matter is that complexities of economic life 
in socialist societies tend to favor business independence of the 
89 Denisov & Bernstein, supra note 85, at 54; cf. also Ostrovitianov, 
"Tovarnoe proizvodstvo i zakon stoimosti pry sotsializme," Kommunist 
92 ff. (No. 13,  1957).  
90 Denisov & Bernstein, supra note 85, at  51 ff. 
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juristic persons, at the expense of the idea of the centralized man­
agement of the national economy, as the business of public authority. 
In a new form the distinction between various functions of the 
public authority, those subject to the rule of the public law, and 
those under the rule of the Civil Code is finding its way into the Soviet 
legal system. 
In Yugoslav legal theory, which was evolved after a total reor­
ganization of the economic mechanism of the country, the concept of 
national ownership of the means of production became a purely 
theoretical proposition. As a Yugoslav lawyer wrote : 
[N]o organ of society may be the general bearer of social property. Each 
institution is the bearer but of determinate rights as issuing from social 
ownership. This does not mean that property as property is divided into 
a supreme property and the lower categories of property as in feudal law, 
but that the different social organs have different rights in the management 
of social property.91 
Socialist codes of the most recent vintage still maintain the 
unity of the ownership of the means of production. Article 1 8  of the 
Soviet Draft of Principles of Civil Legislation stated: 
Socialist ownership has the form of state ownership (property of all the 
people) ,  or the form of collective farm cooperative ownership (ownership 
by an individual collective farm of cooperative association, or common 
ownership by several collective farms or cooperative associations) .  
In practice, however, these differentiations have little practical 
significance. Indeed, it seems that property relations in terms of the 
permanent assignment of control of various economic assets to various 
parts and elements of Soviet government apparatus have not yet 
reached that degree of stability which would permit a serious analysis 
of reality in order to produce a doctrinal formulation. In addition to 
a great movement in various forms of the immediate control of eco­
nomic assets by socialist corporations, there is constant change in 
assigning responsibility for organizing industrial activity to various 
levels of government (federal, individual republics, provinces, etc.) .  
The only real element of significance for legal forms of economic ac-
9 1  Gerskovic, "On the Basic Institutes of Property Law," The New Yugo­
slav Law 27 (Jan.-June, 1955). 
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tivity are the powers of various institutions to participate in their 
own name in the system of socialist transactions.92 
Another aspect of the economic operations which militated 
against the doctrines of Pashukanis in contemporary conditions in Rus­
sia and in the satellite countries is the fact that such notions would 
tend to strengthen the rule of bureaucratic management in the na­
tional economy. It was not only a question of the realization of 
political postulates, i.e., of direct participation of the workers' or­
ganizations in the management of their factories. In addition was in­
volved the question of economic efficiency which, in the final 
analysis, decides the issue. 
These two questions provided the chief motivation in the de­
mand for the reform of economic management and the rule of law 
in Poland after October 1956. In order to put a limit to bureaucratic 
rule and to establish an efficient bulwark to administrative arbi­
trariness, it was proposed to distinguish between various types of 
enterprises and to apply a varying degree of decentralization in their 
administration. Decentralization, however, was to stop short of their 
virtual return to private, although collective, ownership. In this 
system civil law would regain its pristine role and application. It was 
argued that, although the government would continue to control all 
industrial enterprises and that trade and distribution would continue 
to be an almost exclusive preserve of government monopoly, this 
fact would not preclude the rule of civil law and the regime of con­
tracts in their commercial relations. Indeed, it was agreed, if any­
thing, that the rule of civil law in the government sector of economy 
was even more indispensable, because by its very size government par­
ticipation in the administration of economic resources affected the 
life of everybody. Polish lawyers at that time saw the only alterna­
tive to untrammelled rule by bureaucracy in decentralization and in 
the return of regulation of business transactions by the civil law.93 
92 In an article published in 1958, Professor Pyontkovskii attacked the 
view that subjective rights have no place in the Soviet legal system: "K 
voprosu o vzaimootnoshenii obiektivnogo i subiektivnogo prava," SOP 
(No. 5, 1958). 
93 Buczkowski, 0 wla8ciwfl rol� prawa cywilnego w gospodarce uspolecz­
nionej," PiP 249-62 (No. 8-9, 1956);  Brus, Prawo wartosci a prob­
lematyka bodZc6w ekonomicznych 88 If. (1956); Mayzel, "0 umowach 
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While the defenders of the system of contractual relations in 
the socialist economic sector favor an expansion of civil law insti­
tutions, they are quite firm in their conviction that Soviet civil law 
is not the private law of the West. A leading Soviet expert in this field 
stated that : 
[T]he term "civil law," as well as a number of other terms, has lost its 
pristine meaning. Soviet civil law represents that branch of law which 
concerns property relations tied to the commodity exchange relations ir­
respective of the participants. The political, procedural, rights of citizens 
from employment relations do not enter there, but belong to the field of 
civil law financial relations, agrarian relations, and also relations arising 
from the membership in the agricultural and other cooperative organ­
izations. 94 
In this sense, the civil law of the Soviet Union has lost its tradi­
tional function. It has become part of the legal system which is 
concerned primarily with public service, administered in a manner 
which has borrowed from the patterns of Western Europe, developed 
in the Soviet law. 
Defenders of civilistic forms in business relations or the socialist 
economy have also pointed out that the preference for these forms 
was brought about by processes which are characteristic of the period 
preceding the moment of transition from socialism to communism. 
Civil law signifies relations based on cooperation, while economic law 
emphasizes administrative forms of ordering. Thus, civil law forms 
are closer to the ultimate form of social institutions characteristic of 
the highest form of social existence : 
What meaning has the above-described objective process, if it is con­
sidered in terms of the perspectives of the development of Soviet society 
in the period of construction of communism? . . .  one must keep in mind 
the fact that in contrast with the administrative law, in civil law the main 
role belongs not to the organizing activity of the governmental agencies, 
but to regulations founded on juristic equality of . . .  parties. And therefore, 
the expansion of the sphere of application of civil law at the expense of 
the sphere of direct organizing activity of the agencies of Soviet state 
dostawy pomi�dzy jednostkami gospodarki uspolecznionej," PiP 378 ff. 
(No. 8,  1956) ;  cf. Grzybowski, "Polish Workers' Councils," 17 Journal 
of Central European Affairs 272-86 ( 1957) .  
9 4  Bratus, "0 normowaniu prawnym stosunk6w majqtkowych w ZSRR," 
PiP 63 1 (No. 4-5, 1960) .  
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represent a sui generis stage in the process of the development of the 
Soviet law, which is characterized by the narrowing of the realm of 
direct governmental coercion. 911 
The problem of the historical significance of the re-establish­
ment of the rule of civil law is a somewhat esoteric issue. What is 
real is that the economic situation calls for departure from the ad­
ministrative methods in the economic life of the socialist countries. 
Yugoslavs have referred this process to an earlier historical moment, 
that of the transition from capitalism to socialism. A Yugoslav law­
yer, supplying a political rationale for the administrative and legal 
reform in his country, thus described the stages of transition from 
the capitalist to the socialist society. He pointed out that in the last 
stages of capitalism, the control of means of production was in the 
hands, not of the capitalists, but of the managerial class, consisting 
of the "economic bureaucracy both of the private monopolies and 
the contemporary state developing in the direction of state capitalism." 
He continued: 
The experience of socialist development in the world has indicated that 
even after the winning of power on the part of the working class, a 
special social stratum is being created which stands between the direct 
producers and means of production. The same practice has further shown 
that, at this early stage of socialist development too, the direct producers 
are still separated from the means of production. The social stratum in 
question, and which still separates both the essential factors of any pro­
duction in the initial stages of socialist development, is made up of the 
members of the economic administration of the proletarian state. Such 
a condition is necessary directly after the Revolution . . .  but after a 
time such a condition begins to lose its necessary and progressive char­
acter . . .  and leads to a system of bureaucratic dictatorship and this system 
in its deepest substance in no way differs from any other class rule . . . .  
Consequently: as long as there will subsist such a social stratum, which 
will stand between both the essential factors of every system of production, 
whether in the form of legal owners of means of production or in the 
form of state bureaucracy, exploitation also will subsist.oo 
95 Aleksieiev, "0 zakonomernostiakh razvitia sovetskogo prava v period 
razvernutogo stroitelstva kommunizma," SGP 16 (No. 9, 1960). 
96 Goricar, "Workers' Self-Government in the Light of Scientific Social­
ism," New Yugoslav Law 3-4 (April-Dec., 1957); Yugoslav theories 
were condemned by the Soviet jurists because they were based on the 
theory that the process of the withering away of the state and law in 
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In effect, a number of causes have contributed to the fact that 
political amnesty for the theories of Pashukanis bas not been trans­
formed into his posthumous victory. Such would have meant the con­
tinuation of the rigid regimentation of economic life, very much in 
the pattern of Stalin's regime. That, of course, was no longer politically 
possible. It was out of tune with the general economic situation in 
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, where further eco­
nomic progress depended on the decentralization of authority. Finally, 
it was inconsistent with the great expansion of trade with other mem­
bers of the socialist bloc and also with the free world, both in its 
neutralist part as well as that organized in the Western alliance. All 
of these developments called, not for the first time in the history of 
the Soviet Union and other socialist states, for stabilizing the rules 
of trade in some general formulas.91 
Internally the most important development was the administra­
tive decentralization of economic management, practically throughout 
the entire area of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. Administrative 
reform in the Soviet Union in the course of 1957 contributed funda­
mentally to the expansion of the contractual forms of economic co­
operation between Soviet economic units. As Professor Bratus 
wrote at the end of 1957, barely a few months after the reform, it 
was apparent that "the scope of purchase and sale contract has now 
a socialist society begins immediately after the overthrow of the power 
of the bourgeoisie. Cf. Romanshkin, supra note 10; also Hazard, supra 
note 10, at 27. 
97 The responsibility for building up a new legal system under the revo­
lutionary regime in Russia was laid at the door of the capitalist states 
with which the Soviet Union had concluded commercial treaties and 
agreements. Kurskii told the congress of workers of the administration 
of justice that when the question of the agenda for a congress in Genoa 
was being discussed, Lloyd George had said that Soviet Russia would 
have to establish a known system of legal norms which would permit 
other countries to have permanent relations with her. Kurskii added as 
an aside: "We shall see what these juridical norms shall be and who in 
the last analysis will dictate them." He admitted, however, that com­
mercial treaties had raised some problems because they put forward 
demands for specified guarantees of property and persons. Hazard, 
supra note 1 0, at 150. 
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been considerably enlarged as regards the legal relations between 
the socialist economic organizations." 98 
No less important was the impact of foreign trade. Professor 
Bratus, the chief spokesman of the civilist orientation in the ranks 
of Soviet scholars, was convinced that : 
To accept proposals of the partisans of the economic law, would result 
in serious difficulties in the field of foreign trade transactions with the 
capitalist firms . . . .  It would be impossible to apply to a foreign merchant 
. . .  those rules, which determine property relations of the Soviet citizens 
as the owner of the consumer goods. It would be also impossible to apply 
to foreign transactions the rules of the so-called economic law which 
is to serve relations between the Soviet socialist organizations. • . . When 
a foreign deal is referred to the rule of law competent in the place of 
the contracts, such rules of the civil law are applied as a given state 
applies with regard to its physical and iuristic persons. Otherwise a dis­
crimination against the foreign partner would take place, which in turn 
would result in the creation of a special legal regime for the trade organ­
izations of the Soviet Union, which would upset the foundations of the 
economic cooperation of the USSR with the capitalist countries.99 
Developments in the Soviet Union and in other socialist coun­
tries have inspired hopes that this was a first step toward the gradual 
relaxation of the administrative rule in business relations, and that 
the system of planned contracts, ••masquerading as civil contracts 
and until recently unchallenged, is now to some extent giving way to 
truly civil contracts, and due recognition is given to the law of 
value." 100 A Polish jurist, an expert in the field of commercial law, 
drew further comfort from the fact that Soviet economists have 
changed their position and now stress the commercial character of 
commodities and recognize the validity of the law of value for the 
circulation of commodities.101 
98 Bratus, "0 nekotorykh chertakh istorii sovetskogo grazhdanskogo 
prava," SGP 86-103 (No. 1 1 ,  1957). 
99 Bratus, supra note 94, at 642; Aleksieiev, "Differentsiatsia grazhdanskogo 
pravovogo regulirovania v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve," SGP 79 
(No. 2, 1960). 
100 Piotrovski, ''The · Great Importance of Commercial Law for Peaceful 
Economic Collaboration of All Nations," The New Yugoslav Law 6-8 
(July-Dec., 1958) .  
101 See proceedings of the Soviet Institute of Economy of the USSR Acad­
emy of Science (September 1957),  Voprosy Ekonomiki 103-1 1 (No. 
1 1, 1957).  
. 
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Furthermore, in a number of Soviet bloc countries, in Yugo­
slavia, and also for international trade within the Soviet bloc itself, a 
type of regulation was adopted which provided some general rules 
regarding important aspects of commercial relations between govern­
mental institutions engaged either in internal or foreign trade rela­
tions. In 1954 the State Court of Arbitration in Yugoslavia adopted 
a commercial code under the name of General Usages of Trade 
for the adjudication of disputes arising from business transactions 
of Yugoslav business organizations. In mid-December of 1957 the 
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance at its session in Moscow 
adopted "General Terms of Goods Deliveries Between the Foreign 
Trade Concerns of the Member Countries" for the regulation of for­
eign trade between the member countries of the Soviet bloc in 
Eastern Europe. In Czechoslovakia, a law on "Business Relations 
between the socialist organizations was adopted on October 17,  
1958." 102 Finally, in the Soviet Union itself, a resolution of the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR of May 22, 1959, enacted a regula­
tion on the deliveries of capital and consumer goods to govern the 
simplified system of contractual relations between economic units 
after the reform of 1957.1°3 
In inter-bloc trade, a more precise definition of the mutual 
rights and obligations of the parties and of the terms of performance 
was the result of a considerable reassertion of equal position in the 
economic cooperation of the members of the bloc with the Soviet 
Union. Terms of delivery or general usages of trade constitute a 
system of rules which have their analogy in the commercial codes 
of the capitalist countries. As such they are sui generis civil law 
statutes adopted to business relations between that category of juristic 
persons which is closest to the merchant class of the free world. But 
here their resemblance ends. They contain no rules regarding the 
organization of juristic business entities. As in the socialist legal sys­
tem, these matters belong to the public law. Owing to the standardiza­
tion of business relations in the socialist world, only sale-purchase 
and contract of construction are described. Finally all those con­
tracts and arrangements which provide for guarantees and security of 
commercial relations are eliminated. Performance of contracts and 
102 Sbirka, No. 26/67, 1958, consolidated text Sbirka, 26/68, 1958. 
103 Cf. supra at 91 fi. 
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terms of performance, as well as terms of payments, are guaranteed 
by over-all provisions regulating foreign trade. Clearing arrange­
ments make provisions superfluous in case of bankruptcy, and also 
of liens and sureties.10' 
The presence of the new regulations introduced a new element 
into the activity of the government arbitration boards in the socialist 
countries, converting them into a kind of commercial court. In addi­
tion to the provisions of the economic plans and other administra­
tive regulations which regulate business relations between various 
economic institutions, the boards have for their guidance a set of 
general rules for the performance of contracts which they must apply 
in the interpretation of the terms of commercial and other business 
deals between the partners. With respect to these aspects of the liti­
gations concerned with the business activity of Soviet and other social­
ist enterprises, their function is identical with that of the civil courts 
dealing with commercial disputes in the civil law countries of the West. 
Otherwise, government arbitration boards have retained their origi­
nal character and function as administrative bodies participating 
directly in adjusting, by administrative action, the cooperation of the 
economic units. The reform of economic administration in the Soviet 
Union and other satellite countries, although relaxing the controls 
and supervision of higher economic authorities, has failed to change 
fundamentally the regime of the planned economy in which business 
operations are geared strictly to the plan. 
The only exception in this picture was Yugoslavia which reor­
ganized the economic administration according to a pattern which 
gave full control of business operations to their individual workers' 
collectives. This made it possible to re-establish the normal system of 
adjudication between the business organizations of Yugoslavia. Fol­
lowing the economic reform of 1950-1953, the Judiciary Act of 
1954 transformed Yugoslav government arbitration boards into a 
system of economic courts which have assumed functions similar in 
essence to commercial courts in the civil law countries of Western 
Europe. As the presiding judge of the Supreme Economic Court of 
Yugoslavia explained: 
104 Piotrowski, supra note 100, also Piotrowski, "Na marginesie propono­
wanych zmian w polskim prawie rodzinnym," PiP 739 (No. 11, 1960). 
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The reason for converting the State Court of Arbitration into economic 
courts lies in the changes which were made in Yugoslavia in the system 
of economy and planning. The new economic system, whose hallmarks 
included the economic-juridical independence of economic enterprises, 
the management of factories and enterprises by the working collective and 
the fixing of the economic organizations' rights, has made it possible for 
economic organizations to appear independently on the market, which 
fact, in tum, has had its effect of expanding the role of law in regulating 
mutual property relationships and strengthening the role of law in that 
domain.105 
In this situation, the work of the courts of arbitration has assumed 
a new function, and has turned into a "purely judicial organ." 
The interesting feature of the new Yugoslav arrangement is that 
the Soviet type of adjudication through arbitration boards was re­
tained in those industries which have remained in the direct admin­
istration of the Department of Defense. Such is directed to decide 
controversies between military and economic organizations, military 
institutions, or authorized commands which have continued for spe­
cific reasons under the bureaucratic regime.106 
ENFORCEMENT OF PRIVATE RIGHTS 
A distinguished American jurist has thus characterized the law 
of modem societies : 
.. . there had resulted a degree of antinomy between the classic system 
of private rights and the concept of public service, closely supervised or 
even provided by administrative organs of the state. Private rights in 
essence pertain to individuals; the public services to great impersonal 
public utilities or organs of government. The former are enforced by 
sporadic litigation in independent tribunals; the latter supervised or con­
ducted by administrative officers subject to more or less restricted judicial 
• 107 rev1ew . . . .  
In the Soviet polity this antinomy is no longer in evidence. In­
dividual life has been so closely integrated with the activities and 
vast responsibilities of the public organizations that litigation in in­
dependent tribunals is no longer important in securing the frontiers 
105 Goldstajn, "The Economic Courts," The New Yugoslav Law, 32-37 
(July-Dec., 1954 ) ;  cf. Gsovski and Grzybowski, supra note 57, at 820-23. 
106 Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 57, at 821 .  
107 Yntema, Crossroads of Justice 162 ( 1957 ) .  
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of individual liberties. Courts are still competent to provide solutions 
to conflicts arising from family relations and to ajudicate in disputes 
arising from petty transactions betWeen individuals, private quarrels, 
or conflict of interests. Rights arising from contracts of work or 
government employment belong to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
general jurisdiction, and courts still deal with claims to a share in 
inheritance. But these rights are precarious. The institution of in­
heritance is not necessarily a constant feature of socialist order, and 
the institution of the family was subject to scrutiny as to the role 
it would play in the new society. In the vast area where the roots of 
individual existence are planted, however, individual rights have 
only a secondary mission. Thus, there is no channel for the adjudica­
tion against the government of claims arising from their exercise for 
the benefit of individual existence. Rights are determined in general 
constitutional clauses and concretized in administrative regulations. 
The general atmosphere in which the vast mechanism of the socialist 
state developed and in which the spirit of its laws took shape was such 
that some forty years after the Soviet State had come into existence, a 
leading Soviet jurist complained: 
Until quite recently such an important function in the activity of the social­
ist state as the protection of rights and legal interests of the citizens was 
not considered an independent function. This thesis was based on an 
incorrect interpretation of the well known statements of I. V. Stalin . . .  
who stated that "the main task of the revolutionary legality in our time 
consists concretely in the protection of socialist property-and in nothing 
else." Without doubt, protection of socialist property is an important 
function of the Soviet state. However, limitation of the tasks of the socialist 
legaljty exclusively to the protection of socialist property means nothing 
else but. the neglect in the protection of rights and legal interests of the 
citizens. los 
108 Romashkin, supra note 1 0, at 9. Kaminskaia, "V chem znachenie 
protsessualnikh garantii v sovetskom ugolovnom protsesse," SGP 52 
(No. S, 1950) : "If we say that Soviet law protects the interests of the 
Soviet citizens we mean those interests which are identical with the 
interests of the state and we may not think of anything else. Certainly, 
the Soviet state and its legislation cannot guarantee the interests of 
those citizens to live the life of parasites." Cf. Vyshinskii, Voprosy 
teorii gosudarstva i prava 72, 83 (1949) ;  Trainin, "Nekotorye vivody 
dla nauki prava iz diskussii po voprosam biologii," SGP 2 (No. 2, 
1949);  Fedkin, "0 rukovodiashchei roli VKP(b) v razvitii sovetskogo 
sotsialisticheskogo prava," SGP 1 1  ff. (No. 6, 1950). 
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In addition, the indifference of the Soviet state to the problem 
of rights is not the only reason for their poor enforcement and lack 
of concern with that aspect of legal commerce in the socialist order. 
The formulation of individual rights is such that legal processes have 
no function in their implementation. One of the techniques of the 
integration of individual life into the social processes has been 
that individual rights became formulated so as to be capable of 
implementation primarily through social action, e.g., right to work, 
protection of family, or equality of sexes. Two Polish lawyers have 
pointed out that such a formulation frequently means that a full im­
plementation of rights depends upon the level of economic develop­
ment: 
For the poor countries, a narrower formula of the civil rights is more 
advisable particularly as regards these points which deal with the so-called 
social rights, in order to establish some correlation between their formula­
tion and a reality. It is also indispensable to remove all sorts of "democratic 
privileges" in the areas which do not belong to the sphere of civil rights. 
In this sphere, real liberty is better than phony equality-the freedom 
of the citizen to acquire certain property according to his financial pos­
sibilities, and not according to the official prices with rights to acquire 
factually limited to a small circle of persons. Official prices constitute 
one of those shams of democracy : prices so low that (theoretically) every­
body has a material chance to acquire a thing or a service. But what of 
it when there is not enough of them for everybody? In such situations 
it is preferable that the price of such objects be fixed according to supply 
and demand.1oe 
In this situation, the implementation and content of individual 
rights is not a matter of the concrete legal situation but of govern­
mental policy. In consequence, judicial review became disqualified 
from playing a hand in the process of the supervision of government's 
performance, and the control of governmental activities in this re­
spect was entrusted to the procuratura. In addition to its functions 
in the field of the prosecution of crimes and the protection of the in­
terests of the state in private litigations, it was charged with a gen­
eral supervision of all governmental institutions below the ministerial 
level from the point of view of the observance of the laws and regula-
109 Opalek & Zakrzewski, Z zagadnien praworzl¢no§ci socjalistycznej 98-99 
( 1958) .  
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tions in force. In practice, procuratorial agencies respond to individual 
complaints against governmental actions which impair the rights of 
Soviet citizens. 
This aspect of the activities of the procuratorial agencies came to 
the fore after the demise of Stalin. Socialist Legality, a periodical is­
sued by the Procurator General, carries in each number a section 
devoted to the protests lodged by the procuratorial officers against 
the violations of the law not only in judicial cases but also in regard 
to the action by various administrative agencies.110 
Procuratorial actions reveal the intimate connection between 
administrative decisions and the rights of citizens arising from general 
conditions provided in the laws in force regarding various categories 
of employment.111 So, for instance, a protest was lodged against a 
ministerial instruction which gave the foremen, senior foremen, and 
chiefs of plants the right to impose certain penalties exceeding the 
disciplinary powers given these officers under the law .112 In another 
case, a protest was lodged against the instruction of the chief of an 
educational program which ordered the subordinate administration of 
education in Kursk to replace all instructors without higher education 
with instructors with higher education, as the law does not require 
higher education from this category of instructors.113 
Similarly, a procuratorial protest was made against an instruc­
tion of the USSR Ministry of Finance concerning certain persons in 
possession of houses and building plots. Involved was the operation 
of certain regulations imposing special taxes on those who had 
taken posession of such house and plots without proper authoriza­
tion: 114 The procuratura also protested an instruction of higher 
authorities which would deprive candidates for higher examinations of 
their earnings during the time of such examinations; 115 an instruc­
tion barring employment of a dismissed worker in another enterprise 
under the same administration; 1 16 an order to reduce the wages of 
1 10 Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 57, at 547-57; cf. also editorial: 
"Pravo grazhdanina na zhalobu," Sots. zak. 4 (No. 7, 1960).  
1 1 1  Gsovski & Grzybowski, supra note 57, at 554. 
1 12 Sots. zak. 5 (No. 5, 1958) .  
1 13 Ibid. 
1 14 Ibid. 
1 15 Id. at 94 (No. 4, 1958) .  
116  Ibid. 
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workers for incomplete production; 117 an order fixing without proper 
authorization an age limit for certain positions in the research in­
stitutes of the Ministry of Health; 118 and an instruction which pro­
hibited employment of persons living in other localities.119 
Another aspect of the right to work was dealt with by a protest 
against an instruction which barred the employment of drivers who 
failed a driver's test in other jobs in the same institution.120 A 
procuratorial protest dealt with the refusal of an executive commit­
tee of a province in Uzbekistan to continue grants in aid to a mother 
of many children who left a kolkhoz for another locality without 
the permission of the committee. The protest contended that this deci­
sion violated the right to freedom of movement of this woman.121 In 
another case, the procuratura objected against delegation of authority 
to the subordinate agency.122 
The characteristic feature of this type of redress is that indi­
vidual complaint is only a means of obtaining information of the 
departure from the rules of law. Proceedings are then initiated which 
aim not so much at safeguarding individual rights as at the correc­
tion of a mistaken line of policy. Individual involvement in the preser­
vation of the correct line of policy by government authorities in 
accordance with the laws in force is reduced to a minimum. The ele­
ment of the violation of private rights pertaining to a specific indi­
vidual citizen of the Soviet polity is not essential for the performance 
of the function of supervision. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to 
detect the element of a violation of rights in the case which concerned 
the validity of the instruction that in future only people living in the 
locality where a government institution was located be considered 
for employment. 
Thus, in the final analysis, the concern of the procuratorial 
services with individual rights originates not so much in the content 
of the rule of law, which deals also with general conditions of 
service regarding personnel policy, but from the decision of the 
1 17 /d. at 108 (No. 7, 1958) .  
1 18 /d. at 87  (No. 7, 1960) .  
1 19 /d. a t  87  (No. 5 ,  1960) .  
120 Ibid. 
121  /d. at 89 (No. 7, 1959) .  
122 Ibid. 
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Twentieth Congress which ordered a stricter protection of individual 
rights. The decision of the Party Congress could influence the gen­
eral tone of the work of government agencies in the performance of 
their official duties, but could not change the function of individual 
rights in the socialist legal order. It is not in the nature of this order 
to consider individual rights as absolute values. 
In a Polish case in which a worker sued a government enter­
prise for damages (one month's pay) because of improper dismissal, 
it was alleged that, contrary to the regulations, the factory manager 
alone signed the notice of separation. The Polish Supreme Court 
gave the following opinion: 
· 
[I]t is necessary to examine whether claimant's demands are not an abuse 
of his rights . . . It must be borne in mind that the Polish People's Republic 
is a state of the working people, in which every citizen has a duty to 
protect social property . . . .  It follows that one of the rules of social co­
existence in a people's state is that a citizen has no right to counterpoise 
fully his rights to the interests of his enterprise as being totally alien to 
his own. Obviously this is not to mean that individual interests should 
be subordinated to the interests of all, but to mean a wise compromise 
between the two.128 
To adjust the rights and claims of the disputants in a civil suit 
is a legitimate function of the modem judge. According to modem 
civil codes, its classic example is judicial power to distribute more 
equitably the hazards of modem life, not according to principles of 
liability, but according to the economic position of the parties. The 
appearance of this institution is one of the symptoms of the relativity 
of the institution of property in our society. The decision of the 
Polish Supreme Court indicates that the rights of the workingman, 
which in our world are a matter of public policy and remain un­
affected by contract, have also become relative. 
123 Decision of November 23, 1958, Case No. 4 CO 18/58, PiP 1085 (No. 
1 2, 1959) .  
Chapter VI 
THE QUESTION MARK OVER THE 
SOCIALIST RECHTSST AA T 
THE NEW PHASE 
The work of the Soviet jurist is done in the shadow of the thesis 
that its ultimate purpose is to contrive a disappearing act for both 
the state and the legal order. The prophecy that state and law will 
one day no longer be the attributes of our life lies beyond the range 
of the present study. It is brought in here only fuasmuch as it provides 
the ethos of Soviet planning and as it influences the forms of Soviet 
institutions, preferences for the forms of social action, and the legisla­
tive techniques to effect governmental and social reforms. While it 
is useful to establish connections between political aims and a legal 
measure, its effects must be examined in the context of its social 
role, irrespective of the political aspects of its origin. Once the rule 
of law has been enacted, it represents its own complex of prob­
lems occurring in response to the unique characteristics of legal ac­
tion. 
The issue of the withering of state and law lay dormant during 
Stalin's regime. After the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, the im­
mediate task was to repair the damage caused to the Soviet ship of 
state by the "cult of personality"-a brand name for policies and 
governmental techniques which relied on use of force and dictatorial 
forms of government with little respect for the legal rule and demo­
cratic processes. The socialist state was to give meaning to the rule 
of its own law. Since the Twenty-first Congress of the Party in 1959, 
the reform of the legal system has acquired a new sense because, as 
the Congress stated, the time has come to reorganize all phases of 
Soviet life. The time is thought to be ripe because of the contemporary 
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upsurge of economic forces in Soviet society on which the dawn of 
communism is predicated. This declaration has put on the action 
calendar of the day the question of the withering away of the state 
and law. 
The socialist state, which followed the destruction of the capi­
talist order, retained certain characteristics of the bourgeois state, 
which were deemed indispensable under socialism. Among these were 
remnants of bourgeois law, including techniques of legal action and 
the use of force by the state. These features of the socialist state were 
scheduled to disappear under communism.1 
Lenin established certain objective conditions for the arrival of 
communism, independent of the levels of socialist productive forces. 
These consisted primarily in the ability of Soviet society to exercise 
controlling and organizing functions without the state and formal 
legal rule. The need for the state and law would be eliminated because 
the vast majority of members of the society would acquire skills re­
quired for performing government and administrative functions. Fur­
thermore, they would acquire the habit of performing these func­
tions without remuneration and in addition to their normal duties 
in the economic processes. Then these functions, which are now in 
the hands of the administrative departments, agencies, and special 
governmental services, would be discharged by the society itself. The 
result would be a perfect state .of law enforcement and a biological 
unity between the social structure and the exercise of governmental 
functions. 2 
In general perspective, the reforms initiated after the Twenty-first 
Party Congress were a continuation of the reforms which followed 
the demise of Stalin. The regime of the Georgian dictator was charac­
terized by a high concentration of administrative powers in the hands 
of the Union government. The gradual unloading of the accumulated 
powers was followed by a radical reform of the economic adminis­
tration, which shifted ail administrative functions from the center to-
1 Aleksieiev, "0 zakonomernostiakh razvitia sovetskogo prava v period 
razvernutogo stroitelstva kommunizma," SGP 10 (No. 9, 1960 ) .  
2 Lenin, The State an d  Revolution, 3 3  Soch. ISS; cf. Chapter IV supra, 
text at note 9a; the full theory of this process was worked out by Engels 
in Anti-DUring. 
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ward the republics and the regions administered by the councils of na­
tional economy.3 Decisions of the Twenty-first Congress attached an 
ideological significance to the process which was already taking place 
and mapped out a further program of decentralization. Decentraliza­
tion, in this phase, went beyond the mere framework of the bureau­
cratic mechanism of the Soviet state, but engaged its representative 
and social institutions. 
In the first place, the Congress recommended further decentrali­
zation of authority and a further shifting of governmental functions 
to the lower levels of governmental authority. Secondly, it was de­
cided to draw social organizations into the processes of government 
and to devise methods which would make them directly responsible 
for the maintenance of law and order and for the exercise of judicial 
and certain other functions of government. 
The decisions of the Twenty-first Congress expressed the con­
viction that, as Lenin predicted, more perfect law enforcement would 
3 At the time of Stalin's demise, administration of the national economy 
of the USSR was almost exclusively tied to decision from the center. 
According to the distribution of responsibilities for the management 
of various branches of national economy, only some 30 per cent of 
industry was in charge of the individual republics, while the rest was 
run by the Union. This process was reversed, and by 1956, after the 
initial unloading of responsibilities for various industrial branches, only 
some 45 per cent of the national economy was still run by the industrial 
ministries of the federal government, while the rest was classified as 
industry of local character and importance. As such it was under the 
direct and exclusive administration of the individual republics or local 
soviets. 
These measures were only preliminary to more basic reforms, and, 
after a good deal of cogitation and discussion, the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR approved during the session May 7-10, 1957, the law on 
Further Improvement of the Organization of Industry and Construction 
in the Soviet Union. The main feature of the reform was to replace 
branch administrations run from the center by the territorial ad­
ministrations under economic councils (sovnarkhoz) set up by the 
individual republics forming the Union. The entire territory of the 
Soviet Union was divided into 104 economic administrative units, each 
beaded by an economic council. Vedomosti, sec. 275 (1957); cf. SOP 
4 (No. 4, 1959); Kommunist 27 (No. 13, 1958); Khrushchev's speech 
to the Supreme Soviet of May 7, 1957, Pravda, May 9, 1957; for de­
tailed description of the organization and operation of the councils of 
national economy cf. Petrov, Sovety narodnogo khoziaistva (1958). 
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thus be assured. The direct participation of society could play an im­
portant role in combating breaches of socialist law and order. "Our 
public organizations," said Khrushchev, "have no less adequate ca­
pacities, means and forces for this than the militia, the courts and the 
prosecutor's office." 4 
Less than a year later, Khrushchev reported to the Supreme 
Soviet as follows: 
Guided by the decisions of the Twenty-First Congress, the Party and the 
government are constantly effectuating measures for the further develop­
ment of socialist democracy drawing the wide masses of the working 
people into the administration of the country's political, economic and 
cultural affairs. Extension of the rights of Union Republics, local authorities 
and public organizations and reorganization of industrial management 
have produced valuable results. The activity of the masses, politically and 
on the labor front, is growing and their creative initiative developing. 
More and more functions are being entrusted to public organizations, 
and they are playing a bigger part in economic and cultural development 
and in strengthening socialist legality. One evidence of this is the recent 
decision of the USSR Council of Ministers and of the Party Central Com­
mittee to abolish the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and transfer its 
functions to the Republics and local authorities. This is done not only 
to reduce the size and cost of our administrative apparatus but chiefly 
to further develop socialist democracy and enhance the role of public 
organizations in combating infringement of our laws, and to extend the 
powers of local authorities.ll 
The process of decentralization, which resulted in an impressive 
reduction of the central apparatus of the government of the union, 
was paralleled by the transfer of some governmental functions into 
the administration of social organizations. Even before the Twenty­
first Congress, the administration of . sports and physical culture was 
made the business of the social organizations (trade unions) , and the 
Congress recommended that a similar step should be taken for the 
administration of health and cultural aflairs.6 
4 XXI sjezd KPSS o razvitii i ukreplenii sovetskogo sotsialisticheskogo 
gosudarstva (No. 4, 1959); Denisov, "0 sootnoshenii gosudarstva i 
obshchestva v perekhodnyi ot kapitalizma do kommunizma period," 
SGP 29-40 (No. 4, 1960); cf. XXI sjezd KPSS i zadatchi sovetskoi 
pravovoi nauki, SGP 4-5 (No. 2, 1959). 
S Supplement to the New Times, No. 4, January 1960. 
6 XXI sjezd KPSS i zadatchi sovetskoi pravovoi nauki, SGP 4-5 (No. 
2, 1959) . 
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Decentralization of governmental powers and the creation of 
new channels for law enforcement represent only two sides of the 
same process, directed at drawing broad social strata into direct par­
ticipation in government. At the present stage, the level of individual 
skills and habit of participation in governmental functions does not 
permit the individual involvement of Soviet citizens. This must still 
be done by way of their membership in social organizations, on the 
basis of directed action. 7 
The transition to communism, or at least the first phase of it, 
will not result in the relaxation of formal social ties. Quite to the con­
trary, as the Resolution of the Twenty-first Congress of the Party 
warned: 
[A] definite dialectical link is inevitable between a socialist state formation 
and law, on the one hand, and self-administration by the people and social 
norm of a communist society on the other; it consists of the preservation 
in a different form of some of the elements constituting the activity of 
the state and content of the norms of law.8 
· 
Soviet jurists interpret this statement as indicating that the cen­
tralized character of the Soviet state will not be affected by the process 
of change, neither at present nor in the future. Communist society is 
not planned to be a structure of free individuals who act according 
to a certain pattern because of internal compulsion and acquired 
behavioral pattern. Communist society will still be a centralized so­
ciety. As a Ukrainian jurist wrote: 
The view that the system of self-administration in a communist society 
is a decentralized system is a revisionist and anarcho-syndicalist distortion 
of Marxist-Leninist teachings on the socialist state and structure of 
society in the highest phase of communist society. Both a socialist state 
formation and self-administration in a Communist society are understood 
by the classics of Marxism-Leninism as a democratically centered organ­
ization.9 
Soviet leaders and jurists are anxious to forestall any premature 
ideas regarding a rapid change in the methods and forms of govern-
7 Ibid. 
8 XXI sjezd KPSS o razvitii i ukreplenii sovetskogo sotsialisticheskogo 
gosudarstva 14 (No.4, 1959). 
9 Radyanskie pravo 18 (No.4, 1959). 
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ment, such as turning the Soviet state into a system of loosely con­
nected organizations, each responsible for its own area of competence. 
Khrushchev, describing the process of transition from socialism to 
communism, used language which left little doubt as to the fact that 
the process of transition means a greater cohesion of both govern­
mental machinery and social structures.10 Transition from the socialist 
state into communist society will be a gradual process, characterized 
not so much by the organization of new means of exercising govern­
mental powers but by the changes in the nature of governmental 
functions. Organs of state administration will acquire the character 
of social organizations, and their function will acquire a social char­
acter, while rules of social behavior, which they will enforce, no 
longer will be legal rules: 
[T]he withering away of the state by no means implies the disappearance 
of all . . .  authority and administration. 
The withering away of the laws does not mean the disappearance of 
standards of social behavior, personal freedoms, and social duties of the 
peoples. It would be an unforgivable vulgarization to represent the matter 
in a manner according to which as the laws wither away under communism, 
all the rules governing social relations and personal rights and freedoms 
of citizens disappear, too. They wiii remain under communism, but they 
wiillose their political and legal character.n 
Soviet jurists and leaders have restated in a new form Stalin's 
doctrine that, as Soviet society comes closer to the realization of the 
goals of social reconstruction, the functions of the state and law will 
expand. They sound a note warning that resolutions of the Twenty­
first. Congress indicate that state direction of the national economy 
will increase, that the government of the Soviet polity will continue 
to provide for the defense of the country, and that its educational 
and organizing functions will expand. In particular 
10 " ... year 1960 will go down in history as the first year of the extensive 
building of communist society in our country . .. .  The past year has been 
a further strengthening of the social and political system, the continued 
development of socialist democracy and the heightening of the or­
ganizing and educational role of the Communist Party." Supra note 8, 
at 15. 
11 Romashkin, "Razvitie funktsii sovetskogo gosudarstva v protsesse pos­
troienia kommunizma," SGP (No. 10, 1958). 
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... shall continue and shall grow such functions of the socialist state 
as the function of the brotherly cooperation with other countries of 
socialism, the function of the preservation of peace. Until the full victory 
of Communism, shall be preserved protection of social property and 
social order and the supervision and the measure of work and measure 
of satisfaction of social needs.t2 
Not until several conditions are met will state and law disappear, but 
even then not wholly. Before that happens, a high level of production and 
high cultural level of the entire society will have to be reached. Differences 
between the forms of life in the urban and agrarian environment, and be­
tween physical and intellectual work must be abolished. Survivals of 
capitalism in the minds of the people, and the danger of external aggression 
must be liquidated, and the entire society with all its members must fully 
conform to the rules of life in a socialist community. Only then will the 
socialist state have no function and no responsibility. However, adminis­
tration of things and productive processes will continue, but will lose its 
political function.ts 
The general picture of this process is an almost total identifica­
tion of social organizations with the governmental apparatus, and the 
integration of social and governmental actions into single patterns of 
activity not only within a single area of life (e.g., economic activity) 
but also within the same governmental function (administration of 
justice, police functions, etc.). Social organizations become govern­
ment agencies organized on a different principle: 
The activities of the social organization in the administration of the 
affairs of the society, as distinct from the "intra-union" administration of 
voluntary so-;ieties ... must be carried out within the framework of the 
Soviet Constitution which envisages the uniform subordination of all 
organizations and citizens to the law of the Soviet state.t4 
Conversely, the elements of public administration acquire the 
characteristics of social organizations of the voluntary associations 
in the discharge of public functions. Khrushchev, referring to social 
organizations, called the Soviets the largest and the most important 
among them.15 Kommunist, the ideological paper of the Communist 
12 Mitskievitch, "Razshirenie roll obshchestvennikh organizatsii v period 
razvernutogo stroitelstva kommunizma," SOP 26 (No. 9, 1959). 
13 Id at 33. 
14 Jd. at 32. 
15 Khrushchev, Rech na sobranii izbiratelej Kalininskogo izbiratelnogo 
okruga goroda Moskvy 7 ( 1959). 
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Party of the Soviet Union, anticipated Khrushchev's statement by 
writing in 1958 that the Soviets will not disappear from the future 
Communist society, but "as society draws closer to Communism, 
they, gradually, losing their class political character may merge into 
a system of self-administration in a Communist society." Further, 
they will not only merge, but may even occupy the central, leading 
position.16 
Thus, some form of fusion between social and governmental 
organizations is planned in which the Soviets will occupy a control­
ling position with two facets-one representative of the administrative 
aspect of the Soviet governmental machinery and the other indicative 
of its essential association with the society which it represents. In the 
new scheme of things which is taking shape as a result of govern­
mental and party decisions, both sides of Soviet activities have gained 
considerable importance. 
Owing to the process of decentralization, the Soviets have ob­
tained a firmer grip on local industries which serve to satisfy local 
needs. In the areas of its original jurisdiction, interference by the 
higher echelons of the administrative apparatus seems to have been 
restricted to cases of clear violations of the rule of law in forceP On 
the village level, the Decree of September 12, 1957, introduced an 
important reorganization of the village Soviet. By increasing its size 
and assigning additional personnel, the exercise of some basic func­
tions of government on the local level became possible.18 Another 
development, which enhanced the role of the local Soviets, was the 
assignment of administrative punitive powers to the militia com­
mis�ion of the local Soviet, beginning with the township Soviets within 
their territorial units.19 
Moreover, a significant change occurred in the style of the work 
of the local authorities. Until now, decisions of the Soviet, consisting 
of the elected members, were implemented through the instrumen­
tality of administrative personnel employed by its executive commit-
16 Kommunist (No. 11, 1958); cf. Aleksieiev, supra note 1, at 12-16. 
17 C/. supra at 180-81. 
18 Zimin, "Novoe polozhenie o selskom sovete deputatov trudiashchykhsia 
RSFSR" SGP 3-ll (No. 1, 1958). 
19 Mitskievitch, supra note 12, at 27. 
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tee. Now, the emphasis is on the direct action of the various com­
missions consisting of the elected members of the Soviet. These now 
practice direct action in cooperation with social organizations or 
through the so-called activists in various areas of administrative re­
sponsibility. 
Since 1959, the number of deputies in tlie Soviet has increased 
considerably. Thus has been permitted closer and informal coopera­
tion of the Soviets with trade unions, youth organizations, housing 
and street committees, people's militia, committees for the affairs of 
minors, etc., which themselves are active in their various areas of 
social action. These latter also cooperate with the Soviets in order to 
realize specific programs in the field of public security, education, 
social welfare projects, the administration of housing, and the liquida­
tion of crime and juvenile delinquency. 20 
The over-all purpose is to exploit the influence, social ramifi­
cations, and manpower which various social institutions have at their 
disposal. There are at least three patterns of cooperation between 
social and governmental institutions. Social organizations perform 
specific services (e.g., rehabilitation of criminals). They are in charge 
of governmental functions, which are also handled at a different level, 
by the governmental agencies. Finally, social organizations, particu­
larly those which participate in the economic functions of the socialist 
system, assume general responsibility for the affairs of a social group, 
thus bringing the situation very close to the medieval pattern of dis­
tributing authority. 
SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GOVERNMENTAL 
FUNCTIONS 
The involvement of social organizations in the administration of 
justice, resulting from the reforms initiated by the Twenty-first Con­
gress, had its precedent in the early days of the Revolution. Trade 
unions with special responsibilities in the factories of Russia had 
established their disciplinary tribunals. These were limited initially 
to disciplining the workers, but tended to expand their functions un­
til they began to compete with the jurisdiction of the people's courts, 
20 Ibid 
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which finally caused their liquidation.21 A somewhat longer career 
was enjoyed by comradely courts which, organized in the army 
(1917),  ultimately spread later to the factories (1919).  Their pur­
pose was to maintain the morale of the army and of factory crews in 
the fulfillment of their duties. In 1928 (August 28 ) the basic law on 
the organization of the comradely courts in factories and in govern­
mental and social establishments was enacted. Then in 1930, village 
courts were set up, and in 1930 and 1931, similar institutions were 
established in housing organizations. 
The purpose of these organizations was to deal with minor of­
fenses originating mainly in private accusations. Their jurisdiction 
was based on the fact that parties were employed, or lived, in the 
same village, factory, or in the same house. Such minor problems, 
arising out of conflicts between neighbors or coworkers, have little 
general significance. Neither did they constitute a danger to the pres­
ervation of peace. Thus, the state could profitably leave them to be 
handled by quasi-judicial bodies. However, as Soviet society moved 
toward total monopolization of public authority by the central gov­
ernment, the activities of the comradely courts began to dwindle and 
in the late thirties were practically halted.22 
An editorial in a: Soviet legal periodical found the cause of the 
disappearance of this form of social participation in governmental 
activities in the fact that comradely courts lost contact with the social 
milieu which produced them: 
The drawback of the regulations concerning social courts, introduced 
thirty years ago, was precisely this, that direction of their work was the 
responsibility not of the Soviets or trade unions, but of the people's courts. 
This fact transformed comradely courts into a supplementary element in 
the state judicial system, and limited their contact with the broad social 
masses.28 
21 Hazard, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society, The Formative Years of 
Legal Institutions 182 .(1960). 
22 "Obshchestvennye sudy-vazhneishaia rola borby z perezhytkami prosh­
logo," SGP 4-5 (No.5, 1959); Savitskii & Keyzerov, "Razvitie pravovykh 
form organizatsii i dejatelnosti tovarishcheskikh sudov," SGP 37-46 
(No. 4, 1961); Hazard, Le droit sovi6tique et le d6p6rissement de !':£tat 
4-5 (1960). 
23 Obshchestvennye sudy, supra note 22, at 1 0; Mitskievitch, supra note 
12, at 26. 
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It is useless to speculate whether comradely courts had a chance 
to survive Stalin's regime merely by dint of a different affiliation. 
However, it is also true that the present policy of the regime is to 
foster the expansion of governmental functions of a general nature 
within social groups which owe their existence to their functions in 
the economic units, i.e., collective farms and workers' organizations 
on the factory level. 
Of the two, farming collectives are more important in terms of 
the human mass involved, as somewhat more than 50 per cent of the 
Soviet population lives and works in the countryside. By the very 
nature of things, village communities, closely identified with the 
economic organization which almost totally absorbs the life of an 
average member of the collective, represent an ideal social environ­
ment for self-government activities. Under Stalin these tendencies suf­
fered from the fact that centralized economic administration gave 
little independence to the collective's authorities, which voted charters 
and statutes according to the single model prepared by the ministries 
and adopted economic plans and deliveries of farm products to the 
government according to instructions centrally prepared. 
On March 5, 1956, the Central Committee of the Party and the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR passed a resolution to encourage 
the collectives to depart from the pattern and adapt their charters to 
local conditions. After the Twenty-first Party Congress, the Supreme 
Court of the Soviet Union followed this resolution with a ruling 
(March 26, 1960) which instructed the courts that charters of the 
collective farms had to be considered as the basic source of law in 
legal disputes: 
[W]hile adjudicating in civil matters pertaining to agricultural collectives, 
the courts should take into account that members of the collectives make 
decision as regards the disposal of the products and of the property of 
the collective, and direct its activities in accordance with the laws of the 
Soviet authority, decisions of the Party and of the Government ... and 
that a collective's charter with its supplements and amendments which 
were registered by the executive committee of the region represents the 
basic law for its activities.24 
24 Bardin, "Novoe postanovlenie plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR '0 
Sudebnoi praktike po grazhdanskim kolkhoznym delam,'" SGP 12 (No. 
6, 1960). 
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Self-government of agricultural collectives has also been upheld 
by the Supreme Court in connection with the administration of crimi­
nal statutes. Thus, the court quashed the case against three members of 
a collective, who were charged with a theft of social property, stating: 
It is not correct to initiate criminal prosecution of the members of an 
agricultural collective for offenses connected with the economic activities 
of the collective, without a prior decision in this respect by the general 
meeting of the collective. If the injured party is a collective farm, then 
the problem regarding making good the losses, application of correctional 
measures to the offenders should be in the first place decided by the 
general meeting of the members of the collective.211 
The Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Union, in. an article 
published in the leading legal periodical, approvingly described the 
situation in one of the agricultural collectives with a membership of 
some six thousand. This collective gives no business to the criminal 
courts. It is admitted that criminal offenses are committed in this 
exemplary association of Soviet Citizens. The chairman of the col­
lective explained this situation by the fact that, owing to the organiza­
tion of work, not the slightest transgression of the law escapes 
attention. Transgressions are dealt with on all of the levels of the organ­
ization of the collective, in the working brigade, by the party com­
mittee, and by the administration, as well as in the general meeting. 
The results of this method are said to be most satisfactory, particu-
larly in regard to moral rehabilitation of the offenders.26 
· 
A somewhat analogous development took place in the indus­
trial sector of the national economy. The decree of the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet of July 15, 1958, gave additional jurisdiction to 
the factory and local trade union committee regarding participation 
in the management of industrial enterprise or a working institution, 
in all those aspects which concern the interests and the rights of the 
factory crew, enforcement of the labor law, and matters affecting the 
fulfillment of the economic plan. Expansion of administrative respon­
sibilities was combined with expansion of judicial powers. Thus, the 
factory and trade union committee deal locally with all matters of 
discipline, with appeals from the labor disputes boards, and render 
25 Gorkin, "0 zadatchakh sovetskogo suda v period razvernutogo stroitelstva 
kommunizma," SGP 17 (No. 3, 1960); cf. Pravda, July 29, 1959. 
26 Ibid. 
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decisions on the dismissal of workers. In this particular field their 
decisions are final, and their powers resemble very much the powers 
of an umpire. The factory committee may modify the decision to 
dismiss a worker and impose another disciplinary measure, with a 
warning to the culprit. It may also order steps designed to instill in 
the member of the crew a correct attitude toward work and per­
formance of his duties, including social supervision by the members 
of his working brigade or team, as well as investigation of his per­
sonal circumstances. 27 
As compared with the situation in the agricultural collectives, 
the operation of group government in the industrial environment of 
socialist society is narrow in scope, and certainly the urban environ­
ment restricts the degree of the factory committee's control over 
individual workers. However, the expansion of factory housing proj­
ects and of welfare services and the amenities of factory life tend to 
increase the effectiveness of collective control over individual mem­
bers of the factory crew. 
NEW FORMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 
The outline of principles to provide a guide for the reform of 
criminal codes in the Soviet republics states that 
... administration of justice in criminal matters belongs exclusively to the 
court. Nobody may be declared guilty of committing a crime and be 
subjected to penalty except by court sentence. 
Article 7 of the General Principles of Criminal Legislation was read 
in the context of the abolition in 1955 of the Special Board in the 
Ministry of the Interior which exercised vast punitive powers, gen­
erally without trial, and which at one time was the most important 
instrument of criminal repression.28 
27 Ak.hverdian, "Zakreplenie vazhneishykh dostizhenii sovetskogo naroda," 
SGP 97 (No. 11, 1959): " • . .  in those enterprises, where the factory 
committee of the trade union under the leadership of the party organiza­
tion fully exercises the rights which it has under the statute, all basic 
problems of production, of work and living conditions are decided by 
the management of the enterprise only in cooperation with the trade 
union organization." 
28 Gsovski & Grzybowski, Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe 578 ( 1959). 
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The significance of Article 7 was somewhat weakened by the 
fact that in a number of Soviet Republics a law against parasites was 
adopted. It provided that a meeting of neighbors could exile for 
two to five years of forced labor persons who carry on "a parasitic 
mode of life ... as well as those living on unearned income." The 
only formality required, in addition to the popular vote, was that 
the decision to impose a sentence was subject to confirmation by the 
executive of the district soviet. There was no appeal to a court. 
However, at that particular moment this method of criminal 
repression of the enemies of the socialist mode of life was somewhat 
in doubt. Its adoption was discussed in other republics but was re­
jected in RSFSR, which somewhat checked its progress. In the ab­
sence of the regime's clear position, it seemed that this law would 
not significantly detract from the judicial monopoly for the adminis­
tration of criminal statutes. 
The situation changed materially after the Twenty-first Party 
Congress. Khrushchev declared himself in favor of the exercise of 
governmental functions by social organizations: 
Problems of security in our social order, and enforcement of the rules 
of socialist coexistence should, to an ever increasing degree, become the 
business of social organizations. . . . Socialist society forms such volun­
tary agencies of enforcement of the social order as people's militia, com­
radely courts, and similar institutions. They will discharge in new man­
ner ... social functions . . .. 
According to Khrushchev, this new approach to law enforcement 
was dictated by the serious restriction of the powers of the security 
police. 29 The proposal soon became adopted in the RSFSR and in a 
number of other republics, reflecting a change in the general attitude 
of the legislatures of the various republics toward the law on para­
sites. 
In the debate which followed, the administration of serious 
penalties by nonjudicial bodies was declared to be typical for the 
period of transition to communism. Administrative regulation of cer­
tain relationships is being replaced by the institutes of civil law and 
kolkhoz law. Similar changes occur in the field of the administration 
29 Pravda, Jan. 29, 1959. 
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of justice, where judicial functions and court action are replaced by 
administrative forms of criminal responsibility: 
In conditions of transferring separate functions of the governmental 
agencies to social conditions, the tendency in this group of relations is to 
tie it directly to the expansion of autonomous and creative participation 
of the broad working masses in the maintenance of social order and of 
rules of socialist coexistence.so 
The inference is that the broad working masses may provide admin­
istrative action but cannot be a source of judicial process. 
In the past, the functions of the comradely courts were primarily 
concerned with the internal discipline of the social groups which they 
served. As a party resolution stated: 
Disciplinary courts should ... raise the discipline of labor and cultural 
forms of the struggle for the higher productivity of labor not interfering 
with the functions of the people's courts and governmental functions.Bl 
The main duties of the comradely courts were in the re-education of 
the workers, with a view to advancing the interests of production. 
Their social significance consisted in the specific purposes of the 
group, as defined by its economic function. But, in addition, the 
comradely courts dealt with immoral behavior of the factory crew, 
rowdiness, indecent behavior, cursing, minor thefts, etc.32 
The resolution of the Executive Committee of the Council of 
National Economy of the RSFSR of August 27, 1928, added to the 
jurisdiction of the comradely courts cases of insults and lies. 88 A year 
later, they were instructed to deal with cases of bodily harm, minor 
larceny of materials and tools, and civil disputes involving small 
value.84 
Comradely courts were instructed to proceed in an informal 
and simple manner. However, their duty was always to give an op­
portunity to the accused party to be heard. Their action included 
30 Aleksieiev, supra note 1, at 17. 
31 Decision of the Central Committee of the Party of January 12, 1922, 
Savitskii & Keyzerov, supra note 22, at 38. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Sob. uzak. No. 114/707 (1928). 
34 Sob. uzak. No. 67 /62; Savitskii & Keyzerov, supra note 22, at 39. 
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conciliation, arbitration, arrangements for the restitution of damages, 
as well as simple judicial functions. 
Post-Stalin developments have contributed significantly to the 
expansion of their function, although the technicalities of their ac­
tion have remained practically unchanged. 
At the Twenty-first Party Congress, Khrushchev postulated ex­
pansion of their activity outside the immediate social group they 
serve.3� This was duly reflected in Article 1 of Model Act of the 
Comradely Courts, stating that their duty consists in 
.. . educating Soviet citizens in the spirit of communist attitude to work, 
socialist property, observance of the rules of socialist coexistence, pro­
moting with the Soviet people the spirit of collectivism, comradely help, 
respect for dignity and honor of the citizens. 
Their duties were no longer confined to the framework of a social 
group, but were to extend to everybody within their territorial juris­
diction. 
Following the Twenty-first Party Congress decision, No. 3 of 
the Plenary Session of the Soviet Supreme Court (June 19, 1959) 
and Order No. 43 of the Procurator General of July 20, 1959, the 
courts and subordinate prosecutors were instructed to restrict judicial 
action to cases which called for the action of courts. Minor cases 
which could be sucessfully dealt with by social organizations and 
comradely courts should be transmitted to them for informal disposal 
without resorting to formal criminal procedures. 
Both the Supreme Court and the Procurator General resorted to 
an unusual legal argumentation. They referred to Article 7, part 2, 
of the Principles of Criminal Legislation enacted in December 1958. 
Article 7, part 1, contains the definition of the crime. Part 2 of Arti­
cle 7 states that: 
An act of commission or omission shall not be deemed a crime; if al­
though formally containing the elements of an act specified by the crimi­
nal statute, it nevertheless does not represent social danger, because of 
its insignificance.86 
35 Khrushchev, 0 kontrolnikh tsyfrakh razvitia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR 
na 1959-1965 gody 122 (1959). 
· 
36 Sots. zak. 13-19 (No. 9, 1959). 
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The jurisdiction of the comradely courts was regulated in detail 
by the Model Act of the Comradely Courts, which was to serve as 
the basis for the adoption by the individual republics. The Model 
Act appeared in Izvestia on October 23, 1959. 
Comradely courts are competent to deal with minor civil cases, 
breaches of the discipline of labor or factory rules, misuse of ma­
terials, tools, instruments, or means of transport which are social or 
government property, failure to provide proper education for chil­
dren, refusal to accept respectable employment and carrying on of a 
parasitic mode of life, small thefts, minor assault, violation of the 
government monopoly of trade, speculation, breaches of peace, viola­
tion of rules in living quarters, and in all those matters which are 
transmitted by the prosecution or courts. Comradely courts may apply 
various forms of censure, impose fines, put an offender on probation, 
obligate his immediate collective to exercise supervision during a 
certain period, and impose on him the obligation to make up the 
damages caused by his action. 
· 
The primary purpose of the comradely courts is to relieve courts 
of general jurisdiction from dealing with minor criminal and civil 
cases. As an editorial in a Soviet periodical revealed, people's courts 
dispose yearly of more than four million civil cases, quite frequently 
of great simplicity and concerning small value.81 
Moreover, their purpose is to combine the protection of social 
interests with preventive action. The law states: 
The main task of the comradely courts is to prevent violations of the 
law and all actions which harm society, education of the people by means 
of crime prevention and social influence, creation of an atmosphere of 
intolerance for anti-social behavior of any kind. Comradely courts are 
clad in the confidence of the collective and express its will. 
The broad aims of the quasi-judicial action of the comradely 
courts are made realistic by the fact that their action is supported 
by the general mobilization of social organizations in the enforce­
ment of the rules of life in socialist society. Simultaneously with the 
Model Act of the Comradely Courts, two additional model acts, one 
dealing with raising the Role of Social Organizations in the Struggle 
37 SGP 4-S (No. 2, 1959). 
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with the Violations of Soviet Laws and Rules of Soviet Society, and 
the other on the creation of committees for the Affairs of the Juveniles 
(Izvestia, October 23 and 24, 1959) , were published. The comradely 
courts thus became a center of a vast mechanism which is to deal 
with antisocial manifestations in Soviet life, beginning with the af­
fairs of children without proper care, and affecting the behavior of 
Soviet citizens in public places and at work, their general attitude to­
ward one another, family relations, manners in public places, and even 
at home. 
The leading idea in this scheme of things is that not all viola­
tions of codes of social behavior need to be dealt with through judicial 
channels. 88 
The action of the social courts and social organizations is 
strengthened by the formation of the so-called people's detachments, 
which strengthen police action and work on a part-time basis to 
provide security and safety in public places. They participate as a 
supporting arm for the regular police in the investigation of crimes 
and intervene on the spot in all situations which would threaten dis­
turbance of the peace. Their obvious advantage is the presence of 
members of the detachments everywhere-in streets, houses, dwell­
ings, at work, and in recreational institutions-in numbers greatly 
exceeding manpower possibilities of the regular police.89 
Article 38 of the Principles of Criminal Legislation gave social 
organizations the right to intervene in a criminal case, thereby assum­
ing direct responsibility for the rehabilitation of the offender: 
Taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, the character 
of the guilty person, as well as the petition for suspension of sentence 
presented by a social organization, or a collective farm, where the guilty 
person is employed, the court may impose upon these organizations .the 
duty of re-educating and reforming the person whose sentence is sus­
pended. 
38 Utevskii, "Voprosy ugolovnogo prava v projekte zakona," SGP 116-19 
(No. 1, 1960). The leading principle in this connection is that judicial 
punishment is necessary only for those who cannot be reformed by 
means of social influence. 
39 "Nekotorye voprosy sudoustroistva," SGP 72-83 (No.7, 1959); Barsukov, 
"Ob uchastii trudiashchikhsia v okhranie obshchestvennogo poriadka," 
SGP 51-SS (No. 8, 1959). 
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The close collaboration of the courts with the various forms of 
crime prevention is further assured by the institution of the social 
prosecutors and social counsels who, by court order, may be called 
upon to participate for the defense (Article 41 of the Principles of 
Criminal Procedure). 
The purpose of these provisions was to further the idea that 
only some forms of actions and some types of duties may be dis­
charged satisfactorily by the institutions of the state. The functions of 
rehabilitation and re-education are thought to be the proper province 
of social organizations. Some of the drafts of the criminal codes for 
the individual republics have rules that convicts with suspended 
sentences will be placed in the charge of local and village Soviets, 
which report to the courts on the rehabilitation and re-educational 
procedures in each individual case. Some of the other drafts have 
demonstrated rather poor understanding of the new approach. Al­
though it was clear that a suspended sentence precluded execution 
and that educational and supervisory methods did not constitute a 
penalty, it was specified that in such cases procedures provided for 
in the legislation on correctional labor should apply. Correctional 
labor is conceived as a form of penalty which consists in performing 
labor at a selected place of work, without deprivation of freedom and 
at reduced wages (Article 21 and 25 of the Principles of Criminal 
Legislation) .40 
The new order of things, which in this respect differs little from 
the practices of the Stalinist period, aims at exploiting the administra­
tion of criminal justice for the education of the populace at large. 
40 Durmanov, "Ugolovnoe zakonodateistvo Soiuza SSR i ugoiovnoe 
zakonodatelstvo soiuznykh respublik,'' SOP 87-95 (No. 7, 1959). 
Direct participation of social organizations in the administration 
of justice has a long tradition in the Soviet administration of justice. 
Basic principles of criminal procedure of 1924 provided that "deprivation 
of freedom as a preventive measure may be replaced by the guarantee 
of the professional, and other workers, peasant, and social organizations" 
(art. 10). Similarly, art. 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the 
USSR ruled that in addition to the individual guarantee that the suspect 
will not evade justice, such a guarantee may be given by social organiza­
tions of which the suspect is a member. However, codes of the Union 
republics have not included this provision. Baginskii, "Institut obshchest­
vennogo poruchitelstva kak miera preduprezhdenia pravonarushenii i 
perevospitania pravonarushytelei," SOP 71 (No. 10, 1959). 
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Thus, great attention is being paid to the idea that some trials should 
be held in the factories or collective farms which made up the scene 
of the crime or involved their members.n 
Another idea was that a social group or a locality which was 
involved in some manner in the commission of the crime should, 
preliminary to the hearing and the trial of the case itself, be the scene 
of the public investigation of the crime. The proposal was to effect 
this desire at a public meeting in the presence of all those possessing 
some knowledge of the circumstances of the case or at least of the 
actors of the judicial drama. The only objection to this treatment of 
the procedural aspects of criminal proceedings was that it could 
hardly satisfy the need for the secrecy of the pretrial investigation.42 
These various schemes and proposals demonstrate the new con­
cept of the judicial process, which differs in form from direct social 
action only in the feeling of a need for a higher expertise in the 
practical handling of the case. The chief element of formal justice­
the absence of the influence of the local environment on the minds of 
the judges-has been eliminated and replaced by the idea of collective 
responsibility for the behavior of the individual. This is to become 
the cornerstone of the social order in which the coercive role of the 
state and of public authority is to play an ever diminishing role. 
SOCIAL ACTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
There is a good deal of confusion in the minds of Soviet jurists 
concerning the question of to what extent social organizations called 
upon to perform governmental functions are to be bound by the rule 
of law. It is certain that their action will be different as to form, but 
at the same time members of the legal profession point out that all 
governmental functions must conform with the principles of the Con­
stitution and of the Soviet statutes.48 The same impression is gained 
from the provisions of the law on the Increasing the Role of Society 
in .the Protection of Social Order. Its basic idea is to make the entire 
41 Sovetskaia obshchestvennost, reshaiushchaia sila v borbe za ukreplenie 
sotsialisticheskogo pravoporiadka, SGP 20 (No. 10, 1959 ) .  
42 Mitrichev, "Privlechenie obshchestvennosti k rassledovanii prestuplenii," 
Sots. zak. 84 (No. 10, 1960) .  
4 3  Mitskievitch, supra note 12, a t  32. 
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society responsible for the maintenance of law and order. It postulates 
that each Soviet citizen shall not only follow the rules of law, but 
shall act as a law enforcement officer and demand that others con­
form to the rules of socialist legal order (Article 1 ) .  
Moreover, the Resolution of the Twenty-first Congress of the 
Party indicated that some form of lawmaking will still be preserved, 
even after the higher form of social organization is reached. The 
change will affect the form of legal rule, but not its content.44 
Characteristically enough, if there is apprehension as to the 
competence of social organizations to deal with the legal problems of 
modem life, there is a good deal of evidence that, on the whole, 
social organizations are inclined to adopt at least formal aspects of 
governmental action. They are sternly warned, however, that this 
is not what is needed. Informality and direct action should be guiding 
principles in their operations. 
Nevertheless, the quest for informality does not dispense with 
a need for some expertise in the field of law. The very fact that social 
organizations have been given a role in the preservation of law and 
order and in the administration of justice calls for some familiarity 
with its rules and with certain refined legal techniques. Only then may 
the distinction be made between those cases which are fit for social 
treatment and those which still need to be handled with reference to 
the strict rules of the Codes. A high government official (Procurator 
General of Kazakhstan) was greatly concerned with the level of 
legal education of those members of Soviet officialdom who were 
responsible for the application of Soviet statutes. Many violations of 
the rights of citizens could be traced to the lack of legal education, 
and this problem becomes even more acute as social organizations 
are called to discharge public functions : 
Now that participation of society in the strengthening of socialist legality 
and protection of citizens' rights expands, popularization of Soviet laws 
among the population bas an even greater significance in order to pre­
vent the violation of social order.45 
A great obstacle in the preparation of the vast social strata for 
proper functioning in their new role is also a generally low level of 
44 Cf. supra at 245; Aleksieiev, supra note 1. 
45 Nabatov, "Strogo okhraniat prava grazhdan," Sots. zak. (No. 2, 1960). 
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studies and scholarly research in certain areas, which must involve 
broad ranks of the public if the new order is to function as designed. 
This is especially true in regard to the study of some basic concepts 
of criminal law: 
Can it be said that the study of criminology and of the causes of crimes 
is properly organized in our country? Unfortunately this work is still of 
departmental nature. The public, including the scientific community, 
has not been drawn into this work. True, of late the study of criminology 
has received some treatment in the general and specialized legal literature. 
Scientific and practical conferences devoted to the study of crime and 
its causes have been held in Moscow .. . . But these conferences were of 
an episodic nature and did not result in programs of systematic studies 
with the participation of the public . . .  for the purpose of eradicating 
crime in our country. Because of this, highly primitive methods of 
criminological studies and of the causes of crimes are locally em­
ployed. . . . The tasks consist in . . .  popularizing the experience in this 
matter, in working out a method of instruction . . .  and in making availa­
ble to the offices of the procuratura, of the militia, to the courts, and also 
to the social organizations, information as regards fundamental and at 
the same time totally effective methods of crime detection and preven­
tion.46 
It is easy to see that, without proper guidance and instruction 
in methods of justice, the comradely courts would reach that degree 
of simplicity and informality which characterized the courts of revo­
lutionary Russia during the chaotic years of the Civil War. 
In the beginning of 1960, the Law Institute of Sverdlovsk, with 
the approval of the Party authorities, decided to establish a univer­
sity of legal knowledge to provide a basic legal education to all those 
needing some familiarity with . the Soviet legal system. It will consist 
of three faculties. A faculty of Soviet work is intended for economic · 
and trade union officers, executive officers of Soviet institutions, 
. . .  activists of the Party, of the Communist Youth Organizations and of 
the local Soviets. Another faculty will give instruction in all those sub­
jects useful to the commanders of voluntary people's detachments, and a · 
third will cover all aspects required by the chairmen of the people's 
courts.47 
46 Gertsenson, "Ob izuchenii i preduprezhdenii prestupnosti," SGP 85 (No. 
7, 1960) .  
47 Semenov i Yakushev, Sov. iust. 14-17 (No. 4, 1960).  
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Some consolation is offered by those who insist that the transi­
tion to higher forms of social organizations will also simplify the forms 
of social action. 
According to this pattern, labor relations, affairs of the agricul­
tural collective, and business relations are governed by the general 
institutions of the proper branches of law, labor, kolkhoz, and civil. 
Individual life is increasingly coming under the rule of administrative 
law and of administrative action.48 
Irrespective of the problem of the dialectics of transition to 
higher forms of social organization, it seems that the prediction that 
greater opportunities for social action in the maintenance of public 
order will emphasize administrative rather than judicial action is well 
founded. As an arm of formal justice, social organizations represent 
an inferior and ill-equipped instrument. As instruments for social 
regimentation, they are far superior to any other form of social ac­
tion, and the enforcement of individual rights and adjudication of 
disputes will have to take second place. 
· 
Quite a different tendency may be observed in business rela­
tions. Here it has been realized that higher forms of economic organi­
zations call for individual initiative and transactional forms of eco­
nomic cooperation. 
Thus, each economic institution, which is at the same time a 
basis for the coordination of human participation in economic proc­
esses, represents a complex of relations run according to conflicting 
principles. Internal relations of the factory crews and of farming 
communities in the agricultural collectives are handled according to 
the flexible rules of administrative action. In the socialist business 
world, rights and duties are gaining expression, and their social role, 
a wider recognition. 
Max Weber observed, in connection with the social function of 
formal justice, that : 
mhe bourgeois strata have generally tended to be intensely interested in 
rational procedural systems and therefore in a systematized and unam­
biguously formal and purposefully constructed substantive law which 
eliminates both obsolete traditions and arbitrariness and in which rights 
can have their source exclusively in general objective norms.49 
48 Aleksieiev, supra note 1. 
49 Weber, On Law in Economy and Society 229 (1954).  
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It seems that the general tendency of the Soviet legal order is 
to shift the rule of law almost exclusively into the service of its 
economic operations. 
PROPERTY REGIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
The central aim of the social reforms launched by the Twenty­
first Party Congress is a higher degree of equality for all members of 
the Soviet polity. This is to be achieved through the reform of prop­
erty relations: 
The building of communism, transforming of all aspects of social and 
personal life on a higher social basis, also introduces substantial changes 
in the problem of personal property. The establishment of communism 
is the objective basis for the intensification of tendencies toward com­
plete equality on the basis of creation of an abundance of material and 
spiritual wealth. 
Socialism, Soviet scholars claim, achieved the first condition of 
human equality by monopolizing in the hands of the State the 
ownership of the means of production (socialist property) . It left 
a good deal of inequality in the category of consumer goods (per­
sonal property) .  This was due primarily to the fact that the state of 
the national economy was such that equal satisfaction of everybody's 
needs was impossible. Communism, it is argued, will remove that 
last aspect of inequality by increasing the ability of social institu­
tions to meet individual needs beyond bare existence. The increasing 
ability of social production to satisfy the needs of society is eventually 
to result in a fundamental revision of the concept of property . 
. In order to achieve this new dimension of equality, a new 
attitude and a new legal basis must be created regarding the use 
of the so-called durable consumer goods. Under socialism, those who 
earned higher incomes, owing to their contribution to social life, were 
able to acquire legally a greater share of durable consumer goods, 
private homes, cars, pleasure boats, etc. than the rest of society. This 
attitude and legal form, as expressed in personal ownership, was cor­
rect as long as these articles were in short supply. Now that their 
production is assuming mass proportions, personal ownership is no 
longer a correct solution. The ideal solution would be to establish 
a situation where the use of certain consumer goods would be made 
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available to the public without turning them into the personal prop­
erty of individuals.60 
The first hint of the new approach in this matter came from 
Khrushchev at the Twenty-first Party Congress : 
Satisfaction of individual needs of each citizen must take place in the 
measure of the growth of the material and cultural welfare of the so­
ciety. It should take place not only in the form of raising wages, but 
also through the so-called funds, the role and function of which will con­
stantly increase. 
As an illustration of what he meant in this connection, Khru­
shchev referred to the expanding production of automobiles in the 
Soviet Union, which will serve society not according to the American 
pattern but will be used to establish taxi pools. Rather than own in­
dividual cars, people will rent them as they need them.111 
In June of 1960, Pravda began to publish letters from its readers 
concerning abuses in connection with the distribution of plots from 
the so-called collective gardens, which were established on govern­
ment lands allotted to individual factories for the use of their mem­
bers. It appears that these collective gardens, divided into small plots, 
were then used by the individual workers to build small dachas. 
Furthermore, vegetables grown in these small plots were disposed 
of at a handsome profit, thus causing a good deal of jealousy and 
anguish among those who were unable to secure such plots. It also 
appears that these gardens were given to those who occupied higher 
positions in the factory's hierarchy, and generally to those who were 
able to use some influence. This again caused indignation among the 
lower ranks of Soviet sqciety. In this manner, members of the Party 
and those holding executive positions in the factories were accused 
of succumbing too easily to the lures of capitalism. Moreover, it was 
reported that in some localities (in Sverdlovsk) a real black market 
in the garden plots developed. 112 
SO Stepanyan, "Kommunizm i sobstvennost," Oktiabr (No. 9, 1960).  
51  Khrushchev, supra note 35, at 53. 
52 Pravda, June 16, July 3, August 3 1, 1960; the Decree of the Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet of the Tadzhik Republic of August 21,  1960, de­
clared punishable all concealed transfer of land allotted for construction 
of private housing, unauthorized construction of houses, and illegal ac-
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The sale of vegetables from private gardens was not the only 
form of obtaining a profit from objects which were primarily designed 
to serve the person of the owners. Owners of automobiles were paid 
for hiring them to others, or for renting their houses, dachas, and 
garages. Thus, they were turned into the private property of the 
means of production and a source of unearned income.53 
In consequence, a further restriction on the scope of objects 
capable of personal ownership became imperative. As a first step 
toward communism, it would be necessary to liquidate all those situ­
ations which represented a differentiation as to source of income in 
the Soviet society: 
The complete liquidation of private property and its anti-socialist tend­
encies is a task of the first stage of communism. . . . The existing garden 
plots and dachas personally owned by workers, employees, scientists and 
writers must be voluntarily placed under a cooperative system. The co­
operative system, as one of socialist property, strengthens the socialist 
nature of personal property and makes it possible through the . common 
efforts . . .  to stop abuses . . • .  11• 
The proposed reform of property relations will also affect the 
forms of legal relations. Legal commerce concerned with private life 
will shift from the contract of sale to contracts of lease, rent, and hire 
between individuals and social institutions controlling and adminis­
tering social funds. Such will "promote the development of new re­
lations and will lead to the liquidation of all proprietary concepts of 
'mine' and 'yours,' to be replaced by a truly communist concept that 
all this is 'ours.' " 1111 
. THE CROSSCURRENTS 
At present the growth of Soviet law and its institutions is in­
tluenced by two contlicting tendencies. In the first place, one may 
clearly discern a tendency toward expansion of the rule of law. Mter 
long years, the Soviet leadership has finally realized that continuation 
of administrative regulation of economic activity represents serious 
quisition of building materials. ·  Kommunist Tadzhikistana, Aug. 21, 
1961. 
53 Stepanyan, note SO. 
54 Ibid.; XXI. sjczd KPSS, supra note 4, at 7. 
SS Ibid. 
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drawbacks and adversely affects economic progress. While the state 
may intervene locally and adjust the flow of capital, while it may plan 
investment according to social needs, the end result in terms of the 
national product depends equally upon the individual initiative of 
those who manage production, distribute, and serve. As a result, a 
legal system combining administrative action with transactional forms 
of economic cooperation has been developed. 
This tendency favors codification as the method of social order­
ing. Business activity calls for the presence of general rules of law to 
which partners in legal commerce could readily refer without involv­
ing official action, except in the form of expert solution of their dis­
putes by the courts. 
In contrast, methods of social ordering affecting individual life 
reveal a different tendency. Here, the function of the abstract legal 
precept and of the general rule of law is on the decline. It is re­
placed by social discipline, by collective action, and by the interven­
tion of public authority. And these latter are · deeply and intimately 
concerned with all aspects of individual existence. 
Extensive reforms feature deeper involvement of social organiza­
tions and individual representatives of society in the affairs of govern­
ment. The human being is submerged in the social mass and appears 
only as a carrier of higher authority, as a representative of the people, 
as a social activist and social organizer. Social pressure and mass con­
trol become important instruments of social and even legal . reforms. 56 
The characteristic feature of social and governmental reforms 
is the transfer of vast judicial powers to social organizations which 
dispose of private litigations and minor conflicts in a nonjudicial 
manner. Legal development stresses social harmony--composition 
rather than litigation. 
To seek an analogy with these developments of the Soviet legal 
order, one must leave the world of the Western European tradition. 
56 ''The complete liquidation of private property and its antisocial tendencies 
is a task of the first stage of communism. By force of the law, which 
expressed the will of a united and monolithic Soviet people, it is neces­
sary to close all the loopholes through which private owners crawl. . . . 
Obviously, this will be done not through a legislative action, but by 
the pressure of public opinion, by mass action." Stepanyan, supra 
note 50. 
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As one of the keen observers of the rule of law in Chinese civilization 
stated: 
The peoples of Western civilization have all lived under the Graeco­
Roman conception of law. In the West the law has always been revered 
as something more or less sacrosanct, the queen of gods and men, im­
posing itself on everyone like a categorical imperative, defining and 
regulating, in an abstract way, the effects and conditions of all forms 
of social activity. In the West there have been tribunals, the role of 
which has not only been to apply the law, but often to interpret it in 
the light of debates where all contradictory interests are represented and 
defended . . . .  But as one passes to the East, this picture fades away. At 
the other end of Asia, China has felt able to give to law and jurisprudence 
but an inferior place in that powerful body of spiritual and moral values 
which she created and for so long diffused over so many neighboring 
cultures . . .  ,liT 
In this conception there is no place for law in the Latin sense of the 
term. Not even rights of individuals are guaranteed by law. There are 
only duties and mutual compromises governed by the ideas of order, 
responsibility, hierarchy, and harmony . . . .  The supreme idea of the 
Chun-tzu is to demonstrate in all circumstances a just measure, a ritual 
of moderation; as is shown in the Chinese taste for arbitration and re­
ciprocal concessions. To take advantage of one's position, to invoke one's 
rights, has always been looked at askance in China.11s 
It is a moot question whether modem tendencies in the develop­
ment of the Soviet legal order are due to the national characteristics 
of the peoples of Russia, the absence of a legal tradition in the Rus­
sian culture, or to its transitional character as a bridge between the 
East and the West. Nor is it important to establish the relationship 
between Soviet policies and the political doctrines of Marxism.59 
Social and legal reforms which followed the demise of Stalin were a 
response to the needs of the Soviet economy. Further progress was 
57 Escarra, Le droit chinois 3 ( 1936) .  
58 /d. at 17; "Lao Tzu advocated a government of men who might possess 
all powers but would not use them. This idea of government of men 
was fully developed by Confucius . . . .  " Tseng Yu-Hao, Modem Chinese 
Legal and Political Philosophy 8-9 ( 1930) ; cf; van der Valk, An Out­
line of Modem Chinese Family Law 10, 12 ( 1939) ;  1 Wigmore, 
Panorama of the World's Legal Systems, ch. 4 (1928) ;  Hu Shi, The 
Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China (1922 ) ;  Wu, 
The Art of Law (1936) . 
59 Cf. Guins, Soviet Law and Soviet Society 382 (1954). 
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predicated by greater opportunity for business initiative and a further 
strengthening of the discipline of labor. 
There is no doubt that Soviet leadership was convinced that 
Soviet workers would be capable of greater effort if social discipline 
would also involve the Soviet citizens' life outside the boundaries of 
the institution in which he works. Constant concern with the dis­
organizing effect of industrial economy and the urban conditions of 
life suggests that they are considered a serious obstacle in economic 
progress. The model law on Raising the Role of Society in the Strug­
gle with the Violations of Soviet Legality and Rules of Socialist Co­
existence points out that: 
Soviet citizens devotedly work on all sectors of communist construc­
tion, honorably discharge their social duties, abide by Soviet statutes 
and respect the rules of socialist coexistence. At the same time there 
are still among us people who live an undignified life, commit crimes and 
other antisocial offenses. By their doings they make it impossible for 
Soviet people to live quietly and to work, and they harm society.60 
A proper style of life corresponding to the dignity of the Soviet 
man-stressing the duty to work-will result in great economies both 
in terms of costs of maintaining social discipline and order and greater 
discipline of labor. 
The need for greater social discipline in modern mass society 
is not less keenly felt in open societies. The Western response was a 
system of rules and social organizations which emphasized the ac­
commodation of conflicting situations, individual rights, collective ac­
tion, administrative intervention of public authority, and economic 
initiative within a framework of abstract legal institutions and ju­
dicial controls. The polycentric social mechanism of the Western 
type provided room for individual existence. A process of delegation 
of power in the Soviet social order brought an even tighter control 
of individual life. In the Soviet system, it is exposed to several tyr­
annies, which are petty and local but nonetheless erosive to human 
dignity. 
60 Izvestia, Oct. 23, 1959. 
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